FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Krajniw v Newman (No 2) [2015] FCA 673
Citation: Krajniw v Newman (No 2) [2015] FCA 673 Parties: TONY KRAJNIW v CAMPBELL NEWMAN MP PREMIER, ANDREW POWELL MINISTER FOR ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE PROTECTION, AARRON DILLAWAY MP, JON BLACK DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE PROTECTION, DEAN ELLWOOD DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE PROTECTION, TAMARA O'SHEA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE PROTECTION, TONY ROBERTS DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE PROTECTION, IAN STEWART POLICE COMMISSIONER, GRAHAM QUIRK - MAYOR BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL, BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL, COLIN JENSEN CHIEF EXECUTIVE BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL, RYAN MURPHY - COUNCILLOR BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL, MICHAEL LAWSON REGIONAL COORDINATOR NATURAL ENVIRONMENT EAST BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL, KEN EDIE TECHNICAL ARBORICULTURE OFFICER BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL, MICK MAHER NATURAL ENVIRONMENT TECHNICAL OFFICER BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL, CRAIG HARDY [SIC] - RANGER BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL and BRISBANE TREE SERVICES File number: QUD 574 of 2014 Judge: REEVES J Date of judgment: 3 July 2015 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – application for removal of parties under r 9.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – application to strike out statement of claim under r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – consideration of whether no reasonable prospect of success – consideration of whether an abuse of process – where no legal or factual foundation to claims – where scandalous and inflammatory language used in pleadings
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – application regarding alleged contraventions of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 – operation of s 475 of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 – operation of ss 18 and 18A of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 – where species are not protected – where conduct amounting to alleged contraventions not pleaded
Legislation: Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)Cases cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256; [2013] FCA 641
du Boulay v Worrell [2009] QCA 63
Krajniw v Brisbane City Council [2011] QPELR 260
Krajniw v Brisbane City Council (No 2) [2011] FCA 563
Krajniw v Newman [2014] FCA 1454
Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCAFC 18
Mulhern v Bank of Queensland [2015] FCA 44
Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275
Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378
Zippo Manufacturing Co v Jaxlawn Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1125Date of hearing: 21 April 2015 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 42 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: Ms J Brien Solicitor for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: Crown Law Counsel for…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 673
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Mr Krajniw's claims lacked both legal and factual foundation. It noted that many of the claims were not supported by any facts pleaded in the statement of claim and that some of the relief sought was not available to Mr Krajniw under the EPBC Act. The court further observed that Mr Krajniw's pleadings were marked by scandalous and inflammatory language, which did not contribute to a fair and effective litigation process. The court concluded that Mr Krajniw did not have any reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting his claims against the respondents and that the proceeding should be dismissed. Given this conclusion, the court did not need to consider the other orders sought by the respondents.
The court's decision was based on the fundamental obligations of a self-represented litigant to properly state their claims, including addressing standing, jurisdiction, parties, relief sought, and the facts supporting the claims. The court found that Mr Krajniw's statement of claim was deficient in these respects and amounted to an abuse of process. Consequently, the court granted judgment in favour of the respondents, ordered the applicant to pay the respondents' costs, and dismissed the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Judgment be entered for the respondents against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
2. The applicant pays the first to sixteenth respondents’ costs of and incidental to this application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As with his written submissions, Mr Krajniw’s oral submissions did not address the respondents’ applications for summary judgment. His oral submissions comprised little more than a series of emotional statements about the alleged destruction of the squirrel glider possum.CONSIDERATION In Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCAFC 183 (Manolakis), the Full Court of this Court described the obligation of a self-represented litigant to properly state his or her claim in the following terms (at [12]):An aggrieved self-represented applicant must, like any other litigant, address:Ÿhis or her standing to make claims against other persons;Ÿthe jurisdiction of the court in which he or she wishes to make those claims;Ÿthe precise identity of the parties against whom the claims are to be made; Ÿthe relief that is to be sought; andŸthe facts which are said to found an entitlement to that relief. In du Boulay v Worrell [2009] QCA 63 (du Boulay), Muir JA provided a summary of the conduct of a self-represented litigant in that case. His Honour said:[68]The appellant appears to have succumbed to the phenomenon which inflicts many self-represented litigants of becoming so fixated on real or perceived wrongs that he has lost any semblance of objectivity and the power of discrimination. It does not appear to have occurred to him that by heaping allegation on allegation he has put it beyond his ability to plead, let alone conduct and finance his case. Nor does it appear to have occurred to him that the myriad of allegations has a tendency to destroy whatever credibility may have attached to a case involving fewer allegations more obviously supported by clearly identified material facts. [69]It may be that self-represented litigants should be afforded a degree of indulgence and given appropriate assistance: Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCA 223. But if a self-represented person wishes to litigate, he or she is as much bound by the rules of Court as any other litigant. Those rules exist to facilitate efficient, fair and cost-effective litigation. The Court’s duty is to act impartially and ensure procedural fairness to all parties, not merely one party who may be disadvantaged through lack of legal representation. The other party to the litigation is entitled to protection from oppressive and vexatious conduct regardless of whether that conduct arises out of ignorance, mistake or malice. When one examines Mr Krajniw’s statement of claim in this proceeding, it becomes obvious that he has spurned the obligations described by the Full Court in Manolakis and instead produced a document which suffers most of the vices described by Muir JA in du Boulay above. Indeed, Mr Krajniw’s statement of claim in this proceeding evokes the words of Searles DCJ in a previous proceeding involving him: Krajniw v Brisbane City Council [2011] QPELR 260 at [17], as follows:Mr Krajniw has, in these proceedings, taken a ‘scattergun’ approach to raising a litany of issues that are variously repetitive, irrelevant, not supported by the evidence, misconceived, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and, at times, scandalous.The summary below of Mr Krajniw’s statement of claim demonstrates why all these observations are entirely apt.