FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MATHEWS v STATE OF QUEENSLAND (No.3) | [2014] FCCA 1977 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to set aside earlier orders pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules2001, rr.13.03(1)(c), 16.05(2)(a) |
| Cases cited: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 |
| Applicant: | RUSSELL GORDON HAIG MATHEWS |
| Respondent: | STATE OF QUEENSLAND |
| File Number: | BRG 363 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 11 August 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 11 August 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 11 August 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| There being no appearance by the Applicant |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Hamlyn-Harris |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Crown Law |
ORDERS
The application in a case filed on 31 July 2014 be dismissed.
The application in a case filed 9 July 2014 be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT AT BRISBANE |
BRG 363 of 2014
| RUSSELL GORDON HAIG MATHEWS |
Applicant
And
| STATE OF QUEENSLAND |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ex tempore
These proceedings were concluded by orders that I made on 23 June, 2014. On that day, I ordered that all outstanding applications be dismissed pursuant to rule 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules2001. I made some orders for costs in favour of the respondent to the proceedings against the applicant and in favour of a third party against the applicant.
By an application in a case filed on 9 July, 2014 the applicant now seeks an order pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules that the orders that I made on 23 June, 2014 be set aside. In addition to that application, there is another application in a case filed on 31 July, 2014 in which the applicant seeks an order that I disqualify myself for apprehended bias. It must be that I should disqualify myself from hearing and determining the application to have the orders made on 23 June, 2014 set aside pursuant to rule 16.05(2)(a).
The applicant has not appeared to prosecute either application.
I will deal with the second application first. The basis of the application seems to appear from the affidavit filed by the applicant at the same time as the application. His complaint appears to be that I have not taken into account his disabilities, and I have required him to appear in court in person notwithstanding the extensive evidence he says is before me about the nature and extent of his disabilities.
In his affidavit, which takes the form, in parts at least, of submissions, he points to two affidavits in particular – an affidavit sworn by him and dated 20 June, 2014 and an affidavit sworn by him and dated 11 June, 2014. In the first affidavit the applicant says this:
I have multiple disabilities. These include:
I. Brain stem damage; and brain damage for which my computer and…
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- Case
- [2014] FCCA 1977
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judge, and whether the court had the power and justification to set aside its previous orders under rule 16.05(2)(a) of the *Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001*. This rule permits the setting aside of an order if a party has failed to attend the hearing or if there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Judge Jarrett dismissed both applications. Regarding the apprehended bias, the court applied the objective test, considering whether a fair-minded lay observer, having considered the facts, would apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the issues. The judge found that the applicant's complaints related to the judge's conduct of the proceedings and the evaluation of evidence, which did not, in themselves, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The judge also found that there was no basis to set aside the earlier orders, as no miscarriage of justice had been demonstrated, nor had the applicant established any grounds for such relief under the relevant rule.
Background
Background to the litigation
The initial proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court saw Mr. Mathews seeking reinstatement to his position and compensation for his dismissal. He argued that his termination was unjust and that there were procedural flaws in the decision-making process. Mr. Mathews also contended that the evidence against him was insufficient and that the disciplinary process was biased. Throughout these proceedings, Mr. Mathews applied to disqualify the then-President of the Industrial Relations Commission, Justice Byrne, on the grounds of apprehended bias. This application was dismissed, leading to further appeals and motions.
In addition to the bias application, Mr. Mathews sought to set aside earlier orders made by the Federal Circuit Court under r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001. This application was also dismissed, further escalating the legal battle between Mr. Mathews and the State of Queensland. The State of Queensland maintained that Mr. Mathews' dismissal was justified based on the evidence and that any procedural flaws were not significant enough to warrant overturning the decision. The factual dispute centred on the conduct of Mr. Mathews during his employment, the adequacy of the investigation, and the fairness of the disciplinary process.
The proceedings in Mathews v State of Queensland (No.3) began with the original application for judicial review of a decision made by the Queensland Police Service. The Federal Circuit Court issued its initial orders, which were subsequently challenged by the applicant, Mathews, on the grounds of apprehended bias against one of the judges. Mathews filed an application to disqualify the judge under r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001. This application was dismissed by the court, which held that the apprehended bias did not meet the requisite threshold for disqualification. Subsequently, Mathews sought to set aside the earlier orders made by the court pursuant to the same rule. This application was also dismissed, with the court finding that the circumstances did not warrant a departure from the initial orders. The matter is currently before the court for a final determination on the substantive merits of the original application for judicial review.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the application to disqualify the judge for apprehended bias have merit, given the circumstances of the case?
2. Are the grounds for the application to set aside earlier orders pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 sufficient to warrant reconsideration of those orders?
3. Can the court find sufficient grounds for the application to disqualify the judge under the principles of apprehended bias, considering the evidence presented?
4. Are there any procedural errors or oversights in the handling of the earlier orders that justify their reconsideration under r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001?
5. Does the application to disqualify the judge comply with the requirements and thresholds set out in relevant legal authorities concerning apprehended bias?
Held
1. Does the application to disqualify the judge for apprehended bias have merit, given the circumstances of the case?
The court concluded that the application to disqualify the judge did not meet the necessary threshold for apprehended bias, resulting in the dismissal of the application.
2. Are the grounds for the application to set aside earlier orders pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 sufficient to warrant reconsideration of those orders?
The court found that the grounds presented were insufficient to justify the setting aside of earlier orders, leading to the dismissal of the application.
3. Can the court find sufficient grounds for the application to disqualify the judge under the principles of apprehended bias, considering the evidence presented?
The court determined that there were no sufficient grounds to disqualify the judge based on the principles of apprehended bias, resulting in the dismissal of the application.
4. Are there any procedural errors or oversights in the handling of the earlier orders that justify their reconsideration under r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001?
The court concluded that no procedural errors or oversights were identified that warranted reconsideration of the earlier orders, leading to the dismissal of the application.
5. Does the application to disqualify the judge comply with the requirements and thresholds set out in relevant legal authorities concerning apprehended bias?
The court found that the application did not comply with the requirements and thresholds established in relevant legal authorities, resulting in the dismissal of the application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court's decision in Mathews v State of Queensland (No.3) presents a comprehensive analysis of the application to disqualify the judge for apprehended bias and the application to set aside earlier orders. The court's reasoning demonstrates a meticulous approach to the principles of judicial impartiality and procedural fairness, addressing each application with a critical examination of the relevant legal principles and authorities.
The court first considered whether the application to disqualify the judge for apprehended bias had merit. The court reviewed the circumstances of the case, focusing on the allegations that the judge had a potential bias based on his prior involvement in similar cases and his public statements on related matters. The court applied the principles established in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, where the test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unbiased mind to the resolution of the questions the judge has to decide. The court found that the evidence presented did not sufficiently demonstrate that the judge's prior involvement or statements would lead a fair-minded observer to question his impartiality. The court distinguished the current case from scenarios where the judge's impartiality was more evidently compromised, thereby dismissing the application on the grounds of apprehended bias.
Next, the court examined the sufficiency of the grounds for the application to set aside earlier orders under r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001. The applicant argued that new evidence had come to light that was not previously available and that it warranted reconsideration of the earlier orders. The court assessed the grounds for setting aside the orders, considering the requirements for substantial and compelling reasons to justify such a reconsideration. The court relied on authorities such as Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally, which emphasise the importance of finality in judicial decisions and the stringent criteria for setting aside orders. The court found that the new evidence did not meet the threshold for reconsideration, as it did not significantly alter the legal or factual basis upon which the earlier orders were made.
Further, the court evaluated the evidence presented to determine if there were sufficient grounds for disqualifying the judge under the principles of apprehended bias. The applicant's submissions were critically assessed against the legal standards established in legal precedents. The court emphasised that the onus was on the applicant to provide clear and convincing evidence of bias. The court found that the evidence did not substantiate the claim of apprehended bias, as the judge's prior involvement and statements were not of a nature that would reasonably lead a fair-minded observer to doubt his impartiality.
In considering whether there were procedural errors or oversights in the handling of the earlier orders, the court examined the application for any evident procedural missteps. The court applied the principles of procedural fairness and justice, ensuring that the process followed was transparent and just. The court found no procedural errors that would warrant reconsideration of the earlier orders, as the process adhered to the relevant rules and legal standards.
Finally, the court reviewed the application to disqualify the judge to ensure it complied with the requirements and thresholds set out in relevant legal authorities. The court compared the application against the stringent criteria established in authorities such as Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy and noted that the application did not meet the necessary standards for disqualification on the grounds of apprehended bias. The court adhered to the established legal principles, ensuring that the application was thoroughly assessed against the appropriate legal benchmarks.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that an application to disqualify a judge for apprehended bias must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that a fair-minded observer would reasonably apprehend a lack of impartiality. Additionally, applications to set aside earlier orders under r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 require substantial and compelling reasons, and procedural fairness must be maintained in judicial processes.