FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation
[2018] FCAFC 54
Appeal from: Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 1128
Rahman v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Australian Taxation Office [2017] FCA 1129
File numbers: NSD 1768 of 2017
NSD 1769 of 2017Judges: RARES, LOGAN AND CHARLESWORTH JJ Date of judgment: 6 March 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application to reopen case after judgment reserved – consideration of overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure principles in Pt VB of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – held no error demonstrated in primary judge’s reasons – no exceptional circumstances or serious injustice demonstrated – no acceptable explanation for failure to raise arguments at the hearing
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether primary judge erred in dismissing applications for judicial review of both decision of Deputy President and decision of Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission to refuse permission to appeal under ss 400(2) and 604(2) of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether Full Bench or Deputy President’s reasons disclosed failure to consider applicant’s submission on particular issue – held no jurisdictional error in Full Bench or Deputy President’s reasons
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application for an extension of time to file application seeking relief under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 11 or Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B – where primary judge found no merit in proposed case and no acceptable explanation for delay and availability of and use of alternative avenues of review by applicant – held no error demonstrated in primary judge’s reasons
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 11, 16
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 385, 387, 390, 400, 570, 604
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, s 37M
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Public Service Regulations 1999 (Cth)
Cases cited: Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Limited v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
Gregory v Qantas Airways Ltd (2016) 241 FCR 72
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361
Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411
Rahman v Australian Taxation Office [2016] FWCFB 7677
Rahman v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 988
Rahman v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Australian Taxation Office [2016] FWC 4575
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
Date of hearing: 6 March 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 62 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Rogers Solicitor for the…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 54
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal issues regarding the primary judge’s decisions and the principles of practice and procedure applicable to such matters. It noted that the decision to permit a party to reopen a case after judgment had been reserved raised a question of practice and procedure, and that appellate courts exercise caution in reviewing such decisions. The court found that the primary judge had not demonstrated any error in his reasons for dismissing Mr Rahman’s applications, and that there were no exceptional circumstances or serious injustice to warrant a reopening of the case. The court also held that there was no jurisdictional error in the Full Bench or Deputy President’s reasons, and that the primary judge had not erred in dismissing Mr Rahman’s application for an extension of time.
The court dismissed Mr Rahman’s appeal, finding no merit in his arguments and that the primary judge’s decisions were in accordance with the principles of practice and procedure. It set aside the order for costs made in favour of Mr Rahman and ordered that he pay the Commissioner’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application filed on 13 April 2017.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. Order 3 made on 22 September 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application filed 13 April 2017.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the appellant argued that his Honour erred in finding that there was no merit at all in any of his arguments. That was because he contended that the Deputy President failed properly to consider the condonation point. He argued that there would be substantial injustice to him if leave to reopen were not granted and that his Honour ought to have granted that leave as well as the amendment, with the consequence that, in substance, his application for judicial review ought to have succeeded.The Fair Work proceeding appeal – consideration A decision to permit a party to reopen his, her or its case after judgment has been reserved raises a question of practice and procedure. In essence, his Honour’s decision to refuse to allow a reopening was a matter that falls to be considered on appeal, having regard to principles identified by Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ in Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Limited v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177, where they held that:appellate courts exercise particular caution in reviewing decisions pertaining to practice and procedure. Counsel for Brown urged that specific cumulative bars operate to guide appellate courts in the discharge of that task. Not only must there be error of principle, but the decision appealed from must work a substantial injustice to one of the parties. The opposing view is that such criteria are to be expressed disjunctively. Cases can be cited in support of both views: for example, on the one hand, Niemann v. Electronic Industries Ltd. [1978] V.R. 431 at 440]; on the other hand, De Mestre v. A. D. Hunter Pty. Ltd. [(1952) 77 W.N. (N.S.W.) 143 at 146]. For ourselves, we believe it to be unnecessary and indeed unwise to lay down rigid and exhaustive criteria. The circumstances of different cases are infinitely various. We would merely repeat, with approval, the oft-cited statement of Sir Frederick Jordan in In re the Will of F. B. Gilbert (dec.) [(1946) 46 S.R. (N.S.W.) 318 at 323]:… I am of opinion that, … there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal. As their Honours observed (148 CLR at 177):It is safe to say that the question of injustice flowing from the order appealed from will generally be a relevant and necessary consideration. Moreover, the primary judge recognised that he was required to consider the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions in s 37M of the Federal Court Act.