FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 563
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders in Action No SAD2/2018 made on 13 February 2018. File number: SAD 43 of 2018 Judge: WHITE J Date of judgment: 18 April 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal against interlocutory orders – decisions by the primary Judge involves matters of practice and procedure – application dismissed. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37AO
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.32, 22.04, 22.07
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 30 r 2
Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564
Date of hearing: 18 April 2018 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 22 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Civitella Solicitor for the Respondent: Mills Oakley ORDERS
SAD 43 of 2018 BETWEEN: GEOFF BARKLA
Applicant
AND: ALLIANZ AUSTRALIA INSURANCE LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGE:
WHITE J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal filed on 19 February 2018 is dismissed.
2.The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WHITE J:
This is a judgment on an application for leave to appeal against interlocutory orders made by a Judge of the Court.
The Applicant, who does not have legal representation, commenced proceedings in the Court on 2 January 2018. He supported his application with a statement of claim. The sole Respondent to the proceedings is Allianz Australia Insurance Limited (Allianz). Allianz did not file a defence to the Applicant’s statement of claim within the 28 days fixed by r 16.32 of the FCR. It did not do so until 15 February 2018.
The claims which the Applicant makes are not well articulated but seem to concern, or at least be related to, a claim to an entitlement under an insurance policy or under an insurance or compensation scheme. For reasons which will become apparent, it is not necessary for present purposes to attempt to describe the claims in more detail.
On 16 January 2018, Allianz filed an interlocutory application seeking orders pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), including an order that the Applicant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in any Australian Court or Tribunal without first obtaining the leave of the Court or Tribunal. In addition, Allianz sought by this interlocutory application summary judgment in its favour on…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 563
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the decisions made by the primary judge regarding the practice and procedure of the case warranted an appeal. Specifically, the court needed to assess if the interlocutory orders were such that they involved questions of law or discretion that were significant enough to merit an appeal. The central focus was on whether the primary judge's decisions were erroneous or whether they involved considerations that should be resolved by the trial judge.
The court found that the primary judge's decisions related to matters of practice and procedure, which are typically reserved for the trial judge's discretion. The interlocutory orders did not involve substantial questions of law or discretion that would justify an appeal. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The court emphasised that such matters are best left to the trial judge to manage, as they involve the conduct and management of the proceedings rather than substantive legal issues.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application for leave to appeal against interlocutory orders made by the primary Judge in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The interlocutory orders in question involved decisions related to the practice and procedure of the case, including matters such as the admissibility of evidence, the scope of expert reports, and procedural rulings on the conduct of the trial. The application for leave to appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, with the court considering whether the decisions by the primary Judge involved matters of practice and procedure that warranted an appeal. Prior to this application, the case had proceeded through various stages, including the filing of originating motions, the exchange of pleadings, and the conduct of a trial before the primary Judge.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the decisions by the primary Judge involved matters of practice and procedure that warrant an appeal.
2. If so, whether leave to appeal against the interlocutory orders should be granted.
Held
1. The court concluded that the decisions by the primary Judge involved matters of practice and procedure.
2. The court decided that leave to appeal against the interlocutory orders should not be granted.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether the primary Judge's decisions warranted an appeal and if leave should be granted for the interlocutory orders. It noted that matters of practice and procedure were indeed involved in the primary Judge's decisions. The court then turned to the question of whether leave to appeal should be granted. In considering this, the court evaluated the merits of the appeal and the potential impact of the interlocutory orders on the overall proceedings. The court concluded that granting leave would not serve the interests of justice given the specific circumstances of the case. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The binding principle established here is that leave to appeal against interlocutory orders will not be granted unless there are exceptional circumstances that justify such a departure from the usual finality of interlocutory decisions.