FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bizuneh v Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission [2022] FCA 1198
File number(s): NSD 90 of 2022 Judgment of: RAPER J Date of judgment: 7 October 2022 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – where the applicant’s employment was terminated – where the applicant claims breaches of ss 15(3), 15(4), 29(1), 41B(3) and 50A of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) and under s 39B(1) and 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application by the respondent for summary judgment and strike out – interlocutory application by the applicant to dismiss the respondent’s interlocutory application –– whether the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success – respondent’s application to strike out parts of the applicant’s claim partially successful – applicant allowed to re-plead one aspect of his claim- applicant’s interlocutory application dismissed
Legislation: Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 351(1), 117, 392
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 31A(2), 37M, 37N
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), 39B(1A)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) ss 7, 15(3), 15(4), 22(2), 29(1), 41B(3), 50A(2), 78
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 9(1), 15(1)
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.02, 16.21, 16.21(1)(e)
Cases cited: Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 499
Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629
Cook v Australian Postal Corporation [2017] FCA 509
Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Turnbull Cooktown Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 489
Kimber v Owners of Strata Plan No. 48216 [2017] FCAFC 226; 258 FCR 575
Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney [2021] FCA 360
McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424
Sadie Ville Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) [2017] FCA 1202; 123 ACSR 223
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118
White Industries AustLtd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; 160 FCR 298
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 54 Date of hearing: 6 and 21 September 2022 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr T Woods of Lander & Rogers (on 6 September 2022)
Ms E Lutwyche of Lander & Rogers (on 21 September 2022)
ORDERS
NSD 90 of 2022 BETWEEN: TAFESE ESHETU BIZUNEH
Applicant
AND: TOM ROGERS COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RAPER J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 OCTOBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s originating application filed on 15 February 2022 and amended statement of claim filed on 30 June 2022 is struck out pursuant to r 16.21(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
2.The applicant is granted leave to re-plead only his claim under s 29(1) of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) regarding the alleged lack of power on the part of Ms Roebeck (by reason of her position) to terminate his employment.
3.The applicant’s interlocutory…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1198
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the applicant’s claims had a reasonable prospect of success and if they disclosed a reasonable cause of action. The court considered the pleaded facts and the additional claims raised by the applicant during the hearing. The court found that there was a factual dispute regarding the identity of the person who terminated the applicant’s employment, which made it inappropriate to grant summary judgment. However, the court concluded that the applicant’s claims, except for the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The court partially upheld the respondent’s application for strike out, except for the applicant’s claim relating to the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act, for which the applicant was given leave to re-plead.
The Federal Court of Australia refused the respondent’s interlocutory application for summary judgment but partially upheld the respondent’s application for strike out. The court found that the applicant’s claims, except for the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out. The applicant was given leave to re-plead on the issue of the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act. Consequently, the applicant’s interlocutory application was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
An “Agency Head” is defined in s 7 of the PS Act to mean: (a) the Secretary of a Department; or (b) the Head of an Executive Agency; or (c) the Head of a Statutory Agency. Consideration For the following reasons, I conclude that given there is a factual dispute with respect to one aspect of the applicant’s claim, this is not an appropriate matter for which summary judgment should be ordered in the respondent’s favour. However, I am of the view that, save for the applicant’s unpleaded claim under s 29(1) regarding the alleged absence of power on the part of Ms Roebeck to terminate the applicant’s employment, all other claims made by the applicant do not disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out. The applicant will be given leave to re-plead on this issue only. Paragraphs [4]–[28] of the applicant’s amended statement of claim sets out his brief employment history. The applicant claims to be aggrieved by the fact of him only being able to work three days “for nearly one month” (at [9]), that he was “deliberately and systematically denied” the opportunity of “crucial training” (at [10] and [13]) which he then had to do in his own time (at [14]), was not given an access pass (at [11]), suffered delays in the approval of his timesheet (at [12]), was required to share a desktop computer and workstation undermining NSW health orders in relation to the COVID-19 virus (which he refused) (at [16]) and about which he alleges discrimination because of his “constitutional right to be respected and to be treated equally like other team members” (at [17]) (this comprises the incident referred to in Ms Roebeck’s email notifying him of the termination of his employment), that Ms Roebeck’s accusation of him raising his voice was “pure fabrication and defamatory … racist, sexist and ageist” (at [18] and [19]), his termination was “pre orchestrated by Ms Castillo and Ms Roebeck” and “should have not been terminated at the drop of a hat — summary dismissal — with no verbal or written warning — more importantly without some procedural fairness” (at [22]) and where he was “unfairly and unlawfully terminated”: at [24]. As can be seen from the foregoing, there is little cohesion between the pleaded factual history (at [3]–[28]) and the articulated causes of action (at [29]–[31]) of the amended statement of claim. Unfortunately, it appears that the applicant’s true grievance appears to be the alleged unfairness of the termination of his employment, a claim which could be brought under the FW Act before the Fair Work Commission but for which this Court has no jurisdiction. I accept that in considering an application under s 31A the Court must consider not only the pleadings but all the material before it. The applicant at hearing articulated two additional claims, arising under s 29(1) of the PS Act, which was not set out in his amended statement of claim, namely: (a) the absence of power on the part of Ms Roebeck to terminate his employment; and, (b) s 29(1) required that the applicant be given notice in writing in advance of the termination of his employment.