Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2016] FCAFC 97

Appeal from: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCA 504
File number: VID 486 of 2016
Judges: DOWSETT, TRACEY AND BROMBERG JJ
Date of judgment: 19 July 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment of primary judge – proceeding before primary judge involved allegations of contravention by applicants of Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) and Australian Consumer Law (Cth) – criminal proceedings commenced against natural person applicants – application by applicants to primary judge for stay of civil proceeding until conclusion of criminal proceeding – primary judge dismissed application – whether leave should be granted to appeal – whether primary judge erred in consideration of prejudice to natural person applicants, constituted by “invidious choice” whether or not to give evidence in civil proceeding – comparison with Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Zhao (2015) 255 CLR 46 –whether primary judge erred in consideration of prejudice to natural person applicants, constituted by the exposure of their defences to criminal proceeding, attendant upon the burden of overlapping proceedings, or attendant upon the making of findings and declarations in the civil proceeding – whether primary judge erred in consideration of prejudice to union applicant, in conduct of defence to civil proceeding – whether primary judge erred in failing to take account of primacy of criminal proceeding – whether primary judge erred in failing to differentiate as between private and public applicants in application of principles relevant to stay – application for leave to appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law (Cth), s 50

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ss 45D, 45E

County Court Act 1958 (Vic)

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 87

Criminal Code (Cth), ss 11.2, 400.4

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 128

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)

Sex Work Act 1994 (Vic), s 10

Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper [2016] FCAFC 63

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCA 504

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v HLP Financial Planning (Aust) Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 487

Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Zhao (2015) 255 CLR 46

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Alpha Flight Services Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 118

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 47

Fuller v Toms [2012] FCAFC 155

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Lee v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 455

Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357

McMahon v Gould (1982) 7 ACLR 202

Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (2011) 85 ACSR 531

X7 v Australian Crime Commission

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 97
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, along with two natural person applicants, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment from the Federal Court. The appeal concerned allegations of breaches of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and the Australian Consumer Law. The applicants had already faced criminal proceedings, and they sought a stay of the civil proceedings until the conclusion of the criminal case. The primary judge dismissed their application, leading to this appeal.

The central legal issues addressed by the court were whether the primary judge erred in his assessment of the prejudice to the natural person applicants. This included the potential "invidious choice" they faced in deciding whether to give evidence in the civil proceeding, the exposure of their defences in the criminal proceeding due to overlapping proceedings, and the burden of managing both. Additionally, the court examined whether the primary judge failed to appropriately consider the primacy of the criminal proceeding and the need to differentiate between private and public applicants in applying principles relevant to a stay.

The court held that the primary judge's discretionary judgment should not be interfered with, even if the weight attributed to certain considerations might be debatable. It was noted that the primary judge had already provided avenues to address any unfairness that might arise during the civil trial. Although the court expressed reservations about certain aspects of the primary judge's reasoning, particularly regarding the potential for jury contamination, it concluded that the intervention of the appellate court at this stage would be premature. The court was satisfied that the primary judge would offer further opportunities to mitigate any anticipated prejudice.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application for leave to appeal, allow the applicants seven days to submit any costs arguments, and permit the respondent to reply if the applicants chose to submit costs arguments. If no submissions were made, the applicants would be responsible for the respondent's costs of the appeal application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Applicants’ application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. Within seven days of the date of this Order, the Applicants file and serve any submission as to costs.

3. If the Applicants file and serve any submission as to costs pursuant to Order 2, then within seven days thereafter the Respondent file and serve any submission in reply.

4. Should no submission be made pursuant to Order 2, the Applicants pay the Respondent’s costs of the application for leave.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It may be that the substance of the applicants’ complaint is that this consideration was given too much weight, but, on its own, for the reasons earlier stated, the attribution of weight is not a basis for interfering with a discretionary judgment.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the application for leave to appeal ought to be dismissed. Costs usually follow the event, and we are not aware of any reason why that would not be appropriate in this case. However, the effect of our order in that connection will be that the applicants will have seven days to lodge submissions in support of a different costs order, in which case reply submissions may be lodged, but failing which costs will follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In any event, as the primary judge noted at [102], if any unfairness does arise, that can be considered and addressed in the course of the civil trial.Prejudice to Setka and Reardon—the making of findings and declarations The applicants contended that the declarations the ACCC seeks in the s 45D proceeding would require the Court to make findings about Setka’s and Reardon’s conduct, including their states of mind in relation to material facts relevant to the blackmail proceedings. It was asserted that such findings may prejudice and effectively foreclose decisions and outcomes in the criminal proceedings. What seems to be here raised is the prospect that the jury in the blackmail proceeding may be contaminated by the findings and declarations that may be made in the s 45D proceeding. The primary judge dealt with this issue at various points in his reasons including at [54]–[67], [90]–[96] and [101]. With respect to the primary judge, we hold reservations about his reasoning on this issue. In particular, we do not share the primary judge’s confidence that members of the jury in the blackmail proceeding would not learn of findings made in the s 45D proceeding or that, if they did, they would be able to put aside that knowledge either in compliance with judicial direction or because of a capacity to make a distinction between the different contraventions alleged in the respective proceedings. As to jury contamination, we share the reservations expressed by Finkelstein J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v HLP Financial Planning (Aust) Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 487 at [59], as follows:Third, there is potential for an adverse impact on the jury. The civil case will be decided on evidence that, for the most part, will not be available to the prosecutor in a criminal trial. Imagine what would happen if a jury discovers that a civil court has ruled that Mr Berlowitz’ conduct is illegal. The judge presiding over the criminal trial will be obliged to tell the jury to leave that out of account. It is axiomatic in our courts that jurors can be trusted to leave out of their consideration things that they are instructed to leave out. Yet many regard this kind of instruction as little more than wishful thinking. Perhaps the jurors will have explained to them that the judge who made the ruling acted on evidence not before the jury and that in any event a lower standard of proof was required in the civil court. Whether those instructions will result in a fair criminal trial may be strongly doubted. However, it does not follow that an error is established sufficient to overturn a discretionary judgment or sufficient to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. On the issue of leave to appeal, we have arrived at that view including because the intervention of this Court at this juncture would be premature. The possibility of jury contamination flowing from the making of findings and declarations in the s 45D proceeding may be entirely averted if the publication of reasons and the making of declarations post-date the hearing of the blackmail proceeding. The primary judge at [101] specifically recognised that such a course may be appropriate. The primary judge noted that the form and content of the appropriate final relief are not presently resolved and, depending on the circumstances, it may be appropriate that the Court determine to delay the publication of its reasons and any declarations it intends to make. That all suggests that the primary judge intends to provide the applicants with a further opportunity to obtain relief from the prejudice which they apprehend.