Power Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Power Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd (No. 3)
[2011] FCA 539

Citation: Power Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2011] FCA 539
Parties: POWER INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LIMITED (ACN 126 099 643) v DOWNER EDI ENGINEERING POWER PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 983 700); DOWNER EDI ENGINEERING POWER PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 983 700); POWER INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LIMITED (ACN 126 099 643) and JASON POWER
File number: NSD 692 of 2010
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 6 May 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – pleading – particulars – application for further and better particulars – sufficiency of particulars supplied – further requests unnecessary to enable other parties to know the case they had to meet –overarching purpose – duties of the parties
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N
Federal Court Rules O 12 r 1, O 12 r 2, O 12 r 3, O 12 r 4, O 12 r 5
Cases cited: Deemah Marble & Granite Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sutherland [2001] NSWSC 829
Police & Nurses Credit Society Ltd v Burgess Rawson (WA) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1395
Trade Practices Commission v Total Australia (1975) 24 FLR 413
Date of hearing: 6 May 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Cotman SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: CLS Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Williams
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mallesons Stephen Jaques

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 692 of 2010

BETWEEN:

POWER INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LIMITED (ACN 126 099 643)
Applicant

DOWNER EDI ENGINEERING POWER PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 983 700)
Cross-Claimant

AND:

DOWNER EDI ENGINEERING POWER PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 983 700)
Respondent

POWER INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LIMITED (ACN 126 099 643)
First Cross-Respondent

JASON POWER
Second Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MAY 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent:

(i)provide particulars of the further information giving rise to the alleged estoppel or waiver and/or acknowledgment pleaded in subparagraph 29(a) of the amended defence; and

(ii)identify the arrangements between the parties, to which reference is made in the same subparagraph.

2.Otherwise, the motion is dismissed with costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 692 of 2010

BETWEEN:

POWER INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LIMITED (ACN 126 099 643)
Applicant

DOWNER EDI ENGINEERING POWER PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 983 700)
Cross-Claimant

AND:

DOWNER EDI ENGINEERING POWER PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 983 700)
Respondent

POWER INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LIMITED (ACN 126 099 643)
First Cross-Respondent

JASON POWER
Second Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE:

6 MAY 2011

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The proceeding

  1. Jason Power is the sole director, secretary and…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 539
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Power Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd (No 3), the primary concern was the adequacy of the particulars provided by the defendant, Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd, in response to a request from Power Infrastructure Pty Ltd. The dispute centred on whether the particulars supplied were sufficient to enable the plaintiff to know the case they had to meet, in accordance with established principles of pleading. This case was heard and determined in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The court was required to decide whether the particulars provided by the defendant were sufficient under the principles of pleading and whether any further requests for particulars were necessary. The core issue was whether the particulars provided were adequate for the plaintiff to understand the case they had to meet, without delving into the specifics of the evidence that would be presented. The court also had to balance the overarching purpose of litigation efficiency against the need for clarity in pleadings.

The court held that the particulars provided were adequate and that further requests for particulars were unnecessary. The judge referred to the Deemah Marble & Granite case, emphasising that the function of particulars is to alert the opponent to the scope of the case being made, without requiring the disclosure of evidence. The judge concluded that the particulars provided by the defendant met this standard and that no further requests were necessary at that stage. Consequently, the motion was dismissed with costs.

The final orders were that the respondent, Downer EDI Engineering Power Pty Ltd, was required to provide particulars of the further information giving rise to the alleged estoppel or waiver and/or acknowledgment pleaded in subparagraph 29(a) of the amended defence, and to identify the arrangements between the parties, to which reference is made in the same subparagraph. Otherwise, the motion was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent:

(i) provide particulars of the further information giving rise to the alleged estoppel or waiver and/or acknowledgment pleaded in subparagraph 29(a) of the amended defence; and

(ii) identify the arrangements between the parties, to which reference is made in the same subparagraph.

2. Otherwise, the motion is dismissed with costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Young CJ in Eq provided a convenient summary of the relevant principles in Deemah Marble & Granite Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sutherland [2001] NSWSC 829 at [6] (“Deemah Marble & Granite”):(1)The basal function of particulars is to reduce costs by alerting the opponent to the scope of the real case being made so the opponent is not caught by surprise, nor does the opponent waste time and money in preparing to meet issues that the other party does not intend to raise: see eg Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317, 321 and Banque Commerciale SA (In Liquidation) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 286.(2)Particulars are supplied of the material facts pleaded as P E Joske J said in Trade Practices Commission v Total Australia (1975) 24 FLR 413, 417:“While the defendant is entitled to know the case it is called upon to meet, it is not entitled to be told the evidence that will be called to prove the case. A defendant is entitled to ask for the material facts upon which the plaintiff will rely and he may make his request for the facts and matters relied on, which is taken to mean the same thing. When he asks for the facts and circumstances relied on he is going beyond the scope of particulars, and is probing for evidence.”(3)However, every litigation lawyer knows it may be appropriate, in order to carry out the aim which I have stated in (1), it will almost be inevitable to disclose some of the evidence, and that if this happens, it is no answer that evidence must be disclosed by the giving of the particulars. See Sims v Wran at 321 and Wilson v Wilson (1952) 69 WN 358.(4)The party’s obligation is only to supply the best particulars he or she can supply, provided that after discovery those particulars are supplemented, if possible; see Marshall v Inter-Oceanic Steam Yachting Co (1885) 1 TLR 394.(5)When one party has the means of knowing the real facts, ordinarily the opponent will not be ordered to supply particulars until after discovery: Millar v Harper (1888) 38 Ch D 110; TPC v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1995) 131 ALR 581, 593.(6)The degree of particularity depends upon the nature of the case: American Flange and Manufacturing Co Inc v Rheem Australia Pty Ltd [1963] NSWR 1121, 1126.(7)In equity, because other remedies may seem appropriate, and because evidence is filed by affidavit, the Court is less likely to order particulars and will not permit parties to slow down proceedings unjustifiably in their preparation for trial. This proposition is partly derived from the American Flange case and partly from the tactic used up to about 1980 by large firms acting for defendants, who created delays by constant requests for copious particulars, a worldwide phenomenon, as shown by the judgment of Wessels JA in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa in Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd (1968) 3 SA 98, 102.(8)The order for particulars is discretionary, the object being to ensure the efficient process of the Court. The point his Honour made at (7) is of particular relevance here. In Police & Nurses Credit Society Ltd v Burgess Rawson (WA) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1395 at [17] French J (as his Honour then was) went further:What are “necessary” particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded is a matter of judgment. The underlying principle is that the case of each of the parties is adequately exposed to the other. It is important to maintain a sense of balance in the detail of particulars sought and ordered. The provision of particulars should not be allowed unduly to increase the cost and delay associated with litigation. In contemporary commercial litigation where, frequently, the court will direct the filing of witness statements or affidavits on either side subject to the right to cross examination, the necessity for elaborate particulars and lengthy debates about them is even more questionable.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

These requests are for the same information sought with respect to paragraph 9 of the amended cross-claim and for the reasons given above, I refuse to order they be answered at this time.Conclusion I order that DEE:(i)provide particulars of the further information giving rise to the alleged estoppel or waiver and/or acknowledgment pleaded in subparagraph 29(a) of the amended defence; and(ii)identify the arrangements between the parties, to which reference is made in the same subparagraph. Otherwise, the motion is dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.