Garvey v Australian National University

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Garvey v Australian National University [2024] FCA 140   

File number(s): QUD 129 of 2023
Judgment of: MEAGHER J
Date of judgment: 26 February 2024
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Subpoenas – Whether leave to issue subpoena to give evidence returnable at an interlocutory hearing should be granted – Whether a legitimate forensic purpose is established – Leave to issue subpoena refused
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 24.01, 24.12, 31.02

Cases cited:

Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) (2011) 195 FCR 43

Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564

Pigozzo v Mineral Resources (No 2) [2023] FCA 1489

McIlwain v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 785

Rossi Pty Ltd v Ballymore Tower Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 167

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 1234

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 23
Date of hearing: 13 February 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in-person
Counsel for the Respondent: K E Slack
Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

QUD 129 of 2023
BETWEEN:

BENJAMIN PATRICK GARVEY

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MEAGHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 FEBRUARY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant is to file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena subject to this application.

2.Leave to issue the subpoena is refused.

3.Costs are reserved.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MEAGHER J

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 8 December 2023, the applicant, who is self-represented, sent a Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena and Subpoena via email, seeking that his former lawyer, Mr Downes, attend and give evidence at a hearing of this matter. Whilst these matters are usually dealt with ex parte in chambers: see r 24.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), given the unusual basis for the subpoena sought by Mr Garvey, and the fact that he is not legally represented, I held an interlocutory hearing on 13 February 2024 to hear from the parties in that regard.

  2. For the reasons that follow, leave is not granted to issue the subpoena.

    BACKGROUND

  3. For the purposes of determining whether the subpoena has a legitimate forensic purpose, it is useful to briefly set out the background to this matter.

  4. The substantive matter is an application for an extension of time pursuant to r 31.02 of the Rules to lodge an application for judicial review. The judicial review application relates to a decision made more than four years ago by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the respondent to decline to uphold the applicant’s appeal against the decision to terminate his candidature in his PhD program. In his draft originating application, which is attached to his application for an extension of time, Mr Garvey claims that the Deputy Vice-Chancellor did not consider that the decision to terminate his candidature for…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Garvey v Australian National University involves the applicant, Mr. Garvey, seeking leave to subpoena Mr. Mitchell Downes, his former lawyer, to give evidence in an interlocutory hearing related to an application for an extension of time to lodge an application for judicial review. The judicial review application concerns the decision of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University to decline to uphold Mr. Garvey's appeal against the termination of his PhD candidature. Mr. Garvey alleges that this decision infringed on his academic freedom and that his former lawyer was pressured to drop him as a client, leading to a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. The central legal issue before the court was whether the subpoena to Mr. Downes served a legitimate forensic purpose.

The court held that the applicant's basis for seeking to subpoena Mr. Downes was speculative and not supported by any evidence suggesting that Mr. Downes would provide different testimony from what was already documented in his emails. The court emphasised that Mr. Downes had clearly stated in his email that he was not influenced improperly and had advised Mr. Garvey against pursuing an unmeritorious claim. The applicant's argument that Mr. Downes’ evidence would lead to an adverse inference against the respondent was rejected as it was based on mere speculation rather than reasoned conclusions. The court found that the speculative nature of the applicant's claims did not establish a legitimate forensic purpose for issuing the subpoena. Consequently, the court refused to grant leave to issue the subpoena.

The court ordered that Mr. Garvey file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena and confirmed that leave to issue the subpoena was refused. Costs were reserved for determination. This decision underscores the necessity for applicants to substantiate their claims with concrete evidence rather than mere speculation to successfully argue for the issuance of a subpoena in legal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant is to file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena subject to this application.

2. Leave to issue the subpoena is refused.

3. Costs are reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, leave is not granted to issue the subpoena. BACKGROUND For the purposes of determining whether the subpoena has a legitimate forensic purpose, it is useful to briefly set out the background to this matter. The substantive matter is an application for an extension of time pursuant to r 31.02 of the Rules to lodge an application for judicial review. The judicial review application relates to a decision made more than four years ago by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the respondent to decline to uphold the applicant’s appeal against the decision to terminate his candidature in his PhD program. In his draft originating application, which is attached to his application for an extension of time, Mr Garvey claims that the Deputy Vice-Chancellor did not consider that the decision to terminate his candidature for the PhD program was wrong on the basis that it was (1) an infringement of “the implied constitutional limitation on interference with freedom of political communication – that is, my academic freedom – and (2) condone research misconduct of Dr Mark Harrison”. In the Details of claim, the applicant states that he is aggrieved by the failure including because it violated his basic human right, as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to seek and impart information. In the interlocutory hearing, the applicant relied upon his affidavit dated 13 February 2024 which deposed as follows: 1.I am the Applicant. 2.I seek the leave of the court to subpoena lawyer Mr. Mitchell Downes to give evidence at the hearing set down for 27 March 2024. 3.The reason Mr. Downes in 2019 abruptly and mysteriously dropped me as a client – after he agreed to act on my behalf in judicial review proceedings against the Australian National University and I had paid his firm money – is relevant to the current proceeding. 4.His purported reason that he was “unable to identify any grounds of review that would support [my] making an application for judicial review” is not persuasive at all, as I had told Mr. Downes my academic freedom had been violated, that my scholarship was good, and that I had robust proof that the ANU’s purported reasons for rejecting my scholarship were false as Dr. Mark Harrison had demonstrably committed research misconduct. This is the main reason I believe there was a wrongdoing. 5.The letter of advice from Mr. Downes to me was a verbose, longwinded statement of the law – as if his main concern was providing me with a letter of advice that was sufficiently lengthy, given that he already decided to do no legal work to assist me but would not be refunding me the monies I had already paid him. 6.I believe that there was wrongdoing by an agent of the Respondent that had the purpose of either pressuring, manipulating, tricking or otherwise inducing Mr. Downes to drop me as a client--wrongdoing that amounts to perversion of the course of justice.7.I believe the wrongdoing achieved its purpose as Mr. Downes suspiciously and out-of-the-blue dropped me as a client.8.I believe the action of Mr. Downes in dropping me as a client constitutes his participation in the Respondent’s conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.9.I believe Mr. Downes has been dishonest with me in multiple email replies he sent to me in the period 2020-2023, when I began to question him.10.For example, in his email to me from email address mdownes@mahoneys.com.au dated 13 May 2020, he said to me: “For the avoidance of any doubt, we deny the allegations made against us in your email. We came under no improper influence. We have not contravened any ethical rule. In fact, we have discharged our duties, including our paramount duty to the administration of justice, by advising you against running an unmeritorious claim.” (See annexure 1 attached to this affidavit)11.I believe the lies Mr. Downes told me in his emails demonstrate his consciousness of his guilt.12.I believe Mr. Downes is reluctant to admit to me that he was pressured, manipulated, tricked or otherwise induced to drop me as a client, as that would easily make him legally liable and damage his reputation as a lawyer.13.If Mr. Downes as a subpoenaed witness admits he came under improper influence, directly or indirectly, from an agent of the Respondent, the court should be more willing to exercise its discretion to grant my application for the extension of time within which to apply for judicial review.14.Annexure 2 in my sealed affidavit in support of the extension of time, submitted to the court on 11 September 2023, is an email to me from Mr. David Barakin, principal investigator of the Queensland Ombudsman. Mr Barakin’s email to me was lengthy and nuanced, and its content is easily interpreted to have the meaning that there was merit in my complaint to the Legal Services Commission about the conduct of Mr. Downes. It was certainly not a summary dismissal of my complaint. 15.The Respondent claims that my application for the extension of time should not be granted as “the delay is significant [and no] satisfactory reason has been provided to explain the delay.” But it is ridiculous if the Respondent can induce my lawyer to drop me as a client in 2019 – when I was applying for judicial review within time – and now claim that I am applying for judicial review out of time to preclude judicial review of the legality of its decision. 16.Mr. Downes is aware that I intend to subpoena him as on 9 August 2023 I emailed Mr. Downes at his email address of downes@qldbar.asn.au and told him so. 17.Mr. Downes replied the same day saying he was happy for me to call him as a witness but that he “require[d] a subpoena as I [may] need to it [sic] to manage my commitments, but I do not require any conduct money.” (See annexure 2 attached to this affidavit) 18.It will be practical for Mr. Downes to comply with a subpoena, as his office is nearby. 19.Mr. Downes will have sufficient notice for him to comply with a subpoena. 20.If the Respondent objects to the issuing of a subpoena to Mr. Downes, I invite the court to consider making the following inference adverse the Respondent: the Respondent is aware that the evidence of Mr. Downes will not assist its case. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Furthermore, in accordance with the passage set out above from Pigozzo, I am not satisfied that this is a circumstance where it is appropriate for the Court to depart from its usual practice on an interlocutory application. CONCLUSION I am not minded to grant leave for the subpoena to be issued. As the applicant has yet to file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena, I order that he file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena and that leave to issue the subpoena is refused. Costs are reserved.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the approach to be adopted, Mortimer J (as Her Honour then was) in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 1234 stated at [13] and [14]: As a starting point, I accept with respect the position adopted by Bromberg J in Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) (2011) 195 FCR 43; [2011] FCA 622 at [28] that it is generally appropriate where there is a real question as to leave to issue a subpoena for the decision as to leave to adopt the approach which would be taken on an application to set aside a subpoena. In most circumstances, the lawful basis for a subpoena, whether as a proposed exercise of coercive power to give evidence, or as an actual exercise of coercive power to give evidence, should be approached in the same way.This was the approach taken by Greenwood J in McIlwain v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 785; [2005] FCA 1233 at [35], in relation to leave to issue a subpoena as to documents. There may be some distinctions in relation to witnesses in terms of discretionary considerations but in principle the approach is the same. With respect, I consider the matters outlined by his Honour at [35] represent the key considerations.CONSIDERATION The applicant’s affidavit dated 13 February 2024 annexed an email from Mr Downes in response to the applicant’s allegation that he was dropped as a client. The email dated 13 May 2020 provided: We did not “suddenly drop [you] as a client”. We were retained to advise you on a potential judicial review claim against ANU. Your email below is itself a response to our email to you attaching a letter wherein we provide that advice to you. The effect of the advice was (at [5]): We have been unable to identify any grounds of review that would support you making an application for judicial review. We would be willing to act for you in any meritorious claim. For the avoidance of doubt, we deny the allegations made against us in your email. We came under no improper influence. We have no contravened [sic] any ethical rule. In fact, we have discharged our duties, including our paramount duty to the administration of justice, by advising you against running an unmeritorious claim. (emphasis in original) Despite the applicant’s speculation, he has provided nothing to suggest that Mr Downes, who is an officer of the Court, would give oral evidence before the Court which is different from the information contained in the letter referred to in paragraph 17 above. Nor is the applicant assisted by reframing his argument to suggest that Mr Downes’ evidence would give rise to an inference being able to be drawn. “Infer” means “to derive by reasoning; conclude or judge from premises or evidence” (Macquarie Dictionary). It is different from speculation which is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as “the contemplation or consideration of some subject”. However, as there is no reason to conclude that Mr Downes would respond differently from his emailed response to the applicant as to why he declined to act for him if asked the question again, the inference the applicant invites the Court to draw would not be available. Thus, consistent with the applicant’s affidavit, the premise upon which he seeks leave to issue the subpoena is no more than speculation.