Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company [2019] FCA 1276

File number: WAD 354 of 2018
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 15 August 2019
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment or, alternatively, orders striking out paragraphs of the cross-claim – principles applicable to applications for summary judgment and for strike out – s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – r 13.21 and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

EQUITY – equitable contribution – principles applicable to assessment of liability – doctrine of contribution – consideration of Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law, Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 18, 237

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9, 180, 233, 236, 588G

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 15.01(b), 15.07, 16.21, 26.01(1)(a), Div 15.1

Cases cited:

Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342

Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Turnbull & Partners Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 265

Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1

BP Petroleum Development Ltd v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1987] SLT 345

Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282

Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978

Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd [2000] SLT 1123

CSR Ltd v AMACA Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320

Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318

Friend v Brooker (2009) 239 CLR 129

HIH Claims Support Limited v Insurance Australia Limited (2011) 244 CLR 72

Re La Rosa; Norgard v Rodpart Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 83

Mahoney v McManus (1981) 180 CLR 370

Ruabon Steamship Co Ltd v London Assurance [1900] AC 6

Smith v Australian Executor Trustees Limited; Creighton v Australian Executor Trustees Limited [2017] NSWSC 1406

Swiss Re International SE v Simpson (2018) 354 ALR 607

Date of hearing: 24 June 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Cross-Claimant: Ms K McNally
Solicitor for the Cross-Claimant: McNally & Co
Counsel for the Third Cross-Respondent: Mr M Bennett with Mr D Banda
Solicitor for the Third Cross-Respondent: Bennett + Co

ORDERS

WAD 354 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CARNA GROUP PTY LTD ACN 063 629 630 (IN LIQUIDATION)

Applicant

AND:

THE GRIFFIN COAL MINING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 008 667 285

First Respondent

RAJ KUMAR ROY

Second Respondent

JAMES RIORDAN

Third Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

THE GRIFFIN COAL MINING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 008 667 285

Cross-claimant

AND:

CARNA GROUP PTY LTD ACN 063 629 630 (IN LIQUIDATION)

First Cross-Respondent

HARRY CARNA
Second Cross-Respondent

MICHAEL GREY
Third Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Paragraphs 26 and…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1276
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The decision in Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company concerned an application by the defendant, Griffin, for summary judgment or, alternatively, orders to strike out paragraphs of the cross-claim filed by the cross-claimant, Mr Grey. The legal issues before the court included whether Mr Grey had established the basis for his substantive rights to claim relief against Griffin and the principles applicable to the assessment of liability and doctrine of contribution.

The court found that Mr Grey had not established a substantive cause of action against Griffin, and therefore his cross-claim should be dismissed. The court emphasised that a cross-claimant must have a cause of action arising under statute, common law, or equity against the cross-respondent to maintain a cross-claim. The court noted that the doctrine of contribution is founded on equality, with no intermediate position between equal contribution and indemnity. The court also observed that the law on contribution in Australia is not entirely settled and that a summary dismissal might stifle the development of the law in this area.

The court granted the application and ordered that certain paragraphs of the cross-claim be struck out, with liberty to Mr Grey to re-plead within 21 days. The court also ordered Mr Grey to pay the costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraphs 26 and 27, and prayers for relief 1 and 4(a) of the Statement of Cross-Claim, filed 30 October 2018, be struck out.

2. The cross-claimant have liberty to re-plead within 21 days.

3. The cross-claimant pay the third cross-respondent’s costs of this application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A cross-claimant must establish the basis upon which it asserts substantive rights to claim relief against a cross-respondent in order to maintain a cross-claim against that cross-respondent: Turnbull (at 276-278). That means, the cross-claimant must have a cause of action arising under statute, common law or equity against the cross-claimant.Summary judgment The legal principles relating to summary judgment are well settled. The relevant test to be met under both s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(a) of the Rules requires Mr Grey to satisfy the Court that Griffin ‘has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting ... part of the proceeding’. It is unnecessary to refer extensively to the relevant cases. The principles have been considered in detail: see, for example, Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978 (at [3]):Without reference to all the well-known authorities, the parties agree that it is well established that the Court may give judgment for a defending party in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding where the Court is satisfied that the prosecuting party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or a part of the proceeding. Further:•the claim need not be hopeless or bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospects of success: s 31A of the Federal Court Act;•a reasonable prospect of success is one which is real, not fanciful or merely arguable: Rogers v Assets Loan Co Pty Ltd (2008) 250 ALR 82 per Logan J (at [41]);•there will be no prospect of success in circumstances where there is a defect in the pleadings which cannot be cured: Ship “Sam Hawk” v Reiter Petroleum Ltd (2016) 246 FCR 337 per Kenny and Besanko JJ (at [269]);•s 31A is amenable to resolving straightforward questions of law: Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2008] FCA 1582 per Logan J (at [16]). However, summary judgment may still be appropriate if a question raised is of some complexity: SK Foods LP v SK Foods Australia (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543 per Flick J (at [115]); •if a prima facie case in support of summary judgment is established, the onus shifts to the opposing party to point to some factual or evidentiary issues making a trial necessary: Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 per Gordon J (at [127]);•it is clear that the legislature’s intention in enacting s 31A was to lower the bar for obtaining summary judgment, including summary dismissal, below that fixed by previous authorities: Spencer v Commonwealthof Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118 per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Jefferson Ford per Gordon J (at [127]);•s 31A permits dismissal of a proceeding where an inquiry into the merits of the issues of law demonstrates the arguments are insufficiently strong to warrant the matter going to trial: McAleer v University of Western Australia (No 3) (2008) 171 FCR 499 per Siopis J (at [39] and the cases therein cited);•summary dismissal will not apply to ‘a real question of law that is serious, important or difficult, involves conflicting authority, or is apparently arguable yet novel’: Nichol v Discovery Africa Ltd (2016) 343 ALR 594 per Greenwood, McKerracher and Moshinsky JJ (at [134]);•the moving party bears the onus of persuading the Court the application has no reasonable prospects of success. The assessment of whether a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success necessitates the making of a value judgement in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with a result that the provision vests a discretion in the Court. That discretion includes whether to deal with the motion at once or at some later stage in the proceedings, when the legal and factual issues have been more clearly defined: Kimber v The Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 [2017] FCAFC 226 per Logan, Kerr and Farrell JJ (at [62]) quoting with approval Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381 per Perry J (at [37]);•despite the threshold for summary dismissal having been lowered, it must still be exercised with caution. The power is not to be exercised lightly: Spencer v Commonwealth per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (at [60]);•the Court does not, in such an application, conduct a ‘mini trial based upon incomplete evidence to decide whether the proceedings are likely to succeed or fail at trial’. Rather, it ‘requires a critical examination of the available materials to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact that should be decided at trial’: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256 per Reeves J (at [46]); and•each application for summary judgment or summary dismissal has to be determined according to its particular circumstances. What is required is a practical judgment of the case at hand. The relevant facts and circumstances will partly depend upon the stage which the proceedings have reached. Among other things, this will affect materials available to the Court for considering the application, for example, where the pleadings have been exchanged, or discovery of documents has occurred: Cassimatis per Reeves J (at [46]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, Griffin notes that on 11 June 2019, it notified Mr Grey of an intention to amend the cross-claim to plead that Mr Grey was involved in Carna’s breaches of the ACL. CONSIDERATIONThe law on contribution In response to Mr Grey’s reliance on La Rosa to assert Griffin can only seek a contribution from a party with whom it had or shared common obligations, Griffin contends the law on this issue is unsettled. Griffin relies on Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342 and CSR Ltd v AMACA Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320 (in particular at 288-299). Griffin contends the law in Australia in relation to contribution and indemnity is unclear and that a summary dismissal would have the effect of stifling the development (or clarification) of the law in Australia. In Bialkower, the Full Court considered La Rosa. The Court did not need to decide whether there was a general right of apportionment, but noted (at 12-13):However, despite the observation of Davies J in Jones at 422; 565 that he could see no reason why equity “should not aid ... the ascertainment of what would be a just contribution”, we doubt whether the general law of contribution authorises an apportionment such as that made by the primary judge. Contribution is “founded on equality”: Albion at 351, though it is true that “equality” in the maxim “equity is equality” is not literal equality, but proportionate equality: Re Steel [1979] Ch 218 at 225‑226. Equality was the basis of the doctrine of contribution between trustees liable to make good a breach of trust: RP Meagher and MC Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997), p 644. If one paid more than his share he could claim contribution from the others. In exceptional cases the rule of equal contribution was replaced by a right on the part of one trustee to obtain an indemnity from the others. But, according to Snell, until the intervention of statute (Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK), ss 1(1), 6(1) and 7(3) [)] there was no intermediate position between these two extremes: Snell’s Equity (29th ed, 1990), p 296. And see Jacobs , p 644. The matter was not argued before us, and since the apportionment can be supported by s 23B of the Wrongs Act, we need not decide the issue, which will be a live one in jurisdictions such as New South Wales which do not have a provision such as s 23B [of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic)].(Emphasis added.)See also the discussion of contribution by Hayne J (at [14]-[23]) in Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282, against the view of McHugh J (at [44]-[45]). The issue was also discussed but not decided in Smith to which I have already referred and on which Griffin principally relies. By way of background, the Australian Executor Trustee (AET) was trustee for debenture holders. AET dealt with, on behalf of the debenture holders, debentures in Provident Capital Limited. Provident was subsequently placed into receivership. The debenture holders claimed damages against AET on the basis of alleged breaches of statutory duties under the Corporations Act and/or fiduciary duties owed to the debenture holders. AET filed a cross-claim against, inter alia, the auditors of Provident (PricewaterhouseCoopers, or PwC) in relation to financial reports issued by PwC as auditors of Provident for certain financial years. AET’s claims against PwC included ones for statutory or equitable contribution in respect of any liability AET was found to have to the debenture holders: Smith at [13]. Like Mr Grey, PwC, sought orders that the claim be summarily dismissed or struck out. The Court in Smith struck out the pleading (but allowed AET to re-plead). Summary judgment was not ordered. Ward CJ said (at [180]) that her Honour was ‘not persuaded that that the pleading deficiency cannot be cured’. Her Honour made the following observations regarding contribution without deciding the matter (at [45], [47]-[48], [60], [62], [70], [168], [172] and [176]):45The second basis for the statutory contribution claim is that PwC engaged in misleading conduct in contravention of the statutory prohibitions pleaded earlier (at [25] and [32]) which has caused the plaintiff and group members loss, that being the same loss in respect of which the plaintiff and group members seek to recover damages in this proceeding from AET. It is asserted that, if AET is liable as alleged in the statement of claim, then that liability could have been established in tort (see [41]-[43]). (How that tortious liability could arise is not articulated in the pleading.)…47The claim for statutory contribution is made pursuant to s 5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) (the 1946 Act), s 23B of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and “such other corresponding provision of the contribution legislation of the other States and Territories as may be applicable to each group member’s claim against AET” (see, for example, [44]).48The alternative claim for contribution is made pursuant to the doctrine of equitable contribution on the basis that if AET is liable to the plaintiff or group members as alleged in the statement of claim then its liabilities are coordinate with those of PwC ([45]-[46]). For the purpose of the equitable contribution claim, the focus is on the statutory claims: the alleged breach by PwC of the statutory prohibitions on misleading and deceptive conduct and the alleged breach by AET of its statutory duties.…60Second, AET argues that PwC’s applications raise two likely High Court points: first, the question as to whether the auditor of a corporation that issues debentures under Ch 2L of the Corporations Act owes a duty of care to the trustee for debenture holders and the debenture holders themselves; and, second, the question as to whether s 5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 can extend to statutory wrongs.…62As to the second, AET points to a divergence of views in the authorities and in academic writing (referring to Jonstan Pty Limited v Nicholson (2003) 58 NSWLR 223; [2003] NSWSC 500 at [97] (Hulme J); Dorrough v Bank of Melbourne Limited [1995] FCA 1573 at [73]; and the argument in favour of characterising the action for breach of s 52 as a tort advanced by Campbell J, as his Honour then was, writing extra judicially in “Contribution, Contributory Negligence and Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act” (1993) 67 ALJ 87, 177) on the one hand (cf ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Turnbull (1991) 33 FCR 265 at 277 (Shepherd J); Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1 at 11 (Full Federal Court)); and Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 161; [2000] FCA 1155 at [131] (Lehane J), dicta in ACQ Pty Ltd v Cook (2008) 72 NSWLR 318; [2008] NSWCA 161 at [174] (Campbell JA, with whom Beazley JA, as her Honour then was, and Giles JA agreed) and dicta in Hunt & Hunt v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; [2013] HCA 10 (Bell and Gageler JJ) on the other hand.…70Where what is pleaded is a novel claim, it has been said that the court does not apply strike out procedures in a way that might stultify the development of the law (see Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564; [2000] FCA 1572 at [50]; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at 740-741).…168PwC submits that the fact that the damage may be the same does not establish that the liabilities are co-ordinate. It says that AET’s statutory obligations under s 283DA cannot reasonably be characterised as co-ordinate with alleged misleading and deceptive conduct by PwC (referring to Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282; [2002] HCA 17, where McHugh J said that:“although the conduct of both parties may ultimately have been responsible for the loss, their respective responsibility arose from the breach of substantially different obligations”; at [56]).…172As a further practical matter, PwC says that the nature of AET’s contribution claim, as now put forward in the proposed amendments, would mean that the hearing of the main proceedings will determine whether AET is liable to the plaintiffs; and AET would seek to press a contribution claim in respect of that liability in circumstances where it expressly does not have grounds for that contribution claim in respect of the plaintiffs because AET cannot plead that PwC owed any duty to the plaintiffs. PwC says that it follows from this that AET’s contribution claim could not be resolved at the hearing in July 2018, because that claim cannot arise in respect of the plaintiffs’ claims, and cannot be the subject of any common question because no facts will be before the court by which any such common question could be determined. PwC further says that as a result the determination of AET’s contribution claim against PwC in respect of Group Members (other than the Plaintiffs) would be, at any initial trial, entirely hypothetical. Reference is made in this regard to what was said in Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; [1999] HCA 9 at [49].…176I am not persuaded that it is appropriate at this stage, in advance of the final hearing, to make a determination (or comment) on the dispute as to the various matters raised in relation to the contribution claims, other than to note that to the extent that the pleading of the contribution claims alleges audit wrongdoing and causation of loss, it suffers from the same deficiencies earlier identified, and that AET should articulate which contribution regime is said to apply to what causes of action and why. PwC should not be left to speculate as to those matters.