FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Quach v Registrar of Trade Marks [2025] FCA 311
File number(s): QUD 380 of 2024 Judgment of: MEAGHER J Date of judgment: 3 April 2025 Catchwords: TRADE MARKS – Intellectual property – Application for Registration – Registration of Trade Mark – Opposition to Registration – Assignment
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Power to register a trade mark – Whether a judicial power – Whether validly conferred on Registrar of Trade Marks
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Whether judicial review enlivened – Whether a decision made
EVIDENCE – Affidavit evidence – Whether signed – Whether false and misleading
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Summary judgment – No reasonable prospects of success
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interlocutory injunction – Prima facie case – No serious question to be tried – Balance of probabilities
COSTS – Indemnity basis – Litigant in person – Whether to award
Legislation: Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1977 (Cth) Ch 3
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 31A(2)
Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) s 3, sch 1
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) s10
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6, 27, 27(2), 35, 35(b), 41, 43, 52, 52, 55, 56, 106, 107, 108, 111, 197, 206
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01, 40.01
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (Cth) sch 1 cll 12, 12(a)(i), 12(a)(ii), 12(d), 12(e)
Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) regs 3A, 3A.1, 3A.3, 3A.4, 3A.5, 3A.5(1)(b), 4.1, 19.2
Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) s 6A Div 5
Cases cited: Alhalek v Quintiliani trading as Kells Lawyers (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 150
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256
Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978
Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381
Kimber v The Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575
Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533
Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275
Pekar v Holden (No 2) [2021] FCA 343
Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Trade Marks Number of paragraphs: 85 Date of hearing: 24 October 2024 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in-person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Mitchenson appeared with Ms L Leonard Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
QUD 380 of 2024 BETWEEN: DR MICHAEL VAN THANH QUACH
Applicant
AND: REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MEAGHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 APRIL 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth),…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 311
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues were whether the Registrar had the authority to oppose the registration of the trade mark and if this constituted judicial power that was not validly conferred. Another issue was whether the decision-making process of the Registrar was subject to judicial review. The court also needed to assess the validity of the affidavit evidence provided by Dr Quach, specifically whether it was signed and whether it contained false and misleading information. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether the application for an interlocutory injunction was appropriate and if there was a serious question to be tried.
The court found that the Registrar had the authority to oppose the registration of the trade mark and that this did not constitute judicial power. The decision-making process of the Registrar was not subject to judicial review as it did not involve the determination of a disputed question of fact. The court also determined that Dr Quach's affidavit evidence was not signed and contained false and misleading information. Consequently, the application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed as there was no serious question to be tried. The court granted the Registrar interlocutory relief in the form of summary judgment, as Dr Quach had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.
The court ordered that judgment be entered in favour of the Registrar in relation to the whole of the proceeding, dismissed the applicant's application for interlocutory relief, and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), judgment be entered in favour of the respondent in relation to the whole of the proceeding.
2. The applicant’s application for interlocutory relief be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The authorities regarding summary judgment are well-established, and are helpfully summarised by McKerracher J in Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978 at [3]: Without reference to all the well-known authorities, the parties agree that it is well established that the Court may give judgment for a defending party in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding where the Court is satisfied that the prosecuting party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or a part of the proceeding. Further:•the claim need not be hopeless or bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospects of success: s 31A of the Federal Court Act;•a reasonable prospect of success is one which is real, not fanciful or merely arguable: Rogers v Assets Loan Co Pty Ltd (2008) 250 ALR 82 per Logan J (at [41]);…•s 31A is amenable to resolving straightforward questions of law: Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2008] FCA 1582 per Logan J (at [16]). However, summary judgment may still be appropriate if a question raised is of some complexity: SK Foods LP v SK Foods Australia (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543 per Flick J (at [115]);•it is clear that the legislature’s intention in enacting s 31A was to lower the bar for obtaining summary judgment, including summary dismissal, below that fixed by previous authorities: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118 per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Jefferson Ford per Gordon J (at [127]);•s 31A permits dismissal of a proceeding where an inquiry into the merits of the issues of law demonstrates the arguments are insufficiently strong to warrant the matter going to trial: McAleer v University of Western Australia (No 3) (2008) 171 FCR 499 per Siopis J (at [39] and the cases therein cited).(Emphasis in original.) In Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation, McKerracher J at [3], citing Kimber v The Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575; [2017] FCAFC 226 per Logan, Kerr and Farrell JJ (at [62]) quoting with approval Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381; [2015] FCA 1045 per Perry J (at [37]), noted that a consideration of summary judgment requires a discretionary “value judgement in the absence of a full and complex factual matrix and argument”. The particular facts and circumstances of each case are relevant: Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation at [3], citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256; [2013] FCA 641 per Reeves J (at [46]). In Cassimatis, Reeves J stated at [50]: Finally, these authorities show that there are at least two other factors that need to be borne in mind on a summary judgment application such as this. The first is that, in all the situations outlined above, the court has a discretion as to whether to determine the proceedings summarily, or to refer them to trial. Of course, as with any such discretion, it has to be exercised judicially: see Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 569; 97 ALR 45 at 69 per McHugh J, quoting Donald Campbell and Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 811–12 per Viscount Cave LC. Second, while s 31A sets a lower bar, or a softened test, for the summary determination of proceedings, any such summary determination still has to be approached with caution. This is so because a trial is the usual and accepted means by which disputed questions of fact are determined in this country.