FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MULHERN v BANK OF QUEENSLAND LIMITED | [2012] FMCA 1266 |
| BANKRUPTCY – Sequestration order – annulment – failure to demonstrate solvency – imposition of Mareva orders – refusal to settle – assessment of assets – residency – carrying on a business – applicant carrying on a business in Australia – insufficient material to warrant annulment – application dismissed. |
| Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.43, 52, 153B Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), Rule 389A |
| Bulic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2007] FCA 307 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA (The Mareva) [1980] 1 All ER 213 Mulhern Constructions Pty Ltd v Mulhern [2012] QSC 120 Watt v Barnett (1878) 3 QBD 183 |
| Applicant: | JACQUELINE PATRICIA MULHERN |
| Respondent: | BANK OF QUEENSLAND LIMITED |
| File Number: | BRG 959 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Burnett FM |
| Hearing date: | 4 December 2012 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 4 December 2012 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 6 December 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr M. Williams |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Michael Smith Legal |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr B. Porter |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Dibbs Barker Lawyers |
ORDERS
That the application filed on 31 October 2012 be dismissed.
That the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application in an amount to be assessed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 959 of 2012
| JACQUELINE PATRICIAL MULHERN |
Applicant
And
| BANK OF QUEENSLAND LIMITED |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex Tempore)
On 7 November 2012 I adjourned this application for reasons then stated. In summary, although I was satisfied that, prima facie, the court had properly made the original sequestration order and the application for annulment should be dismissed, I was prepared to adjourn the application to permit the applicant to put more material before the court. I did so because authority indicates that in circumstances where orders for substituted service are relied upon to support orders for final relief, a defendant might be permitted to defend if he or she has “… a substantial case which he desires to try” – see Watt v Barnett (1878) 3 QBD 183 at 185.
By analogy, I consider that before finally resolving the question to be addressed in this application, pursuant to s.153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”), as to whether a sequestration order ought to have been made, I must consider whether upon the merits that strict reliance on substituted service ought be permitted. To that end, the applicant debtor was afforded three weeks to prepare and file material adducing matters she says could have been raised pursuant to s.52(2) of the Act but which were not because she was unaware of proceedings having been served upon her in the manner provided for in the order for substituted service.
The applicant has now filed material, a substantial part of which is inadmissible. However, despite that, she principally advances four grounds:
a)Solvency;
b)The merits of the judgment underlying…
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- Case
- [2012] FMCA 1266
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the setting aside of the default judgment. The applicant's claim that he had not received notice of the proceedings was not substantiated, as there was evidence that the respondent had sent the necessary documents to the applicant's last known address. The court also held that the respondent's conduct did not amount to an abuse of process. The applicant's failure to respond to the proceedings was due to his own neglect and not because of any fault on the part of the respondent.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application in an amount to be assessed. The court held that the applicant's application was an abuse of process and that the respondent was entitled to be compensated for the costs incurred in defending the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
That the application filed on 31 October 2012 be dismissed.
2.
That the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application in an amount to be assessed.