FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Garvey v Australian National University [2024] FCA 140
File number(s): QUD 129 of 2023 Judgment of: MEAGHER J Date of judgment: 26 February 2024 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Subpoenas – Whether leave to issue subpoena to give evidence returnable at an interlocutory hearing should be granted – Whether a legitimate forensic purpose is established – Leave to issue subpoena refused Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 24.01, 24.12, 31.02
Cases cited: Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) (2011) 195 FCR 43
Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564
Pigozzo v Mineral Resources (No 2) [2023] FCA 1489
McIlwain v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 785
Rossi Pty Ltd v Ballymore Tower Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 167
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 23 Date of hearing: 13 February 2024 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in-person Counsel for the Respondent: K E Slack Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 129 of 2023 BETWEEN: BENJAMIN PATRICK GARVEY
Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MEAGHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 FEBRUARY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant is to file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena subject to this application.
2.Leave to issue the subpoena is refused.
3.Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MEAGHER J
INTRODUCTION
On 8 December 2023, the applicant, who is self-represented, sent a Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena and Subpoena via email, seeking that his former lawyer, Mr Downes, attend and give evidence at a hearing of this matter. Whilst these matters are usually dealt with ex parte in chambers: see r 24.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), given the unusual basis for the subpoena sought by Mr Garvey, and the fact that he is not legally represented, I held an interlocutory hearing on 13 February 2024 to hear from the parties in that regard.
For the reasons that follow, leave is not granted to issue the subpoena.
BACKGROUND
For the purposes of determining whether the subpoena has a legitimate forensic purpose, it is useful to briefly set out the background to this matter.
The substantive matter is an application for an extension of time pursuant to r 31.02 of the Rules to lodge an application for judicial review. The judicial review application relates to a decision made more than four years ago by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the respondent to decline to uphold the applicant’s appeal against the decision to terminate his candidature in his PhD program. In his draft originating application, which is attached to his application for an extension of time, Mr Garvey claims that the Deputy Vice-Chancellor did not consider that the decision to terminate his candidature for…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 140
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the applicant's basis for seeking to subpoena Mr. Downes was speculative and not supported by any evidence suggesting that Mr. Downes would provide different testimony from what was already documented in his emails. The court emphasised that Mr. Downes had clearly stated in his email that he was not influenced improperly and had advised Mr. Garvey against pursuing an unmeritorious claim. The applicant's argument that Mr. Downes’ evidence would lead to an adverse inference against the respondent was rejected as it was based on mere speculation rather than reasoned conclusions. The court found that the speculative nature of the applicant's claims did not establish a legitimate forensic purpose for issuing the subpoena. Consequently, the court refused to grant leave to issue the subpoena.
The court ordered that Mr. Garvey file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena and confirmed that leave to issue the subpoena was refused. Costs were reserved for determination. This decision underscores the necessity for applicants to substantiate their claims with concrete evidence rather than mere speculation to successfully argue for the issuance of a subpoena in legal proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant is to file the Request for Leave to Issue Subpoena subject to this application.
2. Leave to issue the subpoena is refused.
3. Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the approach to be adopted, Mortimer J (as Her Honour then was) in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 1234 stated at [13] and [14]: As a starting point, I accept with respect the position adopted by Bromberg J in Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) (2011) 195 FCR 43; [2011] FCA 622 at [28] that it is generally appropriate where there is a real question as to leave to issue a subpoena for the decision as to leave to adopt the approach which would be taken on an application to set aside a subpoena. In most circumstances, the lawful basis for a subpoena, whether as a proposed exercise of coercive power to give evidence, or as an actual exercise of coercive power to give evidence, should be approached in the same way.This was the approach taken by Greenwood J in McIlwain v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 785; [2005] FCA 1233 at [35], in relation to leave to issue a subpoena as to documents. There may be some distinctions in relation to witnesses in terms of discretionary considerations but in principle the approach is the same. With respect, I consider the matters outlined by his Honour at [35] represent the key considerations.CONSIDERATION The applicant’s affidavit dated 13 February 2024 annexed an email from Mr Downes in response to the applicant’s allegation that he was dropped as a client. The email dated 13 May 2020 provided: We did not “suddenly drop [you] as a client”. We were retained to advise you on a potential judicial review claim against ANU. Your email below is itself a response to our email to you attaching a letter wherein we provide that advice to you. The effect of the advice was (at [5]): We have been unable to identify any grounds of review that would support you making an application for judicial review. We would be willing to act for you in any meritorious claim. For the avoidance of doubt, we deny the allegations made against us in your email. We came under no improper influence. We have no contravened [sic] any ethical rule. In fact, we have discharged our duties, including our paramount duty to the administration of justice, by advising you against running an unmeritorious claim. (emphasis in original) Despite the applicant’s speculation, he has provided nothing to suggest that Mr Downes, who is an officer of the Court, would give oral evidence before the Court which is different from the information contained in the letter referred to in paragraph 17 above. Nor is the applicant assisted by reframing his argument to suggest that Mr Downes’ evidence would give rise to an inference being able to be drawn. “Infer” means “to derive by reasoning; conclude or judge from premises or evidence” (Macquarie Dictionary). It is different from speculation which is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as “the contemplation or consideration of some subject”. However, as there is no reason to conclude that Mr Downes would respond differently from his emailed response to the applicant as to why he declined to act for him if asked the question again, the inference the applicant invites the Court to draw would not be available. Thus, consistent with the applicant’s affidavit, the premise upon which he seeks leave to issue the subpoena is no more than speculation.