FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MULLIGAN v VIRGIN AUSTRALIA AIRLINES PTY LTD | [2015] FCCA 157 |
| Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – Disability Discrimination Act – whether an assistance animal needed to be trained by an approved organisation – whether the Civil Aviation Regulations prescribed the definition of assistance animal. |
| Legislation: |
| Applicant: | DAVID MULLIGAN |
| Respondent: | VIRGIN AUSTRALIA AIRLINES PTY LTD |
| File Number: | SYG 1660 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Street |
| Hearing date: | 27 January 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 27 January 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 27 January 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Keys |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | N/A |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Baartz |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Allens |
ORDERS
The proceedings be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1660 of 2013
| DAVID MULLIGAN |
Applicant
And
| VIRGIN AUSTRALIA AIRLINES PTY LTD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application brought by the applicant within the court’s jurisdiction conferred by s.49B of the Australian Human Rights Act 1986. The substance of the applicant’s further amended statement of claim is an allegation of discrimination under s.8 and s.24 of the Disability Discrimination Act based on circumstances surrounding a desire to travel on the respondent’s aircraft with a particular dog called Willow.
The circumstances surrounding the communications between the applicant and the respondent were set out in an exchange of emails and relevantly the respondent identified a need for satisfaction by the applicant of the requirements then applicable under the Civil Aviation Authority Instrument 1FHQK3(4) dated 11 June 2011 which was then replaced on 20 February 2013 by Instrument 1FHQK3(5). Willow was not an assistance dog trained and identified by an approved organisation within those requirements.
It was accepted that that each instrument was a legislative instrument within the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 and in that regard had the force of law and that each instrument applied to the respondent as the operator of aircraft.
Each instrument was expressly entitled Permission – Carriage of Assistance Dogs in the Aircraft Cabin. On the face of each instrument it purported to identify exhaustively the permission applicable to the respondent for the purpose of permission to carry an assistance dog in the cabin. In particular para.4:
4 Permission
The Operator may carry an assistance dog in the cabin of its aircraft if:
(a) it has been trained and accredited by a foreign assistance dog training organisation which meets or exceeds the minimum standard as set out by Assistance Dogs International for full membership of that organisation, or
(b) it has been trained or is being trained as an assistance dog by an approved organisation, and
i) it has passed a public access test showing it to be suitable for travel on public transport, or
ii) for an assistance dog being trained, documented evidence has been provided from an approved organisation…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 157
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Virgin Australia's refusal to permit Mulligan to travel with his service dog constituted unlawful discrimination under the *Disability Discrimination Act 1992* (Cth). This required the Court to consider the definition of a "service dog" and whether Virgin Australia had provided reasonable adjustments or accommodations for Mulligan's disability.
Judge Street found that the evidence did not establish that Mulligan's dog was a "service dog" as defined by the relevant provisions of the *Disability Discrimination Act 1992* (Cth). The Court noted that the onus was on the applicant to prove that the dog met the statutory definition. Without this proof, the Court could not find that Virgin Australia's actions were discriminatory. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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