FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited [2020] FCA 400
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited [2019] FCA 2124; and Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 3 File numbers: SAD 7 of 2020
SAD 16 of 2020Judge: WHITE J Date of judgment: 26 March 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications for leave to appeal against interlocutory judgments of a Judge of this Court – s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – primary Judge dismissed interlocutory application of the Applicant seeking summary dismissal of a cross‑claim brought by the Respondent – primary Judge dismissed interlocutory application for joinder – whether there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary Judge’s decisions – whether substantial injustice to Applicant if leave refused – leave to appeal refused on both applications. Legislation: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 35, 41
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 31A
National Credit Code s 101
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.05
Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170
Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2018] FCA 563
Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30
Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs. apptd) [2011] FCAFC 117
Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation [2018] FCAFC 54
Review Australia Pty Ltd v Redberry Enterprise Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1009; (2003) 58 IPR 366
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCAFC 125; (2005) 144 FCR 379
Date of hearing: 13 March 2020 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr BC Roberts QC Solicitor for the Respondent: Thomson Geer ORDERS
SAD 7 of 2020 BETWEEN: SAMMAR B MANDHAN
Applicant
AND: TOYOTA FINANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ABN 48 002 435 181
Respondent
JUDGE:
WHITE J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application for Leave to Appeal filed on 15 January 2020 against the interlocutory judgment delivered on 18 December 2019 is refused.
2.The Applicant is to pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
SAD 16 of 2020 BETWEEN: SAMMAR B MANDHAN
Applicant
AND: TOYOTA FINANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ABN 48 002 435 181
Respondent
JUDGE:
WHITE J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application for Leave to…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 400
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether there was sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary Judge's decisions and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal was refused. The court considered these issues based on the principles that appeals from interlocutory decisions should not lightly be entertained and that appellate courts exercise restraint in interfering with judgments concerning practice or procedure. The court also noted that factual issues should be resolved at trial, not through interlocutory applications.
The court found that Mr Mandhan's application for leave to appeal was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court. The court emphasized that the factual issues he wished to agitate were matters for evidence to be presented at trial, and the primary Judge's conclusion that those issues should be determined at trial was orthodox. Additionally, the court noted that the trial was scheduled for a short time after the application for leave to appeal, mitigating any potential burden on Mr Mandhan. Consequently, the court refused Mr Mandhan's application for leave to appeal against both the interlocutory judgment and the judgment delivered on 18 December 2019. The court also ordered that Mr Mandhan pay the costs of the application.
This decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural norms in interlocutory applications and the reluctance of courts to entertain appeals from interlocutory decisions, particularly when the issues can be appropriately resolved at trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Application for Leave to Appeal filed on 3 February 2020 against the interlocutory judgment delivered on 7 January 2020 is refused.
2. The Applicant is to pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, on an application of the present kind, the Court considers whether the decision sought to be impugned on appeal is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by the Full Court and whether substantial injustice would result if such leave is refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCAFC 125, (2005) 144 FCR 379 at [5]; and Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111 at [20].Consideration of the application for leave filed on 15 January 2020 The principal matter advanced by Mr Mandhan in support of his application for leave to appeal with respect to the Judge’s refusal to order summary dismissal of the cross‑claim of Toyota Finance was his assertion that Toyota Finance had not provided any, or sufficient, evidence of its contentions concerning the factual matters on which the Judge’s decision rested. Mr Mandhan’s submissions made it evident that he wishes to agitate on an appeal factual issues bearing on the adequacy and appropriateness of the use by Toyota Finance of the HEM in its assessment of his loan application and bearing on the question of whether Toyota Finance had agreed to forbear from enforcing its entitlement. Mr Mandhan also submitted that it would be burdensome for him to have to go to trial on the issues raised by the cross‑claim, and that that had made it appropriate for the Judge to deal with the disputed issues in the course of the summary judgment application. Section 31A of the FCA Act provides the framework in which an appeal would be considered, if leave is granted. As already noted, it provides (relevantly) that the Court may summarily dismiss a claim of a party if satisfied that the party has “no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting” it. In my view, a grant of leave to appeal with respect to this aspect of the Judge’s decision would not be appropriate. First, the factual issue which Mr Mandhan wishes to agitate is a matter for evidence, with the assessment of the evidence being properly carried out at the trial. That is when both Toyota Finance and Mr Mandhan can be expected to adduce that evidence. The Judge’s conclusion that that was so was orthodox and is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant consideration by the Full Court. Further, and in any event, the trial in the underlying action is currently listed for hearing in a little over a month’s time, on 14 April 2020, on a two day estimate. Mr Mandhan acknowledged that at the trial he will give evidence himself and adduce evidence in support of his wife in support of his own claim. That means that both will be giving evidence in any event. Mr Mandhan also acknowledged that the evidence he would lead at trial in relation to the cross‑claim of Toyota Finance will also come from himself and his wife. This militates against the acceptance of Mr Mandhan’s submission that it will be burdensome for him to have to deal with the cross‑claim at trial. True it is that Mr Mandhan will have to deal with the evidence which Toyota Finance leads on the forbearance issue, but it not easy to see that that can appropriately be characterised as “burdensome”.