Barns v Commissioner, Queensland Fire and Emergency Services

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CITATION:

Barns v Commissioner, Queensland Fire & Emergency Services [2017] QCAT 263

PARTIES:

James Thomas Barns
Lynette Joy Barns
(Applicants)

v

Commissioner, Queensland Fire & Emergency Services

(Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

GAR028-17

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

HEARING DATE:

31 July 2017

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Olding

DELIVERED ON:

7 August 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS MADE:

1.    The Respondent’s application to strike out a proceeding, filed on 22 May 2017, is dismissed.

2.    Each party is to bear their own costs of the application.

3.    The application for review is to be listed for a directions hearing at a date to be advised.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where Commissioner decided not to accept late application for compensation – whether Tribunal has jurisdiction to review decision

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s14A, s 14B, s 35
Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld), s 125
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 100, s 102

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384
Dyankov v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 81
The Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404

APPEARANCES:

APPLICANT:

James Thomas Barns and Lynette Joy Barns

RESPONDENT:

Commissioner, Queensland Fire & Emergency Services

REPRESENTATIVES:

APPLICANT:

represented by Ms K M Riedel of Counsel, instructed by Condon Charles Lawyers

RESPONDENT:

represented by Mr M J Woodford of Counsel, instructed by Crown Law

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. A person who suffers loss or damage because of the exercise or purported exercise of certain powers under the Disaster Management Act 2003 (Queensland) (“the Disaster Management Act”)[1] is, subject to certain conditions, entitled to be paid just and reasonable compensation under that Act.[2]

    [1]All legislative references are to the Disaster Management Act, unless otherwise indicated.

    [2]Section 121(1).

  2. An application for compensation must be made to the Respondent Commissioner within 90 days after the loss or damage is suffered.[3] However, the Commissioner may accept an application made more than 90 days after the loss or damage is suffered if satisfied that it would be reasonable to do so.[4]

    [3]Section 121(2).

    [4]Section 121(5).

  3. The Applicants, Mr and Mrs Barns, applied to the Commissioner for such compensation. Their application was made outside the 90-day period. The Commissioner, not being satisfied that it was reasonable to accept the late application, did not accept, and therefore did not consider, the application or pay any compensation.

  4. The Commissioner says the only decision that has been made is to not accept the late application. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review that decision, the Commissioner says, and therefore the Applicants’ application for review should be struck out.

  5. The Applicants argue that the Tribunal does have jurisdiction and therefore the Commissioner’s application to strike out their application for review should be dismissed, and also that the Commissioner should pay their costs of the strike out application.

  6. I have decided that the Tribunal does…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCAT 263
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter between Barns and the Commissioner, Queensland Fire and Emergency Services was brought before the Court. The dispute arose when the Commissioner decided not to accept a late application for compensation from Barns. The central issue for the Court was whether the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision not to accept the late application for compensation.

The Commissioner argued that the statutory provisions established a two-step process for late applications. First, the Commissioner, as chief executive, had to decide whether to accept the late application under section 121(5). Second, if the Commissioner decided to accept the late application, the Commissioner would then consider and decide the application. The Commissioner contended that there was no provision for QCAT to review the first decision—whether to accept a late application—because a decision not to accept a late application was not considered a decision to refuse compensation. According to the Commissioner, only the second decision, whether to pay compensation and, if so, how much, in relation to an accepted application, had that character.

Barns, on the other hand, argued that the phrase "decision to refuse to pay compensation" in section 125 encompasses any situation where an applicant applies for compensation and does not receive it, whether because the application was considered and refused or, as in this case, it was not accepted as a late application. The Court had to interpret the statutory language, its context, and purpose to resolve this complex statutory construction issue. The Commissioner's argument had significant merit as it aligned with the natural reading of the provisions in their order of appearance. However, Barns' argument that the phrase "decision to refuse to pay compensation" covers any case where an applicant does not receive compensation was also compelling.

The Court dismissed the Respondent's application to strike out the proceeding and ordered that each party bear their own costs. The application for review was to be listed for a directions hearing at a later date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Respondent’s application to strike out a proceeding, filed on 22 May 2017, is dismissed.

2. Each party is to bear their own costs of the application.

3. The application for review is to be listed for a directions hearing at a date to be advised.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 124 provides:124 Notice about decisionAs soon as practicable after deciding the application, the chief executive must give the applicant a written notice stating all of the following-(a) the decision and the reasons for it; (b)if the chief executive decides to pay compensation- (i) details of the amount and how the amount was assessed; and (ii) if the amount is less than the amount claimed– the matters mentioned in the QCAT Act, section 157(2)(c) to (e);(c)if the chief executive decides not to pay compensation- the matters mentioned in the QCAT Act, section 157(2)((c) to (e). The Commissioner’s argument is straightforward:(1) For late applications, the provisions create a two-step process requiring two distinct decisions.(2) First, the Commissioner as chief executive decides under s 121(5) whether to accept the late application.(3) Next, if the Commissioner decides to accept the late application, the Commissioner must consider and decide the application.(4) This, so the argument goes, is clear from s 123, which is only concerned with “accepted applications”, an expression defined in s 123(3) to mean a late application that the chief executive accepts (and applications lodged on time).(5) The Commissioner argues that there is no provision for the Tribunal to review of the first decision – whether to accept a late application – because a decision not to accept a late application is not, according to the Commissioner, a decision to refuse to pay compensation.(6) Only the second decision – whether to pay compensation, and if so how much, in relation to an accepted application – has that character, according to the Commissioner. The Applicants argue that, considered in its context, the expression “decision to refuse to pay compensation” in section 125 covers any case where an applicant applies for compensation and does not receive it, whether because the application was considered and refused or, as in this case, it was not accepted as a late application. This matter raises a difficult question of statutory construction. As the High Court regularly reiterates,[5] the construction of section 125 is to be derived from its text, context and purpose.[5] Reiterated recently by Nettle J in Talacko v Bennett [2017] HCA 15, [82]. See also the authorities referenced by his Honour at footnote 85. The Commissioner’s argument has considerable force. Taken together, in the order the provisions appear, the more natural reading is that:(1) Section 123 requires the Commissioner to consider and decide an “accepted application”; (2) As soon as possible after deciding “the application” – that is, as the Commissioner would say, the accepted application referred to in the immediately preceding section – section 124 requires notice of “the decision” to be given – again, the decision on the accepted application referred to in the immediately preceding section; and(3) Section 125 provides a review right for “the chief executive’s decision to refuse to pay compensation or about the amount of the compensation” – that is, the decision on the accepted application referred to in section 123 and, as the argument goes, also in section 124.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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