FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company [2019] FCA 1276
File number: WAD 354 of 2018 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 15 August 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment or, alternatively, orders striking out paragraphs of the cross-claim – principles applicable to applications for summary judgment and for strike out – s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – r 13.21 and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
EQUITY – equitable contribution – principles applicable to assessment of liability – doctrine of contribution – consideration of Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282
Legislation: Australian Consumer Law, Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 18, 237
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9, 180, 233, 236, 588G
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 15.01(b), 15.07, 16.21, 26.01(1)(a), Div 15.1
Cases cited: Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Turnbull & Partners Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 265
Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1
BP Petroleum Development Ltd v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1987] SLT 345
Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282
Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978
Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd [2000] SLT 1123
CSR Ltd v AMACA Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320
Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318
Friend v Brooker (2009) 239 CLR 129
HIH Claims Support Limited v Insurance Australia Limited (2011) 244 CLR 72
Re La Rosa; Norgard v Rodpart Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 83
Mahoney v McManus (1981) 180 CLR 370
Date of hearing: 24 June 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 55 Counsel for the Cross-Claimant: Ms K McNally Solicitor for the Cross-Claimant: McNally & Co Counsel for the Third Cross-Respondent: Mr M Bennett with Mr D Banda Solicitor for the Third Cross-Respondent: Bennett + Co ORDERS
WAD 354 of 2018 BETWEEN: CARNA GROUP PTY LTD ACN 063 629 630 (IN LIQUIDATION)
Applicant
AND: THE GRIFFIN COAL MINING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 008 667 285
First Respondent
RAJ KUMAR ROY
Second Respondent
JAMES RIORDAN
Third Respondent
AND BETWEEN: THE GRIFFIN COAL MINING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 008 667 285
Cross-claimant
AND: CARNA GROUP PTY LTD ACN 063 629 630 (IN LIQUIDATION)
First Cross-Respondent
HARRY CARNA
Second Cross-RespondentMICHAEL GREY
Third Cross-Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Paragraphs 26 and…
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- [2019] FCA 1276
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Mr Grey had not established a substantive cause of action against Griffin, and therefore his cross-claim should be dismissed. The court emphasised that a cross-claimant must have a cause of action arising under statute, common law, or equity against the cross-respondent to maintain a cross-claim. The court noted that the doctrine of contribution is founded on equality, with no intermediate position between equal contribution and indemnity. The court also observed that the law on contribution in Australia is not entirely settled and that a summary dismissal might stifle the development of the law in this area.
The court granted the application and ordered that certain paragraphs of the cross-claim be struck out, with liberty to Mr Grey to re-plead within 21 days. The court also ordered Mr Grey to pay the costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Paragraphs 26 and 27, and prayers for relief 1 and 4(a) of the Statement of Cross-Claim, filed 30 October 2018, be struck out.
2. The cross-claimant have liberty to re-plead within 21 days.
3. The cross-claimant pay the third cross-respondent’s costs of this application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, Griffin notes that on 11 June 2019, it notified Mr Grey of an intention to amend the cross-claim to plead that Mr Grey was involved in Carna’s breaches of the ACL. CONSIDERATIONThe law on contribution In response to Mr Grey’s reliance on La Rosa to assert Griffin can only seek a contribution from a party with whom it had or shared common obligations, Griffin contends the law on this issue is unsettled. Griffin relies on Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342 and CSR Ltd v AMACA Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 320 (in particular at 288-299). Griffin contends the law in Australia in relation to contribution and indemnity is unclear and that a summary dismissal would have the effect of stifling the development (or clarification) of the law in Australia. In Bialkower, the Full Court considered La Rosa. The Court did not need to decide whether there was a general right of apportionment, but noted (at 12-13):However, despite the observation of Davies J in Jones at 422; 565 that he could see no reason why equity “should not aid ... the ascertainment of what would be a just contribution”, we doubt whether the general law of contribution authorises an apportionment such as that made by the primary judge. Contribution is “founded on equality”: Albion at 351, though it is true that “equality” in the maxim “equity is equality” is not literal equality, but proportionate equality: Re Steel [1979] Ch 218 at 225‑226. Equality was the basis of the doctrine of contribution between trustees liable to make good a breach of trust: RP Meagher and MC Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997), p 644. If one paid more than his share he could claim contribution from the others. In exceptional cases the rule of equal contribution was replaced by a right on the part of one trustee to obtain an indemnity from the others. But, according to Snell, until the intervention of statute (Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK), ss 1(1), 6(1) and 7(3) [)] there was no intermediate position between these two extremes: Snell’s Equity (29th ed, 1990), p 296. And see Jacobs , p 644. The matter was not argued before us, and since the apportionment can be supported by s 23B of the Wrongs Act, we need not decide the issue, which will be a live one in jurisdictions such as New South Wales which do not have a provision such as s 23B [of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic)].(Emphasis added.)See also the discussion of contribution by Hayne J (at [14]-[23]) in Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282, against the view of McHugh J (at [44]-[45]). The issue was also discussed but not decided in Smith to which I have already referred and on which Griffin principally relies. By way of background, the Australian Executor Trustee (AET) was trustee for debenture holders. AET dealt with, on behalf of the debenture holders, debentures in Provident Capital Limited. Provident was subsequently placed into receivership. The debenture holders claimed damages against AET on the basis of alleged breaches of statutory duties under the Corporations Act and/or fiduciary duties owed to the debenture holders. AET filed a cross-claim against, inter alia, the auditors of Provident (PricewaterhouseCoopers, or PwC) in relation to financial reports issued by PwC as auditors of Provident for certain financial years. AET’s claims against PwC included ones for statutory or equitable contribution in respect of any liability AET was found to have to the debenture holders: Smith at [13]. Like Mr Grey, PwC, sought orders that the claim be summarily dismissed or struck out. The Court in Smith struck out the pleading (but allowed AET to re-plead). Summary judgment was not ordered. Ward CJ said (at [180]) that her Honour was ‘not persuaded that that the pleading deficiency cannot be cured’. Her Honour made the following observations regarding contribution without deciding the matter (at [45], [47]-[48], [60], [62], [70], [168], [172] and [176]):45The second basis for the statutory contribution claim is that PwC engaged in misleading conduct in contravention of the statutory prohibitions pleaded earlier (at [25] and [32]) which has caused the plaintiff and group members loss, that being the same loss in respect of which the plaintiff and group members seek to recover damages in this proceeding from AET. It is asserted that, if AET is liable as alleged in the statement of claim, then that liability could have been established in tort (see [41]-[43]). (How that tortious liability could arise is not articulated in the pleading.)…47The claim for statutory contribution is made pursuant to s 5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) (the 1946 Act), s 23B of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and “such other corresponding provision of the contribution legislation of the other States and Territories as may be applicable to each group member’s claim against AET” (see, for example, [44]).48The alternative claim for contribution is made pursuant to the doctrine of equitable contribution on the basis that if AET is liable to the plaintiff or group members as alleged in the statement of claim then its liabilities are coordinate with those of PwC ([45]-[46]). For the purpose of the equitable contribution claim, the focus is on the statutory claims: the alleged breach by PwC of the statutory prohibitions on misleading and deceptive conduct and the alleged breach by AET of its statutory duties.…60Second, AET argues that PwC’s applications raise two likely High Court points: first, the question as to whether the auditor of a corporation that issues debentures under Ch 2L of the Corporations Act owes a duty of care to the trustee for debenture holders and the debenture holders themselves; and, second, the question as to whether s 5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 can extend to statutory wrongs.…62As to the second, AET points to a divergence of views in the authorities and in academic writing (referring to Jonstan Pty Limited v Nicholson (2003) 58 NSWLR 223; [2003] NSWSC 500 at [97] (Hulme J); Dorrough v Bank of Melbourne Limited [1995] FCA 1573 at [73]; and the argument in favour of characterising the action for breach of s 52 as a tort advanced by Campbell J, as his Honour then was, writing extra judicially in “Contribution, Contributory Negligence and Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act” (1993) 67 ALJ 87, 177) on the one hand (cf ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Turnbull (1991) 33 FCR 265 at 277 (Shepherd J); Bialkower v Acohs Pty Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 1 at 11 (Full Federal Court)); and Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 161; [2000] FCA 1155 at [131] (Lehane J), dicta in ACQ Pty Ltd v Cook (2008) 72 NSWLR 318; [2008] NSWCA 161 at [174] (Campbell JA, with whom Beazley JA, as her Honour then was, and Giles JA agreed) and dicta in Hunt & Hunt v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; [2013] HCA 10 (Bell and Gageler JJ) on the other hand.…70Where what is pleaded is a novel claim, it has been said that the court does not apply strike out procedures in a way that might stultify the development of the law (see Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564; [2000] FCA 1572 at [50]; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at 740-741).…168PwC submits that the fact that the damage may be the same does not establish that the liabilities are co-ordinate. It says that AET’s statutory obligations under s 283DA cannot reasonably be characterised as co-ordinate with alleged misleading and deceptive conduct by PwC (referring to Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 282; [2002] HCA 17, where McHugh J said that:“although the conduct of both parties may ultimately have been responsible for the loss, their respective responsibility arose from the breach of substantially different obligations”; at [56]).…172As a further practical matter, PwC says that the nature of AET’s contribution claim, as now put forward in the proposed amendments, would mean that the hearing of the main proceedings will determine whether AET is liable to the plaintiffs; and AET would seek to press a contribution claim in respect of that liability in circumstances where it expressly does not have grounds for that contribution claim in respect of the plaintiffs because AET cannot plead that PwC owed any duty to the plaintiffs. PwC says that it follows from this that AET’s contribution claim could not be resolved at the hearing in July 2018, because that claim cannot arise in respect of the plaintiffs’ claims, and cannot be the subject of any common question because no facts will be before the court by which any such common question could be determined. PwC further says that as a result the determination of AET’s contribution claim against PwC in respect of Group Members (other than the Plaintiffs) would be, at any initial trial, entirely hypothetical. Reference is made in this regard to what was said in Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; [1999] HCA 9 at [49].…176I am not persuaded that it is appropriate at this stage, in advance of the final hearing, to make a determination (or comment) on the dispute as to the various matters raised in relation to the contribution claims, other than to note that to the extent that the pleading of the contribution claims alleges audit wrongdoing and causation of loss, it suffers from the same deficiencies earlier identified, and that AET should articulate which contribution regime is said to apply to what causes of action and why. PwC should not be left to speculate as to those matters.