Travers v State of New South Wales

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Travers v State of New South Wales [2000] FCA 1565

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION – proceeding seeking relief in respect of alleged unlawful discrimination commenced in the Court following the termination of a complaint made to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission – motion filed by respondent seeking an order summarily dismissing the proceeding under FCR O 20 r 2 on the basis that the application disclosed no reasonable cause of action – whether the application failed to meet the requirements of s 46PO(3) of the Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 (Cth) because the discrimination which it alleged was not the same as (or the same in substance as), or did not arise out of the same (or substantially the same) acts, omissions or practices as, the discrimination which was the subject of the terminated complaint – whether the facts alleged by the applicant would, if proved, amount to indirect discrimination within the meaning of s 6 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether it would be appropriate for the Court to conclude that an application is not supported by the evidence filed, and to proceed to make an order under FCR O 20 r 2, on the basis of a possible inconsistency between the affidavit filed with the application and another affidavit filed on behalf of the applicant

Federal Court Rules, O 20 r 2
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s 6
Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1999 (Cth), s 46PO(3)

Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548, referred to
Australian Public Service Association v Australian Trade Commission (1988) EOC 92-228, followed
Styles v Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1988) EOC 92-239, followed
Assal v Department of Health, Housing & Community Services (1992) EOC 92-409, referred to
Simplot Australia Pty Ltd v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1996) 69 FCR 90, referred to
Commonwealth v Sex Discrimination Commissioner (1998) 90 FCR 179, referred to

STEPHANIE TRAVERS by her next friend, MS WENDY LORRAINE TRAVERS v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES

N 473 OF 2000

LEHANE J
3 NOVEMBER 2000
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 473 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

STEPHANIE TRAVERS by her next friend,
MS WENDY LORRAINE TRAVERS
APPLICANT

AND:

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

LEHANE J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 NOVEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The relief sought by the respondent in its notice of motion filed on 6 October 2000 be refused.

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the motion.

3.The proceeding be transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 473 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

STEPHANIE TRAVERS by her next friend,
MS WENDY LORRAINE TRAVERS
APPLICANT

AND:

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
RESPONDENT

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1565
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Travers v State of New South Wales is a case involving a claim of discrimination under the Discrimination Act. The applicant, Travers, who has spina bifida, alleged that she was discriminated against at her school when she was denied access to a disabled toilet. The State argued for the dismissal of Travers' application on two grounds: first, that the discrimination alleged was not the same as, or did not arise out of the same acts, omissions, or practices which were the subject of the terminated complaint, and second, that the acts and omissions on which the applicant relied did not amount to discrimination as defined by the Act.

The court was required to determine whether the discrimination alleged in the application was sufficiently related to the discrimination in the terminated complaint to satisfy the statutory requirements and whether the acts and omissions alleged constituted discrimination under the Act. The court found that the phrase "is not able to comply" in the Act should be interpreted to extend to situations where compliance would cause serious embarrassment or distress, aligning with established legal principles. The court held that the motion for summary dismissal was not warranted, as the application did not lack substance and the interests of justice would be better served by allowing the case to proceed.

The court dismissed the motion for summary dismissal and ordered that the proceeding be transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, considering the complexity and resources of the case. This transfer was intended to ensure efficient administration of justice. The final orders included refusal of the relief sought by the State, a direction for the State to pay Travers' costs of the motion, and the transfer of the proceeding to the Federal Magistrates Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The relief sought by the respondent in its notice of motion filed on 6 October 2000 be refused.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the motion.

3. The proceeding be transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia.

Background

Background to the litigation

The State seeks summary dismissal on two grounds. One commences with the proposition that the discrimination alleged in the application to the Court is not the same as, or the same in substance as, the discrimination which was the subject of the terminated complaint and does not arise out of the same, or substantially the same, acts, omissions or practices which were the subject of the terminated complaint: that is, the application to the Court, the State contends, does not meet the requirements of s 46P0(3) of the Amendment Act. If, the argument proceeds, the application is limited to the substance of the complaint to the Commission, it is not supported by the evidence filed, and should be dismissed. The other basis of the State’s motion is that the acts and omissions on which the applicant relies do not amount to discrimination of a kind that is forbidden by the Discrimination Act.FACTS For the purpose of dealing with the motion, the allegations of fact on which the applicant bases her claim may be summarised quite briefly. The applicant was born on 14 December 1988. She has spina bifida. As a result, she has some physical disability, an aspect of which is that she has some difficulties with bladder and bowel control. In order to minimise the risk of accidents, she needs (or, at least, at the relevant time needed) to be within about twelve seconds’ walking distance of a toilet. During 1995 and early 1996, the applicant attended Parramatta West Public School. In 1995 some arrangements were made, principally the provision of a teacher’s aide, to help the applicant. In 1996 the applicant entered year 2. Her usual classroom was not within twelve seconds’ walking distance of a toilet to which she had access. There was, however, a toilet for disabled children, referred to in the material filed in support of the application as the “disabled toilet”. The disabled toilet was close to the applicant’s classroom. It was, however, kept locked. A number of teachers had keys and, in order to use the disabled toilet, it was necessary to ask one of those teachers to open it. On 16 February 1996 the applicant’s mother, accompanied by the applicant and her grandmother, had a discussion at the school with the principal and the deputy principal. The discussion, according to the account given by the applicant’s mother, was acrimonious and unsatisfactory. The applicant’s mother asked that the applicant be provided with a key to the disabled toilet or, alternatively, that the toilet be left unlocked. Both requests, according to her account, were refused. The applicant did not attend the school after 16 February 1996. On 10 February 1997 the applicant’s mother made a complaint to the Disabilities Commissioner, alleging discrimination. The discrimination alleged in the heading of the letter of complaint was “Access denied to the Disabled Toilet by Mr. Robert Lamaro (Principal) and Miss Vicky Russell (Deputy Principal)”. The body of the letter largely consists of an account of the meeting and discussion on 16 February 1996. The letter does, however, say that Mr Lamaro and Miss Russell appeared to be aggravated by what they were told in support of the request for access to the disabled toilet, “an attitude which seems to have been present since [the applicant’s] enrolment in the school”. The concluding paragraph of the letter reads:“This resulted in a stalemate being reached leaving no alternative but to remove [the applicant] from a hostile environment that was not allowing [the applicant] the use of the disabled toilet as other children in the school with disabilities had the privilege of.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LEHANE J
To conclude that it could amount to discrimination of that kind requires a reasonably liberal interpretation of the phrase “is not able to comply” in par (c) of s 6. Neither the original complaint nor the claim in this proceeding suggests that it is literally impossible for the applicant to comply with a condition in the form I have suggested. She could do so, but only with consequences which (if the facts alleged are proved) are seriously embarrassing and distressing. The absence of any argument by the State specifically directed to the point makes me confident in taking the view – which in any event seems to me correct – that it is appropriate to construe “is not able to comply” as extending to the requirement as I have expressed it. It is consistent with a line of Australian decisions which have applied a construction adopted by the House of Lords in Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 at 565, 566 per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, with whom the other members of the House agreed. It is unnecessary to list the Australian decisions. It is sufficient, I think, to mention two of the earlier cases, each a decision of a judge of this Court: Australian Public Service Association v Australian Trade Commission (1988) EOC 92–228 at 77,162 and Styles v Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1988) EOC 92–239 at 77,238.CONCLUSION I accept that, as counsel for the State submitted:“… it is in the public interest, as well as in the interests of both parties, that the hearing of a complaint which is clearly shown to be lacking in substance should be summarily terminated. Certainly, it is no kindness to a complainant to shrink from the exercise of the power … in circumstances where that exercise is clearly warranted.” (Assal v Department of Health, Housing & Community Services (1992) EOC 92–409 at 78,900 per Sir Ronald Wilson, President of HREOC). That is especially so, perhaps, in this Court where an unsuccessful litigant, if proceedings are protracted, may face what can be the considerable burden of a costs order. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to refer to the well known authorities which establish the proposition that the power of summary dismissal is to be exercised only with caution and in a clear case. The reasons I have given necessarily lead, in my view, to the conclusion that this is not such a case and accordingly the motion will be dismissed with costs.TRANSFER TO FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT At the conclusion of the hearing of the motion I suggested to counsel that this might well be a case which, if the motion were dismissed, might appropriately be transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia. Neither party opposed that course; indeed, both readily accepted that transfer might well be appropriate. The power to transfer a proceeding to the Federal Magistrates Court is conferred by s 32AB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). An order may be made on the Court’s own initiative. Subsections (3) to (6) prescribe requirements to be observed and matters to be taken into account. In considering whether an order should be made in this case I have, of course, had regard to those provisions. Particularly, I have considered the matters which s 32AB(6) requires to be taken into account. I have ascertained that the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient to hear and determine the proceeding and, in my view, the interests of the administration of justice would be served by ordering the transfer. In those circumstances, in addition to the orders disposing of the motion, I order that the proceeding be transferred from this Court to the Federal Magistrates Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LEHANE J