Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 81

Appeal from: Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 311 FLR 497; [2016] FCCA 2167
File number: VID 1086 of 2016
Judges: LOGAN, GRIFFITHS AND MOSHINSKY JJ
Date of judgment: 23 May 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – jurisdiction of Migration Review Tribunal – where adverse decision made on approved sponsor’s nomination of occupation in relation to visa applicant – where no application made to review adverse nomination decision – where delegate refused visa application – where visa applicant sought merits review of refusal to grant visa – where Tribunal decided it did not have jurisdiction – whether the visa applicant was “sponsored by an approved sponsor”
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116, 140, 245, 337, 338, 347

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 1.03, 1.20, 2.72, 4.02

Migration Legislation Amendment (Sponsorship Measures) Act 2003 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ahmad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 237 FCR 365

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27

Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370

Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1

Kandel v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2013

Minister for Immigration v Lee & Ors [2014] FCCA 2881

Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

Zangzinchai v Millanta (1994) 53 FCR 35

Date of hearing: 8 March 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the Appellants: Ms GA Costello with Mr M Guo
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr GJ Johnson with Mr L Brown
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1086 of 2016
BETWEEN:

TIHOMIR ENCHEV DYANKOV

First Appellant

SILVIA KRASIMIROVA DYANKOVA

Second Appellant

EMANUEL TIHOMIROV DYANKOV

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

LOGAN, GRIFFITHS AND MOSHINSKY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. On 3 July 2014, S.I.R.E.B. Company Pty Ltd (Sireb), which carries on a car wash business under the name “Malvern Hand Car Wash”, lodged with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection: (a) an application for approval as a standard business sponsor; and (b) an application for the approval of a nominated occupation, namely Chief Executive or Managing Director, naming the first appellant (Mr Dyankov) as…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved a visa applicant, Mr Dyankov, who sought to appeal against a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The central issue was whether the visa applicant was "sponsored by an approved sponsor" for the purposes of section 338(2)(d)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The matter was brought before the court after the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) declined to exercise its jurisdiction to review the decision to refuse the visa application. The tribunal held that the visa applicant was not sponsored by an approved sponsor because the nomination of an occupation in relation to the visa applicant had been refused, and no application for review of the adverse nomination decision had been made.

The court was required to determine the legal issue of whether the visa applicant was considered to be "sponsored by an approved sponsor" for the purposes of section 338(2)(d)(i) of the Migration Act. The relevant statutory provisions, including sections 338 and 347 of the Migration Act and regulations 4.02(1A)(k), (4), and (5) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), were examined to ascertain the proper construction of the term "sponsored." Additionally, the legislative history of the provisions and the scheme of Division 3A of Part 2 of the Migration Act were considered to provide context and purpose to the statutory interpretation.

The court concluded that, having regard to the text and context of the provision, including its legislative history and the scheme of the legislation, the preferable construction was that the visa applicant was not "sponsored by an approved sponsor" in such circumstances. It followed that, unless an application for review of the adverse nomination decision was pending (in which case the Tribunal would have jurisdiction under section 338(2)(d)(ii)), the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to review a refusal to grant a visa to the visa applicant. The court held that the Full Court's obiter statement in Ahmad was correct and found no inconsistency with the reasons given in Kandel v Minister for Immigration & Anor.

In light of the court's reasoning, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In our view, having regard to the text and context of the provision, including its legislative history and the scheme of the legislation, the preferable construction is that the visa applicant is not “sponsored by an approved sponsor” in such circumstances. It follows that, unless an application for review of the adverse nomination decision is pending (in which case the Tribunal would have jurisdiction under s 338(2)(d)(ii)), the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to review a refusal to grant a visa to the visa applicant.Background facts As noted above, on 3 July 2014, Sireb lodged an application for approval as a standard business sponsor. On the same date, Sireb lodged an application for the approval of a nominated occupation, namely Chief Executive or Managing Director. Although this application was not included in the appeal papers, it is evident from other documents that the application identified Mr Dyankov as the person who would work in the nominated occupation. Also on 3 July 2014, Mr Dyankov applied for a Subclass 457 visa, with the second and third appellants included as secondary applicants. On 28 July 2014, Sireb’s application for approval as a standard business sponsor was approved. On 24 October 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused Sireb’s nomination of an occupation. The delegate referred in the ‘decision record’ to reg 2.72 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) which prescribed criteria for approval of a nomination of an occupation in relation to an applicant for a Subclass 457 visa. Specifically, the delegate referred to reg 2.72(10)(f) which required the Minister to be satisfied that the position associated with the nominated occupation “is genuine”. The delegate stated that, upon consideration of the information provided by Sireb, the position of Chief Executive or Managing Director did “not appear to be a position necessary to the operations of the business”. Although the decision to refuse the nomination was reviewable, Sireb did not apply for review of the decision. Also on 24 October 2014, the same delegate refused the appellants’ applications for visas. The delegate found that Mr Dyankov did not satisfy public interest criterion 4013 in Sch 4 to the Migration Act because the application was made within three years of his Class TU subclass 573 student visa being cancelled under s 116 of the Act on the basis that he breached condition 8202(2)(a) (concerning non-enrolment). The delegate noted that exclusion periods could be waived if there were compelling circumstances that affected the interests of Australia, or compelling or compassionate circumstances that affected the interests of an Australian citizen, permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen. However, the delegate considered that no such circumstances existed. Accordingly, the delegate was not satisfied that the criteria set out in cl 457.224 were met. It followed that the second and third appellants, as secondary applicants, did not meet the relevant criteria.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 338 is the key relevant provision for the issue raised by the appeal. Section 338(1) provides that a decision is an “MRT-reviewable decision” if this section so provides, unless certain matters apply (which are not presently relevant). Section 338(2) and (9) provide:(2)A decision (other than a decision covered by subsection (4) or made under section 501) to refuse to grant a non-citizen a visa is an MRT-reviewable decision if:(a)the visa could be granted while the non-citizen is in the migration zone; and(b)the non-citizen made the application for the visa while in the migration zone; and(c)the decision was not made when the non-citizen:(i) was in immigration clearance; or(ii)had been refused immigration clearance and had not subsequently been immigration cleared; and(d)where it is a criterion for the grant of the visa that the non-citizen is sponsored by an approved sponsor, and the visa is a temporary visa of a kind (however described) prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph:(i)the non-citizen is sponsored by an approved sponsor at the time the application to review the decision to refuse to grant the visa is made; or(ii)an application for review of a decision not to approve the sponsor has been made, but, at the time the application to review the decision to refuse to grant the visa is made, review of the sponsorship decision is pending.…(9)A decision that is prescribed for the purposes of this subsection is an MRT-reviewable decision.As may be noted, s 338(2)(d) refers to a visa that is “a temporary visa of a kind (however described) prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph”. A Subclass 457 visa is so prescribed: reg 4.02(1A)(k). Further, it is convenient to note that both a decision to refuse an application for approval as a sponsor and a decision to refuse to approve a nomination are prescribed for the purposes of s 338(9): reg 4.02(4)(a) and (d). Thus both are MRT-reviewable decisions. Section 347 is headed “Application for review by Migration Review Tribunal”. Section 347(2) relevantly provides:(2) An application for review may only be made by:(a)if the MRT-reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A), (4) or (7A)—the non-citizen who is the subject of that decision; or…(d)if the MRT-reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(9)—the person prescribed in respect of the kind of decision in question prescribed for the purposes of that subsection. Regulation 4.02 of the Migration Regulations deals with interpretation and relevantly provides:(1AA)For section 337 of the Act, sponsored includes being identified in a nomination under section 140GB of the Act.…(4)For subsection 338(9) of the Act, each of the following decisions is an MRT-reviewable decision:(a)a decision under subsection 140E(1) of the Act to refuse a person’s application for approval as a sponsor in relation to one or more classes of sponsor;…(d)a decision under subsection 140GB(2) of the Act to refuse to approve a nomination;…(5)For paragraph 347(2)(d) of the Act, an application for review of a decision mentioned in subregulation (4) may only be made by:(a)in the case of a decision mentioned in paragraph (4)(a)—a person to whose application the decision relates;(c)in the case of a decision mentioned in paragraph (4)(d)—the approved sponsor who made the nomination;…Thus, in the case of a nomination application, it is the approved sponsor (and not the visa applicant) who may seek review of a decision to refuse the nomination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants challenge the correctness of the obiter statement at [113] of Ahmad (set out in [31] above). The appellants submit that: it is not apparent from the reasons of the Full Court why it reached the views expressed in [113], which suggest that an undecided nomination is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, but that an adverse nomination not being challenged is not sufficient; and the passage appears to be inconsistent with Kandel v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2013, in which the Federal Circuit Court, although not explicitly rejecting the Minister’s submissions, did not adopt the position that s 338(2)(d)(i) is satisfied only if an application for nomination was approved, or at least pending, at the time the visa refusal review application was lodged. Further, the appellants submit that: the obiter statement is inconsistent with the reasons given by the Full Court in Ahmad for rejecting [44]-[45] of Lee (see Ahmad at [111]); if Lee was rejected on the basis that there is no requirement for the approval of the nomination of an occupation, then it naturally follows that there is no requirement for the approval of the nomination of any particular individual; there is no warrant, whether from the text of the Migration Act or the legislative history, as was said in Ahmad at [102], to construe s 338(2)(d)(i) as if it contained unexpressed limiting words.Consideration The issue to be determined is whether, in circumstances where an approved sponsor has nominated an occupation in relation to a visa applicant and the nomination has been refused, the visa applicant is “sponsored by an approved sponsor” for the purposes of s 338(2)(d)(i) of the Migration Act. The issue described above was left open by the Full Court in Ahmad at [113]. The Full Court expressed the obiter view in that paragraph that, in such circumstances, the visa applicant would not be “sponsored by an approved sponsor” for the purposes of s 338(2)(d)(i). Although the task of statutory construction begins and ends with the text, it is undertaken with regard to context and purpose: see, eg, Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1 at [57], [61]-[62] per French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Nettle JJ, at [77] per Gageler J; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47] per Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]-[71] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. It is important to have regard to the legislative history of the relevant provisions and the scheme of Div 3A of Pt 2 of the Migration Act. As detailed in Ahmad, the Division was introduced in 2003 and there were important amendments made in 2008: see Ahmad at [27]-[56]. As originally introduced, the relevant provisions combined the process of approving a sponsor and approving a nomination. In that context, s 338(2)(d) (the terms of which were the same as set out in [25] above) was designed to prevent abuse. The concern was that visa applicants may try to extend their stay in Australia in circumstances where they had no prospect of satisfying the relevant criteria because they did not have an approved sponsor: see Ahmad at [33].