FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 552
Citation: Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 552 Parties: WAJIRA DANTHANARAYANA and NIRVANA CONSULTING PTY LTD (ACN 141 797 355) v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, BRETT LAWRENCE BILLETT, MARGARET ANNE SYKES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ROBERT JOHN SYKES, MARK ANDREW WALES, MICHAEL JOHN POPE, ANNE MARION BROWN, PETER JOHN SINFIELD and FRANCIS XAVIER ROBERTS File number: ACD 74 of 2011 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 28 May 2014 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether the applicants’ current Statement of Claim adequately pleads causes of action in tort for conspiracy, for misfeasance in public office and for negligence – whether the applicants have a sufficient and proper basis upon which to allege conspiracy and misfeasance in public office – Statement of Claim defective and fatally flawed – Statement of Claim struck out – further consideration to be given to the applicants’ case in negligence – all other causes of action summarily dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52, s 82
Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 16.21(1)(c), (d) and (e), 26.01(1)(a), (b) and (c)Cases cited: Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713 applied
HMS Truculent: The Admiralty v The Divina (Owners) [1951] 2 All ER 968 cited
McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343 applied
Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 applied
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2012) 203 FCR 325 applied
Rajski v Bainton (1990) 22 NSWLR 125 followed
Shammas v Canberra Institute of Technology [2014] FCA 71 cited
Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 applied
Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 cited
Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248 citedDate of hearing: 5 September 2012 and 11 October 2012 Date of last submissions: 2 November 2012 Place: Sydney (via video link to Canberra) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 121 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr AJ Bartley SC Solicitor for the Applicants: Colquhoun Murphy Counsel for the Respondents: Mr TM Begbie Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 74 of 2011
BETWEEN: WAJIRA DANTHANARAYANA
First ApplicantNIRVANA CONSULTING PTY LTD (ACN 141 797 355)
Second ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First RespondentBRETT LAWRENCE BILLETT
Second RespondentMARGARET ANNE SYKES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ROBERT JOHN SYKES
Third RespondentMARK ANDREW WALES
Fourth RespondentMICHAEL JOHN POPE
Fifth RespondentANNE MARION BROWN
Sixth RespondentPETER JOHN SINFIELD
Seventh RespondentFRANCIS XAVIER ROBERTS
Eighth Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MAY 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The whole of the Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 22 August 2012…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 552
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the applicants' Statement of Claim adequately pleaded the necessary elements of conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, and negligence. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the applicants had a sufficient basis to allege these causes of action and whether the Statement of Claim was fatally flawed.
In delivering the judgment, the court found that the applicants' Statement of Claim was indeed defective and lacked the necessary particulars to support the pleaded causes of action. The court noted that the claims for conspiracy and misfeasance in public office were not adequately pleaded because they failed to establish the requisite unlawful motives and shared objectives among the alleged conspirators. Furthermore, the court held that the claim for negligence, while not necessarily flawed, required further development and particularisation. Consequently, the court struck out the Statement of Claim, dismissed the claims for conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, and other specified causes of action, and granted the applicants leave to replead the negligence claim against the Commonwealth.
The final orders of the court included striking out the Statement of Claim, dismissing all causes of action except for negligence against the Commonwealth, granting the applicants leave to amend their pleadings to focus solely on the negligence claim, and setting a timeline for the submission and consideration of the amended pleadings. The applicants were also required to pay the respondents' costs of the interlocutory application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The whole of the Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 22 August 2012 be struck out.
2. Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the claims for damages and exemplary damages made by the applicants, or either of them, against the respondents, or one or more of them, based upon the tort of civil conspiracy, misfeasance in public office and s 52 and s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) be summarily dismissed.
3. As a consequence of Orders 1 and 2 above, the proceeding as against the second to eighth respondents be wholly dismissed.
4. The first applicant, Wajira Danthanarayana, have leave to endeavour to replead a case for damages in negligence against the first respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia.
5. By 27 June 2014, the first applicant, Wajira Danthanarayana, serve and lodge with the Associate to Foster J a draft Amended Originating Application and draft Second Further Amended Statement of Claim in which he pleads such claims in negligence against the Commonwealth as he may be advised consistent with Reasons for Judgment of Foster J delivered this day and by which he deletes from his claims for relief and pleading all claims made by the second applicant, Nirvana Consulting Pty Ltd, all claims against the second to eighth respondents and all other claims against the first respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia.
6. By 18 July 2014, the solicitors for the Commonwealth of Australia inform the solicitors for the first applicant, Wajira Danthanarayana, whether the Commonwealth opposes the grant of leave to the first applicant to file and serve an Amended Originating Application and Second Further Amended Statement of Claim in conformity with the drafts served upon the solicitors for the Commonwealth in accordance with Order 5 above.
7. The proceeding be adjourned to 9.15 am on 1 August 2014 before the A.C.T. List Judge, at which time the Court will consider whether leave to amend should be granted as sought by the first applicant.
8. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the Interlocutory Application filed by the respondents on 7 August 2012.
9. The costs of and incidental to the said Interlocutory Application may be taxed forthwith.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Cox, Dixon J (at 717) specifically approved the observations made by Evatt J at 399 ff in McKernan. At 718–719 in Cox, Dixon J explained why the defendants in that case were entitled to take steps to revolt against the control of the chairman and managing director if they thought it was in the best interests of the relevant corporation to do so. The mere fact that their actions might injure the chairman and managing director was not sufficient to make out the tort of conspiracy. In Cox, Dixon J summarily dismissed the action because he took the view that it was clearly hopeless.Consideration In their Originating Application, conspiracy is alleged against all of the second to eighth respondents. The conspiracy so alleged is a conspiracy to injure both applicants. In the FASOC, at pars 43–45, the alleged conspiracy is said to be directed to harming Mr Danthanarayana only although the allegation against all of the second to eighth respondents is maintained. In par 46A ff, the alternative conspiracy is said to be directed against Mr Danthanarayana alone but, in that paragraph, the conspirators are confined to the second to fifth respondents. The essential framework of these allegations is confusing and not consistent with the claims for relief made in the applicants’ Originating Application. In support of his claim for damages for conspiracy, Mr Danthanarayana points to a series of disparate acts pleaded earlier in the FASOC as acts constituting bullying and harassment and attempts by the individuals concerned to prevent his being contracted to the DOD and the DMO. I pause to note that, nowhere in either par 43, 44 or 46A is there any particular allegation made against the fifth respondent (Mr Pope). Notwithstanding those matters, Mr Pope is the subject of a general conspiracy allegation in par 43 and a further conspiracy allegation in par 46B of the FASOC and thus is dragged into the consequential allegations in par 46C, 46D and 46E of the FASOC. Counsel for the respondents submitted that:In order to establish an “unlawful purpose” conspiracy, it is necessary to show that each conspirator shares the predominant motive of causing pecuniary harm to the plaintiff. Two aspects of this requirement are to be noted:(a)That motive must be held by each individual said to be a party to the conspiracy. An “evil motive” proved to exist in one or more cannot be imputed to other persons, even if they be involved in actions which the others are undertaking with the predominant motive of injuring the plaintiff. And if only one person has the necessary evil motive, neither they nor any of the others can be liable.(b)It is not enough that the defendants know that their actions will cause financial harm. Such harm may be inevitable but if it is brought about by persons motivated by an ultimate objective of protecting their own trade or business, it will not be a conspiracy. To be actionable, the predominant motive, or ultimate goal, must be the infliction of harm upon the plaintiff.