Site Skills Group Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Site Skills Group Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2019] FCA 1970

Review of: Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Oral decision, Deputy President Hanger, 13 March 2019)
File number: QUD 233 of 2019
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 22 November 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and/or r 26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal committed any jurisdictional error in making the procedural ruling – application granted
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth))

Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

National Vocational Education and Training Regulator Act 2011 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596

Australian Trade Commission v South Bank Corporation (2000) 104 FCR 116; [2000] FCA 1322

Barker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 302; [2014] FCAFC 165

Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381; [2015] FCA 1045

EnergyAustralia Yallourn Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2014) 218 FCR 316; [2014] FCAFC 8

Esposito v Commonwealth (2015) 235 FCR 1; [2015] FCAFC 160

Geographical Indications Committee v The Honourable Justice O’Connor (2000) 64 ALD 325; [2000] FCA 1877

Kimber v Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575; [2017] FCAFC 226

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 363 ALR 599; [2019] HCA 3

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Productivity Partners Pty Ltd and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2018] AATA 4878

Riverside Nursing Care Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2001] FCA 1410

Standards for Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) 2015

Date of hearing: 26 July 2019
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr SA McLeod QC and Mr M Wilkinson
Solicitor for the Applicant: HopgoodGanim
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent filed a Submitting Notice
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Ms M Brennan QC and Ms S Wright
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 233 of 2019
BETWEEN:

SITE SKILLS GROUP PTY LTD ACN 153 744 417

Applicant

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

First Respondent

AUSTRALIAN SKILLS QUALITY AUTHORITY
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 NOVEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s originating application filed 9 April 2019 is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs to be taxed failing agreement.

3.Should any of the parties wish to seek a different order…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1970
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Site Skills Group Pty Ltd, sought review of a decision by the National VET Regulator (the Authority) to cancel its registration as a Registered Training Organisation (RTO). The respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), was the body before which Site Skills had sought review of the Authority’s decision. The Authority sought summary judgment in its favour, contending that Site Skills had no reasonable prospects of success in its review application. The legal issues before the Court were whether the Tribunal had committed any jurisdictional error in making certain procedural rulings and, if not, whether the Authority was entitled to summary judgment.

The Court found that the Tribunal had not committed any jurisdictional error in its procedural rulings. The Court held that the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion to order that Site Skills provide certain monthly reports to the Authority as a condition of the stay of the Authority’s decision. The Court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in refusing Site Skills’ application to amend its review application to include additional grounds of review. The Court held that Site Skills had no reasonable prospects of success in its review application because it had failed to establish that the Tribunal had committed any error in fact or law. The Court further found that Site Skills had no reasonable prospects of success on any of the grounds it advanced in its review application, including its contention that the Tribunal had failed to give it a fair opportunity to present its case.

Accordingly, the Court granted the Authority’s application for summary judgment and dismissed Site Skills’ originating application. The Court ordered that the Authority’s costs be paid by Site Skills, to be taxed failing agreement. Should any party wish to seek a different order as to costs, it must notify the other parties by a specified date. If no such notice is given, the original costs order stands. If notice is given, the parties must file and serve outlines of their submissions, limited to five pages, and any supporting affidavit material, by specified dates. The question of costs will then be determined on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s originating application filed 9 April 2019 is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs to be taxed failing agreement.

3. Should any of the parties wish to seek a different order as to costs to that in Order 2, by close of business on 30 November 2019 that party is to notify the other parties.

4. If no notice is given in accordance with Order 3, Order 2 stands.

5. If notice is given in accordance with Order 3:

(a) by close of business on 5 December 2019, the party seeking the different costs order is to file and serve an outline of submissions, limited to five pages, and any supporting affidavit material;

(b) by close of business on 12 December 2019, the other parties are to file and serve an outline of submissions if they wish, limited to five pages, and any supporting affidavit material; and

(c) the question of costs will then be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I consider the Authority has succeeded in its application and summary judgment will be entered in its favour.FACTUAL BACKGROUND The factual background to this matter is complicated. Pivotal to it are the activities of two companies that are related to Site Skills: Productivity Partners Pty Ltd, and their common parent company, Site Group International Limited. The latter is a public company which was listed on the Australian Securities Exchange in 2010. It established Site Skills in 2011 and acquired Productivity Partners in 2014. Also pivotal is an event which occurred on or about 28 February 2017. On that date, Mr Ian Cook, who was the serving Chief Executive Officer of Productivity Partners, resigned and was replaced by Mr Vernon Wills. At or about that time, Mr Wills was also the Chief Executive Officer of Site Skills. He remained in that position until March 2019. On 5 May 2017, Productivity Partners applied to the Authority to renew its registration as a RTO. The Authority refused that application on 16 June 2017. At the same time, it cancelled Productivity Partners’ RTO registration under s 36(2)(f) of the NVETR Act and cancelled its registration as a registered provider pursuant to s 83(3)(c) of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth) (PP Decision). In response, on 13 July 2017, Productivity Partners filed an application in the Tribunal seeking a review of that decision (the PP Proceeding). As is already mentioned above, on 18 April 2018, Site Skills suffered a similar fate with respect to its registration as a RTO. On 24 April 2018, it also responded to the Authority’s decision by filing a review application in the Tribunal (the Site Skills Proceeding). At the same time, it applied for an order that the Authority’s decision be stayed. Initially the Authority consented to that stay application on the condition that Site Skills provide certain monthly reports to it. Accordingly, on 21 May 2018, the Tribunal ordered that the Authority’s decision be stayed until the Site Skills Proceeding was determined or until further order. Thereafter, during 2018, Site Skills and the Authority filed the affidavits and statements of the witnesses upon which they intended to rely in that proceeding. In the meantime, on 26 April 2018, the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS), the Authority’s lawyer, sent a letter to HopgoodGanim, Site Skills’ lawyers, indicating its intention to ask the Tribunal to make findings in the PP Proceeding that a number of people connected with Productivity Partners, including Mr Ian Cook, Mr Daryl Sommerville, Mr Vernon Wills, Mr Blake Wills and Mr Joe Ganim, were not fit and proper persons to be involved in a RTO. On or about 7 November 2018, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against Productivity Partners (the PP Federal Court Proceeding), among others, seeking orders including the following: (a)a declaration that Productivity Partners had contravened the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)); and(b)the payment of pecuniary penalties to the Commonwealth of Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, I also do not consider Site Skills has reasonable prospects of success on ground 3.CONCLUSION – THE AUTHORITY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT For these reasons, I do not consider Site Skills has reasonable prospects of success in any of its four grounds of review. In coming to this conclusion, I have had due regard to the caution that should attend it (see at [29(38)] above). It follows that I consider the Authority has succeeded in its application to have summary judgment entered in its favour under s 31A(2) of the FCA Act. In practical terms, this means Site Skills’ originating application should be dismissed. As is already noted above, having come to this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider the Authority’s alternative grounds. The orders will be:1.The applicant’s originating application filed 9 April 2019 is dismissed.2.The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs to be taxed failing agreement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Apart from the Standards which are already set out above, the sections of the NVETR Act, or parts thereof, that are pertinent to this application are as follows: 17RegistrationGrant of application for registration(1)The National VET Regulator may grant an application for registration.(2)In deciding whether to grant an application, the National VET Regulator must consider whether the applicant complies with:(a) the VET Quality Framework; and(b)the applicable conditions of registration set out in Subdivision B of this Division.(3)When considering the application, the National VET Regulator may conduct an audit of any matter relating to the application.(4)The National VET Regulator may charge a registration assessment fee for considering the application.Period of registration(5)If the National VET Regulator grants an application, the Regulator must also determine the period for which the applicant is registered. The period must not be more than 7 years.Note: For renewals of registration, see section 31.Conditions of registration(6)If the National VET Regulator considers it appropriate to do so, the Regulator may impose one or more conditions under subsection 29(1) to which an organisation’s registration is subject.Note:An NVR registered training organisation is also subject to statutory conditions, see Subdivision B of this Division.…31Renewal of registration(1)The National VET Regulator may renew an NVR registered training organisation’s registration under section 17 if the organisation makes an application for renewal:(a)at least 90 days before the day the organisation’s registration expires; or(b)within such shorter period as the Regulator allows.(2)An application must be accompanied by the application fee determined by the Minister, by legislative instrument, under section 232.(3)An NVR registered training organisation’s registration is taken to continue until the organisation’s application is decided.(4)An NVR registered training organisation may apply for renewal of registration during a period when all or part of its scope of registration is suspended.THE PRINCIPLES ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT As is already noted above, there is no dispute between the parties on the principles applicable to an application for summary judgment of the present kind. Those principles were conveniently summarised by Perry J in Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381; [2015] FCA 1045 at [35]–[39] (approved by the Full Court in Kimber v Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575; [2017] FCAFC 226 at [62]) as follows:35First, the respondents as the moving parties bear the onus of persuading the Court that the application has no reasonable prospects of succeeding: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256 (Cassimatis) at [45] (Reeves J).36Secondly, as the respondents submit, the intention behind the enactment of s 31A is “to lower the bar for obtaining summary judgment (including summary dismissal) below the level that had been fixed by such authorities as Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91-92, and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130”: White Industries Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298 (White Industries) at [54] (Lindgren J); see also Cassimatis at [46] (Reeves J). In the cases to which Lindgren J referred in White Industries, the requirement had been expressed in such terms as “manifestly groundless” or “hopeless”. As Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer) at [52]-[53]: … effect must be given to the negative admonition in sub-s (3) that a defence, a proceeding, or a part of a proceeding may be found to have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecution even if it cannot be said that it is “hopeless” or “bound to fail”. … [I]t is important to begin by recognising that the combined effect of sub-ss (2) and (3) is that the inquiry required in this case is whether there is a “reasonable” prospect of prosecuting the proceeding, not an inquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail.In this respect, s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered.37Thirdly, the assessment required by s 31A of whether a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success necessitates the making of value judgments in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with the result that the provision vests a discretion in the Court: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401 (Kowalski) at [28] (the Court). That discretion includes whether to deal with the motion at once or at some later stage in the proceedings when the legal and factual issues have been more clearly defined: Butorac v WIN Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1503 at [19] (Buchanan J); Cassimatis at [50] (Reeves J).38In the fourth place, despite the threshold for summary dismissal having been lowered, the discretion must still be exercised with caution (Spencer at [24] (French CJ and Gummow J) and [60] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ)). Consistently with this, the discretion is concerned “with the bringing and defending of proceedings, not just with pleadings; with substance, not just with form”: White Industries at [50] (Lindgren J) (approved in Kowalski at [30] (the Court); see also Spencer at [23] (French CJ and Gummow J)).39Finally, in his Honour’s helpful explanation of how these principles are to be applied, Reeves J in Cassimatis further explains at [46] that:… the determination of a summary dismissal application therefore does not require a mini-trial based upon incomplete evidence to decide whether the proceedings are likely to succeed or fail at trial. Instead, it requires a critical examination of the available materials to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact that should be decided at trial. Each application for summary judgment or summary dismissal has to be determined according to its particular circumstances. What is required is a practical judgment of the case at hand. The relevant circumstances will partly depend upon the stage which the proceedings have reached. Among other things, this will affect the materials available to the Court considering the application, for example, whether pleadings have been exchanged, or discovery of documents has occurred.