Alramadi v Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Alramadi v Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission [2023] FedCFamC2G 895

File number(s): CAG 46 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE W J NEVILLE
Date of judgment: 6 October 2023 
Catchwords: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – original Application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – Respondents refuse to submit to jurisdiction – issue of “service” through the diplomatic channel as permitted under the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) – where the Respondents initially sought summary dismissal of the original Application but then only ran very limited arguments at hearing – “conclusive Certificate” under the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) issued twice but the Certificate was never addressed by the Respondents who also did not address relevant authority including by the High Court – Application to re-open granted and Application for summary dismissal and general declaration of immunity dismissed.
Legislation: Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth), s.9, 10, 11, 12, 24, 40
Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 58 ACSR 414

Banque Commerciale SA (en liq) v Akhil Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

Douglas v Republic of Nauru (2004) 187 FLR 221

Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381

Ezra Abrahams Pty Ltd v Milburn [2017] VSCA 355

Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2015) 258 CLR 31

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22

Kimber v The Owners Strata Plan No.48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575

The Movie Network Channels Pty Ltd v Optus Vision Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 132

Republic of Italy v Benvenuto (2018) 261 FCR 19; 279 IR 55; 356 ALR 409

Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Professor Richard Garnett, “The Rights of Diplomatic and Consular Employees in Australia” (2018) 31 Australian Journal of Labour Law 1

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 83
Date of last submission/s: 19 July 2023
Date of hearing: 27 March 2023
Place: Canberra
Counsel for the Applicants Ms K Edwards & Ms A Costin
Solicitor for the Applicants Snedden Hall & Gallop Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents Mr J Phillips SC
Solicitor for the Respondents Holding Redlich

ORDERS

CAG 46 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

NIDAL ALRAMADI
First Applicant

ALAA ELKILANY
Third Applicant

AMER HAMZE
Fifteenth Applicant

AND: 

SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL MISSION
First Respondent

THE ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA IN AUSTRALIA (CULTURAL OFFICE)
Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE W J NEVILLE

DATE OF ORDER:

6 OCTOBER 2023

UNTIL FURTHER ORDER, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Respondent’s Application in a Proceeding filed 15th February 2023 be dismissed.

2.The Applicant’s Application in a Proceeding filed 19th May 2023 to re-open the proceedings be granted.

3.The costs of the Applicants be reserved.

4.Within 14 days, the parties are to advise the Court whether there is agreement (and if so, the terms of agreement) regarding the procedural…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 895
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Alramadi v Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission involved an original application under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) where the respondents, the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. The primary dispute was whether the respondents could be served through the diplomatic channel as permitted under the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth). The applicants sought to re-open the proceedings, arguing that the respondents had not addressed the “conclusive Certificate” issued under the Act and had not referred to relevant authority, including the High Court.

The legal issues that the court had to decide included whether the re-opened application introduced new material facts, whether it negated any material facts already before the court, and whether it elucidated any material facts. The court had to consider whether the re-issued section 40 Certificate under the Foreign States Immunities Act provided the necessary compliance details as requested by the respondents themselves and whether this information was relevant and material to the proceedings. The reasoning of the court involved a detailed analysis of the communications between the parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), particularly focusing on the re-issued section 40 Certificate and its compliance with the requirements of the Act and relevant jurisprudence.

The court concluded that the re-opened application did introduce new material facts and that these facts were relevant to the jurisdiction of the court. The court dismissed the application for summary dismissal and the general declaration of immunity, while granting the application to re-open. This decision was based on the fact that the re-issued section 40 Certificate provided the necessary compliance details as requested by the respondents and was a direct response to their inquiry regarding service under the Foreign States Immunities Act. The court found that this new material was significant and relevant to the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, the final orders included granting the application to re-open the proceedings and dismissing the application for summary dismissal and the general declaration of immunity.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

This Application was supported by an Affidavit from the Applicants’ lawyer, Ms Shoemark, filed 19th May 2023. Ms Shoemark deposed as follows:(a)At par.3, Ms Shoemark stated that, on 10th March 2023, she wrote to Mr Ben Milton, Assistant Secretary and Corporate Counsel, Corporate Law Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “seeking clarification regarding the Certificate of compliance issued on 14th July 2022 in relation to service of the Initiating Process in these proceedings.” A copy of that letter is annexed to this Affidavit, at ES-1. Why no earlier inquiry was made in relation to Mr Milton’s letter of 14th July 2022 was not explained, although some clarification came indirectly from the later correspondence noted below. After referring to comments by Ashley J in Douglas v Department of Nauru (2004) 187 FLR 221 that specify certain matters that should form part of a Certificate under the FSI Act to satisfy a Court that service has been properly effected, the letter from Ms Shoemark stated, in part:The Certificate with which our client was provided relies only on section 24 of the FSIA but does not provide the factual basis for that conclusion, including on whom it was served and on what instrumentality that was equivalent to the Department of Foreign Affairs …(b)Ms Shoemark next deposed (par.4) that she received a response to her inquiry to Mr Milton by letter from Ms Mendelsohn, dated 27th April 2023. Ms Mendelsohn is the Director, General Litigation and Corporate Law, Legal Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”). Ms Mendelsohn confirmed that service of the Initiating Application in the current matter had been effected in accordance with s.24 of the FSI Act. A copy of Ms Mendelsohn’s letter is annexure ES-2 to the Affidavit. The letter from Ms Mendelsohn confirmed that, in DFAT’s view, service on the Respondents was effected “in accordance with section 24 of the Foreign State Immunities Act and relevant jurisprudence and, accordingly, has issued a fresh section 40 Certificate … clarifying the issues you raise in your letter.” The letter continued:With respect to section 24(1), the Department considers the Embassy in Canberra to be part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that is equivalent to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.In Douglas v Republic of Nauru (2004) 187 FLR 221 … at [13], Ashley J held that the ‘transmission of process to the department or organ of the foreign country that is equivalent to DFAT may be possible by transmission to a foreign country’s diplomatic mission in Australia.’(c)Also attached to Ms Shoemark’s Affidavit (par.5), at ES-3, is a “fresh s.40 Certificate”, dated 27th April 2023, which is referred to in Ms Mendelsohn’s letter (a copy of that Certificate, dated 27th April 2023 is attached to these reasons); and (d)On 4th May 2023, (par.6) Ms Shoemark’s office received a letter from the Office of International law, Attorney-General’s Department, which enclosed “the original re-issued section 40 Certificate.” A copy of that letter and attached Certificate is at ES-4. Significantly in my view, the letter from the Office of International Law confirmed that (i) the Certificate under s.40 was re-issued after an inquiry was made by the Respondents dated 10th March 2023, which requested details of service of the initiating process, and in particular, “how the Certificate complies with the Act”; and (ii) that DFAT confirmed that the re-issued s.40 Certificate set out how the Department “met its requirements under section 24(1) and 24(2) of the Act.” The Application to re-open: Respondents’ Evidence

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Their Honours went on to say, at [212] and [213] (internal citations omitted; emphasis added)):[212] … Firebird submitted that, apart from ss.27 and 28, the only function of Pt III is to provide an exclusive means of service in cases where service is required by some other statutory provision or rule of court dehors Pt III; and, it was said, that view of the matter is supported by parts of the ALRC report which show that the aim of Pt III was to provide a means of service which would eliminate the uncertainties and other problems which, until then, had attended other forms of service on foreign states.[213] There is force in those contentions…Consideration & disposition - re-opening The first and most appropriate course is to consider the Respondents’ submissions opposing the granting of leave to re-open. In their Outline of Submissions, filed 19th July 2023, the Respondents summarised four basic grounds of opposition to the Court granting leave to re-open. As noted above, these submissions essentially summarise the much longer submissions that were annexed to the Respondents’ Response to the Application to re-open. Grounds 1-3 of the submissions focus upon the “new materials”, albeit in slightly different ways. Ground one contends that these materials (being the s.40 Certificate under the FSI Act re-issued by the Department and related material) does not “introduce new material”, does not negate any of the material facts already before the Court, and does not “elucidate” any of the material facts. Respectfully, I disagree, primarily for two reasons. First, in the letter from the Office of International Law, dated 4th May 2023, revealed for the first and only time, is the fact that, by letter dated 10th March 2023, the Respondents wrote to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade “requesting details of service of the initiating process, and in particular, how the Certificate complies with the Act.” Somewhat concerningly, this letter was never disclosed to the Court by the Respondents, nor any background given to it. This material fact goes a significant way, in my view, to answer almost all of the other objections. This is because, secondly, the re-issued s.40 Certificate (a) answers the questions posed in the Respondents’ letter, and (b) complies with the requirements specified by Ashley J in Douglas v Republic of Nauru. Further, the previously undisclosed letter from the Respondents specifically asked for information regarding details of service of the initiating process and how there had been compliance with the FSI Act. The re-issued s.40 Certificate plainly does that, and does so presumably in direct response to the inquiry from the Respondents. This is also to say that it is the relevant Department (a) exercising its statutory responsibilities, and (b) simply providing the information sought by the Respondents regarding compliance with the relevant Act. It mis-characterises the information provided, as the Respondents do in submissions, as some “view” of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Compliance with the FSI Act is not the expression of a “view”; it is compliance with the Act that, according to the High Court in Firebird, governs a proceeding that concerns an act done or omitted to be done in Australia. It equally complies with the principles set out by Ashley J in Douglas v Republic of Nauru.