Mulhern v Bank of Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mulhern v Bank of Queensland [2015] FCA 44

Citation: Mulhern v Bank of Queensland [2015] FCA 44
Parties: EMER MARIE MULHERN, JACQUELINE PATRICIA MULHERN, PINNACLE INDUSTRIES 11LLC, ANDREW QUINERT T/AS ANDREW Q PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, MULHERN BUILDERS LTD IRE, CELTIC PACIFIC CONTRACTORS LLIC, EMERALD HERVEY BAY DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD, TOOWONG PRIME INVESTMENTS PTY LTD, MULHERN'S PROPERTIES INC, COUGAN CORPORATION PTY LTD and MICHAEL RICHARD MULHERN v BANK OF QUEENSLAND
File number: NSD 887 of 2014
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 5 February 2015
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – application for statement of claim to be struck out – where some plaintiffs bankrupt – whether plaintiffs have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding – whether any reasonable cause of action disclosed – where plaintiffs’ claims based upon contention that orders were wrongfully obtained in a State Supreme Court – where claim based on issue already finally resolved against plaintiff – statement of claim struck out – proceedings partly dismissed as abuse of process – other claims stayed until trustee elects to prosecute or discontinue action – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 58, 60(2), 116, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A, Federal Court of Rules 2011, r 26.01
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act2001 (Cth), s 12CB
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 5(1), 58, 78(1)(f), 116
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.21, 26.01
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 51AC
Cases cited: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564
Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 126; (2011) 197 FCR 25
Dodrill v Bank of Queensland [2010] QSC 371
Dowling v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] FCA 59
Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Jones (No 2) [2006] FCA 1401
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60; (2008) 167 FCR 372
Mulhern Constructions v Mulhern [2012] QSC 120
Mulhern v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2012] FMCA 1124
Mulhern v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2012] FMCA 1266
Mulhern v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2014] FCA 26
Mulhern v Pearce (No 2) [2014] FCA 805
Mulhern’s Properties Inc v Bank of Queensland [2013] FCA 401
Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Ltd v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-522
Pearce v Mulhern (No 2) [2012] FCA 7
Pearce v Mulhern (No 3) [2012] FCA 16
Pearce v Mulhern (No 4) [2012] FCA 54
Pearce v Mulhern [2010] FCA 446
Pearce v Mulhern [2011] FCA 930
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2012] FCAFC 97; (2012) 203 FCR 325
Priest v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 12
Re Baxter; ex parte Official Receiver v Baxter (1986) 10 FCR 398
Rogers v Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 434
Shaw v MAB Corporation Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1231
Shaw v MAB Corporation Pty Ltd
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mulhern v Bank of Queensland involved an application by the Bank of Queensland for summary judgment against the plaintiffs, who sought relief including declarations, monetary relief, damages for breach of contract, and damages for various alleged losses. The dispute arose from the Bank's appointment of receivers and managers to the companies comprising the Mulhern Group, and the obtaining of freezing orders in respect of funds in Mrs Mulhern's bank account. The plaintiffs argued that the Bank was not entitled to the orders, and that the Bank overcharged interest. The primary issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs had any reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, given that some of the plaintiffs were bankrupt, and whether any reasonable cause of action had been disclosed.

The court held that the plaintiffs, apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern, had not identified any real issue of fact or law to be decided as between themselves and the Bank. There was no evidence that would support a conclusion that there may be any real issue of fact or law to be decided as between any of the plaintiffs and the Bank. The proceedings were partly dismissed as an abuse of process, as they were a collateral attack upon a final decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The court found that Mr Mulhern and Mrs Mulhern did not have standing to bring claims to the extent that those claims had vested in their respective trustees in bankruptcy. The court struck out the statement of claim in its entirety, gave judgment for the defendant against the plaintiffs, and stayed the proceedings brought by the second and eleventh plaintiffs until the conclusion of their bankruptcy or further order.

In summary, the court held that the plaintiffs had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, and that the proceedings were an abuse of process. The statement of claim was struck out, judgment was given for the defendant against the plaintiffs, and the proceedings were stayed until the conclusion of the second and eleventh plaintiffs' bankruptcy or further order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The statement of claim be struck out in its entirety.

2. Judgment be given for the defendant against each of the first and third to tenth plaintiffs.

3. Judgment be given for the defendant against the second plaintiff in relation to the following parts of the proceeding:

(1) all claims for relief arising out of orders made by the Supreme Court of Queensland;

(2) all claims for relief arising out of the sequestration order made against the estate of the second plaintiff.

4. Stay the proceedings brought by the second plaintiff until the conclusion of the second plaintiff’s bankruptcy or further order.

5. Judgment for the defendant against the eleventh plaintiff in relation to:

(1) all claims for relief arising out of orders made by the Supreme Court of Queensland;

(2) his claim for damages for false imprisonment.

6. Stay the proceedings brought by the eleventh plaintiff until the conclusion of the eleventh plaintiff’s bankruptcy or further order.

7. Liberty to apply on three days’ notice.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the statement of claim, the plaintiffs seek relief of the following kinds:(1)Declarations about the Bank’s conduct and the effect of that conduct;(2)Monetary relief under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (“TPA”) or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act2001 (Cth) (“ASIC Act”);(3)Damages for breach of contract;(4)Equitable compensation and/or damages referrable to various alleged losses and totalling $428,014,088.14.Background to the proceeding On 3 February 2010, a sequestration order was made against Mr Mulhern’s estate following litigation concerning Mr Mulhern’s business interests. Mr Mulhern did not consent to the sequestration order and has made numerous application to have his bankruptcy annulled or discharged: see Mulhern v Pearce (No 2) [2014] FCA 805. On 6 May 2010, in Pearce v Mulhern [2010] FCA 446, a judge of this Court made declarations, on the application of Mr Mulhern’s trustees in bankruptcy and in the absence of the respondents including Mrs Mulhern and the members of the Mulhern Group of companies, as to the ownership of the various companies. The declarations included that, as at the date of Mr Mulhern’s bankruptcy:(a)Mr Mulhern was the registered holder of all of the issued share capital in Mulhern Constructions and Dicey’s;(b)Mr Mulhern was the registered holder of one half of the issued share capital in Celtic;(c)Celtic was the registered holder of all of the issued share capital of WAK; (d)Mulhern Constructions was the registered holder of all of the issued share capital of Gladstone; and(e)All of the issued share capital in each of Mulhern Constructions and Dicey’s and one half of the issued share capital in Celtic vested in the trustee of Mr Mulhern’s bankrupt estate. It is a source of complaint by some or all of the plaintiffs in this proceeding that these declarations were made in the respondents’ absence (although precisely how they are each adversely affected by the declarations is not clear). In particular, some or all of the plaintiffs contend that Mrs Mulhern, rather than Mr Mulhern, was the beneficial owner of each member of the Mulhern Group of companies until her bankruptcy on 30 August 2012. However, there was no appeal from the decision in Pearce v Mulhern [2010] FCA 446. On 25 May 2010, having appointed receivers and managers to the companies comprising the Mulhern Group, the Bank obtained freezing orders from the Supreme Court of Queensland (“Supreme Court”) in respect of about $450,000 in a bank account in Mrs Mulhern’s name to have effect until 2 June 2010 (“freezing orders”). On 2 June 2010, the orders were varied and continued pending determination of the ownership of the funds. The plaintiffs allege that the Bank was not entitled to appoint the receivers and managers, and was not entitled to the freezing orders. On 8 April 2011, Mrs Mulhern applied to the Supreme Court for a discharge or alternatively variation of the freezing orders. In support of her application, Mrs Mulhern swore an affidavit dated 7 April 2011. Mrs Mulhern’s affidavit refers to ten loan facilities granted by the Bank during the period between January 2007 and May 2010 to:(a)Mulhern Constructions (four facilities);(b)Celtic (two facilities);(c)Gladstone;(d)WAK;(e)Dicey’s (two facilities).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Nor did Mr McClelland address orally the particular claims of Mr and Mrs Mulhern. He accepted that, as bankrupts “[o]n the purely legal point of view” neither of them “have standing to do anything”.Plaintiffs’ evidence Ms Mulhern’s affidavit deposes to the following matters of potential relevance:a.Her schooling has been “dramatically affected” by the freezing orders;b.She believes that she was followed by agents of the Bank in Sydney and she has fears for her personal safety. Mr Franklin’s affidavit contains evidence of the following matters:a.His role in the relationship between the Mulherns, the Mulhern Group and the Bank;b.The financial position and strategy of the Bank at certain times;c.An arrangement by which Bankwest was to “take out” the Bank’s securities over the Mulhern Group prior to the appointment of receivers to the Mulhern Group;d.The loan from Cougan Corporation referred to above;e.His belief that Cougan Corporation was affected by the freezing orders “and is entitled to relief in relation on the undertakings provided”. Mr McClelland’s affidavit is not relevant to the prospects of the proceeding.Consideration It is necessary to consider individually the particular positions of the various plaintiffs. However, there are certain, more general aspects of the case that can be addressed first. Concerning the contention that there is an unresolved dispute as to the interest rates charged by the Bank, this is only significant if there is a plaintiff who can identify a cause of action which raises for determination that factual issue. A person seeking relief must have a real interest in the issue sought to be determined: a Court will not decide a question that is purely hypothetical in the sense that it will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties to the proceeding: cf Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 582. No evidence was adduced that any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern might be parties to any relevant contract or contracts under which interest was charged or demanded. In this regard, I read the reference in paragraph 23 of the statement of claim to “the sixth plaintiff CPP and the seven plaintiff GUP” to be a reference to Celtic and Gladstone (two of the Mulhern Group of companies) and not to Celtic Pacific Contractors LLIC and Emerald. Accordingly, there was no basis for concluding that there might be any relevant cause of action in contract in favour of any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern (putting aside for the moment their status as bankrupts). No submission was made to support any other cause of action in favour of any of the plaintiffs (with the possible exception of Mr and Mrs Mulhern) based on a claim that the Bank overcharged interest to any party. For example, it was not alleged that any relevant representation was made by the Bank to any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr Mulhern (paragraph 29 of the statement of claim) and Mrs Mulhern (paragraph 51 of the statement of claim), or that any relevant representation was intended to be relied upon by any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Otherwise, Mr Mulhern has no standing to bring the claims for the relief specified in the statement of claim, even if those claims are based on reasonable causes of action, which appears not to be the case.Conclusion Apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern, the plaintiffs have not identified any real issue of fact or law to be decided as between themselves and the Bank. There is currently no evidence that would support a conclusion that there may be any real issue of fact or law to be decided as between any of the plaintiffs and the Bank. There remains the question whether any of the plaintiffs has any prospect of ever identifying a valid claim against the Bank. In Mulhern’s Properties Inc v Bank of Queensland [2013] FCA 401, Flick J struck out the applicant’s statement of claim but declined to order summary judgment in the Bank’s favour. In that case, the applicant was represented by Mr Mulhern. At [40] and [41], Flick J said:[40] …Even though the bar may well have been lowered by the introduction of s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act (Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299 at [12]; Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117 at [25], [2009] FCAFC 117; 178 FCR 401 at 408 [per] Spender, Graham and Gilmour JJ), it is not considered appropriate to entertain an application for summary judgment without affording the Applicant an opportunity to seek to amend – with the assistance of a lawyer – the existing Statement of Claim. When drafting any amendment, the legally skilled draftsman will have the benefit of the written submissions filed on behalf of the Bank of Queensland. Whether or not one or other of those difficulties is addressed or not considered to be as difficult as envisaged by the Bank – and not resolved by this Court – is a matter to which future consideration can be directed. [41] An order striking out the existing Statement of Claim in its entirety is not to be construed as precluding the ability of Mulhern’s Properties to file a fresh Statement of Claim which does comply with the Rules of this Court. Within a morass of poorly organised facts and badly articulated arguments a lawyer may be better able to discern a cause of action than an unrepresented litigant and a better able to discern a cause of action which requires judicial resolution. Considerable caution must be exercised before any Court precludes a litigant from placing before a Court a properly articulated cause of action: Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 at 536-537. … This is not a case in which the Court has been presented with facts and arguments that have not been reviewed by a lawyer for the purpose of identifying a cause of action. In this case, the pleading was certified by the plaintiffs’ lawyer and the plaintiffs had the opportunity of adducing evidence to demonstrate their prospects after receiving the Bank’s interlocutory application. Despite these opportunities, there has been no identification on behalf of the first and third to tenth plaintiffs of any basis for a prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that those plaintiffs have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding my view. In those circumstances, caution does not require the Court to refrain from giving summary judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr McClelland’s affidavit is not relevant to the prospects of the proceeding.Consideration It is necessary to consider individually the particular positions of the various plaintiffs. However, there are certain, more general aspects of the case that can be addressed first. Concerning the contention that there is an unresolved dispute as to the interest rates charged by the Bank, this is only significant if there is a plaintiff who can identify a cause of action which raises for determination that factual issue. A person seeking relief must have a real interest in the issue sought to be determined: a Court will not decide a question that is purely hypothetical in the sense that it will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties to the proceeding: cf Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 582. No evidence was adduced that any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern might be parties to any relevant contract or contracts under which interest was charged or demanded. In this regard, I read the reference in paragraph 23 of the statement of claim to “the sixth plaintiff CPP and the seven plaintiff GUP” to be a reference to Celtic and Gladstone (two of the Mulhern Group of companies) and not to Celtic Pacific Contractors LLIC and Emerald. Accordingly, there was no basis for concluding that there might be any relevant cause of action in contract in favour of any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern (putting aside for the moment their status as bankrupts). No submission was made to support any other cause of action in favour of any of the plaintiffs (with the possible exception of Mr and Mrs Mulhern) based on a claim that the Bank overcharged interest to any party. For example, it was not alleged that any relevant representation was made by the Bank to any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr Mulhern (paragraph 29 of the statement of claim) and Mrs Mulhern (paragraph 51 of the statement of claim), or that any relevant representation was intended to be relied upon by any of the plaintiffs apart from Mr and Mrs Mulhern. Accordingly, to the extent that the proceedings seek to agitate a dispute about interest rates, with the possible exception of Mr and Mrs Mulhern, there is nothing to indicate that any of the plaintiffs has any reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. As to Mr and Mrs Mulhern, they do not have standing to bring claims to the extent that those claims have vested in their respective trustees in bankruptcy. Any claims that might be based on breach of contract or estoppel have vested in the trustees. To the extent that the plaintiffs’ claims are based upon contentions that orders were wrongfully obtained in the Supreme Court, the proceedings are an abuse of process because they are a collateral attack upon a final decision of that Court: cf Stergiou v McGrail [1994] FCA 1041 at [8]; Shaw v MAB Corporation Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 62; 220 FCR 425 at [60]. In any event, this Court does not have jurisdiction or power to set aside orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland: cf Shaw v MAB Corporation Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1231 at [44]; Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 126; (2011) 197 FCR 25 at [96] (Rares J); Re Baxter; ex parte Official Receiver v Baxter (1986) 10 FCR 398 at 401. To the contrary, a decision of the Supreme Court may create an “issue estoppel” if it determines an issue in a cause of action as an essential step in its reasoning, precluding re-litigation of that issue: cf Stergiou at [8].