FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Quach v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency [2021] FCA 313
File number: ACD 47 of 2020 Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 31 March 2021 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal – whether applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding – application for pleadings to be struck out – application for summary dismissal granted Legislation: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 4G, 13
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) ss 123.1, 150.1, 150.5
Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 9(5)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 23B
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 26.01
Federal Court (Criminal Proceedings) Rules 2016 (Cth) sch 1
Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW)
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (NSW)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 69(1)
Cases cited: Annetts v McCann [1990] HCA 57; (1990) 170 CLR 596
Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited [1993] FCA 801; (1993) 46 FCR 225
Gedeon v Commissioner of NSW Crime Commission [2008] HCA 43; (2008) 236 CLR 120
Health Care Complaints Commission v Quach [2015] NSWCATOD 2
Health Care Complaints Commission v Quach (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 32
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited v Tolfield Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1309
Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority(No 4) [2011] FCA 1126; (2011) 203 FCR 293
Rana v Commonwealth [2013] FCA 189
Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118
Taylor v Attorney-General (Cth) [2019] HCA 30; (2019) 372 ALR 58
Division: General Division Registry: Australian Capital Territory National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 49 Date of hearing: 15 March 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. E Latiff Solicitor for the Respondent: MinterEllison ORDERS
ACD 47 of 2020 BETWEEN: MICHAEL VAN THANH QUACH
Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN HEALTH PRACTITIONER REGULATION AGENCY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 MARCH 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s application for summary judgment is allowed.
2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or taxed on an indemnity basis.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
The respondent applies, by way of an interlocutory application filed on 26 November 2020 for summary judgment pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.01(1)(b), (c) and/or (d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) on the ground the applicant has no…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 313
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Mr Quach had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting his case against AHPRA. The applicant's pleadings were insufficient as they did not identify any material facts on which the allegation was based. Furthermore, the applicant's claim that AHPRA cancelled his registration was incorrect, as it was the NCAT that made orders to that effect. The court also noted that the applicant's reliance on certain legal precedents did not assist his case. The court found that the proceedings were frivolous and vexatious and that Mr Quach had no reasonable cause of action.
In light of the above findings, the court granted the respondent's application for summary judgment and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs on an indemnity basis. The court noted that the respondent had twice put the applicant on notice of the defects in the proceedings and had invited the applicant to discontinue the proceedings by a nominated date on the basis that it would pay its own costs. The applicant did not respond to either letter. The court found that the principles in relation to the award of indemnity costs were well established and that the respondent's application for indemnity costs was supported by the circumstances of the case.
In conclusion, the Federal Court found that Mr Quach had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting his case against AHPRA and that the proceedings were frivolous and vexatious. The court granted the respondent's application for summary judgment and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs on an indemnity basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s application for summary judgment is allowed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or taxed on an indemnity basis.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
AHPRA’s work is overseen by an Agency Management Committee. This Committee is appointed by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Health Council in accordance with the National Law in force in each state and territory. Consideration These proceedings are misconceived. A number of observations may be made. First, contrary to the applicant’s contention, AHPRA’s submission as to the legislative structure in respect to the National Law is relevant to determining this issue. Nothing in the passage of Quach v MLC Life Ltd which the applicant relied on at [20] above, suggests otherwise. A brief consideration of the legislative scheme as described above, demonstrates the fallacy in various aspects of the applicant’s submissions as to its operation. Second, the applicant does not identify in his pleading any of the material facts on which the allegation is based. Such pleading is plainly insufficient. The applicant does not identify when and to whom the purported false statement was made. I note that although the proceedings are instituted by originating application against AHPRA, the applicant made submissions that such a body did not exist. During submissions, the applicant said the allegation related to a letter Ms Barekzai sent to him dated 31 August 2020. However, that letter is in the following terms: We are a national body whose main aim is to protect the health and safety of the public. We are responsible for ensuring compliance with the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, as in force in each state and territory (the National Law), and we work in partnership with the Medical Board of Australia (the Board) in this regard. That letter does no more than describe AHPRA as a national body; it is an accurate description. Ms Barekzai did not identify herself as Commonwealth body. There is no proper basis on which the applicant could establish the factual assertion underlying his allegation. It follows, to put another way, the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. I note in any event, in her position, Ms Barekzai is protected from personal liability for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith, in the exercise of her function under the National Law, or in in the reasonable belief that the act or omission was in the exercise of a function under the National Law: s 236. Although the only claim in the originating application relates to the false statement said to be made by Ms Barekzai, the applicant’s statement of claim makes an allegation in relation to AHPRA cancelling his registration. Given Ms Barekzai has only been employed by AHPRA since 2018, it is clear that any conduct on her part could not form the basis of this aspect of the statement of claim. Leaving aside the deficiencies in the statement of claim, the assertion that AHPRA cancelled his registration is plainly incorrect, as it was NCAT which made orders to that effect: Health Care Complaints Commission v Quach (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 32, and see Health Care Complaints Commission v Quach [2015] NSWCATOD 2. That was the body entrusted with the power to do so: ss 149, 149C of the National Law. AHPRA maintains the national register of practitioners, and acts on that decision. There is a process of appeal stipulated in the National Law. Any decision in respect to cancelling a health practitioner’s registration is done by operation of the National Law, which is State or Territory Law. The applicant’s reliance on Gedeon v Commissioner of NSW Crime Commission [2008] HCA 43; (2008) 236 CLR 120 and Yager does not assist him. I note that the applicant’s repeated attempts to overturn those decisions of NCAT in the New South Wales Supreme Court have been unsuccessful. If this is another attempt to do so, it is plainly without foundation. Moreover, in so far as the applicant makes an allegation in relation to cancelling his registration, he also has not identified any basis on which this Court would have jurisdiction.