FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Guss v Larkfield Industrial Estates Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 235
ORDERS
MLG 1873 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: JOSEPH GUSS
Applicant
AND: LARKFIELD INDUSTRIAL ESTATES PTY LTD
Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE FORBES
DATE OF ORDER:
5 ApriL 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s Application filed on 9 March 2023 for review of Registrar Edwards decision dated 21 February 2023 be dismissed.
2.The time for compliance with bankruptcy notice BN 256 470 be extended to the time of the pronouncement of these orders and the delivery of my judgment herein.
3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed in default of agreement pursuant to the Federal Court Rules.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g)
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 235
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the language used in the costs orders and determined that the interlocutory costs orders were indeed intended to be part of the costs of the proceeding or reserved costs, as per the orders made by Judge Anderson. This meant that the portion of the security for costs used to satisfy a taxed costs order did not result in an overstatement of the debt in the bankruptcy notice. The court also rejected the argument that issuing the bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process, as Larkfield had no obligation to pursue other debtors before proceeding against Mr Guss. The court concluded that the bankruptcy notice correctly stated the amount owed and dismissed the application to set it aside.
The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the orders made during the litigation and the language used therein. The court held that the interlocutory costs orders were properly included in the calculation of the costs of the proceeding. Additionally, the court found no evidence to support the claim that the bankruptcy notice misstated the debt or that Larkfield abused the legal process by issuing the notice. As a result, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was dismissed, and the bankruptcy notice remained valid.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Following those concessions, I ruled against the application for leave to rely on the further affidavit on the basis that much of it was no longer relevant to an issue in dispute. However, in doing so, I indicated that there had been no objection to Mr Guss advancing matters in his affidavit by way of submission and that it would be received as such. I also indicated that the annexed transcript and the reasons of Registrar Edwards would be admitted and noted that was also no objection to the admission into evidence of the order of Judicial Registrar Gourlay made on 16 June 2021 and each of the five underpinning orders made by various County Court judges.CONSIDERATION I now return to the central thesis of Mr Guss’ argument, namely that the interlocutory costs orders were neither costs of the proceeding nor reserved costs, and that by treating them as such the respondent wrongly applied $46,117.49 of the security to satisfaction of Judicial Registrar Gourlay’s order rather than applying those funds as a credit to the debt in the bankruptcy notice. To that extent, Mr Guss submits that the bankruptcy notice overstates the debt by that amount. Mr Guss submitted that the failure to allow the credit led to an incorrect calculation and necessarily resulted in a misstatement of the amount owing by him. Relying on Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71 he submitted that the notice was a nullity because it was liable to mislead and failed to meet an essential requirement of the Act. In my view, for the reasons advanced in the respondent’s written reply submissions dated 19 October 2022 and as further developed by counsel at the hearing, no error arose in the calculation of the outstanding debt by reason of a portion of the security for costs being applied to the taxed costs order made by Judicial Registrar Gourlay. I accept the respondent’s submission that the orders made by Judge Anderson on 9 May 2018 should be read in a practical and common sense manner. By those orders, Judge Anderson ordered that the defendants by counter-claim pay the plaintiffs by counter-claim’s “costs of the proceeding including the counter-claim and all reserved costs”. In my view his Honour’s formulation of what costs were to be paid by the unsuccessful parties to the successful party was entirely unremarkable. Judge Anderson made his orders at the conclusion of the County Court proceeding and at the time there had been no taxation of any costs orders, including the interlocutory costs orders made by Judges Cohen, Cosgrave, Smith and Marks. All of those costs orders were made during the course of the County Court proceeding and in the ordinary course would be understood to be costs in the proceeding. I do not accept the submission that the interlocutory costs orders fell outside the sweep of his Honour’s orders. In using the expression “reserved costs” I believe his Honour would have had in mind any interlocutory orders in which costs had been expressly reserved and any other extant costs orders made but not yet taxed. In my view, properly construed, there is little doubt that Judge Anderson intended that the untaxed interlocutory costs orders would be swept up as one or other of “costs of the proceeding” or “reserved costs”. Had his Honour intended that untaxed interlocutory orders be treated differently he could easily have said so.