Bizuneh v Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bizuneh v Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission [2022] FCA 1198  

File number(s): NSD 90 of 2022
Judgment of: RAPER J
Date of judgment: 7 October 2022
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW –  where the applicant’s employment was terminated – where the applicant claims breaches of ss 15(3), 15(4), 29(1), 41B(3) and 50A of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) and under s 39B(1) and 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application by the respondent for summary judgment and strike out – interlocutory application by the applicant to dismiss the respondent’s interlocutory application –– whether the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success – respondent’s application to strike out parts of the applicant’s claim partially successful – applicant allowed to re-plead one aspect of his claim- applicant’s interlocutory application dismissed  

Legislation:

Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 351(1), 117, 392

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 31A(2), 37M, 37N

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), 39B(1A)

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) ss 7, 15(3), 15(4), 22(2), 29(1), 41B(3), 50A(2), 78

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 9(1), 15(1)

Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.02, 16.21, 16.21(1)(e)

Cases cited:

Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 499

Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629

Cook v Australian Postal Corporation [2017] FCA 509

Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Turnbull Cooktown Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 489

Kimber v Owners of Strata Plan No. 48216 [2017] FCAFC 226; 258 FCR 575

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney [2021] FCA 360

McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424

Sadie Ville Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) [2017] FCA 1202; 123 ACSR 223

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118

White Industries AustLtd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; 160 FCR 298

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 54
Date of hearing: 6 and 21 September 2022
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitors for the Respondent:

Mr T Woods of Lander & Rogers (on 6 September 2022)

Ms E Lutwyche of Lander & Rogers (on 21 September 2022)


ORDERS

NSD 90 of 2022
BETWEEN:

TAFESE ESHETU BIZUNEH

Applicant

AND:

TOM ROGERS COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RAPER J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 OCTOBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s originating application filed on 15 February 2022 and amended statement of claim filed on 30 June 2022 is struck out pursuant to r 16.21(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2.The applicant is granted leave to re-plead only his claim under s 29(1) of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) regarding the alleged lack of power on the part of Ms Roebeck (by reason of her position) to terminate his employment.

3.The applicant’s interlocutory…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Bizuneh v Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1198
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Bizuneh (the applicant) brought a claim against the Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission (the respondent) seeking compensation for the termination of his employment. The applicant claimed that his employment had been terminated unfairly and unlawfully, without procedural fairness, and without notice. The respondent filed an interlocutory application for summary judgment and an application to strike out the applicant’s amended statement of claim. The court had to determine whether the respondent’s application for summary judgment and strike out should be granted.

The court examined whether the applicant’s claims had a reasonable prospect of success and if they disclosed a reasonable cause of action. The court considered the pleaded facts and the additional claims raised by the applicant during the hearing. The court found that there was a factual dispute regarding the identity of the person who terminated the applicant’s employment, which made it inappropriate to grant summary judgment. However, the court concluded that the applicant’s claims, except for the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The court partially upheld the respondent’s application for strike out, except for the applicant’s claim relating to the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act, for which the applicant was given leave to re-plead.

The Federal Court of Australia refused the respondent’s interlocutory application for summary judgment but partially upheld the respondent’s application for strike out. The court found that the applicant’s claims, except for the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out. The applicant was given leave to re-plead on the issue of the alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act. Consequently, the applicant’s interlocutory application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the respondent’s interlocutory application for summary judgment is refused but the respondent’s application for strike out is partially upheld save for the applicant’s claim relating to an alleged breach of s 29(1) of the PS Act for which the applicant is given leave to re-plead. It necessarily follows that the interlocutory application filed by the applicant should be dismissed.BackgroundEngagement as employee On 22 October 2021, the applicant was offered a position by the respondent as a Temporary Office Assistant with the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) for the period 8 November 2021 to 29 September 2022. The applicant accepted and signed the offer on 26 October 2021. The terms of the offer stated that the applicant was employed “in accordance with paragraph 22(2)(c) of the PS Act”, as a “irregular or intermittent (casual)” employee with “[i]rregular or intermittent duties with no guaranteed hours”. The applicant was engaged to perform work only on three occasions, being 11 November, 30 November and 3 December 2021. Termination of employment On 6 December 2021, the applicant was notified by Ms Roebeck, Assistant Divisional Office Manager of the Haymarket Office of the AEC, by email, that his employment had been terminated. The email stated:Dear Tafese,I am writing to you about the termination of your employment with the Australian Electoral Commission as a Temporary Office Assistant. On 6 December 2021, I gave you a telephone call in the presence of my colleague Dominique. In that meeting, it was outlined that your behaviour on Friday, 3 December 2021 was not appropriate and did not display the values of the Australian Public Service, particularly in regards to raising your voice during training, and in the process not being respectful or courteous of other team members in the office. Therefore, I am notifying you in writing to confirm that effective immediately your services with the Australian Electoral Commission will no longer be required and you will not be required to come to the office on Thursday, 9 December 2021 and Friday, 10 December 2021. You will also be paid any outstanding pay, up to and including your last day of employment.Regards,…Disputed facts with respect to the termination of employment It became apparent during the hearing of the interlocutory application that the applicant disputed the following facts with respect to the termination of his employment:(1)who terminated the applicant’s employment – the applicant asserts it was Ms Roebeck (who had no power under s 29(1) of the PS Act to terminate his employment). The respondent asserts it was the decision of Mr Daniel Taylor, Assistant Director – Operations, NSW State Office, who by delegated authority had such power under s 29(1);(2)whether Ms Roebeck had conversed with Mr Taylor prior to the termination of the applicant’s employment; and(3)whether there had been a “meeting” or discussion over the phone by Ms Roebeck with the applicant prior to the termination of his employment.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 31A of the FCA Act provides: 31A Summary judgment…(2) The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3) For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.… Rule 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules provides:16.21 Application to strike out pleadings(1) A party may apply to the Court for an order that all or part of a pleading be struck out on the ground that the pleading:(a) contains scandalous material; or(b) contains frivolous or vexatious material; or(c) is evasive or ambiguous; or(d) is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding; or(e) fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or(f) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.(2) A party may apply for an order that the pleading be removed from the Court file if the pleading contains material of a kind mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.(Emphasis added).Applicable principles In order for the Court to give summary judgment in favour of a respondent under s 31A(2) of the FCA Act, the respondent bears the onus of establishing that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding: Kimber v Owners of Strata Plan No. 48216 [2017] FCAFC 226; 258 FCR 575 at [62]. It is not necessary for the respondent to establish that the claim is “hopeless” or “bound to fail” for it to have no reasonable prospects of success: s 31A(3). The Court must make a practical judgment as to whether the opposing party has reasonable prospects of success, namely prospects which are “real” not “fanciful”: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118 at [17]–[26] per French CJ and Gummow J. The real issue is whether there is an underlying cause of action or defence, not simply whether one is pleaded: at [23], citing White Industries AustLtd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; 160 FCR 298 at [47] (per Lindgren J). As stated in Spencer, in the joint judgment of French CJ and Gummow J at [24]:The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process. The same applies where such disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter this Court in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said:“The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried”.(Footnotes omitted).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

An “Agency Head” is defined in s 7 of the PS Act to mean: (a) the Secretary of a Department; or (b) the Head of an Executive Agency; or (c) the Head of a Statutory Agency. Consideration For the following reasons, I conclude that given there is a factual dispute with respect to one aspect of the applicant’s claim, this is not an appropriate matter for which summary judgment should be ordered in the respondent’s favour. However, I am of the view that, save for the applicant’s unpleaded claim under s 29(1) regarding the alleged absence of power on the part of Ms Roebeck to terminate the applicant’s employment, all other claims made by the applicant do not disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out. The applicant will be given leave to re-plead on this issue only. Paragraphs [4]–[28] of the applicant’s amended statement of claim sets out his brief employment history. The applicant claims to be aggrieved by the fact of him only being able to work three days “for nearly one month” (at [9]), that he was “deliberately and systematically denied” the opportunity of “crucial training” (at [10] and [13]) which he then had to do in his own time (at [14]), was not given an access pass (at [11]), suffered delays in the approval of his timesheet (at [12]), was required to share a desktop computer and workstation undermining NSW health orders in relation to the COVID-19 virus (which he refused) (at [16]) and about which he alleges discrimination because of his “constitutional right to be respected and to be treated equally like other team members” (at [17]) (this comprises the incident referred to in Ms Roebeck’s email notifying him of the termination of his employment), that Ms Roebeck’s accusation of him raising his voice was “pure fabrication and defamatory … racist, sexist and ageist” (at [18] and [19]), his termination was “pre orchestrated by Ms Castillo and Ms Roebeck” and “should have not been terminated at the drop of a hat — summary dismissal — with no verbal or written warning — more importantly without some procedural fairness” (at [22]) and where he was “unfairly and unlawfully terminated”: at [24]. As can be seen from the foregoing, there is little cohesion between the pleaded factual history (at [3]–[28]) and the articulated causes of action (at [29]–[31]) of the amended statement of claim. Unfortunately, it appears that the applicant’s true grievance appears to be the alleged unfairness of the termination of his employment, a claim which could be brought under the FW Act before the Fair Work Commission but for which this Court has no jurisdiction. I accept that in considering an application under s 31A the Court must consider not only the pleadings but all the material before it. The applicant at hearing articulated two additional claims, arising under s 29(1) of the PS Act, which was not set out in his amended statement of claim, namely: (a) the absence of power on the part of Ms Roebeck to terminate his employment; and, (b) s 29(1) required that the applicant be given notice in writing in advance of the termination of his employment.