Trade Practices Commission v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd

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JUDGMENT No. ........ ........ . J ,--

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application to strike out paragraphs

of statement of claim on ground that they have tendency to

cause prejudice, embarrassment and/or delay - whether allegations of facts and circumstances concerning matters extraneous to geographic market for pre-mixed concrete capable of being relevant to degree of first respondent's power in that market.

Federal Court of Australia Rules, Order 11, r.l6(b)

Trade 1974, 6.46
REQlSTRY

SHEPPARD, JENKINSON and DRUMMOND JJ

S AUGUST 1994 12 SEP 1994

AUSTRAUA

BRISBANE pRlNUPAL
OF AUS- )
)
) No. QG143 of 1992

BETWEEN:

ICES m

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m:  SHEPPARD, JENKINSON and DRUMMOND JJ
g B T E :  5 AUGUST 1994
M:  BRISBANE
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1. Leave be granted to the applicant and to the

respondents to appeal against the judgment of this
Court delivered on 12 May 1994.

  1. The applicant and the respondents file notices of appeal pursuant to that leave.

  2. These orders not be entered until such notices of appeal have been filed.

4 .     The appeal by the applicant be allowed.

  1. The orders made by Cooper J on 12 May 1994 be set aside.

  2. In lieu thereof it be ordered that the respondents' notice of motion filed on 11 February 1993 be dismissed with costs.

7 .    The appeal by the respondents be dismissed.

  1. The respondente pay to the applicant its costs of the applicant's appeal and the respondents' appeal.

a:  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order
36 of the Federal Court Rules.

COURT OF A U S W 1

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- S I D ) No. QG143 of 1992
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W: SHEPPARD, JENKINSON and DRUMMOND JJ

: S AUGUST 1994

SHEPPARD J: To be determined are two applicatione for leave

to appeal and, if leave be granted, the consequential appeal8

from a judgment of a judge of this Court (Cooper J) delivered on 12 May 1994. The matter before his Honour was a notice of motion taken out by the respondents to the original application seeking an order that paras. 3(b) and (c), 14, 15(b) to (f) inclusive, and 17 of the applicants' statement of claim be struck out on the grounds that the paragraphs had a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment and/or delay in the proceedings. The application was made pursuant to Order 11 r.l6(b) of the Court's Rules.

His Honour ordered that paras. 3(b), 3(c), 14, lS(d) and 15(f) of the statement of claim be struck out and that the applicant have leave to amend para.17 to delete therefrom the reference to para.14. The Trade Practices Comiseion seeks leave to appeal against those orders upon the basis that his Honour was in error in ordering any part of the statement of claim to be struck out. The respondents to the original application, to whom I shall refer as 'the respondents', seek leave to appeal because…

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Details
Case
[1994] FCA 628
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal by both the Trade Practices Commission and Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd against a decision made by Cooper J, a judge of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal centred around an application by Pioneer to strike out certain paragraphs of the Trade Practices Commission's statement of claim on the grounds that they had a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment and/or delay. The Federal Court of Australia Rules, Order 11, r.16(b) was the relevant rule in this case. The legal issue to be determined was whether the allegations of facts and circumstances concerning matters extraneous to the geographic market for pre-mixed concrete could be considered relevant to the degree of Pioneer's power in that market.

The court found that the allegations in question were relevant to the assessment of Pioneer's market power, as they demonstrated the corporation's ability to act without regard to its competitors due to its access to capital and resources. The court held that the 1986 amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974 did not limit the scope of the section and that factors outside the market could still be considered when determining market power. The court also found that the allegations were not redundant or irrelevant, as they could contribute to the proof of one or more of the proscribed purposes in subsection 46(1) of the Act.

In conclusion, the court allowed the Trade Practices Commission's appeal, dismissed Pioneer's appeal, and set aside the orders made by Cooper J. The court held that none of the paragraphs in the statement of claim were objectionable and should not have been struck out. The costs of the appeals were to be paid by the respondents.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Trade Practices Commission commenced proceedings against Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd and others to recover pecuniary penalties in respect of alleged contraventions of the Trade Practices Act 1974. The Commission sought injunctive relief and pleaded a statement of claim alleging that Pioneer, a subsidiary of Pioneer International Limited and part of the Pioneer Group, had substantial financial resources and was one of the largest producers and suppliers of pre-mixed concrete in the world. The claim further alleged that Pioneer had substantial market power in the Warwick area of Queensland, enabling it to prevent the entry of competitors and deter competitive conduct. The respondents sought to have certain paragraphs of the statement of claim struck out on the grounds of prejudice, embarrassment, and delay. The primary judge ordered some paragraphs to be struck out, leading to the current appeals.

The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia on appeals from a decision of Cooper J. The respondents to the original application sought to strike out certain paragraphs of the Trade Practices Commission's statement of claim. Cooper J ordered some paragraphs to be struck out, which both the Commission and the respondents appealed. The appeals were heard by Sheppard, Jenkinson, and Drummond JJ, who allowed the Commission's appeal and dismissed the respondents' appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether allegations of facts and circumstances concerning matters extraneous to the geographic market for pre-mixed concrete are capable of being relevant to the degree of Pioneer's power in that market.
2. Whether the allegations in paragraphs 15(d), 15(f), 14(f), and 14(h) are evidentiary, not ultimate facts, contributing to the proof of Pioneer having a substantial degree of power in the Warwick concrete market.
3. Whether the inquiry required by section 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 into whether Pioneer has a substantial degree of power in a market is limited to the matters referred to in section 46(3).

Held
1. The court granted leave for both the Trade Practices Commission and the respondents to appeal against the judgment of Cooper J delivered on 12 May 1994.
2. The appeal by the Trade Practices Commission was allowed, and the orders made by Cooper J on 12 May 1994 were set aside. In lieu thereof, it was ordered that the respondents' notice of motion filed on 11 February 1993 be dismissed with costs.
3. The appeal by the respondents was dismissed, and the respondents were ordered to pay the Trade Practices Commission's costs of both the applicant's appeal and the respondents' appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the application to strike out certain paragraphs of the statement of claim on the grounds that they had a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment, and/or delay. The court examined whether allegations of facts and circumstances concerning matters extraneous to the geographic market for pre-mixed concrete were capable of being relevant to the degree of Pioneer's power in that market. The court held that none of the paragraphs in the statement of claim were objectionable and that none should have been struck out. The court found that the allegations in paragraphs 15(d), 15(f), 14(f), and 14(h) were evidentiary, not ultimate facts, contributing to the proof of Pioneer having a substantial degree of power in the Warwick concrete market. The court also determined that the inquiry required by section 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 into whether Pioneer has a substantial degree of power in a market is not limited to the matters referred to in section 46(3). The court relied on previous authorities to support its conclusion that extraneous factors could be relevant to the identification and assessment of market power. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that extraneous factors may be relevant to the identification and assessment of market power in a given market.