Tameeka Group Pty Ltd v Landan Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tameeka Group Pty Limited v Landan Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1218

Citation: Tameeka Group Pty Limited v Landan Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1218
Parties: TAMEEKA GROUP PTY LIMITED (ACN 120 830 819)  and 2444 ON THE GREEN PTY LTD (ACN 606 425 389) v LANDAN PTY LIMITED (ACN 109 801 229), GRAN-DIA INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 790 223), MALCOLM CORBETT and DIANE MAREE PRESTON
File number: NSD 969 of 2015
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2015
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay pending filing of proceedings in another jurisdiction – application to strike out parts of applicants’ statement of claim – further or in the alternative, application for further and better particulars – whether parts of applicants’ statement of claim is evasive or ambiguous or likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – cross-vesting – power of Federal Court to transfer proceeding to State Supreme Court – appropriate forum where same issues to be determined – interests of justice criterion  

Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Australian Consumer Law) Sch 2, ss 21, 23
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 5(4)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 568A
Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth)
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 74MA
Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 16.21(1)(c), (d), (e), 16.43, 16.45
Cases cited: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Pauls Ltd (2000) ATPR 41-747
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2009) 253 ALR 324
BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Dalle Cort [2014] QSC 296
Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 552
Elston v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 108
Fair Work Ombudsman v Eastern Colour Pty Ltd (2011) 209 IR 263
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Macquarie Bank Ltd v Juno Holdings S.a.r.l. [2015] NSWSC 919
McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343
Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 122 FCR 110
Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Limited (Recs and Mgrs apptd) (2011) 85 ACSR 531
Polar Aviation Pty Limited v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2012) 203 FCR 325
Power Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 539
Spiteri v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 905
Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Limited v The Boots Company (Australia) Pty Limited (1992) 34 FCR 287
Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389
Transerve Pty Ltd v Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 953
Date of hearing: 19 October 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 79
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr CD Freeman
Solicitor for the Applicants: Falvey Kay Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr H Woods
Solicitor for the Respondents: Michael Flaherty

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1218
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter between Tameeka Group Pty Ltd and Landan Pty Ltd involved an application by the respondents for the proceedings to be stayed or transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute arose from a Deed of Option dated 4 May 2010, where Landan granted Tameeka Group an option to require Landan to sell property in Port Macquarie, New South Wales, upon certain conditions being met. The applicants alleged breaches of contract, unconscionable conduct, and conspiracy to injure by the respondents. The respondents, in turn, sought particulars on certain claims and argued that the proceedings should be stayed or transferred to the Supreme Court to avoid unnecessary complexity and cost.

The court had to determine whether certain parts of the applicants' statement of claim were evasive, ambiguous, or likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment, or delay. The court also needed to decide whether the proceedings should be stayed or transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales based on the interests of justice. The respondents argued that the Supreme Court was the more appropriate forum for the real issues to be determined.

The court found that the respondents were entitled to seek particulars of the facts relied on in paragraph 27 of the Statement of Claim, where Tameeka Group appointed a nominee under the Call Option Deed. The court ruled that certain paragraphs of the Statement of Claim were to be struck out, and the applicants were given leave to replead those paragraphs and file an Amended Statement of Claim. The applicants were also required to respond to requests for particulars in the Amended Interlocutory Application. The court dismissed the Amended Interlocutory Application otherwise and relisted the proceedings for directions. In terms of costs, the court ordered the respondents to pay the applicants' costs of the interlocutory application, taking into account the lack of evidence that the respondents had sought particulars prior to filing their application.

The court's decision was based on the principle that the interests of justice should be the guiding factor in determining the appropriate forum for the proceedings, as established in BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400. The court found that, while the respondents had some success in their interlocutory application, the applicants were substantially successful in opposing it. The court also noted that the respondents had not sought particulars prior to filing their application, which influenced the exercise of the court's discretion in ordering costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraphs 31, 35 and 41 of the Statement of Claim be struck out.

2. The applicants have leave to re-plead paragraphs 31, 35 and 41 of the Statement of Claim and to file an Amended Statement of Claim by 25 November 2015.

3. The applicants to respond to the requests for particulars at paragraphs 3(b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Amended Interlocutory Application by 25 November 2015.

4. Otherwise dismiss the Amended Interlocutory Application.

5. The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the Amended Interlocutory Application.

6. The matter be relisted for directions before Markovic J on a date to be notified.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondents rely on two affidavits sworn by Michael Flaherty on 8 and 18 September 2015 respectively in support of the Amended Interlocutory Application. The applicants oppose all of the orders sought in the Amended Interlocutory Application. They rely on an affidavit sworn by James Kay on 6 October 2015.THE FACTS A dispute has arisen between the parties arising out of the entry into of a Deed of Option dated 4 May 2010 between Landan, as grantor, Tameeka Group, as grantee, and Paul Andrew Barr, the sole director, secretary and shareholder of Tameeka Group, as guarantor (the Option Deed). Just prior to the entry into of the Option Deed, pursuant to a lease dated 27 April 2010, Tameeka Pty Ltd (Tameeka), a company of which Mr Barr is the sole director and secretary and in which he holds nine of the issued shares, leased the property described as a shop with two basement car spaces located at 17–19 Horton Street, Port Macquarie, New South Wales being Lot 1 in SP79256 (the Property) for a three year term commencing on 1 July 2010 with a 5 year option to renew and annual rental of $148,000 plus GST from Landan (the First Lease). Relevantly, the Option Deed provides that on payment of the Call Option Fee of $100 by Tameeka Group to Landan, Landan grants to Tameeka Group the Call Option to require Landan to sell the Property on the terms and conditions set out in the Option Deed and the contract for sale of land annexed to the Option Deed (the Contract). The Contract identifies Tameeka Group as the purchaser and provides that the Property will be sold subject to existing tenancies and GST-free because the sale is the supply of a going concern under s 38‑325 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1997 (Cth). The purchase price is $1.25m. Under the terms of the Option Deed, the Call Option can only be exercised during the Call Option Period which expired on the Call Option Expiry Date being 12:00 pm on 30 June 2013. Further, the Call Option can only be exercised by Tameeka Group or the Nominee delivering to Landan:(1)a Notice of Exercise of Call Option executed by Tameeka Group or the Nominee being the person nominated by Tameeka Group pursuant to the Call Option Nomination Notice provided that person is registered for GST and is not either Tameeka or any other entity then being the lessee of the premises;(2)a counterpart of the Contract completed with the name of the purchaser and dated with the date of the exercise of the Call Option; and(3)if the Notice of Exercise of Call Option is exercised by the Nominee, the Call Option Nominee Notice executed by Tameeka Group irrevocably certifying that the Nominee has been nominated, to the exclusion of Tameeka Group, to exercise the Call Option. Upon receipt of the documents required by cl 2.2 of the Option Deed, Landan must deliver to Tameeka Group a counterpart of the Contract executed by it and completed with the name of the purchaser and the date of exercise of the Call Option. On the exercise of the Call Option, a contract for the sale and purchase of the Property on the terms set out in the Contract is concluded between Tameeka Group or the Nominee, as the case may be, and Landan. The exchange of counterparts of the Contract is intended to “record permanently the detailed terms of the Contract and it is [the grantor and grantee’s] intention that the parties to the Contract be and are bound by the Contract on the date and by virtue of the exercise of the Call Option”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Paragraph 27 of the SOC is in the following terms:On 8 July 2015, Tameeka Group irrevocably appointed 2444 as the Nominee under the Call Option Deed.The respondents have pleaded to para 27 in their defence and now seek particulars of the facts relied on to assert the conclusion that Tameeka Group irrevocably appointed 2444 as its nominee. It is not clear on the face of the pleading how that occurred. The respondents are in my view entitled to seek the particulars of para 27 in the terms sought. CONCLUSION I will make orders:(1)striking out paras 31, 35 and 41 of the SOC and will give the applicants leave to replead those paragraphs and to file an Amended Statement of Claim;(2)requiring the applicants to respond to the requests for particulars at paras 3(b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Amended Interlocutory Application;(3)otherwise dismissing the Amended Interlocutory Application;(4) re-listing the proceedings for directions before me on a date to be notified. I turn now to the question of costs. While the respondents have achieved some success on their interlocutory application, I note that, at least in relation to the order seeking particulars of specified paragraphs of the SOC, there is no evidence before me to suggest that the respondents approached the applicants seeking particulars in that form prior to the filing of their Interlocutory Application or their Amended Interlocutory Application. The only attempt to seek clarification was in an early letter from the respondents’ solicitors to the applicants’ solicitors which raised queries in relation to a draft Statement of Claim that was provided to the respondents. In my view, this omission goes to the exercise of my discretion in ordering costs. The usual rule is that costs will be awarded to the successful party. In this instance there is no entirely successful party. However, taking into account the issue I have raised in relation to the seeking of particulars and given that the applicants have been substantially successful in their opposition to the amended interlocutory application, I will order that the respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400 the majority, comprising Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ, said at [14] that, in the context of the Cross-vesting Act, the Court is:… required by statute to ensure that cases are heard in the forum dictated by the interests of justice. An application for transfer under s 5 of the Cross-vesting Act is brought upon the hypothesis that the jurisdiction of the court to which the application is made has been regularly invoked. If it appears to that court that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be determined by another designated court, then the first court “shall transfer” the proceedings to that other court. The concept of the interests of justice is to be interpreted widely. At [15] their Honours observed that the interests of justice are not the same as the interests of one party, that “there may be interests wider than those of either party to be considered” but that despite this, the “interests of the respective parties, which might in some respects be common … and in other respects conflicting, will arise for consideration”. Their Honours went on to note at [19] that:In many cases there will be such a preponderance of connecting factors with one forum that it can readily be identified as the most appropriate, or natural, forum. In other cases, there might be significant connecting factors with each of two different forums. Some of the factors might cancel each other out … Weighing considerations of cost, expense, and convenience, even when they conflict, is a familiar aspect of the kind of case management involved in many cross-vesting applications.Consideration The respondents submit that these proceedings are an inappropriate vehicle to deal with the real issues in dispute and that, in turn, makes this Court a “clearly inappropriate forum” to determine the dispute. In the alternative, the respondents submit that, in the interests of justice, these proceedings should be stayed. The respondents identify the real issues in dispute as:(1)the proper construction of the Option Deed, namely, whether the Option Deed (as varied) is open for acceptance;(2)if the Option Deed remains open for acceptance, whether upon being exercised, the Contract is to be subject to the Gran-Dia Lease; and(3)whether the caveat lodged by the first applicant should be withdrawn pursuant to s 74MA of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)(the Respondents’ Issues). The Proposed Supreme Court Proceedings raise the Respondents’ Issues for determination. The respondents submit that the proceedings in this Court, which allege breach of contract, unconscionable conduct and conspiracy to injure, and claim remedies, including damages, add unnecessary complexity, time and cost to the determination of the Respondents’ Issues. Accordingly, a stay should be granted to enable proceedings to be commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Further reasons provided by the respondents for a stay of these proceedings are that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to deal with all matters in dispute, the respondents have brought their application for a stay of these proceedings or alternatively their transfer promptly so as to avoid any wasted cost and the Supreme Court of New South Wales, with its Real Property List and having jurisdiction to order the withdrawal of the caveat, can provide more effectively for the complete resolution of the whole of the dispute between the parties.