Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

Link copied
Case Copied 55 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCA 504

File number: VID 698 of 2014
Judge: MIDDLETON J
Date of judgment: 11 May 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Alleged contraventions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) – alleged contraventions of the Australian Consumer Law – stay of civil proceedings – criminal prosecution commenced – application by respondents for stay of civil proceedings until conclusion of criminal proceedings – application and ambit of McMahon v Gould guidelines – conduct forming basis of criminal charges substantially the same as contraventions alleged in civil proceeding.  
Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

Criminal Code (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Sex Work Act 1994 (Vic)

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 369

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Craigside Company Ltd (2013) 93 ACSR 176

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v HLP Financial Planning(Aust) Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 487

Brisbane South Regional Health Council v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Zhao (2015) 255 CLR 46

General Manager of the Fair Work Commission v Thomson [2013] FCA 380

Guglielminv Trescowthick (No 3) (2005) 220 ALR 535

Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280

Lee v R (2014) 308 ALR 252

McMahon v Gould (1982) 7 ACLR 202

ML v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2013) 276 FLR 1

R v Laurence [1982] AC 510

Websyte Corporation Pty Ltd v Alexander (No 2) [2012] FCA 562

X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92

Yuill v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 8 ACSR 272

Date of hearing: 29 April 2016, 9 May 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 105
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Crutchfield QC with Mr N De Young
Solicitor for the Applicant: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr N Clelland QC with Ms PC Knowles
Solicitor for the Respondents: Slater + Gordon Lawyers

ORDERS

VID 698 of 2014
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION

Applicant

AND:

THE CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION

First Respondent

JOHN SETKA

Second Respondent

SHAUN MICHAEL REARDON

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MIDDLETON J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application that the part of this proceeding not stayed by order 1 of the Orders of 3 February 2016 be stayed until the conclusion of the criminal proceeding against Mr Setka and Mr Reardon for blackmail contrary to s 87 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), including any appeals made in that criminal proceeding, be dismissed.

2.All costs of and incidental to the orders made on 4 April…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Constru... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 504
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought proceedings against the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) alleging contraventions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and the Australian Consumer Law. The respondents, including Mr Setka and Mr Reardon, sought a stay of the civil proceedings pending the conclusion of criminal proceedings against Mr Setka and Mr Reardon for blackmail under the Crimes Act 1958. The central issue for the court was whether the overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings justified a stay of the civil proceedings to prevent any prejudice to the respondents' right to a fair trial in the criminal proceeding.

The court considered the McMahon v Gould guidelines and the potential for prejudice arising from the overlap of facts between the civil and criminal proceedings. The court noted the safeguards available under the Evidence Act and the principles of Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department, which allow for suppression of certain evidence. The court found that the risk of prejudice to the respondents was remote, as the CFMEU would not disclose any potential defences of the individual respondents in the course of defending itself in the civil proceeding. The court also observed that it had mechanisms to prevent any prejudicial disclosure if it occurred. The court concluded that the respondents had not discharged the burden to show that a stay was necessary to prevent injustice.

In dismissing the application for a stay, the court observed that the final hearing had not commenced and that the form and content of the final relief and publication of reasons were not yet determinable. The court proposed to reserve the costs of the interlocutory applications and to determine them at the conclusion of the proceedings. The court ordered that the application for a stay be dismissed and that the costs be reserved for later determination.

The court's decision highlights the importance of balancing the rights of parties in civil and criminal proceedings, while also recognising the court's ability to manage the proceedings to prevent any actual or potential prejudice. The court's approach to the stay application was cautious, weighing the McMahon v Gould guidelines against the specific circumstances of the case and the available legal safeguards. The court's decision also underscores the principle that the burden of showing the necessity for a stay lies with the applicant, and that the court will only grant a stay if the applicant can demonstrate a real risk of prejudice that cannot be otherwise mitigated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application that the part of this proceeding not stayed by order 1 of the Orders of 3 February 2016 be stayed until the conclusion of the criminal proceeding against Mr Setka and Mr Reardon for blackmail contrary to s 87 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), including any appeals made in that criminal proceeding, be dismissed.

2. All costs of and incidental to the orders made on 4 April 2016, the respondents’ interlocutory application dated 11 April 2016 and the respondents’ interlocutory application for a stay dated 4 April 2016, be reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Again assuming that only the CFMEU is being proceeded against in the civil proceeding, and at one liability hearing commencing on 26 September 2016, the Court has many mechanisms at its disposal to protect the interests of the individual respondents. If either Mr Setka and Mr Reardon were to be called to give evidence, putting aside the powers of the Court to control its own proceedings and to control the manner and form of questions, protection is given under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Evidence Act’) where a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground of self-incrimination. Depending on the circumstances, the individual respondents may not need to give the objected to evidence in any event (see s 128(3) of the Evidence Act), or if required to do so by the Court, are protected under s 128(7). It may well be that at the trial the Court will not require the individual respondents to give evidence. I accept that the protection under s 128(7) (if evidence is in fact given) will not prevent the provision of information about the individual respondents’ defence or evidence in the criminal trial, but the Court could prevent that information from reaching the prosecutor in the criminal proceeding. This civil proceeding is brought by an independent Commonwealth regulator, not an emanation of the Crown. The criminal proceeding is brought by the prosecutor in the State of Victoria. Orders could be made suppressing specific evidence of the individual respondents until after the criminal trial so that the prosecuting authorities do not become aware of it. I will return to comments made by the High Court in Zhao at [44] relating to the open court principle. Of course, the principles of Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280 will apply to information obtained in the course of the civil proceeding that is not otherwise disclosed in open court. However, be this as it may, if the individual respondents do not give evidence, I do not accept that there is any real risk that the manner in which the CFMEU defends the alleged s 45D conduct is likely to otherwise disclose potential defences of the individual respondents so as to interfere with the administration of justice in the criminal proceeding. Whilst the substantial overlap is apparent as described previously, the criminal charges and civil proceedings are quite different in nature and focus. The CFMEU will only be responding to the allegations made against it in the civil proceedings. The CFMEU is a corporate entity, and its controlling mind does not include the individual respondents. The CFMEU will decide the manner in which it runs its defence of this proceeding in relation to the s 45D conduct. I do not regard its decisions as being imputed to the individual respondents relevantly to disclosing their tactical approach or to defences they may seek to run in the criminal trial. In light of what I have said above, it seems very remote to assume that either the CFMEU or the individual respondents (even if they give evidence) will reveal to the prosecutor a potential defence (or tactical position) in the course of the civil proceeding against the CFMEU, being brought solely in relation to the s 45D conduct. In any event, this Court has all the mechanisms at its disposal to prevent this from occurring, if in fact there is any revealing in the first place of such information during the course of the civil trial.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am mindful of the position of the potential witnesses to be called. However, if, as it seems to be accepted, there is a significant overlap in the facts relating to the civil proceeding and criminal proceeding, then this may well facilitate the preparation for the hearing of the civil proceeding and the committal hearing. In any event, at the moment I do not have any evidence to suggest that the proximity of both the civil proceeding and committal hearing will cause any injustice to any or all of the respondents.CONCLUSION In my view the respondents have not discharged the burden upon them to succeed in being granted a stay or adjournment of this proceeding. I propose to dismiss the application for a stay. I make this final observation. The final hearing of the civil proceeding has not been commenced. The form and content of the appropriate final relief (and the form and content of publication of reasons for judgment) in this civil proceeding is not presently able to be addressed nor resolved. It may be that it is appropriate, depending on the circumstances, to delay the publication of reasons or declarations. The result may be that the application of the ACCC is dismissed and no declarations would be made in that event. If during the course of the civil trial any unfairness or potential unfairness arises, either to the CFMEU or to the individual respondents, this can be considered and addressed. Nothing in these reasons precludes any respondent from making an adjournment application during the trial if the interests of justice require such an adjournment, for whatever legitimate reason and upon proper evidence.COSTS There were three extant costs issues between the parties:(a)The costs of and incidental to the orders made on 4 April 2016;(b)The costs of and incidental to the respondents’ interlocutory application dated 11 April 2016; and(c)The costs of and incidental to the respondents’ interlocutory application for a stay dated 4 April 2016. Brief submissions from the parties have been received in relation to these costs issues. No party has requested in these submissions that any cost order to be made in its favour be paid forthwith. Each party has had mixed success and the Court has intervened to cause the parties to reflect upon certain interlocutory steps. It may be that the most appropriate order is that each party bear their own costs in relation to all the extant issues, being a pragmatic way to achieve the appropriate level of justice in dealing globally with the costs incurred in relation to the above matters. Nevertheless, I propose to reserve the costs in relation to each of the extant issues, and consider the question of costs at the determination of the proceedings. No party will be prejudiced by leaving the question of costs to be determined in this way, as costs in the normal course would not be paid until a final taxation upon the determination of this proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established