Worldwide Timber Traders Pty Ltd (ABN 93 009 384) v Brouwer (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Worldwide Timber Traders Pty Ltd (ABN 93 009 384) v Brouwer (No 2) [2009] FCA 447

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – moving for judgment on admissions made in open Court – power of the Court to enforce a settlement agreement

CONTRACT – implied term that payment be within a reasonable time if no term stipulated in agreement

Held:  The application be dismissed.

Federal Court Rules O 18 r 4, O 35 r 10, O 72 r 7 

“Certina”, Re Registered Trade Mark (1970) 44 ALJR 191
Darling Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Ellwood (1988) 18 FCR 510
Greig & Murray & Co Ltd v Hutchinson (1889) 15 VLR 706
Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 623
Louinder v Leis (1982) 149 CLR 509
Maisey, G.W. & Anor v. Mudgeeraba Village Estates Pty Ltd & Ors [1985] FCA 191
Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 537
Termijtelen v Van Arkel (1974) 1 NSWLR 525

We Two Pty Ltd v Shorrock (No 2) (2005) 220 ALR 749

WORLDWIDE TIMBER TRADERS PTY LTD (ABN 93 009 384 454) v JAN WILLEM BROUWER and AURIMA ENTERPRISES Sdn Bhd

WAD 341 of 2005

MCKERRACHER J
5 MAY 2009
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 341 of 2005

BETWEEN:

WORLDWIDE TIMBER TRADERS PTY LTD
(ABN 93 009 384 454)
Applicant

AND:

JAN WILLEM BROUWER
First Respondent

AURIMA ENTERPRISES Sdn Bhd
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MAY 2009

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.Submissions in writing (if any) regarding costs are not to exceed two pages in length and are to be filed and served within 10 days.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 341 of 2005

BETWEEN:

WORLDWIDE TIMBER TRADERS PTY LTD
(ABN 93 009 384 454)
Applicant

AND:

JAN WILLEM BROUWER
First Respondent

AURIMA ENTERPRISES Sdn Bhd
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

5 MAY 2009

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. The trial of this proceeding was originally listed for 7-9 April 2008 inclusive.  On 1 April 2008, the respondents applied (without notice and without an affidavit in support), to adjourn the trial.  The applicant opposed the late motion to adjourn.  The applicant’s witnesses were ready.  One had been booked to fly from Melbourne to Perth for the trial.  The proceedings had been on foot since 2005. 

  2. The parties agreed that only one day rather than three was needed for the trial.  Witnesses for all the parties were available to give evidence on 9 April 2008.  On that basis I listed the matter for trial on 9 April 2008 to commence at an earlier time. 

  3. On the morning the trial was to commence, the parties agreed to an adjournment to…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 447
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved Worldwide Timber Traders Pty Ltd (ABN 93 009 384) as the applicant and Brouwer as the respondent. The dispute was related to the execution of a settlement deed and the additional relief sought by the applicant. The matter was heard in a court where the judge expressed dissatisfaction with the delay and costs involved in finalising the small-value dispute. The judge had previously adjourned the matter to allow the parties to reach an agreement on the terms of the deed, but the parties could not agree, leading to the applicant changing solicitors and seeking additional relief.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether to grant the applicant's request for additional relief despite the requirement for a settlement deed. The court considered whether it could disregard the requirement for a deed and whether the reference to the respondent consenting to judgment was the only obstacle to executing the deed. The judge concluded that the requirement for a deed was part of the agreement reached by the parties and that the removal of the consenting to judgment clause was a straightforward amendment. The judge also highlighted the regrettable delay and costs associated with finalising the dispute and suggested that presenting a deed without the contested clause would strengthen the applicant's position if the respondent refused to execute it.

In light of the analysis, the court dismissed the application for additional relief. The judge emphasised that the obvious way forward was to present a deed without the contested clause and that if the respondent refused to execute it, the matter could be reviewed. The court also noted that it would not make any orders for costs unless persuaded otherwise by submissions, which should not exceed two pages in length and must be filed and served within 10 days. The court's final orders were to dismiss the application and to limit any submissions regarding costs to the specified length and timeframe.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. Submissions in writing (if any) regarding costs are not to exceed two pages in length and are to be filed and served within 10 days.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Worldwide Timber Traders Pty Ltd (ABN 93 009 384) and Brouwer had entered into an agreement regarding a settlement of a dispute between them. The terms of the settlement were to be recorded in a deed. However, there was a disagreement between the parties regarding the inclusion of a clause in the deed that required Brouwer to consent to judgment. The matter had been adjourned to allow the parties to reach an agreement, but they were unable to do so. Subsequently, Worldwide Timber Traders changed solicitors and sought additional relief in the court.

The matter had previously been before the court on 19 August 2008, where it was adjourned to allow the parties to reach an agreement on the terms of the deed. After the adjournment, Worldwide Timber Traders changed solicitors and sought additional relief. The current application for relief was heard by the court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MCKERRACHER J
While it is certainly not for me to rewrite the bargain of the parties reached, it is not clear to me why a deed is necessary. As the reference in the deed to consenting to judgment was the only ‘sticking point’ when the matter was before me on 19 August 2008, I adjourned it for a few days to enable the parties to reach agreement on the terms so as to bring the matter back on so that final orders could be made. Agreement was not reached and the applicant changed solicitors. In the absence of agreement, the new solicitors subsequently sought the additional relief which is the subject of these reasons. CONCLUSION Whether or not execution of a deed is superfluous, doing so was, nevertheless, on any account, part of the agreement reached by the parties. In light of the concession that the only difficulty in the draft deed relates to consenting to judgment, it will be an easy amendment to remove that requirement from the deed and to present it for execution. So far as I understand, that has never been done. The requirement that there be a deed recording the terms of settlement between the parties is not something I can ignore. I do not believe I can therefore at this stage give the applicant the judgment it seeks. I have said now on a number of occasions that given the small amount involved in this dispute the delay and costs in its reaching finalisation is most regrettable. I would have thought the obvious way forward was to present a deed which did not include any reference to the respondents’ consenting to judgment. If the respondents then decline to execute the deed the matter can be reviewed but I would have thought at that stage the applicant would be in a much stronger position to move for judgment. For those reasons the application will have to be dismissed. I do not presently propose making any orders for costs unless I am persuaded otherwise by submissions. If there are to be submissions, they should not exceed two pages in length and are to be filed and served within 10 days. Therefore the orders I will make will be that:1.The application be dismissed.2.Submissions in writing (if any) regarding costs are not to exceed two pages in length and are to be filed and served within 10 days.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MCKERRACHER J

The court found that while it was not appropriate to rewrite the agreement of the parties, the necessity of a deed was unclear. Despite the adjournment to allow the parties to reach an agreement, no agreement was reached and the applicant changed solicitors. The new solicitors then sought additional relief, leading to the court's decision. The judge emphasised that the requirement for a deed was part of the original agreement between the parties and removing the reference to consenting to judgment would be a simple amendment. However, as this had not been attempted, the court could not ignore this requirement. The judge acknowledged the regretful delay and costs involved in finalising the dispute but emphasised that presenting a deed without the contentious term would place the applicant in a stronger position if the respondents declined to execute it. Consequently, the court dismissed the application and invited written submissions on costs, limiting them to two pages and stipulating a timeframe of ten days for filing and serving these submissions. The binding principle, or ratio decidendi, established by the decision is that where a deed is part of the settlement agreement, its execution is necessary for the court to grant the desired judgment.