FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ford v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1784
File number: QUD 349 of 2017 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 11 December 2020 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – sexual harassment – s 28A Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) – complaint before Australian Human Rights Commission terminated under s 46PH(1)(i) Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – scope of jurisdiction – s 46PO(3) Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – whether application before Court the same, or arose out of the same acts, omissions or practices, as complaint before Australian Human Rights Commission – whether alleged conducted substantiated by applicant – whether substantiated conduct constituted sexual harassment – principles of s 28A Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) – whether patting or slapping of applicant’s buttocks was “conduct of sexual nature” – whether fifth respondent’s language was “conduct of a sexual nature” – whether substantiated conduct was unwelcome – whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have anticipated the possibility that the applicant would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct.
EVIDENCE – expert medical evidence – use of psychologist’s non-expert opinion – deemed admissions – r 16.07 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – whether the first and third to fifth respondents made deemed admissions – effect of deemed admissions – s 83 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – objections to evidence – whether evidence of witnesses relevant – s 55 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether evidence of witnesses unfairly prejudicial or misleading – hearsay evidence – s 59 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – admissibility of first-hand hearsay evidence – s 62 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – admissibility of lay opinions – ss 76 and 78 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – admissibility of tendency and coincidence evidence – Pt 3.6 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether sufficient notice to respondents of tendency and coincidence evidence – s 100 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether notice requirement be dispensed with – probative value of tendency or coincidence evidence – use of tendency and coincidence evidence for other purposes – credibility of evidence of witnesses – whether post-traumatic stress disorder affected evidence of applicant – whether evidence of witnesses contaminated – standard of proof in civil matters – s 140 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – ss 46PH(1)(i), 46PO
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – s 55, 59, 60, 62, 64, 76(1), 78, 83, 140(2) Pt 3.6
Evidence Regulations 2018 (Cth) – reg 7
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – s 37M
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – rr 1,34, 16.07, 22.07
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) – ss 28A, 28B, 94, 106
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – s 298K
Cases cited: Adams v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2017) 258 FCR 257; [2017] FCAFC 228
Aldridge v Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Francis (2004) 142 FCR 1
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1784
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that while some of the events alleged by Mr Ford did occur, they did not involve conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of section 28A of the Sex Discrimination Act, nor did they constitute sexual harassment. The court was not satisfied that the conduct alleged by Mr Ford had been substantiated. The court also held that the alleged witnessed conduct could not form part of the applicant's complaint before the court as it had not been the subject of a complaint to the AHRC which was terminated. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant's originating application. The court granted the applicant's oral application to dispense with the notice requirement in sections 97(1)(a) and 98(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s oral application of 30 August 2019, to dispense with the notice requirement in s 97(1)(a) and s 98(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), be granted.
2. The originating application filed on 14 July 2017 be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondents, in their closing submissions, submitted that the individuals allegedly the subject of the incidents did not participate in or appear during the AHRC process, and did not have a right of response until these proceedings. The respondents further submitted that the Court should dismiss the alleged witnessed conduct from the applicant’s claim, for want of jurisdiction, as the applicant, by omitting the incidents from the AHRC complaint, failed to give the parties an opportunity to resolve that part of the dispute in the AHRC and, in effect, bypassed the AHRC to first articulate the alleged incidents in this Court. Consideration Section 46PO(3) of the AHRC Act relevantly provides as follows:(3) The unlawful discrimination alleged in the application:(a) must be the same as (or the same in substance as) the unlawful discrimination that was the subject of the terminated complaint; or(b) must arise out of the same (or substantially the same) acts, omissions or practices that were the subject of the terminated complaint. In considering whether the alleged witnessed conduct can form part of the applicant’s complaint before this Court, the Court must be satisfied that the conduct has been previously the subject of a complaint to the Commission which was terminated. The most recent Full Court authority considering s 46PO(3) is Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118. In that case, their Honours said as follows:46. Section 46PO(3) contemplates some ambit for additional conduct, acts, omissions or practices to constitute unlawful discrimination. In Travers v State of New South Wales [2000] FCA 1565 at [8] Lehane J referred to the terms of s 46PO(3) as suggesting a degree of flexibility. However, s 46PO(3) operates as an important constraint upon the ability of a complainant later to seek relief in the Court in respect of a complaint he or she had not previously raised for consideration by the Commission. As Lehane J cautioned, the ability to make an application to the Court “should not be used to launch an application … effectively bypassing the procedures provided by the legislation”: Travers [2000] FCA 1565 at [8]. His Honour also followed the warning of Branson J in Commonwealth v Sex Discrimination Commissioner (1998) 90 FCR 179 at 188B-D, that usually a complaint will not be drawn by a lawyer and it ought not be construed as a pleading. Justice Branson held also that a complaint under s 46P was not to be equated to a criminal complaint or information: 90 FCR at 188B. Her Honour followed Merkel J’s decision in Simplot Australia Pty Ltd v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1996) 69 FCR 90 at 93–94 that a complaint in writing did not need to include any details of the alleged unlawful discrimination (see now s 46P of the AHRC Act).47. As Lehane J said in Travers [2006] FCA 1565 at [8], the ambit of the complaint may be ascertained for the purpose of s 46PO(3), not by considering its initial form, but by considering the shape it had assumed at the time of its termination: see too Simplot 69 FCR at 94F-G. In Charles v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 105 FCR 573 at 580–581 [35]–[41] Katz J considered the construction of s 46PO(3). He held that s 46PO(3)(b) permitted an applicant to allege different facts in proceedings in the Court from those alleged in the terminated complaint, provided that those new facts were not different in substance from those formerly alleged: Charles 105 FCR at 580 [39].48.The unlawful discrimination referred to in s 46PO(3) consists of any acts, omissions or practices alleged in the complaint that amount to unlawful discrimination as defined in s 3(1) of the AHRC Act….And, in applying the terms of s 46PO(3), the terms of a complaint made to the Commission should not be read with the same strictures as apply to a pleading in a Court. Not only was this approach implicitly recognised by the flexibility of the terms employed in the sub-section itself, s 46PR required an approach “not bound by technicality”...