Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) [2011] FCA 622

Citation: Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5) [2011] FCA 622
Parties: COMCARE v JOHN HOLLAND RAIL PTY LTD (ABN 61 009 252 653) and JOHN HOLLAND PTY LTD (ABN 11 004 282 268)
File number: VID 660 of 2008
Judge: BROMBERG J
Date of judgment: 3 June 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave to call a witness should be granted – witness sought to be called is counsel in the proceeding – application made mid-trial – Court’s power to control the calling of witness evidence – relevance of case management principles and s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 – whether a legitimate forensic purpose exists for the calling of the evidence – test of apparent relevance – need for applicant to demonstrate an identifiable basis to support a reasonable likelihood that evidence is available that might assist the resolution of a fact in issue – balancing process applicable where legitimate forensic purpose exists – whether strength of forensic purpose and its importance to the issues to be determined is outweighed by prejudice, delay and disruption to trial – application dismissed  
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 55, 102, 106(2)(c)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Federal Court Rules O 15 r  2(3), O 27A
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) s 16

Cases cited:

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2011] FCA 388

Attorney-General of Botswana v Aussie Diamond Productions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] WASC 301

Australian Gas Light Company v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2003] FCA 1101

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Emergency Transport Technology Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 181

Clifford v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 326

Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 660

Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 981

Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1516

Comcare v John Holland Rail & Anor (No 3) [2011] FCA 164

Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 253

Cosco Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Taxation [1997] FCA 1504

Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Limited [2005] FCA 588

Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd (2000) 175 ALR 194

Jack Brabham Engines Ltd v Beare [2010] FCA 35

John Holland Pty Ltd v Comcare [2009] FCAFC 127

John Holland Rail Pty Ltd v Comcare [2011] FCAFC 34

Liristis v Gadelrabb [2009] NSWSC 441

McIlwain v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 785

Morley vAustralian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 274 ALR 205

Payne v Parker (1976) 1 NSWLR 191

Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No.2) [1974] Ch 269

Sportsbet Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2010] FCA 31

Thomas v SMP (International) Pty…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 622
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 5), the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with deciding whether to grant leave for the calling of a witness during an ongoing trial. The parties involved were Comcare and John Holland Rail Pty Ltd, and the dispute centred around whether John Holland should be permitted to call a counsel as a witness during the trial. The court had to consider the legal principles governing the calling of witness evidence, particularly the concept of a legitimate forensic purpose, the relevance of case management principles, and the provisions of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. Furthermore, the court had to balance the potential benefits of the anticipated evidence against the risks of prejudice, delay, and disruption to the trial.

The court found that John Holland had failed to demonstrate a legitimate forensic purpose for calling the proposed witness. The basis for the anticipated evidence was speculative, and there was no reasonable likelihood that the witness would provide the evidence that John Holland anticipated. The court emphasised that the likelihood of the admissibility of the evidence also played a significant role in determining whether a legitimate forensic purpose existed. The court concluded that, even if the anticipated evidence was important to the issues being determined, it would not be sufficient to outweigh the potential prejudice, delay, and disruption to the trial that could result from calling the witness.

Consequently, the court dismissed John Holland's notice of motion to call the counsel as a witness, reserving the costs of the motion. The court held that allowing the calling of the witness in the absence of a legitimate forensic purpose would constitute an abuse of process, similar to issuing a subpoena without proper grounds. The court also noted that it would not draw any adverse inference from Comcare's decision not to call the counsel as a witness, as doing so would not serve the interests of justice in the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents’ notice of motion of 2 May 2011 be dismissed.

2. The costs of the motion be reserved.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Whilst I agree that a ruling as to the admissibility of anticipated evidence cannot at this juncture be made, I accept Comcare’s submission that the likelihood of anticipated evidence being available as admissible evidence, is to be properly considered as part of the evaluation of whether a legitimate forensic purpose for calling that evidence is established. The likelihood of the admissibility of evidence sought to be called has an obvious bearing on whether there exists a legitimate forensic purpose in that evidence being called. APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS In applying these principles to the issues before me, the starting point is an identification of what it is John Holland says is the evidence that Mr Rozen may be anticipated to give. As I have earlier indicated, for the purpose of providing that identification, I ordered that John Holland file and serve a memorandum setting out the evidence which it proposed to lead from Mr Rozen. By a memorandum dated 4 April 2011 and headed “Respondents’ Sixth Memorandum of Evidence”, John Holland stated its intention to call Mr Rozen to give evidence at the trial and that John Holland will seek to adduce from Mr Rozen evidence “concerning statements made to him by Mr Meredith on 12 December 2008” regarding ten matters identified in the memorandum. Each of the matters identified deals with a subject matter such as “Mr Meredith’s observations as to fencing on the worksite”. The memorandum failed to set out the evidence which John Holland proposes to lead from Mr Rozen and in particular by setting out what John Holland anticipated Mr Rozen would say in relation to each of the subject matters identified. The fact that John Holland could only provide the Court with an indication of the topics in relation to which it would seek to adduce evidence from Mr Rozen was explained in the first Hartigan affidavit. Mr Hartigan deposed that Mr Rozen had declined John Holland’s invitation to provide a proof of evidence. He said that in those circumstances, it was not possible for John Holland to file and serve a memorandum setting out the evidence that John Holland proposed to lead from Mr Rozen. The memorandum of 4 April 2011 together with the explanation for its deficiency strongly suggests that John Holland have little or no idea what evidence they anticipate Mr Rozen can give. Despite that, the written submission of John Holland now specifies what is said to be the evidence that John Holland now “reasonably anticipates” Mr Rozen will give. That anticipated evidence is set out at paragraphs 19 and 20 of John Holland’s written submission, which I will set out in full shortly. There are a number of matters there identified. The basis given for the anticipated evidence is not specific to each of the matters of anticipated evidence identified, but John Holland puts it globally as based on Mr Rozen’s note analysed in the context of Mr Meredith’s statement of 2 August 2007 (“the August 2007 statement”) and a memorandum of evidence for Mr Meredith filed and served by Comcare on or about 23 December 2008 (“the December 2008 memorandum”). John Holland contends and it is not disputed, that the August 2007 statement is, for this purpose, relevant because it should be inferred from Mr Rozen’s note and its reference to that statement that Mr Rozen was instructed with it at the time of the 12 December 2008 meeting. The relevance of the December 2008 memorandum is put on the basis that subsequent to the conference with Mr Meredith, Mr Rozen prepared and settled that document. Again, that contention is not disputed. I will proceed on the basis that both those inferences are correct. I should add that it is not in contest that Mr Rozen’s note was made by him at a conference attended by him (as counsel) and Mr Davson (a former Comcare investigator) with Mr Meredith on 12 December 2008.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

If I had found a legitimate forensic purpose, for the reasons I have already explained, it would have been necessary that I assess its strength and importance to the issues to be determined and then balance that against any likelihood of prejudice and any relevant case management considerations. For the sake of completeness, and in case I should be found to have erred in my conclusion that no legitimate forensic purpose has been established, I will consider the balancing process. The importance of the anticipated evidence to the issues to be determined In assessing how potentially important the evidence may be, I have assumed that the evidence Mr Rozen will give is the evidence John Holland anticipates. On the basis of my current understanding of the issues, I am of the view that John Holland’s submission exaggerates the importance of Mr Meredith to the proceeding. Mr Meredith is not “the complainant” that John Holland describes him to be. The complainant is Comcare. Its complaint is not that Mr Meredith was injured and the proceeding involves no claim for relief from Mr Meredith for any injury suffered by him. Comcare’s complaint is that John Holland failed to take all reasonably practicable steps to protect Mr Meredith’s health and safety at work. In particular, the essence of Comcare’s complaint is that Mr Meredith was exposed to the Pandrol Clipper in circumstances where there existed a risk of injury to him which had not been avoided by the taking of reasonably practicable steps. Comcare’s complaint is that the risk of injury from contact with dangerous parts of the machine should have been avoided including by:·The installation of guarding to prevent contact with dangerous parts of the machine;·The installation of a “dead man” switch;·The conduct of a hazard identification and risk assessment on the machine;·The provision of adequate training to the operator of the machine; ·The provision of adequate supervision of the operator. In the context of such a complaint, evidence that Mr Meredith was injured whilst using the machine is probative of the existence of a risk of injury and the nature and extent of any such risk. Mr Meredith’s evidence as to how the injury occurred is thus probative of the risk of an injury occurring in that manner. However, Comcare’s case is not confined to the risk of an injury occurring in the precise manner in which Mr Meredith says his injury occurred. Even if it were, the existence of a risk of an injury occurring to the operator of the machine, in the manner in which Mr Meredith says he was injured, is capable of assessment independently of evidence of actual injury. Comcare’s case as to the nature and extent of the risk of injury is not dependent upon the Court accepting Mr Meredith’s account of how he was injured. The central issue is the nature and extent of any risk and whether reasonably practicable steps were available to be taken to avoid the risk. Whether or not Mr Meredith is believed as to the manner in which he says he was injured has but a small part to play in the determination of that central issue. The manner in which Mr Meredith was injured is not a “central fact” in issue in the trial as John Holland contends.

Decision

Reasons for decision

John Holland has failed to demonstrate a legitimate forensic purpose. An identifiable basis, with reasonable precision and tolerable clarity has not been given which would support a reasonably likelihood that Mr Rozen can give the evidence which John Holland says it anticipates. The basis for that anticipation is no more than speculative. I am not satisfied that there is a significant degree of probability that Mr Rozen will have relevant knowledge.Conclusion on Legitimate Forensic Purpose For the same reasons as the issue of a subpoena in the absence of a legitimate forensic purpose constitutes an abuse of process (Arnotts at 102), it would be an abuse of process for Mr Rozen to be called in the absence of a legitimate forensic purpose. I would not permit such a course and will thus dismiss John Holland’s notice of motion. I should add that I have considered John Holland’s submission which criticises Comcare for failing to put Mr Rozen on affidavit. It says Comcare has elected not to produce an affidavit of the evidence that Mr Rozen can produce at trial. However, the prejudice which would flow from making Mr Rozen a witness in the case, is the very thing that Comcare seeks to avoid. No adverse inference is to be drawn from Comcare’s failure to kick an own goal. THE BALANCING PROCESS If I had found a legitimate forensic purpose, for the reasons I have already explained, it would have been necessary that I assess its strength and importance to the issues to be determined and then balance that against any likelihood of prejudice and any relevant case management considerations. For the sake of completeness, and in case I should be found to have erred in my conclusion that no legitimate forensic purpose has been established, I will consider the balancing process. The importance of the anticipated evidence to the issues to be determined In assessing how potentially important the evidence may be, I have assumed that the evidence Mr Rozen will give is the evidence John Holland anticipates. On the basis of my current understanding of the issues, I am of the view that John Holland’s submission exaggerates the importance of Mr Meredith to the proceeding. Mr Meredith is not “the complainant” that John Holland describes him to be. The complainant is Comcare. Its complaint is not that Mr Meredith was injured and the proceeding involves no claim for relief from Mr Meredith for any injury suffered by him. Comcare’s complaint is that John Holland failed to take all reasonably practicable steps to protect Mr Meredith’s health and safety at work. In particular, the essence of Comcare’s complaint is that Mr Meredith was exposed to the Pandrol Clipper in circumstances where there existed a risk of injury to him which had not been avoided by the taking of reasonably practicable steps. Comcare’s complaint is that the risk of injury from contact with dangerous parts of the machine should have been avoided including by:·The installation of guarding to prevent contact with dangerous parts of the machine;·The installation of a “dead man” switch;·The conduct of a hazard identification and risk assessment on the machine;·The provision of adequate training to the operator of the machine; ·The provision of adequate supervision of the operator.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.