FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Abela v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 832
Citation: Abela v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 832 Parties: BEAU ABELA (BY HIS NEXT FRIEND LITIGATION GUARDIAN, PETER ABELA) v STATE OF VICTORIA (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT) File numbers: VID 405 of 2011
VID 1102 of 2011Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 16 August 2013 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – Discrimination – disability – educational services – direct discrimination – whether failure to provide reasonable adjustments has the effect that person with disability is treated less favourably – ground not made out – indirect discrimination – whether requirements or conditions imposed upon an aggrieved person are unreasonable – requirements or conditions to be construed broadly – reasonable degree of precision necessary in formulation – requisite precision absent - ground not made out – alleged breach of Disability Standards – no contravention of standards – application dismissed Legislation: Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) – ss 4, 5, 6, 11, 22, 31, 32, 34
Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – s 140
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – s 46PH, s 46PO
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)Commonwealth, Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Bill 2008, Explanatory Memorandum (2008) 7
Disability Standards for Education 2005 – Parts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7Cases cited: Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165 - followed
Australian Medical Council v Wilson (1996) 68 FCR 46 - cited
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 – followed
Catholic Education Office v Clarke (2004) 138 FCR 121 – followed
Charles v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 105 FCR 573 – followed
Forbes v Australian Federal Police (Commonwealth of Australia) [2004] FCAFC 95 – referred to
Hurst v Queensland (2006) 151 FCR 562 - discussed
Minns v New South Wales [2002] FMCA 60 – discussed, followed
New South Wales v Amery (2006) 230 CLR 174 - followed
New South Wales (Department of Education) v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2001) 186 ALR 69 – referred to
Nojin v The Commonwealth (2012) 298 ALR 410 – discussed
Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92 - applied
Qantas Airways Limited v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537 - followed
Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188 – followed
Travers v New South Wales (2001) 163 FLR 99 - discussed
Walker v State of Victoria (2011) 279 ALR 284 – applied
Walker v State of Victoria [2012] FCAFC 38 - applied
Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 –applied, followed
Zhang v University of Tasmania (2009) 174 FCR 366 – referred toDate of hearing: 30 April 2012 - 25 May 2012 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 221 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Hancock and Mr P Baume Solicitor for the Applicant: MLC Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 832
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the requirement for Beau to prove that the Department's actions were discriminatory by reason of his disabilities, and that he was treated less favourably than someone without disabilities would have been in similar circumstances. The court referenced the High Court decision in Purvis v New South Wales, which emphasised the importance of identifying the true basis for the treatment in question. The court had to determine whether the Department treated Beau less favourably because of his disabilities, or for some other reason.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the Department's actions were not discriminatory, as there was no causal nexus between Beau's disabilities and the conduct of which he complained. The court determined that the Department treated Beau less favourably because of his violent conduct, and not because of his disabilities. The court concluded that the Department's responsibilities towards other students and staff justified their decision to suspend and expel Beau.
In conclusion, the court found in favour of the State of Victoria and dismissed Beau's claims for discrimination and failure to comply with the Disability Standards for Education. The court determined that the Department's actions were justified and not discriminatory, as they were based on Beau's violent conduct and not his disabilities.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Astley confirmed that the letter accurately reflected the reasons why Collingwood considered that the application should be refused.Consideration In order for him to establish this part of his case, it was necessary for Beau to demonstrate that the Department failed to re-enrol him at Collingwood (or any other school) “on the ground of” his disabilities thereby treating him less favourably than the Department would have treated someone without his disabilities in the same, or not materially different, circumstances. There must, therefore, be a causal nexus between Beau’s disability and the conduct of which he complains. In Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ held (at 163) that:“… the central question will always be – why was the aggrieved person treated as he or she was? If the aggrieved person was treated less favourably was it “because of”, “by reason of”, that person’s disability? Motive, purpose, effect may also bear on that question. But it would be a mistake to treat those words as substitutes for the statutory expression “because of””.In his judgment Gleeson CJ (at 102) was also concerned to identify “the true basis” of a decision to expel a student from school. His Honour said that:“The fact that the pupil suffered from a disorder resulting in disturbed behaviour was, from the point of view of the school principal, neither the reason, nor a reason, why he was suspended and expelled … If one were to ask the pupil to explain, from his point of view, why he was expelled, it may be reasonable for him to say that his disability resulted in his expulsion. However, ss 5, 10 and 22 [of the DDA] are concerned with the lawfulness of the conduct of the school authority, and with the true basis of the decision of the principal to suspend and later expel the pupil. In the light of the school authority’s responsibilities to the other pupils, the basis of the decision cannot fairly be stated by observing that, but for the pupil’s disability, he would not have engaged in the conduct that resulted in his suspension and expulsion. The expressed and genuine basis of the principal’s decision was the danger to other pupils and staff constituted by the pupil’s violent conduct, and the principal’s responsibilities towards those people.”See also at 143-4 (per McHugh and Kirby JJ); Forbes v Australian Federal Police (Commonwealth of Australia) [2004] FCAFC 95 at [68]-[70]. The Court is, therefore, required to determine, as a question of fact, why (in the sense of the “real reason” or “true basis”) the impugned conduct occurred. It must also be shown that the Department treated Beau less favourably than it would have treated other students who did not suffer from his disabilities in the same or substantially similar circumstances. The importance of identifying and bringing into account the relevant circumstances when making the comparison required by s 5 was emphasised by members of the High Court in Purvis. In their joint judgment Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ said (at 160-1):“It may readily be accepted that the necessary comparison to make is with the treatment of a person without the relevant disability. Section 5(1) makes that plain. It does not follow, however, that the “circumstances” to be considered are to be identified in the way the appellant contended. Indeed, to strip out of those circumstances any and every feature which presents difficulty to a disabled person would truly frustrate the purposes of the Act. Section 5(2) provides that the relevant circumstances are not shown to be materially different by showing that the disabled person has special needs. …In requiring a comparison between the treatment offered to a disabled person and the treatment that would be given to a person without the disability, s 5(1) requires that the circumstances attending the treatment given (or to be given) to the disabled person must be identified. What must then be examined is what would have been done in those circumstances if the person concerned was not disabled. The appellant’s argument depended upon an inversion of that order of examination. Instead of directing attention first to the actual circumstances in which a disabled person was, or would be, treated disadvantageously, it sought to direct attention to a wholly hypothetical set of circumstances defined by excluding all features of the disability.The circumstances referred to in s 5(1) are all of the objective features which surround the actual or intended treatment of the disabled person by the person referred to in the provision as the “discriminator”. It would be artificial to exclude (and there is no basis in the text of the provision for excluding) from consideration some of these circumstances because they are identified as being connected with that person’s disability. There may be cases in which identifying the circumstances of intended treatment is not easy. But where it is alleged that a disabled person has been treated disadvantageously, those difficulties do not intrude. All of the circumstances of the impugned conduct can be identified and that is what s 5(1) requires. Once the circumstances of the treatment or intended treatment have been identified, a comparison must be made with the treatment that would have been given to a person without the disability in circumstances that were the same or were not materially different.In the present case, the circumstances in which [the student] was treated as he was, included, but were not limited to, the fact that he had acted as he had. His violent actions towards teachers and others formed part of the circumstances in which it was said that he was treated less favourably than other pupils. Section 5(1) then presented two questions: (i) How, in those circumstances, would the educational authority have treated a person without [the student’s] disability? (ii) If [the student’s] treatment was less favourable than the treatment that would be given to a person without the disability, was that because of [the student’s] disability? Section 5(1) could be engaged in the application of s 22 only if it were found that [the student] was treated less favourably than a person without his disability would have been treated in circumstances that were the same as or were not materially different from the circumstances of [the student’s] treatment.” (Emphasis in original).See also at 100-101 (per Gleeson CJ); Zhang v University of Tasmania (2009) 174 FCR 366 at 384-5 [63]-[64] (per Jessup and Gordon JJ).