Administrative Law - Sex Discrimination - Whether complaint under Sex Discrimination Act 1984 must provide sufficient details of the alleged discrimination to show on its face that it relates to an unlawful act - Whether the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission has jurisdiction or power to hold an inquiry into a complaint which may not relate to an unlawful act but alleges that a person has done an unlawful act - Whether discrimination upon the ground of a failure to contract with a corporation offered or nominated by a woman on ground of her sex can constitute sex discrimination - Whether error of law in Commission not being satisfied that the complaint relates to an act which is not unlawful.
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ss.5, 14(1), 16, 50, 52(2), 52(4), 52(5), 59(1), 79 and 81.
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) ss.44(1), 45 and 47.
Nestle Australia Ltd. v. The President and Members of the Equal Opportunity Board [1990] VR 799
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Wu Shan Liang (1996) 136 ALR 481
VG204/96 SIMPLOT AUSTRALIA PTY. LTD. (Trading as EDGELL-BIRDS EYE) V. COMMISSIONER ROBERT NETTLEFOLD (Constituting the HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION)
MERKEL J.
MELBOURNE
9 AUGUST 1996
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION No. VG 204 of 1996
B E T W E E N:
SIMPLOT AUSTRALIA PTY. LTD.
(Trading as EDGELL-BIRDS EYE)
Applicant
AND:
COMMISSIONER ROBERT NETTLEFOLD
(Constituting the HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION)
First Respondent
AND:
ANTONIA DI PETTA
Second Respondent
Coram:Merkel J.
Place:Melbourne
Date:9 August 1996
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The Application be dismissed.
The applicant pay the taxed costs of the respondents of and incidental to the application.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION No. VG 204 of 1996
B E T W E E N:
SIMPLOT AUSTRALIA PTY. LTD.
(Trading as EDGELL-BIRDS EYE)
Applicant
AND:
COMMISSIONER ROBERT NETTLEFOLD
(Constituting the HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION)
First Respondent
AND:
ANTONIA DI PETTA
Second Respondent
Coram:Merkel J.
Place:Melbourne
Date:9 August 1996
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
On 2 March 1994 the second respondent Antonia Di Petta ("Di Petta") lodged a complaint pursuant to s.50 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ("the Act") alleging that the applicant ("Edgell") had discriminated against her on the ground of her sex.
On 12 March 1995 a delegate of the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, acting pursuant to s.52(2)(a) of the Act, decided not to inquire into the act alleged in the complaint on the ground that she was satisfied that it was not unlawful. As a consequence of Di Petta requiring that the complaint be referred to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
("HREOC") pursuant to s.52(4)(a) it was referred to HREOC under s.52(5) of the Act.
Pursuant to s.59(1) of the Act, HREOC was required to hold an inquiry into the complaint or matter…
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- Case
- [1996] FCA 718
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the complaint did comply with s.50 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), as it alleged that Edgell had done an act that was unlawful under the Act. The Court determined that the complaint need not provide specific details of the alleged discrimination to invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission, as the inquiry process allows for the ascertainment of such details during the investigation. Furthermore, the Court held that the complaint sufficiently detailed the alleged discriminatory treatment against Di Petta based on her sex, contrary to Edgell's submissions.
Regarding the alleged error of law, the Court found that the Inquiry Commissioner did not make a reviewable error in not being satisfied that the complaint related to an act that was not unlawful. The Commissioner's decision was made at an early stage of the inquiry, and he acknowledged that the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act would be determined during the course of the inquiry. The Court also found no error in the Commissioner's consideration of the discriminatory treatment of Di Petta, rather than her company, as a potential issue to be determined in the inquiry.
In conclusion, the Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional or other reviewable error of law committed by the Inquiry Commissioner. The Court ordered that the applicant pay the taxed costs of the respondents.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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