Miller v Wertheim

Case [2004] FCA 988


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Miller v Wertheim [2004] FCA 988

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – costs – bill of costs – taxation – judicial review of decision of taxing officer on reconsideration.

Federal Court Rules, O 62, r 44

Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 followed.
Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd [2003] FCA 817 referred to.
In the Marriage of Butler and Glendowan; re Bowdens’ Bill of Costs (1980) 6 Fam LR 502 referred to.
Sundell v Queensland Housing Commission (1954) 94 CLR 531 followed.

ELIANA FREYDEL MILLER V PETER WERTHEIM AND STEPHEN ROTHMAN

N 1464 OF 2001

BEAUMONT J
2 AUGUST 2004
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1464 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

ELIANA FREYDEL MILLER
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER WERTHEIM AND STEPHEN ROTHMAN
RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 AUGUST 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The motion for review of the taxing officer’s decision on reconsideration be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Note:        Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1464 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

ELIANA FREYDEL MILLER
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER WERTHEIM AND STEPHEN ROTHMAN
RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

2 AUGUST 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEAUMONT J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. By a notice of motion filed on 24 March 2004, the applicant seeks review under O 62 r 44(1) of the Federal Court Rules of a decision made by a Deputy District Registrar of this Court (the ‘Taxing Officer’) on 4 March 2004.

  2. The substantive proceeding concerned an action brought under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which was summarily dismissed by a Federal Magistrate.  The applicant appealed that decision.  On 27 May 2002, the Full Court granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal with costs (see Miller v Wertheim [2002] FCAFC 156).

  3. On 21 May 2003, the respondents filed a Bill of Costs (‘the Bill’).  On 5 August 2003, the Taxing Officer provided an estimate of $8,150.00 for the Bill, if it were to be taxed.  The applicant objected to the estimate and the matter proceeded to taxation on 10 November 2003, where the Bill was taxed at $11,530.53.  The total Bill, however, was $12,231.53, which included the $546.00 taxing fee and $155.00 cost of attendance, as the applicant had failed to obtain a variation in her favour of greater than 15 per cent (pursuant to O 62 r 46(4A)). 

  4. The applicant again objected to the Bill and applied to have the matter reconsidered. 

  5. On 4 March 2004, the Taxing Officer provided his reasons for decision on reconsideration.  The practical effect of that decision was that a reduction of $459.03 was made from amounts previously allowed on the taxation, and the sum of $155 was awarded to the respondent in relation to the costs of the reconsideration.  Accordingly, the Certificate of Taxation…

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AGLC
Miller v Wertheim [2004] FCA 988
Case
[2004] FCA 988
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Miller v Wertheim was a case before a court where the applicant sought to review the decision of a taxing officer regarding costs. The applicant objected to certain items charged by the respondent, including taxation fees, errors in the appeal index, and duplication in submissions. The respondent defended these objections, arguing that the charges were justified and reasonable. The court was required to determine whether the taxing officer had made any errors in principle or exercised their discretion in a manifestly wrong manner, and whether the costs charged were reasonable.

The court considered the objections raised by the applicant and found that the taxing officer had acted correctly. The court noted that the taxation fee was payable as per the relevant rules, and that the failure to check the appeal index properly did not justify a reduction in costs. The court also found that minor errors and duplication in submissions did not warrant a significant reduction in costs. The court held that the counsel fees charged were reasonable and within the allowed range. The court applied the principles from Australian Coal and Schweppes' Ltd v Archer, which state that the court will review a decision of a taxing officer where there is an error in principle or a manifestly wrong exercise of discretion, but will generally not interfere where the discretion has been exercised correctly.

The court dismissed the motion for review of the taxing officer’s decision on reconsideration. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the motion. This outcome reflects the court's deference to the taxing officer’s discretion and its reluctance to interfere unless there is a clear error in principle or an extreme case of manifest wrongness in the exercise of discretion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The motion for review of the taxing officer’s decision on reconsideration be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

BEAUMONT J
The objections set out in the applicant’s affidavit were raised before the Taxing Officer and are dealt with in his reasons of 4 March 2004. In summary, the Taxing Officer states:·The $546.00 taxation fee was payable pursuant to O 62, r 46(4A), (which, it will be recalled, provides that the party filing the notice of objection ‘shall bear the costs of taxation of all parties from the date of filing the notice’ unless, on taxation, that party obtains a variation in its favour of ‘at least 15% of the estimate of taxed costs, or of the amount provisionally taxed’). It had no connection with the adjournment sought by the respondents because the fee had not been paid.·The submissions regarding failure to check the appeal index properly (see par 9 of the applicant’s affidavit, set out above) cannot be accepted because a claim for perusing a document does not equate to a claim for understanding the document; and the adjournment and order to file an amended appeal index were the result of the draft not being in the proper form.·The minor error, whereby an officer of this Court was incorrectly named in the Bill, (which was one of the items listed in the applicant’s objections to the solicitor’s costs) does not justify the amount being removed from the bill.·In relation to the claim that part of the respondent’s submissions were replicated (see par 10 of the applicant’s affidavit, above), the basis of the charge is for drawing the necessary document, based on folios. The claim can be made even if material has been obtained from another source, provided it is not substantial.·There was no basis for the objection to the cost of ‘[a]ttending to serve Bill … on [applicant]’ on the basis that the Bill was originally placed under a Supreme Court of New South Wales heading (see par 11 of the applicant’s affidavit, above), as the Bill appeared to be in the correct form for this Court.·Counsel fees charged were ‘reasonable and within the range allowed by taxing officers in the Court, considering the experience of [counsel], the nature of the matter and the questions of law involved.’CONCLUSIONS ON THE MOTION The principles applicable to the present application are set out in Australian Coal, above, at 628, which adopted the following statement of Jordan CJ in Schweppes’ Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178 at 183:‘In appeals as to costs, the principles to be applied are these. The Court will always review a decision of a Taxing Officer where it is contended that he has proceeded upon a wrong principle, for the purpose of determining the principle which should be applied; and an error in principle may occur both in determining whether an item should be allowed and in determining how much should be allowed. Where no principle is involved, and the question is, whether the Taxing Officer has correctly exercised a discretion which he possesses and is purporting to exercise, the Court is reluctant to interfere. It has undoubted jurisdiction to review the Taxing Officer’s decision even where an exercise of discretion only is involved, and will do so freely on a proper case, using its own knowledge of the circumstances … but it will in general interfere only where the discretion appears not to have been exercised at all, or to have been exercised in a manner which is manifestly wrong; and where the question is one of amount only, will do so only in an extreme case.’ (Emphasis added).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BEAUMONT J

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