Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd
[2016] FCA 1032

File number: QUD 686 of 2014
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 26 August 2016
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – where respondent contravened ss 340 and 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) – whether compensation for past and future loss of wages should be awarded under s 545 of the FWA – whether compensation for physical injury awarded in the District Court of Queensland affects any compensation awarded under the FWA – whether any award of compensation should be grossed up for taxation purposes

INDUSTRIAL LAW – where two contraventions of the FWA – assessment of pecuniary penalties – consideration of s 546 of the FWA – consideration of the totality principle in assessing the appropriate pecuniary penalty  

Legislation:

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld)

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld)

Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 (Qld)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Limitation Act 1969 (NSW)

Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic)

Supreme Court Act 1958 (Vic)

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia S.R.L. (formerly Pirelli Cavi E Sistemi Energia Spa) (No 4) (2012) 298 ALR 251; [2012] FCA 1323

Australian Ophthalmic Suppliers Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560; [2008] FCAFC 8

British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185

Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1992) 45 IR 178

Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd v TN Lucas Pty Ltd (1985) 6 FCR 133

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 1384

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal [2016] FCA 199

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v North Goonyella Coal Mine Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1444

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union vPilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (No 4) (2012) 225 IR 113; [2012] FCA 894

Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1

Davinski Nominees Pty Ltd v I & A Bowler Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 220

Fair Work Ombudsman v Toyota Material Handling (NSW) Pty Ltd (2012) 209 FCR 428; [2012] FCAFC 193

Gill v Australian Wheat Board [1980] 2 NSWLR 795

Gray v Richards (2014) 253 CLR 660; [2014] HCA 40

Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (1995) 129 ALR 372

Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60

Kelly v Fitzpatrick (2007) 166 IR 14; [2007] FCA 1080

Maritime Union of Australia v Fair Work Ombudsman [2015] FCAFC 120

Mason v Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 7

Patterson v Middle Harbour Yacht Club (1996) 64 FCR 405

Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (2008) 171 FCR 357; [2008] FCAFC 170

Reilly v Praxa Ltd [2004] ACTSC 41

Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 4

Sellars v…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1032
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd, the plaintiff sought compensation for loss of wages and pecuniary penalties for the respondent's contravention of sections 340 and 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The court was required to determine the appropriate compensation for past and future loss of wages, the pecuniary penalty to be imposed on the respondent, and whether the penalty should be paid to the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU). The factual background revealed that the respondent had stood down the employee from performing any further duties, despite the employee having obtained an award of common law damages against the respondent in the District Court of Queensland.

The court considered the possibility of double compensation for the employee's past and future loss of wages. It was noted that the compensation under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) would be directed to a different purpose than the District Court award and that there was a limited risk of overlap or double compensation. The court also assessed the taxation treatment of the award, determining that the compensation for loss of earning capacity caused by personal injuries should not be taxed in the hands of the plaintiff.

The court assessed the pecuniary penalty to be imposed on the respondent, taking into account factors such as the respondent's lack of deliberate action, advice received from its in-house professionals, and its status as a large employer. The court rejected the respondent's arguments and found the respondent's conduct to be deliberate, compounded by a series of other contraventions. The court ultimately decided on an appropriate penalty of $50,000 for the respondent's contraventions.

In conclusion, the court rejected the respondent's contentions that the employee had no entitlement to compensation and that the award should be grossed up for taxation purposes. The court awarded compensation for the employee's past and future loss of wages and imposed a pecuniary penalty of $50,000 on the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

There are three broad issues to be determined:(a)the compensation, if any, Mr Haylett should be awarded for his past loss of wages (including interest) and for his future loss;(b)the appropriate pecuniary penalty to be imposed on Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd (Hail Creek Coal) for its contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA); and(c)whether an order should be made that the pecuniary penalty be paid to the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU).Because of the nature of the compensation and penalty issues that fall to be determined, it is convenient to begin by outlining the factual background to this matter in a little detail.FACTUAL BACKGROUND Until Monday, 18 November 2013, Mr Haylett worked as a drill rig operator for Hail Creek Coal. On that day, he was stood down from performing any further duties with effect from the next day. That decision was made by Mr Priestly, Hail Creek Coal’s mine manager. It occurred against the backdrop of two events that happened at about the same time. First, on the previous Friday, 15 November 2013, Mr Haylett obtained an award of common law damages against Hail Creek Coal in the District Court of Queensland in the amount of approximately $638,000. That claim arose out of a spinal injury Mr Haylett suffered at work with Hail Creek Coal in mid-2009. In the ensuing 12 months or so, he had a discectomy and spinal fusion at the C6/7 level and eventually returned to work on light duties in October 2010. After briefly attempting other duties, he was trained as a drill rig operator, a position which required Hail Creek Coal to make some special accommodation so that he could fill it. He worked as a drill rig operator from late 2010 until late 2013, when, as already noted above, he was stood down. The second event occurred earlier on Monday, 18 November 2013, when Mr Haylett underwent a pre-arranged five yearly medical assessment under the provisions of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (CMSH Act). That assessment was partly conducted by a Dr Parker. In the prescribed form he completed after the assessment, Dr Parker opined that Mr Haylett was unfit to undertake his current position, described in the form as “operator”. Soon after being stood down, Mr Haylett commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland challenging the validity of Dr Parker’s assessment under the CMSH Act. In August 2014, he was successful in those proceedings. In the meantime, in early April 2014, Hail Creek Coal ceased paying Mr Haylett his wages, claiming that he had exhausted his sick leave and annual leave entitlements. Thereafter, it treated him as being on leave without pay. In response to the Supreme Court ruling, Hail Creek Coal obtained another assessment from Dr Parker and, based on that assessment, maintained its decision to stand down Mr Haylett and not pay him any wages. The circumstances in which that further assessment was obtained from Dr Parker are controversial. It is therefore appropriate that I set out the findings I made about them in my liability judgment as follows:7… on 23 September 2014, Dr Parker produced an assessment form which had a cross in the box beside the statement “Is fit to undertake proposed/current position, subject to the following restrictions.” Beneath that statement, the restrictions were listed as: “unfit for heavy or continuous jarring and vibration”; “unfit for working above shoulder height”; and “unfit for heavy haul trucks or dozers”. However, the form stated he was assessed as: “fit for drill rig operation”.8Dissatisfied with that assessment, Mr Lawler of Hail Creek Coal telephoned Dr Parker and prevailed upon him to issue another assessment form. It contained essentially the same information, but it had a cross beside a different box. The statement beside that box was: “Is not fit to undertake proposed/current position, because of the following restrictions”. The same restrictions as above were then listed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having said that, it must also be said that in this instance, the possibility of such an overlap, or double compensation, is likely to be quite limited. That is so because Mr Haylett’s past and future loss of wages at Hail Creek Coal, to which this award will be directed, can only be assessed by reference to the remaining lifespan of the Hail Creek mine of approximately 13 years. That is approximately a half of the period over which the District Court award was assessed, namely his remaining working life of approximately 23 to 25 years. Furthermore, this award of compensation will be discounted to take account of future contingencies, including the possibility that Mr Haylett’s employment at Hail Creek Coal might have been terminated sooner than the 13 year period mentioned above. It will also be reduced to take account of the alternative employment he is likely to obtain. Nonetheless, in calculating this award, I do intend to bear in mind constantly the need to avoid any double compensation.Conclusion For these reasons, I reject Hail Creek Coal’s contentions above (at [19(a)]) that Mr Haylett has no entitlement to any compensation because any loss he may have suffered has already been covered by the District Court award he obtained. The two awards are directed to different purposes and while they relate to essentially the same matter, namely Mr Haylett’s earnings, there is a limited risk of overlap, or double compensation. Based on the same reasoning, I also reject Hail Creek Coal’s contention above (at [19(b)]) that Mr Haylett’s award for compensation under s 545 of the FWA should be calculated by deducting his District Court award of $500,000 from the total amount of $640,900 he sought in the statement of loss and damage he filed in the District Court. The calculations advanced to assess Mr Haylett’s District Court award have little, if any, bearing on the loss Mr Haylett suffered as a result of Hail Creek Coal’s contraventions of the FWA. GROSSING UP THE AWARDThe taxation treatment of this award This issue was the third particular issue raised by Hail Creek Coal above (see at [19(c)]). While I have adopted the epithet “grossing up the award”, this issue essentially concerns the taxation treatment of an award of compensation for a contravention of the FWA. It is convenient to begin with Hail Creek Coal’s sole contention for opposing any grossing up of Mr Haylett’s award. It submitted that, to do so, was “fundamentally flawed and wrong at law”. It submitted this was so because “[w]hen Courts calculate exonomic [sic] loss (whether post or future) the calculation is done net of tax. The District Court Decision of Baulch J is an example of this.” This contention is, itself, fundamentally flawed. It fails to appreciate the distinction between damages awards that are subject to taxation and those that are not. Since the decision in Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1, where the High Court adopted the House of Lords decision in British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185, damages for loss of earning capacity caused by personal injuries have been calculated on the footing that the award will not be taxed in the hands of the plaintiff and therefore no allowance should be made for taxation. As can be seen above (see at [50]), Baulch DCJ applied that approach by using Mr Haylett’s net earnings after tax when calculating the District Court award.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For its part, Hail Creek Coal submitted that there was a range of factors which should be taken into account in assessing the quantum of the penalty. Those factors included:(a)it had not acted deliberately. Instead, it found itself in a “difficult position with regard to the application of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 (Qld) … and the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) …, which provide very strict requirements in relation to maintaining safety at a mine”;(b)it received advice from Mr Lawler, its in-house health and human resources professional, and Ms Robinson, its in-house injury management professional, in relation to its decision;(c)after the decision was delivered by the Queensland Court of Appeal, it was required to have Mr Haylett examined by a medical professional in accordance with routine practice for employees returning to work in the mine after a period of absence; and(d)it is a large employer and it has not been previously subject to penalties for adverse action over the 13 year life of the mine to date.Consideration In my view, an appropriate penalty for each of Hail Creek Coal’s contraventions is $25,000 or a total penalty of $50,000. In assessing this penalty, I have had regard to each of the matters mentioned above and, in particular, to the following matters. First, I reject the first three factors advanced by Hail Creek Coal above. Each of them is, to a varying degree, contrary to express findings I made in my liability judgment. Specifically, Hail Creek Coal’s claim not to have acted deliberately ([101(a)] above) was addressed at [35] where I found, among other things, that Mr Priestly had acted under a pretext, hastily, and with the intention of removing Mr Haylett from the workforce at Hail Creek Coal because of the risk he thought he posed to its operations. The proposition that it was in a “difficult position” with regard to the CMSH Regulations and Act ([101(b)] above) is based upon its erroneous construction of those provisions which I rejected in my liability judgment at [31]. The contention that it, namely Mr Priestly, received advice from Mr Lawler and Ms Robinson ([101(b)] above) is not consistent with the facts as I found them in the liability judgment (at [35]). Moreover, it is contrary to the findings I made about the unsatisfactory nature of Mr Priestly’s evidence vis-à-vis the statements in the emails emanating from Mr Lawler and Ms Robinson at [32]–[33] and [40] of my liability judgment. Hail Creek Coal’s claim “it was required to have Mr Haylett examined by a medical professional in accordance with routine practice for employees returning to work in the mine after a period of absence” ([101(c)] above) masks its failure to provide any satisfactory explanation for its conduct with respect to the Court of Appeal judgment highlighted in my liability judgment at [29]–[30]. Together, these submissions, made in the face of findings to the contrary in my liability judgment, some of which related to a similar attitude displayed in relation to other court decisions, particularly the Court of Appeal decision, demonstrate a disturbing level of recalcitrance on the part of Hail Creek Coal. It also concurrently demonstrates a number of other features that compound the seriousness of its wrongdoing. To begin at the start, I consider Mr Priestly’s conduct was deliberate and undertaken without obtaining any advice. In this respect, insofar as legal advice is concerned, I agree with the CFMEU’s contention that there is no evidence that Mr Priestly sought or acted upon legal advice before making his decision to stand Mr Haylett down. Its original contravention was then compounded by its refusal to reconsider it when approached by Mr Haylett’s lawyers in early 2014. It was further compounded by its decision, without consulting Mr Haylett, to offset the wages it was paying him in early 2014 against his sick leave and other entitlements. Further still, it was compounded when it ceased paying him any wages in March/April 2014. While this amounted to a compounding of its original contravention, it also constituted a separate contravention in that it was undertaken in breach of Mr Haylett’s employment agreement. These two contraventions were then further compounded by Hail Creek Coal’s failure to respond to Mr Haylett’s lawyers’ requests in 2014 and 2015 that it reconsider its position after each success he had in the Supreme Court proceedings, and later the Court of Appeal proceeding. Finally, they were compounded by its repudiation of Mr Haylett’s employment agreement, as eventually accepted by him in late February 2016.