Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 164

Citation: Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 164
Parties: COMCARE v JOHN HOLLAND RAIL PTY LTD (ABN 61 009 252 653) and JOHN HOLLAND PTY LTD (ABN 11 004 282 268)
File number: VID 660 of 2008
Judge: BROMBERG J
Date of judgment: 2 March 2011
Catchwords: COURTS AND JUDGES – bias – whether reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of private communications – whether statement or disclosure by Judge should lead to recusal – application dismissed.
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N and 37P
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) s 16
Cases cited:

Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Pty Ltd & Anor (1996) 65 FCR 215
Brooks v The Upjohn Company (1998) 85 FCR 469
Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1516
Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 660
Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 981
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd & Anor (2006) 229 CLR 577
Ebner v Official Trustee (2000) 205 CLR 337
Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund v Saunders (1994) 52 FCR 48
Gem v R [2010] VSCA 168
Howell and Ors v Millais and Ors [2007] EWCA Civ 720 Locabail (UK) Limited v Bayfield Properties Ltd and Anor [2000] QB 451
John Holland Pty Ltd v Comcare [2009] FCAFC 127
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488

Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 2) (2008) 172 FCR 376

Kwan v Kang & Ors [2003] NSWCA 336
Margarula v Northern Territory and Others [2009] 175 FCR 333

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Anor v Peko-Wallsend Limited & Ors (1985) 162 CLR 24

R v Carlstrom (1977) VR 366
R v Fisher [2009] VSCA 100
R v Tait and Bartley (1979) 24 ALR 473
R v Wise [2000] 2 VR 287
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342
Re Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Limited (1994) 119 ALR 206
Teakale v WA (2007) 33 WAR 188

Date of hearing: 24 February 2011
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 80
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Rozen
Solicitor for the Applicant: Thomsons Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Wyles SC with Dr T McEvoy
Solicitor for the Respondents: Herbert Geer

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 660 of 2008

BETWEEN:

COMCARE
Applicant

AND:

JOHN HOLLAND RAIL PTY LTD (ABN 61 009 252 653)
First Respondent

JOHN HOLLAND PTY LTD (ABN 11 004 282 268)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2011

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondents’ notice of motion of 23 February 2011 be dismissed.

2.Costs be reserved.  

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 164
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 3), the parties were embroiled in a dispute concerning the alleged bias of the presiding judge, Bromberg J. The crux of the issue was whether the judge's private communications with the parties' associates raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, thus necessitating the judge's recusal from the case. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with addressing these concerns.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the private communications between the judge and the parties' associates were sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court had to determine if these communications, when considered individually and cumulatively, could lead a fair-minded observer to doubt the judge's impartiality. Additionally, the court needed to assess if any statements or disclosures by the judge warranted his recusal.

Bromberg J meticulously evaluated the nature and context of the communications in question, comparing them with previous interactions and orders made in the case. The judge dismissed the notion that the private communications, even when viewed in the context of broader interactions, could create a reasonable apprehension of bias. The judge concluded that a fair-minded observer would not perceive any partiality or lack of impartiality based on the evidence presented. The court held that the test for apprehended bias was not met, and thus, the judge was required to continue presiding over the proceedings. Consequently, the application for the judge's recusal was dismissed.

The court ordered that the respondents' notice of motion dated 23 February 2011 be dismissed. The question of costs was reserved for later consideration, reflecting the court's intention to address this matter separately.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents’ notice of motion of 23 February 2011 be dismissed.

2. Costs be reserved.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Further, Mr Branagan’s account differs from that of the associate in that the associate says that Mr Branagan listed three matters by subject matter only as issues to be raised at the mention but Mr Branagan said no issues were identified. However, despite that difference, on neither account can it be said that information or allegations material to the substantive issues in the litigation were raised and in my view that is how the reasonable observer would perceive it.Background It must be kept in mind, as I have endeavoured to do throughout, that John Holland contended that the impugned communications ought not be examined in isolation but by reference to a number of background matters. By reference to background or context it was said that my preparedness to list the matter for a mention at the instance of Comcare is to be contrasted with my order made on 20 October 2010 (Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1516) to adjourn to the trial the hearing of John Holland’s notice of motion of 14 October 2010. By reference to that order, and in contrast to my decision to convene the mention, John Holland contends that the reasonable observer would perceive that Comcare has different and preferential ‘access’ to me than does John Holland. There are a multitude of difficulties with that approach. Firstly, it is factually incorrect in its protestation of inequality of treatment as between the two occasions pointed to. On each occasion the matter was listed for directions or mention. On the first occasion I received submissions and determined to adjourn the hearing of the orders sought by John Holland to trial. On the second occasion, counsel for Comcare addressed me for about ten minutes before the application that I should recuse myself was made. I am yet to understand what it is that Comcare seeks from the Court as, by reason of this application, that mention hearing was not completed. No application for any relief or any direction has yet been made by Comcare. If any substantive application is made, I may well adjourn it to the trial. At this base level of quantitative comparison, the contention fails at the first hurdle. Assuming for the moment that a quantitative analysis of the instances of ‘access’ to me by each party was of any value, a full contextual analysis, rather than the flawed selective analysis, would demonstrate that John Holland has had greater access to me if ‘access’ is to be determined either by reference to the number of applications for relief made and dealt with by me and/or the hearing time involved.However, a quantitative approach of that kind is about as helpful to the reasonable observer as a complaint by a litigant that it has lost more applications than it has won. The reasonable observer would understand that the reasons for the orders made on 20 October 2010 are set out in my reasons for judgment. The reasonable observer would also know that the orders that I made were not the subject of any challenge, have not been set aside and are to be regarded as legally correct. The reasonable observer would not, in those circumstances, regard the orders made or anything said in exchanges with counsel as demonstrating any failure or preference on the part of the judge and would dismiss contentions made by John Holland to that effect as those of the disappointed litigant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Counsel for John Holland asked that the matter be stood down for 15 minutes and it was. On resumption, counsel for John Holland indicated that his clients pressed their application. EVIDENCE The evidence adduced by the parties comprised of exchanges of correspondence and emails between John Holland’s solicitors Herbert Geer, and Thomsons Lawyers, the solicitors for Comcare. Some of those emails were copied to my associate as I later identify. There are two emails forwarded by my associate to the practitioners. By letter of 7 February 2011, John Holland’s solicitors wrote to Comcare’s solicitors, raised the issue of discovery and advised that a number of documents had been identified and that there were approximately 15 document storage boxes available for inspection. The letter also attached a document headed “Respondents’ Fourth Memorandum of Evidence” which notified that John Holland anticipated calling two additional witnesses and set out outlines of their evidence. By letter of 8 February 2011, Comcare’s solicitors replied complaining of the lateness of the further discovery and requiring that relevant documents be identified. The letter also complained as to the lateness of the outlines of evidence provided. By letter of 10 February 2011, John Holland’s solicitors replied to explain their position in relation to the further discovery and also in answer to the complaint made of the further outlines of evidence. By email sent on 11 February 2011 at 12.36 pm Comcare’s solicitors attached a letter of 11 February 2011 in response to the letter of 10 February 2011 to which I have just referred. The letter addressed the discovery issue earlier raised, complained of the suggestion that Comcare should review the large volume of unidentified material in the storage boxes, criticised what it regarded as John Holland’s refusal to provide a list of all relevant documents and said that it again requested that John Holland’s solicitors identify the relevant documents. The letter dealt further with the outlines of evidence and took issue with the explanation provided by John Holland’s solicitors. In addition, the letter outlined a further basis for objection as to John Holland’s intended reliance on the evidence foreshadowed. At the end of the letter and under a heading “Further actions”, the letter stated:As it is apparent that you are unwilling to accept our proposals or objections relating to ongoing discovery and the Outlines of Evidence, we propose to return to the Court for directions on these issues from Bromberg J.We have notified His Honour’s Associate of our request for listing next week. Can you please notify us of a convenient date?The email which attached this letter also said:We have spoken to Bromberg J’s Associate who has requested that the parties nominate convenient dates for the hearing. Our preferences are Tuesday 15 February and Thursday 17 February 2011. Please advise of your preference. The next relevant written communication was an email sent to the practitioners by my associate on 14 February 2011 at 12.46 pm to the following effect:Dear Practitioners,I have been contacted by Mr Branagan seeking the matter be listed for mention. The following dates are available this week and next week for that purpose:Thursday 17th February 2011Friday 18th February 2011Wednesday 23rd February 2011Thursday 24th February 2011Friday 25th February 2011The matter will be listed for 9.30 am. Please advise which of the above dates is convenient to you and your Counsel.In the absence of agreement by 12.00 pm tomorrow the Court will list the matter for mention on a date to be advised.Regards,

Decision

Reasons for decision

For those reasons, and taking into account all of the matters raised both individually and cumulatively, John Holland’s characterisation of the impugned communications is not assisted by the contextual or background matters upon which it seeks to rely. CONCLUSION For all of those reasons, I do not agree that a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question of John Holland’s breach of s 16 of the OH&S Act. I hold no real doubt as to the correctness of that conclusion. As the test of apprehended bias is not satisfied it follows that I am bound to discharge my duty to continue the conduct of this proceeding. Accordingly I will not recuse myself from the further conduct of the proceeding. I am aware that there is debate and perhaps some uncertainty as to whether in determining an application for recusal, a judge should do so by an order. That matter is discussed in Margarula at [35]-[38] and in Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 2) (2008) 172 FCR 376 at [18]-[23]. I see no reason why I should not approach the matter in the way suggested by Finkelstein J at [23] of Centro and followed in Margarula. I will frame my refusal to recuse myself in terms of an order dismissing John Holland’s notice of motion of 23 February 2011. As the parties have not addressed me on the question of costs, I will reserve that question for later consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.