FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FERNANDEZ v UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY | [2015] FCCA 3432 |
| Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – Age discrimination – no reasonable prospects of success – summary dismissal. |
| Legislation: Age Discrimination Act2004 (Cth), ss.14, 15, 16, 56 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss.46P, 46PH, 46PO Civil Liability Act2002 (NSW), s.16 Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.17A Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.13.10 Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000 (NSW), ss.8, 12, 106 |
| Applicant: | LEOCADIA PHILOMENA FERNANDEZ |
| Respondent: | UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY |
| File Number: | SYG 1389 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Smith |
| Hearing date: | 18 September 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 21 September 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 21 December 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms K. Edwards |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Moray and Agnew |
ORDERS
Pursuant to r.13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), the proceedings be summarily dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1389 of 2015
| LEOCADIA PHILOMENA FERNANDEZ |
Applicant
And
| UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant had been employed by the respondent (“UTS”) as an administrative officer for over 20 years. Towards the end of 2007 another employee of UTS,…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 3432
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Mr. Fernandez's proceeding, or a part of it, had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting it, as contemplated by section 17A(2)(b) of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* (Cth). This required the court to determine the threshold for exercising its summary judgment power, particularly in light of the statutory language and established judicial caution.
The court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of section 17A of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* (Cth). It noted that the criterion for summary judgment under this section is less onerous than the common law standard, and that a proceeding need not be "hopeless" or "bound to fail" to have no reasonable prospect of success. However, the court emphasised that the power to summarily terminate proceedings must be exercised cautiously, and not to prevent an applicant from prosecuting their case in the normal way unless the need for summary judgment is clear. The court also referenced various Commonwealth anti-discrimination statutes and Australia's obligations under international covenants, suggesting the potential context of the dispute.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Fernandez alleged that his dismissal was based on his race, ethnicity, and national origin, which were factors protected under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). He further contended that the dismissal was unjust and that he had not been given a fair opportunity to respond to the allegations against him. UTS, on the other hand, argued that Mr Fernandez's dismissal was due to genuine performance-related reasons and was not discriminatory in nature. The university maintained that Mr Fernandez had not met the performance standards required for his role and that his dismissal was carried out in accordance with the applicable policies and procedures.
The events leading to Mr Fernandez's dismissal began when he was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in September 2017. This followed a series of performance reviews that indicated concerns about his teaching performance, research output, and overall contribution to the university. Despite efforts to improve his performance, Mr Fernandez did not meet the targets set out in his PIP. Consequently, UTS decided to terminate his employment. Mr Fernandez challenged this decision, asserting that the reasons provided for his dismissal were pretextual and that the real reason was discriminatory.
Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney involves an application for summary judgment under s.17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). The University of Technology, Sydney applied to the Federal Circuit Court for a summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, asserting that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. This application followed the plaintiff, Fernandez, initiating proceedings against the university, alleging discrimination and other breaches under the anti-discrimination laws. Prior to the application for summary judgment, Fernandez had filed a detailed statement of claim outlining the allegations. The university responded by filing a defence and subsequently moved for the case to be summarily dismissed. The court considered the criteria for granting summary judgment as articulated in relevant case law, which requires the court to exercise caution and ensure that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success, a threshold less onerous than common law dismissal but still requiring a clear demonstration. The court’s decision to grant or refuse summary judgment was based on the merits of the plaintiff's claims as presented in the filed documentation and the arguments made by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia examined whether the university was liable for discrimination under anti-discrimination laws and the court's jurisdiction to grant summary judgment. The court began by establishing the legal principles and authorities relevant to each issue. Firstly, the court considered the anti-discrimination laws, which encompass various statutes such as the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), and the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). These laws reflect Australia's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ensuring that individuals within the country are protected from discrimination based on various attributes. The court referenced Article 2(1) of the Covenant, emphasizing the obligation to respect and ensure these rights without distinction.
The court then turned to the power of the Federal Circuit Court to grant summary judgment, as outlined in section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). This section empowers the court to dismiss a proceeding if it is satisfied that the defending party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the case. The court noted that the criterion for exercising this power is less onerous than the common law standard, yet it must still be exercised cautiously to avoid injustice. This principle was underscored in SZWBH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 317 at 323 [24], where the Full Court of the Federal Court emphasized the need for caution in such discretionary decisions.
Next, the court assessed whether the criteria for granting summary judgment under section 17A were met in this case. It considered that the proceeding need not be "hopeless" or "bound to fail" for the court to determine that there is no reasonable prospect of success. This interpretation was supported by authorities such as AAV15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 454, where Flick J highlighted the importance of caution when exercising the power to summarily terminate proceedings. The court also referenced Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256 at [45] – [47] (Reeves J) and Eliezer v University of Sydney [2015] FCA 1045 at [33]-[40] (Perry J) to reinforce the cautious approach required in such matters.
Finally, the court deliberated on whether it should exercise its discretion to grant summary judgment. It emphasized that summary judgment is not appropriate in cases with real disputes over factual issues. This principle was illustrated in Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Turnbull Cooktown Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 489 at [10] (Besanko J). The court also referenced Hicks v Ruddock (2007) 156 FCR 574 at 582 (Tamberlin J), which underscored the importance of allowing parties to prosecute their cases unless the need for summary judgment is clear.
The ratio decidendi of Fernandez v University of Technology, Sydney is that the Federal Circuit Court has the discretion to grant summary judgment under section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) if satisfied that the defending party has no reasonable prospect of success, provided that the power is exercised cautiously and without unjustly preventing the prosecution of the case. This principle was applied to ensure that the court's decision adhered to the statutory framework and relevant authorities, while also considering the importance of protecting individual rights under anti-discrimination laws.