FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mulhern v Bank of Queensland [2015] FCA 44
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 44
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the plaintiffs, apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern, had not identified any real issue of fact or law to be decided as between themselves and the Bank. There was no evidence that would support a conclusion that there may be any real issue of fact or law to be decided as between any of the plaintiffs and the Bank. The proceedings were partly dismissed as an abuse of process, as they were a collateral attack upon a final decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The court found that Mr Mulhern and Mrs Mulhern did not have standing to bring claims to the extent that those claims had vested in their respective trustees in bankruptcy. The court struck out the statement of claim in its entirety, gave judgment for the defendant against the plaintiffs, and stayed the proceedings brought by the second and eleventh plaintiffs until the conclusion of their bankruptcy or further order.
In summary, the court held that the plaintiffs had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, and that the proceedings were an abuse of process. The statement of claim was struck out, judgment was given for the defendant against the plaintiffs, and the proceedings were stayed until the conclusion of the second and eleventh plaintiffs' bankruptcy or further order.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The statement of claim be struck out in its entirety.
2. Judgment be given for the defendant against each of the first and third to tenth plaintiffs.
3. Judgment be given for the defendant against the second plaintiff in relation to the following parts of the proceeding:
(1) all claims for relief arising out of orders made by the Supreme Court of Queensland;
(2) all claims for relief arising out of the sequestration order made against the estate of the second plaintiff.
4. Stay the proceedings brought by the second plaintiff until the conclusion of the second plaintiff’s bankruptcy or further order.
5. Judgment for the defendant against the eleventh plaintiff in relation to:
(1) all claims for relief arising out of orders made by the Supreme Court of Queensland;
(2) his claim for damages for false imprisonment.
6. Stay the proceedings brought by the eleventh plaintiff until the conclusion of the eleventh plaintiff’s bankruptcy or further order.
7. Liberty to apply on three days’ notice.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr McClelland’s affidavit is not relevant to the prospects of the proceeding.Consideration It is necessary to consider individually the particular positions of the various plaintiffs. However, there are certain, more general aspects of the case that can be addressed first. Concerning the contention that there is an unresolved dispute as to the interest rates charged by the Bank, this is only significant if there is a plaintiff who can identify a cause of action which raises for determination that factual issue. A person seeking relief must have a real interest in the issue sought to be determined: a Court will not decide a question that is purely hypothetical in the sense that it will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties to the proceeding: cf Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 582. No evidence was adduced that any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern might be parties to any relevant contract or contracts under which interest was charged or demanded. In this regard, I read the reference in paragraph 23 of the statement of claim to “the sixth plaintiff CPP and the seven plaintiff GUP” to be a reference to Celtic and Gladstone (two of the Mulhern Group of companies) and not to Celtic Pacific Contractors LLIC and Emerald. Accordingly, there was no basis for concluding that there might be any relevant cause of action in contract in favour of any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern (putting aside for the moment their status as bankrupts). No submission was made to support any other cause of action in favour of any of the plaintiffs (with the possible exception of Mr and Mrs Mulhern) based on a claim that the Bank overcharged interest to any party. For example, it was not alleged that any relevant representation was made by the Bank to any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr Mulhern (paragraph 29 of the statement of claim) and Mrs Mulhern (paragraph 51 of the statement of claim), or that any relevant representation was intended to be relied upon by any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern. Accordingly, to the extent that the proceedings seek to agitate a dispute about interest rates, with the possible exception of Mr and Mrs Mulhern, there is nothing to indicate that any of the plaintiffs has any reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. As to Mr and Mrs Mulhern, they do not have standing to bring claims to the extent that those claims have vested in their respective trustees in bankruptcy. Any claims that might be based on breach of contract or estoppel have vested in the trustees. To the extent that the plaintiffs’ claims are based upon contentions that orders were wrongfully obtained in the Supreme Court, the proceedings are an abuse of process because they are a collateral attack upon a final decision of that Court: cf Stergiou v McGrail [1994] FCA 1041 at [8]; Shaw v MAB Corporation Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 62; 220 FCR 425 at [60]. In any event, this Court does not have jurisdiction or power to set aside orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland: cf Shaw v MAB Corporation Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1231 at [44]; Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 126; (2011) 197 FCR 25 at [96] (Rares J); Re Baxter; ex parte Official Receiver v Baxter (1986) 10 FCR 398 at 401. To the contrary, a decision of the Supreme Court may create an “issue estoppel” if it determines an issue in a cause of action as an essential step in its reasoning, precluding re-litigation of that issue: cf Stergiou at [8].