Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 552

Citation: Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 552
Parties: WAJIRA DANTHANARAYANA and NIRVANA CONSULTING PTY LTD (ACN 141 797 355) v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, BRETT LAWRENCE BILLETT, MARGARET ANNE SYKES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ROBERT JOHN SYKES, MARK ANDREW WALES, MICHAEL JOHN POPE, ANNE MARION BROWN, PETER JOHN SINFIELD and FRANCIS XAVIER ROBERTS
File number: ACD 74 of 2011
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 28 May 2014
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether the applicants’ current Statement of Claim adequately pleads causes of action in tort for conspiracy, for misfeasance in public office and for negligence – whether the applicants have a sufficient and proper basis upon which to allege conspiracy and misfeasance in public office – Statement of Claim defective and fatally flawed – Statement of Claim struck out – further consideration to be given to the applicants’ case in negligence – all other causes of action summarily dismissed  
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52, s 82
Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 16.21(1)(c), (d) and (e), 26.01(1)(a), (b) and (c)
Cases cited: Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713 applied
HMS Truculent: The Admiralty v The Divina (Owners) [1951] 2 All ER 968 cited
McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343 applied
Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 applied
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2012) 203 FCR 325 applied
Rajski v Bainton (1990) 22 NSWLR 125 followed
Shammas v Canberra Institute of Technology [2014] FCA 71 cited
Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 applied
Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 cited
Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248 cited
Date of hearing: 5 September 2012 and 11 October 2012
Date of last submissions: 2 November 2012
Place: Sydney (via video link to Canberra)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 121
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr AJ Bartley SC
Solicitor for the Applicants: Colquhoun Murphy
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr TM Begbie
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 74 of 2011

BETWEEN:

WAJIRA DANTHANARAYANA
First Applicant

NIRVANA CONSULTING PTY LTD (ACN 141 797 355)
Second Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

BRETT LAWRENCE BILLETT
Second Respondent

MARGARET ANNE SYKES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ROBERT JOHN SYKES
Third Respondent

MARK ANDREW WALES
Fourth Respondent

MICHAEL JOHN POPE
Fifth Respondent

ANNE MARION BROWN
Sixth Respondent

PETER JOHN SINFIELD
Seventh Respondent

FRANCIS XAVIER ROBERTS
Eighth Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The whole of the Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 22 August 2012…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 552
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with examining the validity of the applicants' claims in tort against the Commonwealth and several other respondents. The applicants, Wajira Danthanarayana and Nirvana Consulting Pty Ltd, sought to bring actions against the Commonwealth, the Department of Defence, and other respondents for conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, and negligence. The respondents argued that the applicants' Statement of Claim was defective and lacked sufficient grounds to sustain any of the pleaded causes of action.

The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the applicants' Statement of Claim adequately pleaded the necessary elements of conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, and negligence. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the applicants had a sufficient basis to allege these causes of action and whether the Statement of Claim was fatally flawed.

In delivering the judgment, the court found that the applicants' Statement of Claim was indeed defective and lacked the necessary particulars to support the pleaded causes of action. The court noted that the claims for conspiracy and misfeasance in public office were not adequately pleaded because they failed to establish the requisite unlawful motives and shared objectives among the alleged conspirators. Furthermore, the court held that the claim for negligence, while not necessarily flawed, required further development and particularisation. Consequently, the court struck out the Statement of Claim, dismissed the claims for conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, and other specified causes of action, and granted the applicants leave to replead the negligence claim against the Commonwealth.

The final orders of the court included striking out the Statement of Claim, dismissing all causes of action except for negligence against the Commonwealth, granting the applicants leave to amend their pleadings to focus solely on the negligence claim, and setting a timeline for the submission and consideration of the amended pleadings. The applicants were also required to pay the respondents' costs of the interlocutory application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The whole of the Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 22 August 2012 be struck out.

2. Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the claims for damages and exemplary damages made by the applicants, or either of them, against the respondents, or one or more of them, based upon the tort of civil conspiracy, misfeasance in public office and s 52 and s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) be summarily dismissed.

3. As a consequence of Orders 1 and 2 above, the proceeding as against the second to eighth respondents be wholly dismissed.

4. The first applicant, Wajira Danthanarayana, have leave to endeavour to replead a case for damages in negligence against the first respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia.

5. By 27 June 2014, the first applicant, Wajira Danthanarayana, serve and lodge with the Associate to Foster J a draft Amended Originating Application and draft Second Further Amended Statement of Claim in which he pleads such claims in negligence against the Commonwealth as he may be advised consistent with Reasons for Judgment of Foster J delivered this day and by which he deletes from his claims for relief and pleading all claims made by the second applicant, Nirvana Consulting Pty Ltd, all claims against the second to eighth respondents and all other claims against the first respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia.

6. By 18 July 2014, the solicitors for the Commonwealth of Australia inform the solicitors for the first applicant, Wajira Danthanarayana, whether the Commonwealth opposes the grant of leave to the first applicant to file and serve an Amended Originating Application and Second Further Amended Statement of Claim in conformity with the drafts served upon the solicitors for the Commonwealth in accordance with Order 5 above.

7. The proceeding be adjourned to 9.15 am on 1 August 2014 before the A.C.T. List Judge, at which time the Court will consider whether leave to amend should be granted as sought by the first applicant.

8. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the Interlocutory Application filed by the respondents on 7 August 2012.

9. The costs of and incidental to the said Interlocutory Application may be taxed forthwith.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

By these Reasons for Judgment, I determine the respondents’ Interlocutory Application. SOME BACKGROUND MATTERS The first applicant, Wajira Danthanarayana, is a Sri Lankan by birth who has lived almost his entire life in Australia. He came here at the age of four and received both his secondary and tertiary education at Australian institutions. Mr Danthanarayana is the sole director and shareholder of Nirvana. He is an Information Computer Technology Solutions Architect Project Manager and Program Manager. Nirvana was generally used by him as the entity through which his services would be provided to those who wished to contract for those services. By the second or third directions hearing in this matter, the respondents had taken up with the solicitors for the applicants in considerable detail the many deficiencies which the respondents saw in the applicants’ then current pleading. In addition, there was an argument about particulars in the offing. Confronted with these circumstances and wishing to endeavour to get to the substance of the respondents’ complaints as quickly as possible, on 11 May 2012, I ordered the applicants to file and serve by 22 June 2012 all affidavits upon which they proposed to rely at the final hearing of this proceeding. The purpose of my making that order was to ensure that, if and when the respondents brought forward an application for summary dismissal or strike out, the applicants would have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to bring forward the case which they intended to run at trial so that any application for summary dismissal would be considered against the whole of the applicants’ evidentiary case. That order was made without any serious opposition from the solicitor for the applicants who appeared for those parties on 11 May 2012. On the same occasion, I was informed by the applicants’ solicitor that the witnesses who would be called in the applicants’ case were the first applicant, Mr Danthanarayana, and perhaps some others, but not many others. I was told that Mr Danthanarayana would prove the case which the applicants sought to bring to trial and that the other witnesses would corroborate his version of events as required. On 26 June 2012, the applicants filed a lengthy affidavit affirmed by Mr Danthanarayana pursuant to the order which I had made on 11 May 2012. They also filed an affidavit sworn by Jonathan Toze on 27 June 2012. Mr Toze is a Commonwealth employee who works in the DOD. Both of the affidavits to which I have referred at [18] above were read and relied upon at the hearing of the respondents’ Interlocutory Application. At the directions hearing held on 6 July 2012, Senior Counsel for the applicants informed me that the applicants may wish to file further evidence. However, he agreed with the proposition that the two affidavits to which I have referred were sufficient to sustain the pleading on a challenge for summary judgment and/or strike out. By the time of the hearing of the respondents’ Interlocutory Application, the parties were proceeding upon the basis that I should not be required to read and consider the entirety of Mr Danthanarayana’s affidavit affirmed on 26 June 2012 but should only be required to look at certain extracts from that affidavit. The extracts from that affidavit relied upon by each side of the record were specified in schedules provided to me for the purposes of that hearing. I was also asked to read and consider the affidavit of Mr Toze.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In addition, it is quite clear that, despite Mr Danthanarayana’s perceptions, he was continually engaged by the DOD (with the exception of the two months which I have already noted) for almost three years from 1 October 2008 to 30 June 2011.STRIKE OUT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RELEVANT PRINCIPLES) The relevant principles were not in issue at the hearing before me. Strike Out The respondents relied upon r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (FCR). Particular emphasis was placed upon r 16.21(1)(c), (d) and (e). For the purposes of r 16.21(1)(e), the power to strike out a pleading because it discloses no reasonable cause of action will be exercised only in a plain and obvious case. Leave to replead will be refused if no reasonable amendment can cure the alleged defect and there is no reasonable question to be tried (Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2012) 203 FCR 325 at [43] (p 337)). An ambiguous or evasive pleading will be struck out because it is apt to cause confusion. Similar notions underpin the power of the Court to strike out a pleading if it is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding. Generally speaking, the question of whether a pleading should be struck out will be determined by reference to the pleading alone. However, in an appropriate case, evidence may be led.Summary Dismissal In Shammas v Canberra Institute of Technology [2014] FCA 71, I summarised the principles to be applied when the Court comes to consider exercising its power to summarily dismiss a proceeding pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA) in light of the High Court’s decision in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118. At [50], I said: …(a)The power to order summary dismissal pursuant to s 31A is different from the power to strike out defective pleadings pursuant to a rule of Court in the terms of O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules 1979.(b)The power to terminate proceedings summarily should be exercised with caution.(c)There must be a high degree of certainty that the claimant cannot succeed if the proceeding is allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.(d)There must be “no reasonable prospect of success”. This is a different concept from the concept of “no real prospect of success”. The statutory admonition is that a proceeding may be found to have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecution even if it is not hopeless or bound to fail. This test constitutes a radical departure from previous regimes which required that the proceeding must be shown to have no prospects of success. At [51]–[52], I went on to say:As I observed at [13] above, I am of the view that the test for summary dismissal laid down by r 26.01(a) FCR is the same test as the test for summary dismissal specified in s 31A of the Federal Court Act.Rule 26.01(c) FCR provides that a respondent may apply to the Court for an order that a claim be summarily dismissed if no reasonable cause of action is disclosed in the applicant’s pleadings. Under this rule, an applicant for an order summarily dismissing a proceeding is required to demonstrate that there is no possibility that the claimant’s claim can succeed.THE APPLICANTS’ CAUSES OF ACTIONConspiracy

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Cox, Dixon J (at 717) specifically approved the observations made by Evatt J at 399 ff in McKernan. At 718–719 in Cox, Dixon J explained why the defendants in that case were entitled to take steps to revolt against the control of the chairman and managing director if they thought it was in the best interests of the relevant corporation to do so. The mere fact that their actions might injure the chairman and managing director was not sufficient to make out the tort of conspiracy. In Cox, Dixon J summarily dismissed the action because he took the view that it was clearly hopeless.Consideration In their Originating Application, conspiracy is alleged against all of the second to eighth respondents. The conspiracy so alleged is a conspiracy to injure both applicants. In the FASOC, at pars 43–45, the alleged conspiracy is said to be directed to harming Mr Danthanarayana only although the allegation against all of the second to eighth respondents is maintained. In par 46A ff, the alternative conspiracy is said to be directed against Mr Danthanarayana alone but, in that paragraph, the conspirators are confined to the second to fifth respondents. The essential framework of these allegations is confusing and not consistent with the claims for relief made in the applicants’ Originating Application. In support of his claim for damages for conspiracy, Mr Danthanarayana points to a series of disparate acts pleaded earlier in the FASOC as acts constituting bullying and harassment and attempts by the individuals concerned to prevent his being contracted to the DOD and the DMO. I pause to note that, nowhere in either par 43, 44 or 46A is there any particular allegation made against the fifth respondent (Mr Pope). Notwithstanding those matters, Mr Pope is the subject of a general conspiracy allegation in par 43 and a further conspiracy allegation in par 46B of the FASOC and thus is dragged into the consequential allegations in par 46C, 46D and 46E of the FASOC. Counsel for the respondents submitted that:In order to establish an “unlawful purpose” conspiracy, it is necessary to show that each conspirator shares the predominant motive of causing pecuniary harm to the plaintiff. Two aspects of this requirement are to be noted:(a)That motive must be held by each individual said to be a party to the conspiracy. An “evil motive” proved to exist in one or more cannot be imputed to other persons, even if they be involved in actions which the others are undertaking with the predominant motive of injuring the plaintiff. And if only one person has the necessary evil motive, neither they nor any of the others can be liable.(b)It is not enough that the defendants know that their actions will cause financial harm. Such harm may be inevitable but if it is brought about by persons motivated by an ultimate objective of protecting their own trade or business, it will not be a conspiracy. To be actionable, the predominant motive, or ultimate goal, must be the infliction of harm upon the plaintiff.