FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Boyn v Schering Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 961
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleading – claim of unlawful discrimination by employer on ground of employee’s age – employee joined superannuation fund (Fund) many years before commencement of Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) (Act) on 23 June 2004 – new scheme instituted for Fund before commencement of Act that operated less favourably for older employees - complaint that employer discriminated by failing to “top up” amount payable when employee retired on 31 March 2005 to the amount that would have been payable if he had had a longer period to accumulate benefits beyond his retiring age of 65 years.
Held: pleading deficient in failing to allege unlawful discriminatory treatment by employer occurring after commencement of Act.Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 11 r 16, O 20 r 5
Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) ss 14, 18(2)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46P – 46POAustralian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165 distinguished
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 citedSIEGFRIED ECKHARD BOYN v
SCHERING PTY LTD (ACN 000 023 361)NSD 363 OF 2008
LINDGREN J
25 JUNE 2008
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 363 OF 2008
BETWEEN:
SIEGFRIED ECKHARD BOYN
ApplicantAND:
SCHERING PTY LTD (ACN 000 023 361)
Respondent
JUDGE:
LINDGREN J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JUNE 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The statement of claim be struck out.
2.The applicant have leave to file and serve an amended statement of claim.
3.The applicant file and serve any amended statement of claim by 7 July 2008.
4.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the respondent’s motion brought by amended notice of motion filed on 24 April 2008.
5.The respondent’s motion brought by amended notice of motion filed on 24 April 2008 be otherwise stood over to 9 July 2008 at 9.30 am for directions.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 363 OF 2008
BETWEEN:
SIEGFRIED ECKHARD BOYN
ApplicantAND:
SCHERING PTY LTD (ACN 000 023 361)
Respondent
JUDGE:
LINDGREN J
DATE:
25 JUNE 2008
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
By an amended notice of motion filed on 24 April 2008, the respondent (Schering) seeks summary dismissal of the proceeding, in so far as it relates to certain claims for relief, pursuant to O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules (Rules), and a striking out of certain paragraphs of the statement of claim pursuant to O 11 r 16 of the Rules.
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
The following is a summary account of the allegations made in the statement of claim. Numerals in bold within brackets refer to paragraphs of the statement of claim.
The applicant (Mr Boyn) was born on 16 January 1940 (2). From about…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 961
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues primarily revolved around the jurisdictional aspects of the claim and the sufficiency of the facts pleaded in the statement of claim. The court examined whether the plaintiff's allegations of discrimination were adequately supported by facts that occurred after the Act came into force on 23 June 2004. The court also considered whether the plaintiff's claim could be maintained under the Act or if it needed to be pursued under other legislative provisions. Furthermore, the court needed to determine if the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract could be entertained given the absence of relevant statutory provisions.
The court found that the statement of claim did not sufficiently allege facts that aligned with the requirements of the Act, particularly in relation to the timeline of events post the Act's commencement. The court noted that the plaintiff's claim for relief did not directly stem from the facts pleaded, leading to a significant gap in the legal basis of the claim. The court also highlighted that there was no express provision within the Act that would allow the plaintiff to seek relief directly from the court. Instead, the proper procedure would involve lodging a complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and following the prescribed steps before applying to the court. Given these deficiencies, the court concluded that the statement of claim should be struck out in its entirety, with leave granted to the plaintiff to file an amended statement of claim that adequately addresses the jurisdictional and factual requirements.
The court ordered that the plaintiff's statement of claim be struck out and that he be allowed to file an amended statement of claim by a specified date. Additionally, the plaintiff was directed to pay the defendant's costs associated with the motion. The court's decision also included a direction for the matter to be stood over for further directions on a specified date.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The statement of claim be struck out.
2. The applicant have leave to file and serve an amended statement of claim.
3. The applicant file and serve any amended statement of claim by 7 July 2008.
4. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the respondent’s motion brought by amended notice of motion filed on 24 April 2008.
5. The respondent’s motion brought by amended notice of motion filed on 24 April 2008 be otherwise stood over to 9 July 2008 at 9.30 am for directions.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Boyn filed a motion in the court seeking relief for alleged unlawful discrimination and breach of contract against Schering. Schering filed an application to dismiss the proceeding, arguing that the statement of claim was deficient and that the court lacked jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. The matter came before the court for a hearing, where Schering argued that the statement of claim should be struck out in its entirety with leave to Mr Boyn to replead. The court considered the arguments and found deficiencies in the statement of claim, particularly in the jurisdictional aspect and the failure to allege facts occurring after the commencement of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth).
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: LINDGREN J
Finally, Mr Boyn submits that even if his claim based on the Act should fail, his claim for breach of contract survives within this Court’s accrued jurisdiction.CONSIDERATION There is a threshold difficulty with the statement of claim. There is a hiatus between the facts alleged and the claim for relief. A reading of the statement of claim alone would lead one to expect that on the basis of the facts pleaded, the Act either entitles Mr Boyn to the relief claimed in the application or gives the Court power to grant that relief. This not so. Section 59 of the Act states that the Act does not confer on a person a right of action in respect of the doing of an act that is unlawful under a provision of Pt 4 (which includes s 18) unless a provision of the Act expressly provides otherwise. I am not aware of any provision of the Act that expressly provides otherwise and my attention was not drawn to any. The hiatus is filled by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (HREOC Act). That Act provides for the lodgement of written complaints with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Commission) alleging unlawful discrimination under, relevantly, the Act, inquiry into the complaint, termination of the complaint, and, where a complaint has been terminated in certain circumstances and notice of the termination was given to the complainants (being the persons who lodged the complaint), application to this Court or the Federal Magistrates Court for relief by the affected person in relation to the complaint (being the persons on whose behalf the complaint was lodged): see ss 46P to 46PO of the HREOC Act. Subsection 46PO(4) of the HREOC Act provides for the range of orders that either of those Courts may make if it is satisfied that there has been unlawful discrimination. In fact, Mr Boyn did complain to the Commission alleging discrimination under the Act. The complaint was terminated pursuant to s 46PH(1)(i) of the HREOC Act on the ground that a delegate of the President of the Commission was satisfied that there was no reasonable prospect of the matter being settled by conciliation. Further, Mr Boyn’s complaint relating to superannuation was also terminated pursuant to s 46PH(1)(c) of the HREOC Act on the ground that the delegate was satisfied that it was misconceived and lacking in substance. Mr Boyn was given notice of the termination. In the circumstances recounted above, s 46PO of the HREOC Act was enlivened and Mr Boyn, being an affected person in relation to the complaint, was entitled to apply to this Court alleging unlawful discrimination by Schering. The pleading would have to be amended to allege facts enlivening the Court’s jurisdiction, including the lodgement of the complaint with the Commission, the termination of the complaint under s 46PH(1), and the giving of the notice of termination to the complainant under s 46PH(2) of the HREOC Act. It is common ground that in order to succeed on his claim under the Act, Mr Boyn must be able to establish that Schering unlawfully discriminated against him on the ground of his age in one of the respects identified in paras (a), (b), and (d) of s 18(2) of the Act (see [12] above – it is common ground that para (c) is irrelevant) after the Act commenced operation on 23 June 2004: for example, see Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 at 267. However, the statement of claim does not allege facts falling within s 14 and s 18(2) of the Act occurring after that date. There is no pleading of the conduct of Schering after 23 June 2004 that amounted to Schering having treated Mr Boyn less favourably than, in circumstances that were the same or not materially different, Schering had, after 23 June 2004, treated or proposed to treat persons of a different age after 23 June 2004 (see s 14 of the Act).