Background
Background to the litigation
The background was set out in the primary judgment. That background includes an explanation of earlier proceedings, including in this Court, which are relevant to Ground 1. As no complaint has been made regarding the accuracy of her Honour’s summary, and in the interests of efficiency, I set out below the primary judge’s summary of the background:5 A bankruptcy notice, BN 256 4 70, (Bankruptcy Notice) was issued by the Official Receiver on 26 July 2022. The Bankruptcy Notice demands payment in the amount of $236,934.15 pursuant to a County Court of Victoria proceeding and a number of associated proceedings in the County Court, Supreme Court and Court of Appeal of Victoria, in respect of which Mr Guss is personally liable or jointly and severally liable with other parties.6 There is a significant factual history to the matter, which has involved considerable litigation in multiple courts.Background to the debt 7 The applicant creditor, Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd (Larkfield), operates a commercial storage business. Mr Guss arranged for Larkfield to store goods. After a period of time, the storage charges for the furniture were unpaid and remained due. Larkfield then refused to release the furniture until the outstanding storage charges were paid.8 Scandi International Pty Ltd and Casualife Furniture International Ltd (collectively, Corporate Plaintiffs) claimed to be the owners of the goods in storage and initiated proceedings in the County Court of Victoria to retake possession of the stored goods. Larkfield filed a counterclaim seeking orders for the sale of the stored goods to recover the unpaid charges. Mr Guss was joined as a third defendant to the counter-claim in August 2016. A fourth defendant, LHV Pty Ltd, was also joined to the counter-claim.9 The substantive judgment, Scandi International Pty Ltd v Larkfield Industrial Estate Pty Ltd [2018] VCC 584, dismissed the Corporate Plaintiffs’ application and upheld Larkfield’s counterclaim, ordering judgment against the Corporate Plaintiffs, the fourth defendant and Mr Guss. 10A costs judgment, Scandi International Pty Ltd v Larkfield Industrial Estate Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] VCC 628 was also made, with orders being made for the Corporate Plaintiffs, the fourth defendant and Mr Guss to pay the costs of the proceeding, including the counterclaim, and all reserved costs (Costs Orders). The costs liability of Mr Guss was limited to Larkfield’s costs incurred after 29 August 2016.11 The defendants to the counter claim, including Mr Guss, sought to appeal those decisions in the Court of Appeal of Victoria. Leave to appeal was refused on 14 November 2018.12 On 16 June 2021, a Registrar in the Costs Court (a division of the Supreme Court of Victoria) taxed the bill of costs pursuant to the costs judgment and made two separate costs orders (S ECI 2020 03561 and S ECI 2020 03558).13 Pursuant to the Costs Orders Larkfield sold the goods left in its possession, realising $33,010.83. Proceedings following the Bankruptcy Notice 14 As set out above, the Bankruptcy Notice was issued on 26 July 2022. 15 On 12 August 2022, Mr Guss filed an Application in this Court to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice. Orders were made by a Registrar on 21 February 2023 dismissing the Application and ordering Mr Guss to pay Larkfield’s costs in a lump sum figure to be determined if not agreed (Registrar’s BN Decision). A further order was made extending the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice until 15 March 2023. On 15 May 2023, costs orders were made pursuant to the orders of 21 February 2023.16 On 9 March 2023, Mr Guss filed an Application for Review of the Registrar’s BN Decision. Orders were made on 5 April 2023 dismissing the Application for Review of the Registrar’s BN Decision. Further orders were also made extending the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice until 5 April 2023, and for Mr Guss to pay Larkfield’s costs in the Application for review: Guss v Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 235 (FCFCOA Decision).17 On 13 April 2023, Mr Guss filed a Notice of Appeal against the FCFCOA Decision. The Appeal was dismissed by the Federal Court of Australia and orders were made on 15 September 2023 for Mr Guss to pay Larkfield’s costs: Guss v Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1105 (Federal Court Decision).18 On 13 October 2023 Mr Guss filed an application in the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal the Federal Court Decision (Special Leave Application).19 On 7 March 2024, the High Court of Australia refused the Special Leave Application: Guss v Larkfield [2024] HCASL 30. Current proceedings 20 Following the FCFCOA Decision, Larkfield filed a creditor’s petition on 6 April 2023 (Petition). Orders were made on 8 August 2023 allowing for substituted service on Mr Guss (8 August Orders).21 Mr Guss filed an Application in a Proceeding on 27 September 2023 seeking, amongst other orders, that:•the time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice be extended to a date after the determination of the Special Leave Application;•the Petition be stayed or adjourned until the hearing and determination of the Special Leave Application. 22 Mr Guss also filed a Notice opposing the Petition on the basis that:•if the extension of time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice is granted the Petition must be dismissed or alternatively, the Petition be stayed or adjourned until the hearing and determination of the Special Leave Application;•the Petition claims an overstated amount; and •the issue of the Petition is an abuse of process.23 As noted above, orders were made on 28 September 2023 dismissing the Application in a Proceeding and sequestering the estate of Mr Guss.24 The Review Application was filed on 6 October 2023 and originally listed for hearing on 16 October 2023. At that hearing, Mr Guss sought to cross-examine Mr Ades, the Chief Executive Officer of Larkfield, who filed an affidavit of debt on 13 October 2023. Mr Guss also raised his intention to file an Application in a Proceeding with respect to discovery of documents. Mr Ades was not available on the day of hearing for cross-examination, and as such the matter was adjourned to Monday, 20 November 2023. The Discovery Application was filed on 10 November 2023. 25 In the afternoon of Friday 17 November 2023, chambers received email communication from an unnamed person from the “office” of Mr Guss, requesting an adjournment of the hearing due to Mr Guss being unwell and attaching a copy of a medical certificate of the same date. An adjournment was not granted in chambers and the matter remained listed. Mr Guss did not attend the hearing on 20 November 2023. At that hearing, orders were made for Mr Guss to file evidence relating to his medical condition and the proceedings were adjourned for a short period. Following Mr Guss filing an affidavit of his medical practitioner, a further adjournment for a period of two weeks was granted and the proceedings were listed for hearing on 8 December 2023.26 At 7.17pm on 7 December 2023, chambers received further email communication from an unnamed person from the “office” of Mr Guss. That email stated Mr Guss had been admitted to hospital that afternoon and that “accordingly tomorrows hearing will have to be adjourned to a date to be fixed after Mr Guss is again well enough, which we don’t know when this will be”. A letter from Mr Guss’ treating cardiologist was attached, stating Mr Guss had been admitted to Epworth Hospital “for further management of an acute cardiac condition” and that Mr Guss “will not be able to participate in his scheduled duties for the foreseeable future”. The solicitor for Larkfield in reply email indicated they did not consent to an adjournment of the hearing. Chambers sent an email to both parties in the morning of 8 December 2023 confirming that the matter remained listed at 10.00am.27 At the hearing on 8 December 2023, orders were made adjourning the matter for further final hearing on 27 March 2024. Orders were also made for Mr Guss to file and serve any further submissions and evidence with respect to both Applications by 13 February 2024 and for Larkfield to file any further submissions and evidence with respect to both Applications by 27 February 2024. Further orders were made for Mr Guss to notify the Court by 13 March 2024 of his capacity to appear at the hearing on 27 March 2024. Notations were made that it is intended for both Applications to be heard at the hearing on 27 March 2024, and that if no attendance was made by or on behalf of Mr Guss, the hearing may proceed in his absence pursuant to r 13.06(1)(e) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Rules).28 On 13 March 2024 Mr Guss confirmed his capacity to appear at the hearing on 27 March 2024. Ground 1: the discovery application
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides as follows:91Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions (1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding.(2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. The primary judge only referred to the County Court judgments in setting out the background to the matter before her, as it was the County Court judgments that resulted in the judgment and costs order against Mr Guss (PJ at [9]-[10]). There is no merit in the suggestion that the primary judge’s reference to the County Court judgments in this way was contrary to s 91 of the Evidence Act. Mr Guss’ submissions regarding reference to Guss BN (and the FCFCoA judgment below) also fail as they misunderstand s 91. Contrary to Mr Guss’ submissions, the primary judge did not refer to Guss BN as proof of the existence of any fact relevant to the determination of the matter before her (which was relevantly the discovery application). Rather, the primary judge relied on Guss BN on the basis that the point that Mr Guss wished to run had already been run and determined in the proceedings concerning the Bankruptcy Notice. In any event, even if Mr Guss’ s 91 submission regarding reference to Guss BN had any merit, his arguments would leave untouched the second and third reasons given by the primary judge for rejecting the discovery application insofar as it concerned the Sale Documents category. Recognising that the primary judge also refused discovery of this category on abuse of process grounds, Mr Guss submitted that no abuse of process in fact occurred when regard is had to s 91. Again, this submission is misconceived. The primary judge found that the continued agitation of the same point was an abuse of process. That did not involve relying on a prior judgment to establish a fact in issue, contrary to s 91. Finally, Mr Guss’ only point in relation to the third reason given by the primary judge — ie that Larkfield had already given voluntary disclosure — was that the primary judge accepted that voluntary disclosure is not discovery. This goes nowhere. The point the primary judge was making was that there was no utility in an order for discovery in any event, when voluntary disclosure had been made. None of Mr Guss’ submissions on the discovery application insofar as it concerned the Sale Documents category establishes any error on the part of the primary judge, let alone any error of the kind referred to in House v R. I turn, now, to the primary judge’s dismissal of the discovery application insofar as it sought documents concerning the taxation of costs in the Supreme Court of Victoria, being the second category. In rejecting this aspect of the discovery application, her Honour observed, first, that the costs proceeding had been determined, a final order made, and there was no appeal from that order (PJ at [75]). Her Honour then set out the steps by which she concluded that the argument Mr Guss sought to run in the review of the sequestration order had already been run, and lost, in the proceedings in relation to the Bankruptcy Notice (PJ at [76]-[81]). Finally, the primary judge identified that, as with the Sale Documents category, her Honour accepted Larkfield’s abuse of process argument (PJ at [82]).
Decision
Reasons for decision
In Shephard, Hill and Marshall JJ considered the context and purpose of s 41(6A) (at [40]): Clearly s 41(6A) was intended to be in aid of the application to set aside the judgment or the bankruptcy notice as the case may be. In that context it seems strange that the legislature would intend that so long as at any time in the past there had been an application to set aside a judgment or a bankruptcy notice, and notwithstanding that such application had been determined and even notwithstanding that the time for compliance had long passed the court would have power to extend the time for compliance. Once the application to set aside the judgment or the bankruptcy notice has been finally determined … there is no aid which the power to extend time for compliance can give to the determined application. It follows, in our view, that the power to extend time for compliance has been spent. The use of the perfect tense “have been instituted” and “have been filed” is, of itself, not determinative … Ultimately it is the context of s 41(6A) rather than matters of syntax which lead to the conclusion that the power to extend time under the section is spent once the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice has been disposed of.(Emphasis added.) Mr Guss relied on Sackville J’s reasons in Shepard, which state (at [47]) that the power in s 41(6A) can be exercised after an act of bankruptcy, citing Streimer. However, this does not assist Mr Guss to establish that the power can be exercised after the application to set aside the relevant bankruptcy notice has been finally determined. On the contrary, Sackville J explicitly noted that Streimer is not to be read as authority for any such power (at [49]):The fact that the power in s 41(6A) of the Act can be exercised after an act of bankruptcy does not necessarily mean that the power can be exercised after the proceedings to set aside the bankruptcy notice have been determined. That issue did not arise in Streimer v Tamas. There the application to extend time was made before the proceedings had been concluded (although after the debtor had committed an act of bankruptcy). (Original emphasis.) Accordingly, Mr Guss has not established any error in the primary judge’s finding that the FCFCoA lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension of time for compliance in circumstances where Mr Guss’ application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice had been finally determined, the High Court special leave application in respect of Guss BN having been refused on 7 March 2024. It is not to the point whether the primary judge misunderstood (as Mr Guss suggested) the course of events before the Federal Court, as referred to in the fourth bullet point of the primary judgment at [142]. Mr Guss’ submissions concerning the primary judge’s alternate grounds (referred to in the primary judgment at [143]) do not require determination as the primary judge was correct to conclude that the court lacked power to extend time for compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I am therefore satisfied that the adjournment and extension applications that Mr Guss made orally to the primary judge were not part of the review application that is referred to in Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal. I deal with them as Proposed Ground 3 and Proposed Ground 4. However, as I go on to explain, even if those two issues — extension of time and adjourning or staying the hearing — were approached on the basis that they were advanced before the primary judge as part and parcel of the review application (and not as fresh, oral applications), the outcome would be the same, as Mr Guss’ appeal on these issues would fail in any event.The substance of the application for review of the sequestration order Mr Guss contends, on the appeal, that Larkfield has not proved its claim pursuant to s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act on the basis that it had not established that the debt remained owing as at the date of the hearing, as required by s 52(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. The primary judge made the following finding (PJ at [160]):the amount owed by Mr Guss as at 6 April 2023 was still owed at the time at which the Petition was heard. As such, I am satisfied that Larkfield has proved that the debt on which it relies is still owing. 6 April 2023 was the date on which the petition was presented. The primary judge noted that Larkfield relied on the affidavit of debt of Mr Paino, property manager for Larkfield, filed on 26 March 2023. Mr Paino referred to Larkfield’s books and records in respect of Mr Guss, which recorded that the figure stated in the petition remained due and owing. The primary judge noted (PJ at [158]) concessions obtained in the cross-examination of Mr Paino: he did not personally calculate the amount, did not know how it was calculated and relied on the table in Guss BN as an aide as to the initial quantum. Her Honour nonetheless rejected the submission that Larkfield had failed to prove the judgment debt was still owed, as required by s 52(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. The primary judge’s reasons were as follows (PJ at [159]-[160]):159… Firstly, s 52(l)(c) requires that the Larkfield prove that the debt is still owing. Mr Paino’s affidavit is not the only evidence before the Court of the debt. The Petition sets out that Mr Guss owes Larkfield $236,394.15 and how that sum is comprised. The affidavit verifying the Petition was deposed to by the then Chief Executive Officer of Larkfield, Mr Ades on 6 April 2023. That affidavit deposes to:(a) Mr Ades having access to the books and records of Larkfield;(b) the quantum of the debt and its composition as set out in the Petition being within Mr Ades’ knowledge; and (c) Mr Guss having failed to pay the debt or make arrangements to Larkfield’s satisfaction for payment of the debt.160 Secondly, on 13 and 26 September 2023, 13 October 2023, 17 November 2023, and 7 December 2023, Mr Ades filed affidavits of debt confirming that the debt was, at those dates, still owed by Mr Guss. Despite Mr Guss requiring Mr Ades to attend the hearing of the Review Application for cross examination and him doing so, Mr Guss elected not to cross exam Mr Ades. Thirdly, Mr Piano’s evidence was that he had access to the books and records of Larkfield, he had reviewed them for the period 6 April 2023 until 26 March 2024 and Mr Guss had made no payments to Larkfield in that period. Fourthly, Mr Guss does not contend that he has made any payment of the debt. Accordingly, the amount owed by Mr Guss as at 6 April 2023 was still owed at the time at which the Petition was heard. As such, I am satisfied that Larkfield has proved that the debt on which it relies is still owing.