Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] FCA 910

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – pleadings – amendment of statement of claim – application to amend after trial has commenced – whether amendments would allow applicants to pursue inconsistent claims – doctrine of election – doctrine of approbation and reprobation.

Partnership Act 1958 (Vic) s 9
Federal Court Rules O13 r 2

Fried v National Australia Bank Limited [2000] FCA 604 referred to
O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248 at 257-63 referred to
Sargent v ASL Developments (1974) 131 CLR 634 at 655 referred to
United Australia Ltd v Barclays Banks Ltd [1941] AC 1 referred to
Elder’s Trustees and Executor Co Ltd v Commonwealth Homes and Investment Co Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 603 referred to
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 421 referred to
Verschures Creameries Ltd v Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co Ltd [1921] 2 KB 608 at 611 referred to
Randwick Municipal Council v Broten [1964-5] NSWR 1445 referred to
Bienvenu v Royal Society for Protection of Animals [1967] VR 656 at 664 referred to
Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275 referred to
Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Limited [1990] 3 All ER 376 referred to
VACC Insurance Limited v BP Australia Limited (1999) 47 NSWLR 716 at 724-5 referred to

TAB FRIED & ORS v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
(ACN 004 044 937) & ORS

VG 352 of 1998

WEINBERG J
7 JULY 2000
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VG 352 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

TAB FRIED
First Applicant

EVA FRIED
Second Applicant

DAVID FRIED
Third Applicant

COMPACK PACKAGING EMPLOYEE SHARE PLAN PTY LTD (ACN 062 925 393)
Fourth Applicant

EVATAB INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (formerly TED Engineering Investment Pty Ltd) (ACN 006 392 972)
Fifth Applicant

INVOTIN PTY LTD (ACN 006 786 394)
Sixth Applicant

WINDINA PTY LTD (ACN 074 572 204)
Seventh Applicant

EVATAB LEASING PTY LTD (ACN 074 572 204)
Eighth Applicant

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
First Respondent

BENNI ARONI
Second Respondent
& First Cross-Claimant

ADRIAN COLMAN
Third Respondent
& Second Cross-Claimant

RICHARD STARLING CORNISH
Fourth Respondent
& Third Cross-Claimant

MARK WOLLAN
Fifth Respondent
& Fourth Cross-Claimant

NORMAN SAMUEL FRYDE
Sixth Respondent
& Fifth Cross-Claimant

BRUNO JOHN CHARLESWORTH
Seventh Respondent
& Sixth Cross-Claimant

BRUCE DAVID JOSEM
Eighth Respondent
& Seventh Cross-Claimant

EFFIE KAVADAS
Ninth Respondent
& Eighth Cross-Claimant

TED ENGINEERING AUSTRALIA LIMITED
(ACN 006 790 067)
Tenth Respondent

BENDIGO BANK LIMITED (ACN 068 049 178)
Eleventh Respondent

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
First Cross-Respondent

W F TITCHENER & CO PTY LTD
Second Cross-Respondent

VICTORIAN LAWYERS RPA LIMITED
Third Cross-Respondent

W F TITCHENER & CO PTY LTD
Cross-Claimant

AND:

BENNI ARONI
First Cross-Respondent

ADRIAN COLMAN
Second Cross-Respondent

RICHARD STARLING CORNISH
Third Cross-Respondent

MARK WOLLAN
Fourth Cross-Respondent

NORMAN SAMUEL FRYDE
Fifth Cross-Respondent

BRUNO JOHN CHARLESWORTH
Sixth Cross-Respondent

BRUCE DAVID JOSEM
Seventh Cross-Respondent

EFFIE KAVADAS
Eighth Cross-Respondent

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 910
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd, the applicants sought leave to amend their statement of claim against the respondents, including Bendigo Bank, to clarify their claims regarding the misuse of trust monies and breach of mandate. The applicants had previously settled with the Firm and obtained a consent judgment on the basis that the Firm had made the withdrawals and was liable. Bendigo Bank argued that the proposed amendments would alter the nature of the claims radically and that the applicants were barred from making such amendments due to the doctrine of approbation and reprobation.

The court considered whether the applicants were precluded from proceeding against Bendigo Bank on a different basis and whether the proposed amendments were inconsistent with their previous course of action. The court held that the applicants were not precluded from alleging a breach of mandate against Bendigo Bank while also alleging a misuse of trust monies against the Firm, as these allegations were not inherently inconsistent. The court also found that the proposed amendments did not infringe upon the doctrine of approbation and reprobation.

The court granted the applicants leave to amend their statement of claim as proposed, allowing them to clarify their claims against Bendigo Bank. The respondents were given leave to amend their defences and cross-claims to reflect these changes, with the requirement that any such amendments be filed and served before a specified date.

ORDERS:
1. The applicants are granted leave to amend their further amended statement of claim by deleting specific references to the Firm's partner in paragraphs 13, 14, and 15, and by removing the reference to these paragraphs in paragraph 82.
2. The respondents are granted leave to amend their defences and cross-claims to align with the amendments made to the statement of claim.
3. Any amendments to the defences and cross-claims must be filed and served before 4 August 2000.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants be given leave to amend their further amended statement of claim by deleting from each of pars 13, 14 and 15 the words “the Firm by its partner” and by deleting from par 82 the reference to pars 13, 14 and 15.

2. The respondents be given leave to amend their defences and cross-claims to the extent necessary to meet the amendments made pursuant to order 1.

3. Any amendments made pursuant to order 2 be filed and served before 4 August 2000.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
The fact that the applicants had settled with the Firm, and obtained a consent judgment of $1.23 million on the footing that the Firm had made the withdrawals, and was liable to the applicants on that basis, meant that the applicants were not at liberty to proceed against Bendigo Bank on a different footing. Were the Court to permit the applicants to do so, it would be seen to condone approbation and reprobation. Conclusion I do not accept Bendigo Bank’s contention that the proposed amendments would have the effect of altering radically the claims made against it. I am satisfied too that Bendigo Bank has understood, from the time that it was brought into this proceeding, the precise nature of those claims. There is no reason, in my view, why the applicants should not be permitted to allege, as against Bendigo Bank, a breach of the mandate of the Firm while at the same time, alleging against the Firm a misuse of trust monies. These allegations are not, in my view, inconsistent with each other. The allegations made against the Firm do not involve any suggestion of actual dishonesty on the part of any of the partners. When pars 13, 14 and 15, which were drafted long before Bendigo Bank was joined as a respondent, are read fairly and in context, it becomes clear that the substance of the applicants’ claim is, and always has been, that Green withdrew the monies from the Bendigo accounts, and that the partners of the Firm are liable for his acts, though they did not themselves act dishonestly. If Bendigo Bank is correct in its contention that the proposed amendments will lead ultimately to the applicants’ claims for conversion and breach of trust being untenable, that is a matter which can be addressed by the judge who will now hear this matter commencing in October of this year. There is nothing to prevent NAB, or Bendigo Bank, from moving for summary dismissal of any cause of action pleaded by the applicants which can no longer be sustained once the amendments have been made. It should be noted, however, that the applicants do not accept any of Bendigo Bank’s contentions regarding the effect of these amendments upon the causes of action which they have pleaded. Turning to Bendigo Bank’s submission that the applicants are barred from seeking to amend their statement of claim because they have made an election, and the amendments are inconsistent with the course of action which they have adopted, I am unable to accept that contention. I do not regard the proposed amendments as infringing the doctrine of approbation and reprobation. The term “election” is used in a variety of legal contexts. Its meaning at common law was canvassed by Jordan CJ in O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248 at 257-63, and also by Mason J in Sargent v ASL Developments (1974) 131 CLR 634 at 655. Mason J observed:“A person is said to have a right of election when events occur which enable him to exercise alternative and inconsistent rights, i.e. when he has the right to determine an estate or terminate a contract for breach of covenant or contract and the alternative right to insist on the continuation of the estate or the performance of the contract.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.