Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited [2020] FCA 400

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited [2019] FCA 2124; and Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 3
File numbers: SAD 7 of 2020
SAD 16 of 2020
Judge: WHITE J
Date of judgment: 26 March 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications for leave to appeal against interlocutory judgments of a Judge of this Court – s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – primary Judge dismissed interlocutory application of the Applicant seeking summary dismissal of a cross‑claim brought by the Respondent – primary Judge dismissed interlocutory application for joinder – whether there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary Judge’s decisions – whether substantial injustice to Applicant if leave refused – leave to appeal refused on both applications.
Legislation:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 35, 41

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 31A

National Credit Code s 101

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.05

Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170

Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2018] FCA 563

Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30

Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs. apptd) [2011] FCAFC 117

Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation [2018] FCAFC 54

Review Australia Pty Ltd v Redberry Enterprise Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1009; (2003) 58 IPR 366

Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCAFC 125; (2005) 144 FCR 379

Date of hearing: 13 March 2020
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr BC Roberts QC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Thomson Geer

ORDERS

SAD 7 of 2020
BETWEEN:

SAMMAR B MANDHAN

Applicant

AND:

TOYOTA FINANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ABN 48 002 435 181

Respondent

JUDGE:

WHITE J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application for Leave to Appeal filed on 15 January 2020 against the interlocutory judgment delivered on 18 December 2019 is refused.

2.The Applicant is to pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


ORDERS

SAD 16 of 2020
BETWEEN:

SAMMAR B MANDHAN

Applicant

AND:

TOYOTA FINANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ABN 48 002 435 181

Respondent

JUDGE:

WHITE J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application for Leave to…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 400
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mandhan v Toyota Finance Australia Limited involves a dispute between Mr Mandhan and Toyota Finance Australia Limited, primarily concerning Mr Mandhan's allegations of fraud against Toyota Finance regarding his loan application. Mr Mandhan initiated the underlying proceedings, alleging that Toyota Finance manipulated documents to fraudulently approve his loan application, which should have been refused. Toyota Finance filed a cross-claim seeking payment of outstanding amounts and enforcement of the loan contract. Mr Mandhan subsequently filed interlocutory applications seeking summary dismissal of the cross-claim and other relief, which were dismissed by the primary Judge.

The legal issues before the court were whether there was sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary Judge's decisions and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal was refused. The court considered these issues based on the principles that appeals from interlocutory decisions should not lightly be entertained and that appellate courts exercise restraint in interfering with judgments concerning practice or procedure. The court also noted that factual issues should be resolved at trial, not through interlocutory applications.

The court found that Mr Mandhan's application for leave to appeal was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court. The court emphasized that the factual issues he wished to agitate were matters for evidence to be presented at trial, and the primary Judge's conclusion that those issues should be determined at trial was orthodox. Additionally, the court noted that the trial was scheduled for a short time after the application for leave to appeal, mitigating any potential burden on Mr Mandhan. Consequently, the court refused Mr Mandhan's application for leave to appeal against both the interlocutory judgment and the judgment delivered on 18 December 2019. The court also ordered that Mr Mandhan pay the costs of the application.

This decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural norms in interlocutory applications and the reluctance of courts to entertain appeals from interlocutory decisions, particularly when the issues can be appropriately resolved at trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Application for Leave to Appeal filed on 3 February 2020 against the interlocutory judgment delivered on 7 January 2020 is refused.

2. The Applicant is to pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Mandhan now seeks leave, pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act), to appeal against both judgments. As the application with respect to the judgment delivered on 7 January 2020 should have been filed by no later than 28 January 2020, Mr Mandhan also seeks an extension of time to bring that application.Background Mr Mandham commenced the underlying proceedings on 16 October 2018 as a self‑represented litigant and has represented himself ever since. His articulation of his claims suffers from some shortcomings and, as the Judge noted, it is not always easy to discern precisely what it is that Mr Mandhan is alleging or claiming. However, in the underlying proceedings, Mr Mandhan appears to allege that agents of Toyota Finance fraudulently manipulated documents so that his loan application of 27 May 2016 to purchase a vehicle from Peter Kittle Toyota was approved when it should have been refused. In particular, Mr Mandhan seems to contend that details of his personal circumstances and his expenses were either misrepresented or not taken into account in the loan application, and that he had been misinformed about the availability of finance protection insurance. Mr Mandhan claims relief by way of damages and, possibly, other pecuniary orders. Mr Mandhan’s allegations are denied by Toyota Finance. On 8 May 2019, Toyota Finance filed a cross-claim seeking an order that Mr Mandhan pay the sum of $26,609.01 in addition to enforcement expenses and additional interest pursuant to the loan contract; an order under s 101 of the National Credit Code that Mr Mandhan deliver the vehicle identified in the loan contract to Toyota Finance; and an order that Toyota Finance or its agent be authorised to enter the residential premises of Mr Mandhan or any other location at which the vehicle is reasonably believed to be located for the purpose of taking possession of it, in the event that the vehicle is not delivered to Toyota Finance within 10 days. In seeking these orders, Toyota Finance alleges that Mr Mandhan has been in default since 11 September 2018 in his obligations under the loan agreement into which he entered on 27 May 2016 (as varied in April 2018) by failing to pay the required monthly instalments. It alleges that Mr Mandhan had not remedied his default after being served with a Notice of Default in early April 2019. Mr Mandhan contends that Toyota Finance is not entitled to bring this cross‑claim because it had agreed to forebear from enforcing its loan contract. On 11 July 2019, Mr Mandhan filed an interlocutory application seeking (relevantly) the following orders (expressed verbatim):1.Applicant/Cross-Respondent is seeking summary dismissal in relation to the cross claim lodged by respondent/cross‑claimant via its legal counsellor Thomsan Geer which the applicant/Cross-Respondent is standing to prove with evidence that the cross-claim is started for wrongful purpose and is an abuse of process on the basis;i.Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Finance and Peter Kittle Toyota with agreement is a party to direct and procure the commission of wrongful act by fraudulently misrepresenting applicant’s provided information to deliberately cause damage to the applicant and made the applicant a financial debtor by deception by refraining itself from reasonably inquire and verify the important qualifying element of the fact, which was deliberately overridden, so as the credit applied can be approved.ii.Section 125 of the evidence act 1995, were evidence is adduced of the action of respondent and its legal counsellor in relation to furtherance of commission of fraud that renders a person to a civil penalty, then the client legal privilege stand lost.Section 57 of the evidence act 1995, were the determination of common purpose (whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy) by client and its lawyer may be used by the Honourable Federal Court in determining whether the common purpose existed.2. …2.1Leave to addition names for cross examination at the time of trial From Thomsan Geer Michael O'Donnell and Viki SandersonFrom TFAL anyone who has particular knowledge about the application and approval process of a credit applicationFrom TFAL or PKT or from Toyota Motor Corporation anyone who has particular knowledge to provide clarity about interlinked relationship between TFAL, Toyota Motor and Peter Kittle Toyota3.Additionally requesting the Honourable federal Court to examine to confirm s35 of the crimes act 1914 false testimony by TFAL, PKT and Thomsan Geer to conspire to bring false accusation on the applicant by breaching s41 to defeat justice breach of s42 of Crimes Act-1914.Requesting the Honourable Federal Court to make the proposed summary disposal of cross claim by the respondent through its lawyer Thomsan Geer based on the finding and establishing of existence of fraud and conspiracy from the start of Credit Application submitted by the applicant to furtherance of commission of fraud by Thomsan Geer for its client via cross-claim. Once stands proven with relevant evidence beyond any reasonable doubt. (Emphasis in the original)The decision of the primary Judge on the interlocutory application of 11 July 2019

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

With respect to the claim in [3] of the interlocutory application, the Judge said:[13]Mr Mandhan did not say a great deal in support of this “order”. He suggested that there was a fundamental inconsistency between his account and the account of the witnesses put forward by Toyota Finance. He contends that one of the parties is lying. If it is the witnesses to be called by Toyota Finance, then there should be, as Mr Mandhan put it, “repercussions”. It is not appropriate to make any orders in terms of the “order” sought in paragraph 3. It is not for Mr Mandhan to bring proceedings under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). If there are any consequences of the type identified in paragraph 3 of the Interlocutory application, they will follow from whatever findings I make in this proceeding.The application for leave to appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2019 Mr Mandhan’s application seeking leave to appeal contains three grounds (quoted verbatim):1.In relation to the Summary Dismissal of the Cross-Claim by the respondent along with enforcement action. Respondent did not provided any evidence differentiating exemption granted to applicant from making regular payment to enforcement action taken to recover the regular payment for the period applicant received the exemption.2.In refusing to allow charges made under Crimes Act – 1914 against the respondent the Honourable Court in my belief abstained from considering the fact with evidence mentioned in the interlocutory application with affidavit. 3.Applicant request to reverse the cost of and incidental allowed to the respondent in relation to the interlocutory application due to the financial condition of the applicant and also due to the above grounds mentioned in the leave to appeal. Mr Mandhan’s draft notice of appeal accompanying the application contains three groups of grounds, the first two of which concern the Judge’s dismissal of the summary judgment application. The third group (comprising eight grounds) concerns the Judge’s refusal to make orders with respect to his allegations concerning ss 35 and 41 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Mr Mandhan’s draft notice of appeal refers to additional provisions in the Crimes Act.Principles and approach The requirement for a party to obtain the leave of the Court in order to appeal against an interlocutory decision is based on the underlying principle that the time and resources of the Court and of the parties should not lightly be taken up with appeals about decisions in connection with the proceedings which do not finally determine the rights of the parties: Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1572, (2000) 104 FCR 564 at [42]; Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs. apptd) [2011] FCAFC 117 at [8]; and Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2018] FCA 563 at [13]. Moreover, appellate courts exercise restraint before interfering with judgments concerning practice or procedure: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39, (1981) 148 CLR 170; Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation [2018] FCAFC 54 at [23]‑[24]; and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [36].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, on an application of the present kind, the Court considers whether the decision sought to be impugned on appeal is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by the Full Court and whether substantial injustice would result if such leave is refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCAFC 125, (2005) 144 FCR 379 at [5]; and Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111 at [20].Consideration of the application for leave filed on 15 January 2020 The principal matter advanced by Mr Mandhan in support of his application for leave to appeal with respect to the Judge’s refusal to order summary dismissal of the cross‑claim of Toyota Finance was his assertion that Toyota Finance had not provided any, or sufficient, evidence of its contentions concerning the factual matters on which the Judge’s decision rested. Mr Mandhan’s submissions made it evident that he wishes to agitate on an appeal factual issues bearing on the adequacy and appropriateness of the use by Toyota Finance of the HEM in its assessment of his loan application and bearing on the question of whether Toyota Finance had agreed to forbear from enforcing its entitlement. Mr Mandhan also submitted that it would be burdensome for him to have to go to trial on the issues raised by the cross‑claim, and that that had made it appropriate for the Judge to deal with the disputed issues in the course of the summary judgment application. Section 31A of the FCA Act provides the framework in which an appeal would be considered, if leave is granted. As already noted, it provides (relevantly) that the Court may summarily dismiss a claim of a party if satisfied that the party has “no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting” it. In my view, a grant of leave to appeal with respect to this aspect of the Judge’s decision would not be appropriate. First, the factual issue which Mr Mandhan wishes to agitate is a matter for evidence, with the assessment of the evidence being properly carried out at the trial. That is when both Toyota Finance and Mr Mandhan can be expected to adduce that evidence. The Judge’s conclusion that that was so was orthodox and is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant consideration by the Full Court. Further, and in any event, the trial in the underlying action is currently listed for hearing in a little over a month’s time, on 14 April 2020, on a two day estimate. Mr Mandhan acknowledged that at the trial he will give evidence himself and adduce evidence in support of his wife in support of his own claim. That means that both will be giving evidence in any event. Mr Mandhan also acknowledged that the evidence he would lead at trial in relation to the cross‑claim of Toyota Finance will also come from himself and his wife. This militates against the acceptance of Mr Mandhan’s submission that it will be burdensome for him to have to deal with the cross‑claim at trial. True it is that Mr Mandhan will have to deal with the evidence which Toyota Finance leads on the forbearance issue, but it not easy to see that that can appropriately be characterised as “burdensome”.