Eisele v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Eisele v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 15

Appeal from: Eisele v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor [2016] FCCA 1155
File number: VID 595 of 2016
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 24 January 2018
Catchwords:

DISCRIMINATION – disability discrimination – alleged discrimination against person with associate with disability – reasonable adjustments – where aggrieved person was applicant for a Subclass 457 visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where associate with a disability had applied for approval as a business sponsor – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – subpoenas – applicable principles – where subpoenas addressed to two witnesses were set aside on basis that the evidence proposed to be adduced would be irrelevant – whether primary judge erred in setting aside subpoenas

Legislation:

Constitution, s 75(v)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 46PH

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 24, 29, 52

Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth), s 18

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 87, 140AA, 140E, 140F, 140G, 140GA, 140GB, 334

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.03, Sch 2, cl 457.223

Cases cited:

Ahmad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 237 FCR 365

Dorajay Pty Limited v Aristocrat Leisure Limited [2005] FCA 588

Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 81

Eisele v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor (No 2) [2016] FCCA 3360

Eisele v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 677

Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478

Gloucester Shire Council v Fitch Ratings, Inc [2016] FCA 587

Jackson v Health Services Union [2015] FCAFC 188

Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427

Mulligan v Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd (2015) 234 FCR 207

Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92

Shannon v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2014) 318 ALR 420

Sklavos v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2017) 347 ALR 78

Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1989) 88 ALR 90

Watts v Australian Postal Corporation (2014) 222 FCR 220

Date of hearing: 4 September 2017
Date of last submissions: 21 September 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 108
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared for herself by telephone
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr T Goodwin
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 595 of 2016
BETWEEN:

PATRICIA EISELE

Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

DANIEL HUNTER, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION CASE OFFICER

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 JANUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the respondent, Dr Eisele, appealed against the dismissal of her claims of disability and sex discrimination by the primary judge. Dr Eisele, a United States citizen who had been living in Australia, applied for a Subclass 457 visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The visa application required a business sponsor to nominate an occupation in relation to Dr Eisele and for the nomination to be approved by the Minister under the Migration Act. The business sponsor, Colby Nelson Hickey, applied for approval as a business sponsor on the same day as Dr Eisele applied for the visa. However, the sponsorship and nomination were subsequently withdrawn. Dr Eisele alleged that the actions of Mr Hunter, who was involved in processing her visa application, constituted disability and sex discrimination against her.

The court was required to decide whether the primary judge erred in dismissing Dr Eisele's claims of disability and sex discrimination, and whether the primary judge erred in setting aside subpoenas addressed to two witnesses. The court considered the evidence and submissions made by both parties, and examined the relevant provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).

The court found that the primary judge did not err in dismissing Dr Eisele's claims of disability and sex discrimination. The court held that there was no evidence that Mr Hunter was aware of, or took into account, Dr Eisele's marital status or that she had an associate with a disability. The court also found that Mr Hunter's actions were not of unjust and unlawful discrimination, and that his conduct, as measured against the requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act, pointed to no material difference in treatment of Dr Eisele at all, or by virtue of her association with Mr Hickey. The court held that the primary judge did not err in setting aside subpoenas addressed to two witnesses, as the evidence proposed to be adduced would be irrelevant.

The appeal was dismissed, and Dr Eisele was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal. If Dr Eisele wished to contend for a different costs order, she could file a short written submission within seven days, and the respondents could file a responding written submission within a further seven days. The court proposed to deal with the issue on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

3. If the appellant wishes to seek a variation of paragraph 2, she may within seven days file and serve a written submission (of no more than two pages). In that event, the respondents may within a further seven days file and serve a responding written submission (of no more than two pages).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that leave to appeal is not required in relation to the subpoena decisions. I have also concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.Background facts The following statement of the facts is largely based on the reasons for judgment of the primary judge: Eisele v Commonwealth of Australia & Anor [2016] FCCA 1155 (the Reasons). I have also drawn on certain documents in the Appeal Book. Dr Eisele is a citizen of the United States of America. She lived in Australia from 1999, and was living in Australia at the time of the trial (23 and 24 March 2016). In March 2012, Dr Eisele completed a PhD in Management at RMIT University. At the time of the trial, she held a Bridging E (Class WE) visa. On 21 May 2012, Dr Eisele applied for a Subclass 457 visa. In the section of the application form for details of the applicant’s sponsoring employer, Dr Eisele identified “Colby Nelson Hickey”. The criteria for the grant of a Subclass 457 visa were set out in Pt 457 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Clause 457.223(4) of Sch 2 relevantly required that a “standard business sponsor” had nominated an occupation in relation to the applicant and that the nomination had been approved by the Minister under s 140GB of the Migration Act. “Standard business sponsor” was defined in reg 1.03 of the Migration Regulations as “an approved sponsor”, a term that was in turn defined in s 5 of the Migration Act to mean, in summary, a person who had been approved by the Minister under s 140E of the Migration Act. Also on 21 May 2012, the Business Sponsor Application and the Nomination were made. In relation to the Business Sponsor Application and the Nomination, the following matters are noted:(a)In each case, the form was signed by Jane Hickey in her capacity as the Administrator of the business. In the spaces provided in each form for an office hours telephone number and an email address, the details provided were: “0406-743-272” and “HICKEYJANE@HOTMAIL.COM”. Both the Business Sponsor Application and the Nomination stated that the legal name of the business was “Colby Nelson Hickey” and that the business traded under the name “Colby and Company”. In both forms, in the space provided for the “Contact officer for enquiries”, the name “Jane Hickey” was inserted. In the space for office hours telephone (in relation to the contact officer for enquiries), the same mobile telephone number as referred to above was inserted.(b)In the Business Sponsor Application, in relation to the industry sector in which the business was operating, the box for “Education and Training” was ticked. The attachments to the Business Sponsor Application included a letter from Swinburne University of Technology that stated that Colby and Company was supplying education access workers to support a student with his studies.(c)In the Nomination, the position to be filled was stated to be “Education Manager” and Dr Eisele was nominated as the person to fill the position. Accompanying the Nomination was a letter dated 20 May 2012 on the letterhead of Colby and Company offering Dr Eisele employment as Education Manager. The letter was signed by Ms Hickey as Administrator.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, grounds 2, 3 and 4 of the notice of appeal, insofar as they rely on or refer to Acts other than the Disability Discrimination Act and the Constitution, are rejected.Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal is to be dismissed. In relation to costs, it would appear to be appropriate that costs follow the event. Accordingly, there will also be an order that Dr Eisele pay the costs of the respondents. However, if Dr Eisele wishes to contend for a different costs order, she may within seven days file a short written submission. In that event, the respondents may within a further seven days file a responding written submission, and I propose to deal with the issue on the papers.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge’s core reasoning in relation to Dr Eisele’s claims was set out at [55]-[74] of the Reasons. In this section of the Reasons, the primary judge identified four acts in respect of which Dr Eisele complained: see [55] of the Reasons. I note that this way of identifying the acts complained of had been suggested by the respondents in closing submissions. It is convenient to set out the full text of [55]-[74] of the Reasons:Consideration55.The Applicant’s evidence goes to four acts complained of wherein it is alleged that these acts found an allegation of sex and/or disability discrimination. Those acts are:-a)Mr Hunter giving effect to Ms Jane Hickey’s withdrawal of the sponsorship and nomination applications;b)Mr Hunter failing to conduct “due diligence” regarding whether it was actually Ms Jane Hickey making the withdrawal request. The Applicant asserts that a person other than Ms Jane Hickey was the author of the emails of 26 June 2012 (as set out in paragraphs 18 and 19 herein) and the caller, identified by Mr Hunter as Ms Hickey, in the phone conversation of 27 June 2012; c)Mr Hunter’s failure to act on the instruction received in the email request from email colbyhickey2012@live.com.au and provide more time to Mr Hickey to provide information; andd)Mr Hunter’s refusal of the application for a visa.56.The allegation of breaches of the SDA and the DDA are considered in relation to the above matters. None of the above actions, it is argued by the Respondents, were done “on the ground of” or “by reason of”, an attribute under either the SDA or the DDA [Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 359 (per Mason CJ and Gaudron J)]. Either because of the marital status of the Applicant under the SDA, or by reason that the Applicant had an associate with a disability who had a carer or assistant under ss. 7 and 8 of the DDA. Rather the evidence goes to all of the actions taken by Mr Hunter as being for reasons that are not unlawful.Sex Discrimination Act57.This Act does not apply to the factual matters which are before the Court. There is no evidence that Mr Hunter was aware of, or took into account, the Applicant’s marital status as defined by the SDA.58.On the Applicant’s own evidence she was not in a de facto relationship with Mr Hickey and never lived with him. Accordingly, she did not meet the definition of marital status and therefore could not be discriminated against on this basis. At the time Mr Hunter gave effect to the withdrawal of the sponsorship and nomination applications he knew nothing about any alleged “inappropriate de facto relationship”. He was not so informed of such allegation until 9 July 2012, and that was of an inappropriate relationship, not inappropriate ‘de facto relationship’, which was a time after he had given effect to the withdrawal of the applications.59.Mr Hunter’s evidence, supported by documentation before the Court, is that he advised Ms Jane Hickey that the reason for withdrawal of her applications was not relevant. Such note in the evidence is a contemporaneous note of Mr Hunter’s state of mind, highlighting that the reason for him giving effect to the withdrawal of the applications was that the person who filed same, namely, Ms Jane Hickey, had requested, as she was entitled to, their withdrawal. The only knowledge Mr Hunter had at the time as to the Applicant’s marital status was that she was divorced, that information being contained in her application for the visa.60.In closing submissions the Applicant, sought to rely on the other subparagraphs of s.6(1), namely, subparagraphs (b) and (c). Those submissions did not go to any satisfaction by the Court that discrimination on the ground of marital status under the SDA can be made out.Disability Discrimination Act61.In respect of the claims made under the DDA there is no evidence that there was discrimination by the Respondents against the Applicant either directly or indirectly. There is no evidence of any specific treatment by Mr Hunter toward the Applicant that can be characterised as discrimination against her because of Mr Hickey’s disability or because Mr Hickey had a carer or assistant. Mr Hunter did not treat the Applicant unfavourably and nor did he impose a requirement or condition on her that she was unable to comply with because she was an associate of Mr Hickey.62.The Applicant’s argument that Mr Hunter discriminated against her by failing to follow Mr Hickey’s instruction in the email from colbyhickey2012@live.com.au, or by failing to provide the reasonable adjustment of time, is irrelevant to her claims to suffer discrimination. Those alleged acts were in regard to Mr Hickey himself, not the Applicant.63.The Applicant’s assertion that it may not have been Ms Jane Hickey who contacted Mr Hunter, which she subsequently asserted in evidence as a fact that it was not Ms Hickey who contacted Mr Hunter by email or phone, is irrelevant. Even if it were not Ms Hickey who contacted the Department by both phone and email, Mr Hunter acted reasonably in relying on the information that he had received from the email address as contained in the application and the phone number which corresponded with the application. His actions were not of unjust and unlawful discrimination. His conduct, as measured against the requirements of the DDA, point to no material difference in treatment of the Applicant at all, or by virtue of her association with Mr Hickey [Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92 at [13] (per Gleeson CJ)].64.Further, the Applicant’s argument that Mr Hunter failed to carry out due diligence by inquiring further as to whether he was communicating with Ms Jane Hickey is answered by there being no duty to inquire in this context beyond the normal checks of Departmental procedure, and that, further, there was no obvious inquiry to make in respect of Ms Hickey’s two emails and one phone call which followed up on her request as set out in the two prior emails.65.The Applicant’s reliance on Auscript transcripts of evidence given by Ms Jane Hickey in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Melbourne on the 9 November 2012 and the 20 March 2014 are, in these proceedings, misconceived. In the second of these transcripts the Applicant seeks to rely upon Ms Jane Hickey’s evidence in a proceeding some 21 months after the events in question, being an intervention order proceeding. It is in an exchange between the Applicant and Ms Jane Hickey on Thursday, 20 March 2014, the relevant part being as follows:-“Dr Eisele: You called the Department of Immigration. This letter was the 27th – they said they got the call from you on the 26th – and you made some statements to them. What was the reason, then, for you calling them and withdrawing my – your support – your sponsorship when I already had ---Her Honour: Okay. So that’s sufficient. Dr Eisele: --- when I had a full-time contract.Her Honour: What was the reason for calling them? What was the reason for calling them?Dr Eisele: For calling them? --- We weren’t going to continue on. Why?Her Honour: Yes. So ---The Witness: Because you weren’t working for us any more.Her Honour: No, no.Dr Eisele: No, I was. I wasn’t dismissed. This was 27 June. I wasn’t dismissed until 8 July. What was the reason given?---Well, I didn’t ring them. Why would I have done that?Because this letter – did Colby ring them? He can’t talk on the phone. This is 27 June when you withdrew sponsorship, 27 June?---I – well, I definitely didn’t withdraw sponsorship until you were dismissed. Why would I do that?If you could show – if – I will have the---Her Honour: Well, she can’t comment on that.”66.In the first of these transcripts, being on the 9 November 2012, and therefore much closer in time to the relevant events, again in intervention order proceedings, the exchange between the Applicant and Ms Jane Hickey is as follows:-“Her Honour: Thank you, everybody. Is this Jane Hickey?Ms … …: Yes.Her Honour: And you’re support in court today, are you?Ms …..: I’m Michelle. Yes.Ms Hickey: And also Michelle’s one of Colby’s carers as well.Her Honour: Okay. Just one moment. I will read through the application. Okay. So, Ms Hickey, in order to consider the application you’re seeking an interim intervention order today. I need to hear evidence on oath. Are you ... to stand in the witness box. Yes. Thanks.Jane Hickey, swornMs Hickey: And then he disclosed to his psychologist that, you know, he was in a sexual relationship with her – that they were going to marry – so that she could stay in the country. And it just went on and on and on. I went to Colby’s lawyers, who advised that I terminate her immediately, and contact the immigration department, which we did, and we removed our sponsorship.Her Honour: When did you dismiss her?Ms Michelle: She was dismissed on – I have the letter here – the 8th of July.”67.This evidence, in the totality of the evidence, does not go to establish that Ms Hickey was not the caller on the phone who spoke with Mr Hunter. Indeed, the Court draws the inference that it was, in fact, Ms Hickey who spoke with Mr Hunter. This inference is drawn on the basis of Mr Hunter’s evidence, both oral and documentary, which is accepted by the Court. The transcripts establish a confusion in the witness about timing, but not the fact of withdrawal of the sponsorship application.68.Mr Hunter gave evidence, when asked by the Applicant, as to why he did not respond to the email from colbyhickey2012@live.com.au of 26 June 2012. His response was coherent and considered, as was all the evidence given by him. He was an impressive and truthful witness. His response was that, firstly, it was not from the authorised email address. Further, that he had spoken to his team leader as to the conflicts between the two emails from differing email addresses. There was no requirement for Mr Hunter to speak with his team leader. He simply was required to correspond with the authorised email address. Nevertheless, his evidence is that he received advice from his team leader to follow the instructions as contained in the authorised email address. 69.Mr Hunter’s suspicion as to the author of the email from colbyhickey2012@live.com.au did not affect his treatment of the Applicant. That suspicion was not determinative of, and nor indeed involved in his decision, as to whether to grant or not grant the Applicant the visa.70.Mr Hunter said on reflection, when asked by the Applicant, that he could have done more by responding to the colbyhickey2012@live.com.au and advising the author of that email to speak to the authorised contact. His failure to not follow through in this manner, given he was under no obligation to do so, was not an act of discrimination against the Applicant. The only reason the Applicant did not obtain the visa was because she did not have a nomination. Mr Hunter believed there was no sponsorship application which was the essential criteria for the grant of the Applicant’s visa. The Applicant admitted in evidence that Mr Hunter held such belief.71.Even if there were problems associated with the withdrawal of the applications, including issues of identity or conflicting information between emails, the Applicant had an opportunity to correct those matters when provided with more time by Mr Hunter to provide him with further information following withdrawal of the sponsorship application. The Applicant did not indicate any concerns regarding the visa process. The Applicant failed to respond at all. The rejection of her visa was because she failed to meet an essential criteria, not because of the withdrawal in strict terms of the sponsorship. The Applicant was given, indeed, ample opportunity, to correct the deficiency in her visa application. 72.Mr Hunter did not treat Mr Hickey unfavourably or impose a requirement or condition on Mr Hickey that he could not comply with. Ms Jane Hickey was the person listed as the relevant contact on the sponsorship and nomination application forms and Mr Hunter was entitled to rely on her withdrawal. Further, there was no requirement for Mr Hunter to provide reasonable adjustments. There was nothing in the email from colbyhickey2012@live.com.au dated 26 June 2012 that suggested Mr Hickey required more time “by reason of his disability”.73.Ms Jane Hickey was the authorised contact for the Department. It was her right to withdraw her applications. She was the authorised contact for the business. Mr Hunter gave effect to her request to withdraw the applications. He gave very clear evidence as to the actions he took to verify the withdrawal requests. It is irrelevant whether the Applicant considered Ms Hickey authorised or not to act on behalf of Mr Colby Hickey. 74.The action of Mr Hunter was not unfavourable treatment of the Applicant and nor did it impose a requirement or condition that she could not comply with. The evidence does not establish unfavourable treatment of the Applicant. What the evidence discloses is a standard employee visa application process.