Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2016] FCA 157

File number: ACD 74 of 2011
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 29 February 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether, in the events which have happened, the Court should grant leave to amend to an applicant who has propounded several iterations of his proposed Statement of Claim including at times after an early iteration of that pleading was struck out with a very limited grant of a right to re-plead
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 12, 340, 342, 545

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011, r 26.01

Cases cited:

Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 552

Damevski v Guidice (2003) 133 FCR 438

HMS Truculent:  The Admiralty v The Divina (Owners) [1951] 2 All ER 968

Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox (2009) 240 CLR 1

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471

Rockdale Beef Pty Ltd v Carey [2003] NSWCA 132

Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16

Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248

Date of hearing: Decided on the Papers
Date of last submissions: 31 October 2014
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 117
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr I Neil SC and Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Colquhoun Murphy
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr TM Begbie
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

ACD 74 of 2011
BETWEEN:

WAJIRA DANTHANARAYANA

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s Application for Leave to Amend his Originating Application and his Amended Statement of Claim in accordance with the proposed Amended Originating Application and proposed Second Further Amended Statement of Claim both dated 22 September 2014 be dismissed.

2.Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, this proceeding be wholly dismissed. 

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding incurred in the period from 28 May 2014 to 26 August 2014 on an indemnity basis.

4.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding incurred after 26 August 2014 on an indemnity basis. 

5.Order 9 made on 28 May 2014 be vacated and in lieu thereof ORDERS that the costs ordered to be paid in par 2 of the Orders made on 28 May 2014 as varied on 26 August 2014 may be taxed forthwith. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FOSTER J:

  1. On 28 May 2014, I struck out the applicants’ Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 22 August 2012 and summarily dismissed all of the claims…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 157
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2), the applicant, Danthanarayana, sought leave to amend his Statement of Claim in light of several previous iterations of his proposed pleadings being struck out. The dispute centered around Danthanarayana's claims of vicarious liability against the Commonwealth for the actions of Messrs Sykes and Pope, and whether he had a duty of care directly owed by the Commonwealth. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The legal issues before the Court included whether Danthanarayana should be granted leave to amend his pleadings and whether he had a real prospect of succeeding with his claims.

The Court considered that Danthanarayana's proposed case based on the Fair Work Act was hopeless and that there was no real prospect of success for any of the causes of action he sought to propound. The Court held that Danthanarayana had not heeded the warnings given by the respondents' solicitors about the form of his pleadings and had persistently failed to address their concerns. The Court also found that Danthanarayana's claims lacked the crucial factor of a need to coordinate activities which were inherently dangerous and gave rise to a foreseeable risk of injury. The Court concluded that neither of the direct duties relied upon by Danthanarayana existed in the present case.

Based on the reasoning provided, the Court dismissed Danthanarayana's Application for Leave to Amend his Originating Application and his Amended Statement of Claim. The proceeding was wholly dismissed, and Danthanarayana was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the proceeding incurred in the period from 28 May 2014 to 26 August 2014 on an indemnity basis. The applicant was also ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the proceeding incurred after 26 August 2014 on an indemnity basis. The costs ordered to be paid in par 2 of the Orders made on 28 May 2014 as varied on 26 August 2014 were to be taxed forthwith.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s Application for Leave to Amend his Originating Application and his Amended Statement of Claim in accordance with the proposed Amended Originating Application and proposed Second Further Amended Statement of Claim both dated 22 September 2014 be dismissed.

2. Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, this proceeding be wholly dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding incurred in the period from 28 May 2014 to 26 August 2014 on an indemnity basis.

4. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding incurred after 26 August 2014 on an indemnity basis.

5. Order 9 made on 28 May 2014 be vacated and in lieu thereof ORDERS that the costs ordered to be paid in par 2 of the Orders made on 28 May 2014 as varied on 26 August 2014 may be taxed forthwith.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For all of the above reasons, the applicant’s proposed case based upon the FWA is hopeless.Conclusions (Leave to Amend) For the reasons which I have explained, I consider that the applicant has no real prospect of succeeding with any of the causes of action which he seeks to propound in ASC Version 2. Leave to amend in order to introduce those causes of action should therefore be refused. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. THE INDEMNITY COSTS ORDER MADE ON 26 AUGUST 2014 (ORDER 2) On 26 August 2014, I ordered that the applicant and Nirvana pay all of the respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding up to 28 May 2014 on an indemnity basis. My reasons for making that order were that, in the period from the commencement of this proceeding up to 28 May 2014, when I delivered Danthanarayana No 1, the applicants had had many opportunities to address the respondents’ concerns about the form of their pleading but had steadfastly refused to take heed of the many warnings given to them by the solicitors for the respondents. In her affidavit sworn on 6 August 2014, Ms Harvey traversed the entire history of the respondents’ efforts to secure a sensible pleading from the applicants. The affidavit disclosed a sorry history indeed. It is not necessary for present purposes to traverse in detail the history of the dealings between the parties. The substance of the matter is that, apart from the slim possibility that the applicant in his individual capacity might be able to bring a claim for breaches of a duty of care owed directly to him by the Commonwealth, the case pleaded by the applicants throughout the period 2011 and 2012 was a case which had no reasonable prospects of success. In my judgment, it was a case which should never have been brought. It was for these brief reasons that I considered that an indemnity costs order for the entire case up to 28 May 2014 was justified.COSTS FOR THE PERIOD AFTER 28 MAY 2014 At [2]–[8] above, I set out the steps that were taken in this proceeding between late May 2014 and 26 August 2014. In my view, the applicant should have been ready to make his submissions in support of the DSFASOC on 1 August 2014. He was not then in a position to do so. Although the time in Court on 1 August 2014 was not completely wasted, the fact that the applicant was not ready to proceed on that occasion caused further delay in the disposition of his Application for Leave to Amend. In the end, of course, he chose to propound a further draft of his proposed claim which first became available on 22 September 2014. Against that background, and having had 25 days to consider the Commonwealth’s oral submissions made on 1 August 2014, the applicant was still not ready to proceed on 26 August 2014. The applicant’s lack of preparedness to proceed on 26 August 2014 became apparent soon after the commencement of the hearing on that day. The applicant’s defaults were made more serious by the circumstance that, not only was he not ready to proceed on that day, but Senior Counsel then appearing for him sought yet a further indulgence. Counsel had formed the view that the DSFASOC would need to be amended yet again and he sought time within which to consider and propound further amendments. This was most unsatisfactory since the whole purpose of adjourning the matter at the request of the applicant on 1 August 2014 was to have his Application for Leave to Amend finally resolved on 26 August 2014.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As far as the Commonwealth’s proposition that the duty of care underpinning the alleged vicarious liability of the Commonwealth for the conduct of Messrs Sykes and Pope is concerned, the applicant took issue with the proposition that the duty, as sought to be pleaded, was absolute. The applicant argued that he was intending to put that duty of care more narrowly than this and that it is a duty not to engage in particular conduct which would lead foreseeably to the applicant suffering a psychiatric injury. CONSIDERATION AND DECISIONDirect Duties of Care Owed by the Commonwealth In my view, it is plain beyond argument that, at no time since 2005, has the applicant worked directly for the Commonwealth as an APS employee. The applicant’s last job as an employee of the Commonwealth was his employment by Defence Housing Australia as an ICT Solutions Architect/Project Manager which ended in 2005, four years before the events about which he now complains. At all times from November 2006, the applicant’s services to the Commonwealth had been provided to it by third party service providers (such as Icon) which in turn had contracted with PCIT, not the applicant. In the period from November 2005 onwards, the applicant himself had no direct contractual relationship with the Commonwealth nor did he have any such relationship with the service providers which themselves had a direct contractual relationship with the Commonwealth. He was, in every sense of the word, an independent contractor whose services were provided to the Commonwealth by a service provider which, in turn, had contracted with PCIT to provide the applicant’s services. There is no basis in the pleaded facts and matters nor in the evidence in the applicant’s affidavit affirmed on 26 June 2012 for the applicant’s contention that he was engaged as an independent contractor under an implied contract between him and the Commonwealth. Nor is there any basis for a contention that he was engaged by the Commonwealth directly as its employee under some other implied contract. The matters to which I have referred at [86] above are fatal to the imposition of either of the direct duties relied upon by the applicant at pars 24 and 25 of his proposed pleading. Furthermore, as submitted by the Commonwealth, the fact that the applicant worked with the Commonwealth’s employees and that the Commonwealth should have had control of those employees does not engage the duty to provide a safe system of work explained by the High Court in Stevens. The claim as pleaded here lacks the crucial factor of a need to co-ordinate activities which were inherently dangerous and which, absent co-ordination, gave rise to a foreseeable risk of injury. See also Leighton at 23–24 [52]–[57] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Bell JJ. Further, the Commonwealth’s submissions to the effect that the pleaded duties conflict with other obligations of the Commonwealth are sound and I accept them. They provide another basis for the Court to find that neither of the direct duties relied upon by the applicant existed in the present case.