FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 81
Appeal from: Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 311 FLR 497; [2016] FCCA 2167 File number: VID 1086 of 2016 Judges: LOGAN, GRIFFITHS AND MOSHINSKY JJ Date of judgment: 23 May 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – jurisdiction of Migration Review Tribunal – where adverse decision made on approved sponsor’s nomination of occupation in relation to visa applicant – where no application made to review adverse nomination decision – where delegate refused visa application – where visa applicant sought merits review of refusal to grant visa – where Tribunal decided it did not have jurisdiction – whether the visa applicant was “sponsored by an approved sponsor” Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116, 140, 245, 337, 338, 347
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 1.03, 1.20, 2.72, 4.02
Migration Legislation Amendment (Sponsorship Measures) Act 2003 (Cth)
Cases cited: Ahmad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 237 FCR 365
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27
Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370
Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1
Kandel v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2013
Minister for Immigration v Lee & Ors [2014] FCCA 2881
Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Date of hearing: 8 March 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 60 Counsel for the Appellants: Ms GA Costello with Mr M Guo Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr GJ Johnson with Mr L Brown Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1086 of 2016 BETWEEN: TIHOMIR ENCHEV DYANKOV
First Appellant
SILVIA KRASIMIROVA DYANKOVA
Second Appellant
EMANUEL TIHOMIROV DYANKOV
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
LOGAN, GRIFFITHS AND MOSHINSKY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
23 MAY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
On 3 July 2014, S.I.R.E.B. Company Pty Ltd (Sireb), which carries on a car wash business under the name “Malvern Hand Car Wash”, lodged with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection: (a) an application for approval as a standard business sponsor; and (b) an application for the approval of a nominated occupation, namely Chief Executive or Managing Director, naming the first appellant (Mr Dyankov) as…
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 81
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine the legal issue of whether the visa applicant was considered to be "sponsored by an approved sponsor" for the purposes of section 338(2)(d)(i) of the Migration Act. The relevant statutory provisions, including sections 338 and 347 of the Migration Act and regulations 4.02(1A)(k), (4), and (5) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), were examined to ascertain the proper construction of the term "sponsored." Additionally, the legislative history of the provisions and the scheme of Division 3A of Part 2 of the Migration Act were considered to provide context and purpose to the statutory interpretation.
The court concluded that, having regard to the text and context of the provision, including its legislative history and the scheme of the legislation, the preferable construction was that the visa applicant was not "sponsored by an approved sponsor" in such circumstances. It followed that, unless an application for review of the adverse nomination decision was pending (in which case the Tribunal would have jurisdiction under section 338(2)(d)(ii)), the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to review a refusal to grant a visa to the visa applicant. The court held that the Full Court's obiter statement in Ahmad was correct and found no inconsistency with the reasons given in Kandel v Minister for Immigration & Anor.
In light of the court's reasoning, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellants challenge the correctness of the obiter statement at [113] of Ahmad (set out in [31] above). The appellants submit that: it is not apparent from the reasons of the Full Court why it reached the views expressed in [113], which suggest that an undecided nomination is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, but that an adverse nomination not being challenged is not sufficient; and the passage appears to be inconsistent with Kandel v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2013, in which the Federal Circuit Court, although not explicitly rejecting the Minister’s submissions, did not adopt the position that s 338(2)(d)(i) is satisfied only if an application for nomination was approved, or at least pending, at the time the visa refusal review application was lodged. Further, the appellants submit that: the obiter statement is inconsistent with the reasons given by the Full Court in Ahmad for rejecting [44]-[45] of Lee (see Ahmad at [111]); if Lee was rejected on the basis that there is no requirement for the approval of the nomination of an occupation, then it naturally follows that there is no requirement for the approval of the nomination of any particular individual; there is no warrant, whether from the text of the Migration Act or the legislative history, as was said in Ahmad at [102], to construe s 338(2)(d)(i) as if it contained unexpressed limiting words.Consideration The issue to be determined is whether, in circumstances where an approved sponsor has nominated an occupation in relation to a visa applicant and the nomination has been refused, the visa applicant is “sponsored by an approved sponsor” for the purposes of s 338(2)(d)(i) of the Migration Act. The issue described above was left open by the Full Court in Ahmad at [113]. The Full Court expressed the obiter view in that paragraph that, in such circumstances, the visa applicant would not be “sponsored by an approved sponsor” for the purposes of s 338(2)(d)(i). Although the task of statutory construction begins and ends with the text, it is undertaken with regard to context and purpose: see, eg, Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1 at [57], [61]-[62] per French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Nettle JJ, at [77] per Gageler J; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47] per Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]-[71] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. It is important to have regard to the legislative history of the relevant provisions and the scheme of Div 3A of Pt 2 of the Migration Act. As detailed in Ahmad, the Division was introduced in 2003 and there were important amendments made in 2008: see Ahmad at [27]-[56]. As originally introduced, the relevant provisions combined the process of approving a sponsor and approving a nomination. In that context, s 338(2)(d) (the terms of which were the same as set out in [25] above) was designed to prevent abuse. The concern was that visa applicants may try to extend their stay in Australia in circumstances where they had no prospect of satisfying the relevant criteria because they did not have an approved sponsor: see Ahmad at [33].