Quach v Registrar of Trade Marks

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Quach v Registrar of Trade Marks [2025] FCA 311

File number(s): QUD 380 of 2024
Judgment of: MEAGHER J
Date of judgment: 3 April 2025
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – Intellectual property – Application for Registration – Registration of Trade Mark – Opposition to Registration – Assignment

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Power to register a trade mark – Whether a judicial power – Whether validly conferred on Registrar of Trade Marks

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Whether judicial review enlivened – Whether a decision made

EVIDENCE – Affidavit evidence – Whether signed – Whether false and misleading

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Summary judgment – No reasonable prospects of success

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interlocutory injunction – Prima facie case – No serious question to be tried – Balance of probabilities

COSTS – Indemnity basis – Litigant in person – Whether to award

Legislation:

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1977 (Cth) Ch 3

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 31A(2)

Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) s 3, sch 1

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) s10

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6, 27, 27(2), 35, 35(b), 41, 43, 52, 52, 55, 56, 106, 107, 108, 111, 197, 206

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01, 40.01

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (Cth) sch 1 cll 12, 12(a)(i), 12(a)(ii), 12(d), 12(e)

Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) regs 3A, 3A.1, 3A.3, 3A.4, 3A.5, 3A.5(1)(b), 4.1, 19.2

Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) s 6A Div 5

Cases cited:

Alhalek v Quintiliani trading as Kells Lawyers (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 150

Attorney-General for Australia v R and The Boilermakers’ Society of Australia and Others [1957] AC 288

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256

Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978

Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381

Kimber v The Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575

Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533

Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275

Pekar v Holden (No 2) [2021] FCA 343

Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Trade Marks
Number of paragraphs: 85
Date of hearing: 24 October 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in-person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Mitchenson appeared with Ms L Leonard
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 380 of 2024
BETWEEN:

DR MICHAEL VAN THANH QUACH

Applicant

AND:

REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MEAGHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 APRIL 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth),…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 311
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Quach v Registrar of Trade Marks involved Dr Quach, as the sole director of Bennelong, who sought to register a trade mark. The Registrar opposed the registration on various grounds, leading to a dispute over the application's validity. The court was tasked with determining the validity of the Registrar's opposition to the trade mark application and whether the Registrar had the power to make such decisions. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the evidence provided by Dr Quach was signed and whether it was false and misleading. The court also needed to decide whether judicial review was applicable and if the application for an interlocutory injunction was justified.

The primary legal issues were whether the Registrar had the authority to oppose the registration of the trade mark and if this constituted judicial power that was not validly conferred. Another issue was whether the decision-making process of the Registrar was subject to judicial review. The court also needed to assess the validity of the affidavit evidence provided by Dr Quach, specifically whether it was signed and whether it contained false and misleading information. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether the application for an interlocutory injunction was appropriate and if there was a serious question to be tried.

The court found that the Registrar had the authority to oppose the registration of the trade mark and that this did not constitute judicial power. The decision-making process of the Registrar was not subject to judicial review as it did not involve the determination of a disputed question of fact. The court also determined that Dr Quach's affidavit evidence was not signed and contained false and misleading information. Consequently, the application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed as there was no serious question to be tried. The court granted the Registrar interlocutory relief in the form of summary judgment, as Dr Quach had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.

The court ordered that judgment be entered in favour of the Registrar in relation to the whole of the proceeding, dismissed the applicant's application for interlocutory relief, and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), judgment be entered in favour of the respondent in relation to the whole of the proceeding.

2. The applicant’s application for interlocutory relief be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Registrar relied on the following material: ·an affidavit of Ms Karla Holzberger dated 20 August 2024; ·an outline of submissions dated 26 September 2024; and ·an outline of submissions dated 10 October 2024.For the reasons that follow, the Registrar is granted interlocutory relief in the form of summary judgment. BACKGROUND It is useful to explain the processes available under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (TMA) and Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (TMR) as they apply to this application. The TMA and TMR provide for a number of processes in relation to the registration and protection of trade marks. Relevantly to this matter, the processes include, at Part 3A of the TMR, an assisted filing service (AFS). The AFS includes a preliminary assessment of a trade mark to establish whether a trade mark is likely to be accepted for registration. There is also a process for applying for the registration of a trade mark. Section 27(2) of the TMA provides that an applicant must apply to register a trade mark in accordance with Part 4 of the TMR. The registration of a trade mark may be opposed, and the process to be undertaken in that regard is contained in Part 5 of the TMA. The relevant legislation is set out below. Ms Holzberger is an Assistant Hearing Officer at IP Australia. She deposed that her role is to “administer the trade mark opposition process as part of the Respondent’s Trade Marks and Designs Group, Opposition and Hearings Section”. Assistant Hearing Officers exercise delegations under the TMA and TMR. These delegations include “processing or deciding on statements of grounds and particulars, extensions of time, amendments, costs, and evidence issues”. In her affidavit, she deposed that “[a] ‘TM Headstart’, also known as a ‘Headstart Application’, is a service provided by the Respondent to potential trade mark applicants”. This service allows a trade mark examiner to assess and provide feedback “to an applicant on a proposed trade mark. An applicant is able to consider any feedback received and consider whether to make a formal application to register the trade mark”. This falls within the scope of the AFS procedures in the TMA and TMR. Trade mark 2375963 Dr Quach filed a Headstart Application on behalf of Bennelong on 31 July 2023. He is the sole director of Bennelong. The proposed trade mark in question was the “plain text word mark”, that read “BYRON BAY BEACHFRONT APARTMENTS”. In her affidavit, Ms Holzberger deposed that “[o]n 3 August 2023, the Respondent provided the Applicant with an Adverse TM Headstart assessment”. A copy of that was annexed to Dr Quach’s affidavit affirmed 1 July 2024 and relevantly included the following: Dear Applicant, The results of the assessment of your TM Headstart request indicate that your trade mark would not meet the requirements for registration under the Trade Marks Act 1995. However, please note that this assessment does not constitute a formal examination of your trade mark.…What you need to do now To formally file your trade mark application you must pay the Part 2 application fee by 9 August 2023 otherwise your TM Headstart request will be discontinued. Please refer to the relevant information regarding fees on our website. For assistance with our online lodgement services please contact 1300 65 10 10. …What you can do now The following options are available to you:Change your trade mark so that it is able to distinguish your goods and services from the similar goods and services of others. Please note that you will need to pay an additional fee to provide a new representation for reassessment and new issues may arise as a result of the reassessment. Any changes to the mark should also be reflective of your intention to use the mark, in order to mitigate issues that may result from an opposition in the future should your mark gain acceptance and/or registration. Pay the Part 2 application fee to file a formal application. Once this occurs I will issue a formal report and you will have 15 months in which to address the issues by agreeing to amend your statement of goods, or providing submissions and/or evidence of use. …Things to be aware of …Please remember that you have not yet completed the process of filing a formal application and have not been allocated a filing date. The filing date is important because this is the date from which your protection begins. If you pay the part 2 application fee: •If you choose to pursue the registration of this trade mark it is in your interest to complete the filing process as soon as possible. Every day you wait other traders may file applications for similar trade marks. (Emphasis in original.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Alternatively, the Registrar relies on r 26.01(1) of the FCR, which provides: 26.01Summary judgment(1) A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:(a) the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or(b) the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or(c) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or(d) the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court; or (e) the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding. The authorities regarding summary judgment are well-established, and are helpfully summarised by McKerracher J in Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978 at [3]: Without reference to all the well-known authorities, the parties agree that it is well established that the Court may give judgment for a defending party in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding where the Court is satisfied that the prosecuting party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or a part of the proceeding. Further:•the claim need not be hopeless or bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospects of success: s 31A of the Federal Court Act;•a reasonable prospect of success is one which is real, not fanciful or merely arguable: Rogers v Assets Loan Co Pty Ltd (2008) 250 ALR 82 per Logan J (at [41]);…•s 31A is amenable to resolving straightforward questions of law: Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2008] FCA 1582 per Logan J (at [16]). However, summary judgment may still be appropriate if a question raised is of some complexity: SK Foods LP v SK Foods Australia (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543 per Flick J (at [115]);•it is clear that the legislature’s intention in enacting s 31A was to lower the bar for obtaining summary judgment, including summary dismissal, below that fixed by previous authorities: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118 per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Jefferson Ford per Gordon J (at [127]);•s 31A permits dismissal of a proceeding where an inquiry into the merits of the issues of law demonstrates the arguments are insufficiently strong to warrant the matter going to trial: McAleer v University of Western Australia (No 3) (2008) 171 FCR 499 per Siopis J (at [39] and the cases therein cited).(Emphasis in original.) In Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation, McKerracher J at [3], citing Kimber v The Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575; [2017] FCAFC 226 per Logan, Kerr and Farrell JJ (at [62]) quoting with approval Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381; [2015] FCA 1045 per Perry J (at [37]), noted that a consideration of summary judgment requires a discretionary “value judgement in the absence of a full and complex factual matrix and argument”. The particular facts and circumstances of each case are relevant: Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation at [3], citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256; [2013] FCA 641 per Reeves J (at [46]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The authorities regarding summary judgment are well-established, and are helpfully summarised by McKerracher J in Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation v Onslow Salt Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 978 at [3]: Without reference to all the well-known authorities, the parties agree that it is well established that the Court may give judgment for a defending party in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding where the Court is satisfied that the prosecuting party has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or a part of the proceeding. Further:•the claim need not be hopeless or bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospects of success: s 31A of the Federal Court Act;•a reasonable prospect of success is one which is real, not fanciful or merely arguable: Rogers v Assets Loan Co Pty Ltd (2008) 250 ALR 82 per Logan J (at [41]);…•s 31A is amenable to resolving straightforward questions of law: Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2008] FCA 1582 per Logan J (at [16]). However, summary judgment may still be appropriate if a question raised is of some complexity: SK Foods LP v SK Foods Australia (in liq) (No 3) (2013) 214 FCR 543 per Flick J (at [115]);•it is clear that the legislature’s intention in enacting s 31A was to lower the bar for obtaining summary judgment, including summary dismissal, below that fixed by previous authorities: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118 per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Jefferson Ford per Gordon J (at [127]);•s 31A permits dismissal of a proceeding where an inquiry into the merits of the issues of law demonstrates the arguments are insufficiently strong to warrant the matter going to trial: McAleer v University of Western Australia (No 3) (2008) 171 FCR 499 per Siopis J (at [39] and the cases therein cited).(Emphasis in original.) In Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation, McKerracher J at [3], citing Kimber v The Owners of Strata Plan No 48216 (2017) 258 FCR 575; [2017] FCAFC 226 per Logan, Kerr and Farrell JJ (at [62]) quoting with approval Eliezer v University of Sydney (2015) 239 FCR 381; [2015] FCA 1045 per Perry J (at [37]), noted that a consideration of summary judgment requires a discretionary “value judgement in the absence of a full and complex factual matrix and argument”. The particular facts and circumstances of each case are relevant: Buurabalayji Thalanyji Aboriginal Corporation at [3], citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256; [2013] FCA 641 per Reeves J (at [46]). In Cassimatis, Reeves J stated at [50]: Finally, these authorities show that there are at least two other factors that need to be borne in mind on a summary judgment application such as this. The first is that, in all the situations outlined above, the court has a discretion as to whether to determine the proceedings summarily, or to refer them to trial. Of course, as with any such discretion, it has to be exercised judicially: see Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 569; 97 ALR 45 at 69 per McHugh J, quoting Donald Campbell and Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 811–12 per Viscount Cave LC. Second, while s 31A sets a lower bar, or a softened test, for the summary determination of proceedings, any such summary determination still has to be approached with caution. This is so because a trial is the usual and accepted means by which disputed questions of fact are determined in this country.