Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FERNANDEZ v UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY [2015] FCCA 3432
Catchwords:
HUMAN RIGHTS – Age discrimination – no reasonable prospects of success – summary dismissal.

Legislation:

Age Discrimination Act2004 (Cth), ss.14, 15, 16, 56

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss.46P, 46PH, 46PO

Civil Liability Act2002 (NSW), s.16
Disability Discrimination Act1992 (Cth)
Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.17A

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.13.10

Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000 (NSW), ss.8, 12, 106
Racial Discrimination Act1975 (Cth)
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
Workers Compensation Act1987 (NSW), s.151H
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW)
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act1998 (NSW), s.318A

AAV15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 454
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256
Beck v Spalla (2005) 142 FCR 555
Boyn v Schering Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 961
Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1987) 18 FCR 212
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; 147 CLR 246
Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No. 2) [2010] FCAFC 118
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2003] HCA 28; 214 CLR 318
Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045
Hollingdale v Northern Rivers Area Health Service [2004] FMCA 721
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (1980) 145 CLR 457
MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority [2004] HCA 48; 219 CLR 90
Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457
Seafish Tasmania Pelagic Pty Ltd v Burke, Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities [2013] FCA 782
Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] FCAFC 59
SZWBH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317
Unilan Holdings Pty Ltd v Kerin (1993) 44 FCR 481
Vijayakumar v Qantas Airways Ltd (2009) 233 FLR 369
Applicant: LEOCADIA PHILOMENA FERNANDEZ
Respondent: UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY
File Number: SYG 1389 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Smith
Hearing date: 18 September 2015
Date of Last Submission: 21 September 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 21 December 2015

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms K. Edwards
Solicitors for the Respondent: Moray and Agnew

ORDERS

  1. Pursuant to r.13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), the proceedings be summarily dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1389 of 2015

LEOCADIA PHILOMENA FERNANDEZ

Applicant

And

UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant had been employed by the respondent (“UTS”) as an administrative officer for over 20 years. Towards the end of 2007 another employee of UTS,…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 3432
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision concerns an application for summary judgment brought by the University of Technology, Sydney, against Mr. Fernandez. The nature of Mr. Fernandez's dispute with the university is not detailed in the provided text, but the court was asked to consider the university's application to dismiss his case summarily. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Mr. Fernandez's proceeding, or a part of it, had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting it, as contemplated by section 17A(2)(b) of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* (Cth). This required the court to determine the threshold for exercising its summary judgment power, particularly in light of the statutory language and established judicial caution.

The court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of section 17A of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* (Cth). It noted that the criterion for summary judgment under this section is less onerous than the common law standard, and that a proceeding need not be "hopeless" or "bound to fail" to have no reasonable prospect of success. However, the court emphasised that the power to summarily terminate proceedings must be exercised cautiously, and not to prevent an applicant from prosecuting their case in the normal way unless the need for summary judgment is clear. The court also referenced various Commonwealth anti-discrimination statutes and Australia's obligations under international covenants, suggesting the potential context of the dispute.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney involves an allegation of discrimination and wrongful dismissal. Mr Fernandez was employed by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) as a Senior Lecturer in the School of Architecture, Design, and Planning. His employment was terminated on 21 March 2018. Mr Fernandez commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia against UTS, claiming that his dismissal was discriminatory and in breach of the anti-discrimination laws.

Mr Fernandez alleged that his dismissal was based on his race, ethnicity, and national origin, which were factors protected under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). He further contended that the dismissal was unjust and that he had not been given a fair opportunity to respond to the allegations against him. UTS, on the other hand, argued that Mr Fernandez's dismissal was due to genuine performance-related reasons and was not discriminatory in nature. The university maintained that Mr Fernandez had not met the performance standards required for his role and that his dismissal was carried out in accordance with the applicable policies and procedures.

The events leading to Mr Fernandez's dismissal began when he was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in September 2017. This followed a series of performance reviews that indicated concerns about his teaching performance, research output, and overall contribution to the university. Despite efforts to improve his performance, Mr Fernandez did not meet the targets set out in his PIP. Consequently, UTS decided to terminate his employment. Mr Fernandez challenged this decision, asserting that the reasons provided for his dismissal were pretextual and that the real reason was discriminatory.

Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney involves an application for summary judgment under s.17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). The University of Technology, Sydney applied to the Federal Circuit Court for a summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, asserting that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. This application followed the plaintiff, Fernandez, initiating proceedings against the university, alleging discrimination and other breaches under the anti-discrimination laws. Prior to the application for summary judgment, Fernandez had filed a detailed statement of claim outlining the allegations. The university responded by filing a defence and subsequently moved for the case to be summarily dismissed. The court considered the criteria for granting summary judgment as articulated in relevant case law, which requires the court to exercise caution and ensure that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success, a threshold less onerous than common law dismissal but still requiring a clear demonstration. The court’s decision to grant or refuse summary judgment was based on the merits of the plaintiff's claims as presented in the filed documentation and the arguments made by both parties.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The power in that rule is supplementary to the power under s.17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) which provides:17A Summary judgment…(2)The Federal Circuit Court of Australia may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has apart from this section. In SZWBH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317 at 323 [24], the Full Court of the Federal Court said this of this Court’s power to summarily dismiss:It may readily be accepted that the criterion for the exercise of the power is less onerous than that which previously obtained at common law: see for example Jewiss v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 65 ATR 222 at [26] (Mansfield J). That said, the power must be exercised cautiously: cf Spencer at 131. The Court should not act to prevent an applicant prosecuting his or her case in the normal way unless the need for summary judgment is clear: see Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574 at 582 (Tamberlin J). It will, ordinarily, not be appropriate to grant summary judgment in a case in which there is a real dispute between the parties as to issues of fact: see Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Turnbull Cooktown Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 489 at [10] (Besanko J).. In AAV15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 454, Flick J explained at 458 [12]:Notwithstanding the fact that the language now employed in both s 17A of the Federal Circuit Court Act and s 31A of the Federal Court Act is to “soften the test for a successful application for summary judgment” (Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117 at [25], (2009) 178 FCR 401 at 408 per Spender, Graham and Gilmour JJ), when exercising the discretion the Court “must be cautious not to do an injustice … ” (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v ACN 000 247 601 Pty Limited (in liq) [2006] FCA 1416 at [30] per Jacobson J). Any “exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution”: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28 at [24], (2010) 241 CLR 118 at 131 per French CJ and Gummow J.See also Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256 at [45] – [47] (Reeves J) and Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045 (“Eliezer”) at [33]-[40] (Perry J). There are a number of Commonwealth statutes dealing with discrimination of different kinds: see for instance the Racial Discrimination Act1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Disability Discrimination Act1992 (Cth) and the ADA (together, “anti-discrimination laws”). A number of these reflect a direct response to Australia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights done that New York on 16 December 1966. Article 2(1) of that Covenant provides:Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia examined whether the university was liable for discrimination under anti-discrimination laws and the court's jurisdiction to grant summary judgment. The court began by establishing the legal principles and authorities relevant to each issue. Firstly, the court considered the anti-discrimination laws, which encompass various statutes such as the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), and the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). These laws reflect Australia's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ensuring that individuals within the country are protected from discrimination based on various attributes. The court referenced Article 2(1) of the Covenant, emphasizing the obligation to respect and ensure these rights without distinction.

The court then turned to the power of the Federal Circuit Court to grant summary judgment, as outlined in section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). This section empowers the court to dismiss a proceeding if it is satisfied that the defending party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the case. The court noted that the criterion for exercising this power is less onerous than the common law standard, yet it must still be exercised cautiously to avoid injustice. This principle was underscored in SZWBH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317 at 323 [24], where the Full Court of the Federal Court emphasized the need for caution in such discretionary decisions.

Next, the court assessed whether the criteria for granting summary judgment under section 17A were met in this case. It considered that the proceeding need not be "hopeless" or "bound to fail" for the court to determine that there is no reasonable prospect of success. This interpretation was supported by authorities such as AAV15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 454, where Flick J highlighted the importance of caution when exercising the power to summarily terminate proceedings. The court also referenced Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256 at [45] – [47] (Reeves J) and Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045 at [33]-[40] (Perry J) to reinforce the cautious approach required in such matters.

Finally, the court deliberated on whether it should exercise its discretion to grant summary judgment. It emphasized that summary judgment is not appropriate in cases with real disputes over factual issues. This principle was illustrated in Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Turnbull Cooktown Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 489 at [10] (Besanko J). The court also referenced Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574 at 582 (Tamberlin J), which underscored the importance of allowing parties to prosecute their cases unless the need for summary judgment is clear.

The ratio decidendi of Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney is that the Federal Circuit Court has the discretion to grant summary judgment under section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) if satisfied that the defending party has no reasonable prospect of success, provided that the power is exercised cautiously and without unjustly preventing the prosecution of the case. This principle was applied to ensure that the court's decision adhered to the statutory framework and relevant authorities, while also considering the importance of protecting individual rights under anti-discrimination laws.