Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation

[2018] FCAFC 54

Appeal from:

Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 1128

Rahman v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Australian Taxation Office [2017] FCA 1129

File numbers: NSD 1768 of 2017
NSD 1769 of 2017
Judges: RARES, LOGAN AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
Date of judgment: 6 March 2018
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application to reopen case after judgment reserved – consideration of overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure principles in Pt VB of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – held no error demonstrated in primary judge’s reasons – no exceptional circumstances or serious injustice demonstrated – no acceptable explanation for failure to raise arguments at the hearing

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether primary judge erred in dismissing applications for judicial review of both decision of Deputy President and decision of Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission to refuse permission to appeal under ss 400(2) and 604(2) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether Full Bench or Deputy President’s reasons disclosed failure to consider applicant’s submission on particular issue – held no jurisdictional error in Full Bench or Deputy President’s reasons

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application for an extension of time to file application seeking relief under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 11 or Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B – where primary judge found no merit in proposed case and no acceptable explanation for delay and availability of and use of alternative avenues of review by applicant – held no error demonstrated in primary judge’s reasons

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 11, 16

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 385, 387, 390, 400, 570, 604

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, s 37M

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Public Service Regulations 1999 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Limited v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135

Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Limited (2013) 250 CLR 303

Gregory v Qantas Airways Ltd (2016) 241 FCR 72

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361

Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411

Rahman v Australian Taxation Office [2016] FWCFB 7677

Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 988

Rahman v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Australian Taxation Office [2016] FWC 4575

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609

Date of hearing: 6 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 62
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Rogers
Solicitor for the…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation, the appellant, Mr Rahman, sought to appeal against several decisions made by the Commissioner of Taxation and the Fair Work Commission. The primary judge dismissed Mr Rahman’s challenges and his application to reopen the case after judgment was reserved, as well as his applications for judicial review and an extension of time to file an application seeking relief. Mr Rahman appealed against these decisions, contending that the primary judge had erred in dismissing his applications and that the primary judge had failed to consider his submissions on particular issues.

The court considered the legal issues regarding the primary judge’s decisions and the principles of practice and procedure applicable to such matters. It noted that the decision to permit a party to reopen a case after judgment had been reserved raised a question of practice and procedure, and that appellate courts exercise caution in reviewing such decisions. The court found that the primary judge had not demonstrated any error in his reasons for dismissing Mr Rahman’s applications, and that there were no exceptional circumstances or serious injustice to warrant a reopening of the case. The court also held that there was no jurisdictional error in the Full Bench or Deputy President’s reasons, and that the primary judge had not erred in dismissing Mr Rahman’s application for an extension of time.

The court dismissed Mr Rahman’s appeal, finding no merit in his arguments and that the primary judge’s decisions were in accordance with the principles of practice and procedure. It set aside the order for costs made in favour of Mr Rahman and ordered that he pay the Commissioner’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application filed on 13 April 2017.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. Order 3 made on 22 September 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application filed 13 April 2017.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For these reasons, the Fair Work proceeding appeal must be dismissed, but the order for costs below should be varied as we have indicated at [19] above. The disciplinary proceeding appeal – background The second appeal is concerned with the primary judge’s dismissal of Mr Rahman’s challenges to eight decisions that the ATO had made in the course of events leading up to his termination. The first two decisions occurred in late 2009 (the 2009 decisions) and concerned allegations about the appellant’s behaviour at a meeting with another ATO employee in November 2008. The third, fourth and fifth decisions (the 2013 decisions) concerned allegations connected to a direction that the ATO had given Mr Rahman on 2 May 2011, under the Public Service Regulations 1999 (Cth) made pursuant to the Public Service Act, that he participate in a medical examination with a psychiatrist on a particular date. The last three decisions (the 2015 decisions) concerned Mr Rahman’s suspension and its continuation in 2015 during the investigation that ultimately led to the termination of his employment, the subject of the Fair Work proceeding appeal. Mr Rahman commenced the disciplinary proceeding in 2015. On 29 August 2016, he filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to amend his originating application and statement of claim, and an extension of time to file so much of the proposed amendment to his originating application as sought judicial review under the ADJR Act, as necessitated by s 11(1)(c) of that Act. The Commissioner was the sole respondent to the disciplinary proceeding. The Commissioner objected to leave to amend being granted because, first, Mr Rahman had given no acceptable explanation for his delay in seeking judicial review of the eight decisions, secondly, Mr Rahman had taken other action to challenge each of those decisions, either directly or indirectly, thirdly, the Commissioner would be prejudiced in defending each decision by reason of the delay, notwithstanding that each decision was in writing, fourthly, the case that Mr Rahman sought to advance had been overtaken by the subsequent termination of his employment on 2 September 2015, and, last, the proposed amendments lacked any substantial merit. His Honour considered those arguments. He found that, there was ample evidence before him on which the decision-maker for each of the 2009 decisions was entitled to conclude, that Mr Rahman’s behaviour during the relevant meeting had not been respectful or courteous, and that he had been given ample opportunity to respond to the evidence on which those conclusions had been based. Accordingly, his Honour found that there was no merit in the challenge to the 2009 decisions. Next, his Honour dealt with the challenges to the 2013 decisions that concerned Mr Rahman’s explanations for his failure or refusal to participate in the medical examination by the psychiatrist. On 27 May 2011, the Commissioner had issued Mr Rahman with a notice of suspected breach of the APS Code of Conduct in respect of his failure or refusal to participate in the medical examination. Apparently there was some considerable delay in determining that allegation and it was only on 20 May 2013 that the decision-maker made the 2013 decisions to the effect that he had committed three breaches of the APS Code of Conduct.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 5 April 2017, on the afternoon after his Honour had reserved judgment, Mr Rahman had sent an email to his Honour’s chambers directly seeking in effect to reopen.The Fair Work proceeding appeal – the primary judge’s decision The primary judge found, and this is not challenged on appeal, that the claim as reformulated by Mr Rahman’s pro bono counsel should fail, and therefore the originating application ought be dismissed, subject to the fate of the application to reopen. His Honour adverted to the appellant’s affidavit of 13 April 2017 and written submissions made by counsel who now appears for him (who also had appeared in both proceedings before the Commission) in support of the application to reopen. His Honour noted that the new case was that the Full Bench effectively determined the appeal, rather than decide whether Mr Rahman should have permission to appeal, thus denying him procedural fairness, and it failed to exercise its jurisdiction in determining that there was no appealable error in the decision of the Deputy President. His Honour accepted the Commonwealth’s submission that leave to reopen ought not be granted. He referred to the fact that the arguments which the appellant sought to run on the reopening had been abandoned prior to the hearing by his then pro bono counsel, and that the appellant knew of this throughout the period between 28 March 2017 and the conclusion of the hearing on 5 April 2017. As his Honour said, notwithstanding that knowledge, Mr Rahman gave no evidence about what, if anything, he had sought to do in that one week period before the hearing, to ensure that his pro bono counsel ran the arguments contained in his abandoned statement of claim. His Honour found that the pro bono counsel was competent and experienced, and that, having regard to s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), there were no exceptional circumstances, such as would justify the Court exercising its power to permit a reopening after judgment had been reserved. The primary judge found that there was no proper reason to depart from the principle that a party to litigation should be bound by the conduct of his or her legal representatives, and, also:perhaps more importantly in this case, the additional grounds and arguments sought to be advanced have not been shown to be other than utterly devoid of merit. His Honour accepted that the Full Bench may have delved into the merits to the extent necessary to determine whether permission to appeal should have been granted, but that, on a fair reading of both the decisions of the Deputy President and the Full Bench, Mr Rahman’s asserted errors of fact were baseless. His Honour also noted, for completeness, that the case advanced on Mr Rahman’s behalf at the hearing was the best available to him, and that the fact that it had failed did not suggest that it had not been competently argued. Rather, as his Honour said, the case itself was flawed. For those reasons, he refused leave to reopen and dismissed the Fair Work proceeding with costs.The costs order in the Fair Work proceeding appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the appellant argued that his Honour erred in finding that there was no merit at all in any of his arguments. That was because he contended that the Deputy President failed properly to consider the condonation point. He argued that there would be substantial injustice to him if leave to reopen were not granted and that his Honour ought to have granted that leave as well as the amendment, with the consequence that, in substance, his application for judicial review ought to have succeeded.The Fair Work proceeding appeal – consideration A decision to permit a party to reopen his, her or its case after judgment has been reserved raises a question of practice and procedure. In essence, his Honour’s decision to refuse to allow a reopening was a matter that falls to be considered on appeal, having regard to principles identified by Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ in Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Limited v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177, where they held that:appellate courts exercise particular caution in reviewing decisions pertaining to practice and procedure. Counsel for Brown urged that specific cumulative bars operate to guide appellate courts in the discharge of that task. Not only must there be error of principle, but the decision appealed from must work a substantial injustice to one of the parties. The opposing view is that such criteria are to be expressed disjunctively. Cases can be cited in support of both views: for example, on the one hand, Niemann v. Electronic Industries Ltd. [1978] V.R. 431 at 440]; on the other hand, De Mestre v. A. D. Hunter Pty. Ltd. [(1952) 77 W.N. (N.S.W.) 143 at 146]. For ourselves, we believe it to be unnecessary and indeed unwise to lay down rigid and exhaustive criteria. The circumstances of different cases are infinitely various. We would merely repeat, with approval, the oft-cited statement of Sir Frederick Jordan in In re the Will of F. B. Gilbert (dec.) [(1946) 46 S.R. (N.S.W.) 318 at 323]:… I am of opinion that, … there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal. As their Honours observed (148 CLR at 177):It is safe to say that the question of injustice flowing from the order appealed from will generally be a relevant and necessary consideration. Moreover, the primary judge recognised that he was required to consider the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions in s 37M of the Federal Court Act.