Cassimatis v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cassimatis v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCA 131

File number: QUD 460 of 2013
Judge: EDELMAN J
Date of judgment: 19 February 2016
Catchwords:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – nature of the power to review an order for costs – whether “review” in rule 40.34 Federal Court Rules means a “de novo review” – whether Chapter III of the Constitution requires de novo review – whether de novo review is consistent with taking into account the discretion of a taxing officer

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – review of taxation of costs – background of delays, pleading disputes and excessive pleading – orders of the Full Court requiring payment of costs relating to amendment of pleading including “costs thrown away” – whether costs are thrown away

Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 40.20(3), 40.34, 40.34(1), 40.34(3), 40.34(5)

Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) r 62.44

Constitution s 72

High Court Rules 1952 (Cth)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 945A, 180(1)

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Australian Coal & Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 3) [2015] FCA 385

Boys v Australian Securities Commission [2001] FCA 1440

Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Limited [2003] FCA 817

Clark, Tait & Company v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] HCA 26; (1931) 47 CLR 142

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194

Fashion Warehouse Pty Ltd v Pola [1984] 1 Qd R 251

Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84

In Marriage of Locke (1992) 112 FLR 238

Miller v Wertheim [2004] FCA 988

Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v Rickus (No 5) [2009] FCA 1221

Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Australian Rubber Gloves [1993] FCA 562

Pattison v Hadjimouratis [2006] FCAFC 153; (2006) 155 FCR 226

Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (1987) 62 ALJR 148; (1987) 76 ALR 69

Sanders v Snell (No 2) (2000) 174 ALR 53

Schweppes Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178

Sobey v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1621

Sweeney v Fitzhardinge [1906] HCA 73; (1906) 4 CLR 716

Turnbull v New South Wales Medical Board [1976] 2 NSWLR 281

W & A Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 527

W J Green & Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Tace Pty Ltd (No. 4) [2010] WASC 363

Ziliotto v Dr Hakim (No. 2) [2012] NSWSC 1079

Date of hearing: 19 February 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 84
Solicitor for the Appellants: Mr S C Russell of Russells
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Davis QC with Ms M Castle
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission

ORDERS

QUD 460 of 2013
BETWEEN:

EMMANUEL GEORGE CASSIMATIS

First Appellant

JULIE GLADYS CASSIMATIS

Second Appellant

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties in this matter, Cassimatis v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, are engaged in a dispute regarding the nature of the power to review an order for costs in the context of the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the term "review" in rule 40.34 of the Federal Court Rules means a "de novo review," and if Chapter III of the Australian Constitution requires such a review. Additionally, the court considered whether a de novo review is consistent with taking into account the discretion of a taxing officer. The case arose from an extensive background involving multiple claims, delays, and disputes over pleadings, which led to the Full Court ordering payment of costs relating to the amendment of pleadings, including costs deemed to be "thrown away."

The court had to determine the extent of its review powers over the taxation of costs, particularly in light of the discretion held by taxing officers and the administrative review principles. The court examined the relevant legal precedents, including statements by Kirby J and Kenneth Martin J, which emphasized that the court’s review should respect the expertise and discretion of taxing officers. The court also reviewed the chronology of events provided by ASIC to understand the procedural history leading to the taxation order. The decision required careful consideration of the nature of the costs order and the effect of the Full Court's decision on the Deputy District Registrar's ruling.

In its reasoning, the court concluded that setting aside the decision by the Deputy District Registrar on a matter of pure quantum was highly unlikely, especially given the absence of the client files and the inability to assess their contents. The court acknowledged that the Deputy District Registrar's conclusion about the importance of certain documents could change upon reconsideration of the wasted costs. However, the court decided to remit the matter to the Deputy District Registrar for further assessment, rather than dismissing the application outright. The court emphasized the limited nature of its review, which does not permit a rehearing but rather an evaluative judgment on the extent of any wasted costs.

The final orders of the court were to set aside the Certificate of Taxation issued on 24 December 2015, remit the matter to the Deputy District Registrar for further assessment in accordance with the court's reasons, and direct the solicitors for the parties to confer about the quantum of any costs thrown away before remittal. The costs of the application were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Certificate of Taxation issued on 24 December 2015 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Deputy District Registrar for assessment in accordance with these reasons.

3. Prior to remittal, the solicitors for the parties confer about the quantum of any costs thrown away as may be determined by the remitter, with such conferral to take place before 5 March 2016.

4. Costs of the application be reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

In one of the cases which followed this approach, Kirby J said that the review contemplated by the High Court Rules is “not a hearing de novo of the decision of the court’s taxing officer” but is a hearing where principles of administrative review apply: Sanders v Snell (No 2) (2000) 174 ALR 53, 56. However, it appears that the point being made by Kirby J was not to deny that the Court’s power to review in the absence of error or even in the absence of any issue of principle. The point his Honour was making by denying the propriety of the label “de novo” seems instead simply to have been to emphasise that the review should take into account, and place weight upon, the discretion of the taxing officer. There is a very good reason why this should be so. As Kenneth Martin J explained in W J Green & Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Tace Pty Ltd (No. 4) [2010] WASC 363 at [23], taxing officers “hold expertise in taxations about costs determinations. They deal in the day-to-day nitty-gritty of assessing the costs in litigation, by reference to scales and allowances at a level of detail that judges do not”. That point is well established. Almost a century ago Rich J remarked that although the court may control any decision of a taxing officer, he was “at all times loath to interfere with the decisions of experienced taxing officers”: Clark, Tait & Company v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] HCA 26; (1931) 47 CLR 142, 145-146. And Kitto J remarked that “it must be in a very exceptional case in which the Court will even listen to an application to review such a decision [on a question only of quantum]”: Australian Coal & Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 628.Background to the pleadings and procedure leading to taxation In order to explain the nature and effect of the costs order by the Full Court and the decision of the Deputy District Registrar, it is necessary to set out the unfortunate background to this protracted matter. ASIC helpfully provided a chronology of much of the background which was not in dispute. I described the nature of the claims in this matter in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 3) [2015] FCA 385 [5]-[9]. In very broad summary, Mr and Mrs Cassimatis were the only executive directors and shareholders of Storm Financial Ltd (Storm), a company engaged in the business of providing financial services, financial product advice, and financial products. Mr and Mrs Cassimatis developed the ‘Storm Model’ of investment advice which involved particular advice to investors. In these proceedings, ASIC seeks declarations against each of Mr and Mrs Cassimatis that they committed numerous contraventions of s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Each of ASIC’s alleged contraventions is based on allegations that Mr and Mrs Cassimatis ‘caused’ or ‘permitted’ Storm to provide financial advice to different investors (individuals or couples).The statement of claim

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There are numerous reasons why I decline to venture any opinion on this issue. Foremost is the extreme unlikelihood of setting aside a decision by a Deputy District Registrar on a matter of pure quantum, in circumstances in which I do not accept that his reasoning was in any way inconsistent with the basic propositions set out in the decision cited by Mr Russell: W & A Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liquers Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 534, 535 (Asprey J). Another reason why I decline to express any opinion on this matter is the lack of any of the client files before me and my inability meaningfully to assess the nature and substance of their contents. However, it may be (and I express no opinion on whether it would be so) that the Deputy District Registrar’s conclusion about the importance of some or all of the documents in the client files could change upon reconsideration of the extent to which perusal of the 31 Investors in the Schedule was wasted by the amendment to the Second Further Amended Statement of Claim.Conclusion The parties accepted that one possible course was for me to set aside the Certificate of Taxation and to remit the matter to the Deputy District Registrar. Counsel for ASIC submitted that if I were to conclude that there was a likelihood that some costs had been thrown away in relation to the 31 Investors then I should nevertheless exercise a discretion to dismiss the application rather than remitting it to the Deputy District Registrar. She put this submission as a matter of discretion rather than an objection as to jurisdiction arising from r 40.34(3). I consider that she was right to put the submission in this way. Rule 40.34(3) has the effect that a party must not raise any ground of objection to a Bill of Costs, or response to an objection to a Bill of Costs if that ground or response was not taken in the notice before the Registrar. As counsel properly conceded, it was open on the objections and responses before the Deputy District Registrar for him to conclude that some costs had been thrown away rather than all costs (as Mr and Mrs Cassimatis submitted) or no costs (as ASIC submitted). Counsel for ASIC submitted that I should exercise a discretion to dismiss the application rather than refer it to the Deputy District Registrar essentially because (i) an assessment of whether some costs had been thrown away was not the manner in which the matter had been argued before the Deputy District Registrar nor on this appeal, and (ii) the extent to which any costs would be thrown away would be minimal. As to (i), I accept that the matter was not argued in this way before the Deputy District Registrar or on this review. Nevertheless, the point was open to the Deputy District Registrar and would have been unlikely to have involved much more detail of additional submissions. The question of extent, having regard to the matters explained in these reasons including in broad summary in the introduction, would involve an overall evaluative judgement which is incapable of being reduced to precise submission. Further, although the all-or-nothing submissions persisted by both parties on this review, as I have explained this review is not in the nature of an appeal by way of rehearing. If all of the relevant documents had been able to be before me it would have been open for me to have assessed them in light of the amendments in a broad evaluative manner to reach a conclusion about the extent of costs that were thrown away.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established