Guss v Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Guss v Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 235

File number: MLG 1873 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES
Date of judgment: 5 April 2023
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application by debtor to set aside bankruptcy notice – de novo review of decision of judicial registrar not to set aside notice – whether amount of debt claimed is misstated or liable to mislead – whether bankruptcy notice must set out calculations and full accounting of credits allowed – whether notice is an abuse of process where other entities jointly liable
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth) s 33, 40, 41, 306

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2001 (Cth) s 30, 256

Cases cited: Adams v Lambert (2006) 228 CLR 409
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge[2003] FCAFC 274
Bechara v Bates[2021] FCAFC 34
Brunninghausen v Glavanics [1998] FCA 230
Cassimatis v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[2016] FCA 131
Cumins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCAFC 185
Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581
Ferguson v Premier Plasterboard Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1028
Killoran v Duncan [1999] FCA 1574
Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71
Nobarani v Mariconte [2021] FCAFC 96
Pattison v Hadjimouratis[2006] FCAFC 153
Scandi International Pty Ltd v Larkfield Industrial Estate Pty Ltd [2018] VCC 584
Scandi International Pty Ltd & Anor v Larkfield Industrial Estate Pty Ltd (No.2) [2018] VCC 628
Scott v Charitopoulos [2008] FCA 1914
Seovic Civil Engineering Pty Ltd v Groeneveld (1999) 87 FCR 120
Skouloudis v St George Bank Ltd (2008) 173 FCR 236
Slack v Bottoms English Solicitors [2002] FCA 1445
St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Spalla [2000] FCA 1094
Walsh v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 156 CLR 337
Watkins Limited v Ranger Uranium Mines (1985) 35 NTR 27 at [32]
Zakrzewski v Rodgers [2000] FCA 1187
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 110
Date of hearing: 20 March 2023
Place: Melbourne
Applicant: In person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr McKillop
Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

MLG 1873 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

JOSEPH GUSS

Applicant

AND:

LARKFIELD INDUSTRIAL ESTATES PTY LTD

Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE FORBES

DATE OF ORDER:

5 ApriL 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Applicant’s Application filed on 9 March 2023 for review of Registrar Edwards decision dated 21 February 2023 be dismissed.

2.The time for compliance with bankruptcy notice BN 256 470 be extended to the time of the pronouncement of these orders and the delivery of my judgment herein.

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed in default of agreement pursuant to the Federal Court Rules.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g)

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 235
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Guss v Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd involved an application by Joseph Guss to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd. The dispute arose from a long-standing litigation involving an occupancy agreement between Mr Guss and Larkfield, which led to a series of costs orders. The bankruptcy notice demanded payment of $236,934.15, which included both judgment debts and costs orders from various stages of the litigation. The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the interlocutory costs orders were correctly treated as costs of the proceeding or reserved costs, and whether the bankruptcy notice accurately stated the debt owed. Additionally, the court considered whether the issuance of the bankruptcy notice constituted an abuse of process, given that the other parties to the litigation had not been pursued for payment.

The court examined the language used in the costs orders and determined that the interlocutory costs orders were indeed intended to be part of the costs of the proceeding or reserved costs, as per the orders made by Judge Anderson. This meant that the portion of the security for costs used to satisfy a taxed costs order did not result in an overstatement of the debt in the bankruptcy notice. The court also rejected the argument that issuing the bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process, as Larkfield had no obligation to pursue other debtors before proceeding against Mr Guss. The court concluded that the bankruptcy notice correctly stated the amount owed and dismissed the application to set it aside.

The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the orders made during the litigation and the language used therein. The court held that the interlocutory costs orders were properly included in the calculation of the costs of the proceeding. Additionally, the court found no evidence to support the claim that the bankruptcy notice misstated the debt or that Larkfield abused the legal process by issuing the notice. As a result, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was dismissed, and the bankruptcy notice remained valid.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have carefully considered the parties’ written and oral submissions and the various documents and authorities to which I have been taken. For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice should be dismissed.BACKGROUND Bankruptcy notice BN 256 470 issued by the Official Receiver on 26 July 2022 demands payment in the amount of $236,934.15 pursuant to a judgment and a series of costs orders in respect of which the applicant is either personally liable or jointly and severally liable with other parties. The debt giving rise to the notice arises from complex and long-running litigation. Unless stated otherwise, the following background facts are not materially in dispute. Mr Guss was a party to an occupancy agreement with the respondent, Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd (Larkfield), whereby Larkfield, for a fee, provided storage services. Scandi International Pty Ltd (Scandi) and a Hong Kong company Casualife Furniture International Ltd (Casualife) claimed to be the owners of furniture which had been stored at the Larkfield premises. After rental in respect of the occupancy agreement remained unpaid for some time, Larkfield refused to release the furniture until outstanding storage charges were paid. On 11 July 2016, Scandi and Casualife initiated proceedings in the County Court of Victoria (proceeding no. CI-16-02981) seeking orders that they be permitted to retake possession of the stored goods. By counter-claim, Larkfield sought an order for the sale of the stored furniture in order to recover outstanding rental and other charges and costs. Mr Guss was not initially a party to the proceedings. Mr Guss was joined as a third defendant to the counter-claim on 28 July 2016 and another company ACN 112 314 502 Pty Ltd (ACN) was joined as the fourth defendant on or around 10 October 2017. Over the course of the County Court proceedings there were an array of interlocutory applications and Court events in respect of which cost orders were made or costs were reserved or the orders were silent as to costs. Some of the orders made in the proceeding were against one or more of the companies, but not Mr Guss. Some of the orders were against Mr Guss and one or more of the companies, jointly and severally. There were other orders made against Mr Guss alone. Relevantly, it is not contested that interlocutory cost orders[4] were made by:·Her Honour Judge Cohen on 28 July 2016;·His Honour Judge Cosgrove on 10 October 2016;·His Honour Judge Smith on 14 March 2017; and·Her Honour Judge Marks on 13 November 2017.[4] Affidavit of Joseph Guss sworn 16 March 2023, annexure JG-2 Where costs were ordered in relation to any interlocutory matter, the relevant Court rules required that they were not to be taxed until after the proceeding was completed[5].[5] County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 r 63A.20.1 It is common ground that security for costs in the proceeding of $84,250 was provided by Scandi and Casualife pursuant to orders made by Macnamara J on 11 July 2016 ($7,000), Cohen J on 28 July 2016 ($45,000) and Smith J on 15 March 2017 ($32,250).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Moreover, the respondent submits, and I accept, that there is no evidence before the Court as to the amount at which these orders might be taxed and certainly no evidence upon which the Court could be satisfied that the amount of any counter-claim, set-off or cross demand is likely to be equal to or in excess of the amount of the judgment debt. In the absence of that evidence, the Court cannot be satisfied that the bankruptcy notice misstates the amount of the debt owing.Abuse of process - that the debtor should have sought to recover the judgment and other costs orders against the other counter-claim defendants At the hearing before me, Mr Guss submitted that although the defendants to the counter-claim are jointly and severally liable for the judgment debt and costs of the proceeding, as a “matter of fairness and natural justice” the respondent is obligated to attempt to recover costs from what he describes as “the principal players in the proceeding, and the Court of Appeal hearing”. Mr Guss contends that where one party is pursued and the principal players are not “it creates an abusive process”. In his written submission dated 18 October 2022 Mr Guss submitted that there is no evidence before the Court to establish that Casualife is impecunious. He submits that the Scandi and Casualife paid substantial amounts in security in the County Court and the Court of Appeal proceeding and that this belies the respondent’s contention that recovery proceedings would be futile. He submitted that it should be inferred that those entities had a substantial amount of money because they had engaged solicitors and briefed counsel through those proceedings. It was submitted by Larkfield and it is not contested, that the first and fourth defendants by counter-claim, Scandi and ACN, are companies with $2 issued capital and both are now deregistered. The second defendant by counter-claim, Casualife, is a Hong Kong company and resides out of the jurisdiction. The uncontested evidence of the respondent’s solicitor is that he has been informed and believes that Larkfield has considered its options in terms of trying to recover from these companies and has determined that it is not economic to do so. The respondent’s submission is that recovery action against the Hong Kong company would be pointless due to the costs involved, as would recovery proceedings against deregistered companies. It was submitted by the respondents that the very reason security for costs had been sought from these companies in both the County Court and the Court of Appeal proceedings was the concern that they may be impecunious and not in a position to meet costs orders against them. Mr Guss is jointly and severally liable with those companies in respect of some of the costs orders and Larkfield submits that there is no obligation on it as a creditor to pursue one debtor rather than the other. Larkfield submits that it has been calling for payment of the costs orders since at least 5 August 2021 and that there has been no payment or offer to pay received from any of the parties liable for the costs orders, including Mr Guss. Larkfield rejects Mr Guss’ submission that the bankruptcy notice is an abuse of process and says that its only real prospect of recovering the amounts owed to it is by issuing a notice to Mr Guss.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Following those concessions, I ruled against the application for leave to rely on the further affidavit on the basis that much of it was no longer relevant to an issue in dispute. However, in doing so, I indicated that there had been no objection to Mr Guss advancing matters in his affidavit by way of submission and that it would be received as such. I also indicated that the annexed transcript and the reasons of Registrar Edwards would be admitted and noted that was also no objection to the admission into evidence of the order of Judicial Registrar Gourlay made on 16 June 2021 and each of the five underpinning orders made by various County Court judges.CONSIDERATION I now return to the central thesis of Mr Guss’ argument, namely that the interlocutory costs orders were neither costs of the proceeding nor reserved costs, and that by treating them as such the respondent wrongly applied $46,117.49 of the security to satisfaction of Judicial Registrar Gourlay’s order rather than applying those funds as a credit to the debt in the bankruptcy notice. To that extent, Mr Guss submits that the bankruptcy notice overstates the debt by that amount. Mr Guss submitted that the failure to allow the credit led to an incorrect calculation and necessarily resulted in a misstatement of the amount owing by him. Relying on Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 he submitted that the notice was a nullity because it was liable to mislead and failed to meet an essential requirement of the Act. In my view, for the reasons advanced in the respondent’s written reply submissions dated 19 October 2022 and as further developed by counsel at the hearing, no error arose in the calculation of the outstanding debt by reason of a portion of the security for costs being applied to the taxed costs order made by Judicial Registrar Gourlay. I accept the respondent’s submission that the orders made by Judge Anderson on 9 May 2018 should be read in a practical and common sense manner. By those orders, Judge Anderson ordered that the defendants by counter-claim pay the plaintiffs by counter-claim’s “costs of the proceeding including the counter-claim and all reserved costs”. In my view his Honour’s formulation of what costs were to be paid by the unsuccessful parties to the successful party was entirely unremarkable. Judge Anderson made his orders at the conclusion of the County Court proceeding and at the time there had been no taxation of any costs orders, including the interlocutory costs orders made by Judges Cohen, Cosgrave, Smith and Marks. All of those costs orders were made during the course of the County Court proceeding and in the ordinary course would be understood to be costs in the proceeding. I do not accept the submission that the interlocutory costs orders fell outside the sweep of his Honour’s orders. In using the expression “reserved costs” I believe his Honour would have had in mind any interlocutory orders in which costs had been expressly reserved and any other extant costs orders made but not yet taxed. In my view, properly construed, there is little doubt that Judge Anderson intended that the untaxed interlocutory costs orders would be swept up as one or other of “costs of the proceeding” or “reserved costs”. Had his Honour intended that untaxed interlocutory orders be treated differently he could easily have said so.