Ford v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ford v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1784

File number: QUD 349 of 2017
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 11 December 2020
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – sexual harassment – s 28A Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) – complaint before Australian Human Rights Commission terminated under s 46PH(1)(i) Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – scope of jurisdiction – s 46PO(3) Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – whether application before Court the same, or arose out of the same acts, omissions or practices, as complaint before Australian Human Rights Commission – whether alleged conducted substantiated by applicant – whether substantiated conduct constituted sexual harassment – principles of s 28A Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) – whether patting or slapping of applicant’s buttocks was “conduct of sexual nature” – whether fifth respondent’s language was “conduct of a sexual nature” – whether substantiated conduct was unwelcome – whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have anticipated the possibility that the applicant would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct.

EVIDENCE – expert medical evidence – use of psychologist’s non-expert opinion – deemed admissions – r 16.07 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – whether the first and third to fifth respondents made deemed admissions – effect of deemed admissions – s 83 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – objections to evidence – whether evidence of witnesses relevant – s 55 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether evidence of witnesses unfairly prejudicial or misleading – hearsay evidence – s 59 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – admissibility of first-hand hearsay evidence – s 62 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – admissibility of lay opinions – ss 76 and 78 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – admissibility of tendency and coincidence evidence – Pt 3.6 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether sufficient notice to respondents of tendency and coincidence evidence – s 100 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether notice requirement be dispensed with – probative value of tendency or coincidence evidence – use of tendency and coincidence evidence for other purposes – credibility of evidence of witnesses – whether post-traumatic stress disorder affected evidence of applicant – whether evidence of witnesses contaminated – standard of proof in civil matters – s 140 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – ss 46PH(1)(i), 46PO

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – s 55, 59, 60, 62, 64, 76(1), 78, 83, 140(2) Pt 3.6

Evidence Regulations 2018 (Cth) – reg 7

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – s 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – rr 1,34, 16.07, 22.07

Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) – ss 28A, 28B, 94, 106

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – s 298K

Cases cited:

Adams v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2017) 258 FCR 257; [2017] FCAFC 228

Aldridge v Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Francis (2004) 142 FCR 1

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1784
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Ford v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3), the applicant, Mr Ford, sought to bring an action for sexual harassment against the respondents, Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd and several individuals. The applicants' claims were based on alleged incidents of sexual harassment that occurred during his employment with the respondents. The primary issue before the court was whether the applicant had substantiated conduct that constituted sexual harassment under section 28A of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The court also needed to determine whether the alleged witnessed conduct was part of the applicant's complaint before the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and if the application was within the jurisdiction of the court.

The court found that while some of the events alleged by Mr Ford did occur, they did not involve conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of section 28A of the Sex Discrimination Act, nor did they constitute sexual harassment. The court was not satisfied that the conduct alleged by Mr Ford had been substantiated. The court also held that the alleged witnessed conduct could not form part of the applicant's complaint before the court as it had not been the subject of a complaint to the AHRC which was terminated. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant's originating application. The court granted the applicant's oral application to dispense with the notice requirement in sections 97(1)(a) and 98(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s oral application of 30 August 2019, to dispense with the notice requirement in s 97(1)(a) and s 98(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), be granted.

2. The originating application filed on 14 July 2017 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my view the last filed affidavits of Mr Ogg, Mr Bhardwaj and Mr Ly should be admitted.Respondents’ notice of objection to evidence In their notice of objection to evidence filed on 1 March 2019, the respondents objected to evidence of:·Mr Ly;·Mr Bhardwaj;·Mr Ogg;·Ms Hanner;·Mr Ford;·Dr Byth; and·Mr Barlow. The evidence of Dr Byth and Mr Barlow is medical evidence, and I will deal with that evidence separately. Some confusion arose in the course of the proceedings as to the parties’ approach to, and the Court’s consideration of, the admissibility of this evidence. In the course of case management of the proceedings, I listed the proceedings for a case management hearing on 9 April 2019 in order to hear objections to evidence. In relation to objections to evidence as a whole, however, at the case management hearing on 9 April 2019 I indicated to the parties my overall preference to admit evidence on which the parties sought to rely, in order for the Court to be presented with that which the parties perceived to be their best evidence. This approach was, in my view, consistent with the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions (as set out in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)) in a complex matter involving sensitive and emotional matters of evidence, and the desirability of facilitating the just resolution of the dispute before the Court according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. I was also conscious of the proposed duration of the proceedings and the prospect of significant costs which would be incurred by the parties, as well as Court time in hearing detailed and contested objections to evidence. At the hearing on 9 April 2019 after I expressed my views, the matter was briefly adjourned and Counsel conferred. On resumption of Court, Counsel for the respondents made the following submission:Your Honour, it has been used constructively. Your Honour, I can indicate in the circumstances, given your Honour’s indication, the respondent doesn’t press the objections brought in the filed objections to evidence document. I can only understand that the document to which Counsel referred in this submission was the notice of objection filed on 1 March 2019, that the respondents did not seek to press their objections, and that the matter would proceed at trial with all evidence being admitted for consideration. In the circumstances, and with no apparent demur on the part of the parties, I then adjourned Court. I note the applicant also filed a document, being “Applicant’s Notes on Objections to Evidence” of some 150 pages (including extensive annexures) on 9 April 2019. I understand that the applicant had anticipated relying on that document at the hearing of 9 April 2019. On the first day of the trial, Counsel for the respondents again raised objections to evidence referable to their notice of objections filed on 1 March 2019. At the time, in querying this approach, I said as follows:I also gave the parties the opportunity to return for further case management on 11 June. You might recall that. The parties – my Associates sent an email to the parties. The parties decided to come in for that case management day. We had a case management day. No further issues were raised in relation to objections to evidence, as I recall. Now, I really want to get on with this. If there are specific issues of importance that you want to raise, well, I am reluctant, given the fact that we’ve already been down this path, but I’m not prepared to have 30 pages of evidence – objections to evidence raised on day 1 of the trial. As a matter of case management, in my view, that horse has bolted.I hear what you’re saying, Ms Reece. You can make whatever submissions you like about whether certain evidence should be given any weight by me or shouldn’t be allowed by me, but I would prefer you to perhaps do that after the trial. The reason is because some of this evidence may just simply fall away. I don’t know. I’m also thinking of the time you’re going to spend on this, and you may find that it’s more constructive later. But if you – please don’t put in – expect me to rule on evidence at this point if it’s 30 pages of evidence. I’ve already given – we’ve already been down this path and I’ve already told the parties my preferred approach to deal with the evidence in this case.It is very difficult. They’re very – as the parties are aware, there are some quite difficult allegations being made on both sides. I would simply like to get on and hear the evidence and have that evidence tested properly. And I have no problem with having it properly tested in court….(Transcript page 55 ll 1-24.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

On balance, the weight of credible evidence does not support Mr Ford’s claims in respect of Agreed Issue 1(q).CONCLUSION I have examined, in detail, and carefully, the evidence before the Court. To the extent that I am persuaded that events alleged by Mr Ford did occur, I am not satisfied that they involved conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of s 28A of the SD Act, or otherwise constituted sexual harassment within the meaning of s 28A of the SD Act. Otherwise, I am not satisfied that the conduct alleged by Mr Ford has been substantiated. I will hear the parties in respect of costs. In circumstances where I have found that the applicant has not established that any conduct constituting sexual harassment within the meaning of s 28A of the SD Act occurred, there is no need to give consideration to the appropriate remedy to be awarded, or to consider questions of vicarious liability on the part of the first respondent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondents, in their closing submissions, submitted that the individuals allegedly the subject of the incidents did not participate in or appear during the AHRC process, and did not have a right of response until these proceedings. The respondents further submitted that the Court should dismiss the alleged witnessed conduct from the applicant’s claim, for want of jurisdiction, as the applicant, by omitting the incidents from the AHRC complaint, failed to give the parties an opportunity to resolve that part of the dispute in the AHRC and, in effect, bypassed the AHRC to first articulate the alleged incidents in this Court. Consideration Section 46PO(3) of the AHRC Act relevantly provides as follows:(3) The unlawful discrimination alleged in the application:(a) must be the same as (or the same in substance as) the unlawful discrimination that was the subject of the terminated complaint; or(b) must arise out of the same (or substantially the same) acts, omissions or practices that were the subject of the terminated complaint. In considering whether the alleged witnessed conduct can form part of the applicant’s complaint before this Court, the Court must be satisfied that the conduct has been previously the subject of a complaint to the Commission which was terminated. The most recent Full Court authority considering s 46PO(3) is Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118. In that case, their Honours said as follows:46. Section 46PO(3) contemplates some ambit for additional conduct, acts, omissions or practices to constitute unlawful discrimination. In Travers v State of New South Wales [2000] FCA 1565 at [8] Lehane J referred to the terms of s 46PO(3) as suggesting a degree of flexibility. However, s 46PO(3) operates as an important constraint upon the ability of a complainant later to seek relief in the Court in respect of a complaint he or she had not previously raised for consideration by the Commission. As Lehane J cautioned, the ability to make an application to the Court “should not be used to launch an application … effectively bypassing the procedures provided by the legislation”: Travers [2000] FCA 1565 at [8]. His Honour also followed the warning of Branson J in Commonwealth v Sex Discrimination Commissioner (1998) 90 FCR 179 at 188B-D, that usually a complaint will not be drawn by a lawyer and it ought not be construed as a pleading. Justice Branson held also that a complaint under s 46P was not to be equated to a criminal complaint or information: 90 FCR at 188B. Her Honour followed Merkel J’s decision in Simplot Australia Pty Ltd v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1996) 69 FCR 90 at 93–94 that a complaint in writing did not need to include any details of the alleged unlawful discrimination (see now s 46P of the AHRC Act).47. As Lehane J said in Travers [2006] FCA 1565 at [8], the ambit of the complaint may be ascertained for the purpose of s 46PO(3), not by considering its initial form, but by considering the shape it had assumed at the time of its termination: see too Simplot 69 FCR at 94F-G. In Charles v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 105 FCR 573 at 580–581 [35]–[41] Katz J considered the construction of s 46PO(3). He held that s 46PO(3)(b) permitted an applicant to allege different facts in proceedings in the Court from those alleged in the terminated complaint, provided that those new facts were not different in substance from those formerly alleged: Charles 105 FCR at 580 [39].48.The unlawful discrimination referred to in s 46PO(3) consists of any acts, omissions or practices alleged in the complaint that amount to unlawful discrimination as defined in s 3(1) of the AHRC Act….And, in applying the terms of s 46PO(3), the terms of a complaint made to the Commission should not be read with the same strictures as apply to a pleading in a Court. Not only was this approach implicitly recognised by the flexibility of the terms employed in the sub-section itself, s 46PR required an approach “not bound by technicality”...