Smith v SBP Employment Solutions Pty Ltd and Ors (No.3)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SMITH v SBP EMPLOYMENT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD & ORS (No.3) [2019] FCCA 3516
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Compensation payable consequent upon termination of employment – ‘grossing up’ of loss to have regard to future taxation liability – what constitutes fair compensation in the light of future tax on compensation awarded – interest on past loss – superannuation loss – orders accordingly.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s.545.

Cases cited:

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal [2016] FCA 1032.
Wheeler v Philip Morris Ltd (1989) 97 ALR 282.
Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (1995) 129 ALR 372.
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1992) 45 IR 178.
Reilly v Praxa Ltd [2004] ACTSC 41.
Patterson v Middle Harbour Yacht Club (1996) 64 FCR 405.

Applicant: NICHOLAS SMITH
First Respondent: SBP EMPLOYMENT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD
Second Respondent: SBP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Third Respondent: MAX BURNS
Fourth Respondent: TONY AISTHORPE
Fifth Respondent: DAN MAHONY
Sixth Respondent: NEVILLE HOMBSCH
Seventh Respondent: PETER CHADWICK
File Number: BRG 330 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Egan
Hearing dates: 29, 30, 31 July 2019, 1 August 2019, 28 October, 25 November 2019
Date of Last Submission: 4 December 2019
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 5 December 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Dr. R. Haddrick
Solicitors for the Applicant: FCB Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M. Alexander
Solicitors for the Respondent: Carter Newell

ORDERS

  1. Pursuant to section 545 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and as a consequence of paragraphs 1 – 12 inclusive of the declarations pronounced by the Court in Smith v SBP Employment Solutions Pty Ltd & Ors (No. 2) [2019] FCCA 3318 on 5 December 2019, the First Respondent, the Second Respondent, the Third Respondent, the Fourth Respondent, the Fifth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent are jointly and severally liable to pay to the Applicant, within 28 days of these orders, the sum of $589,439.43 (inclusive of income taxation and superannuation) as compensation.

  2. Pursuant to section 545 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and as a consequence of paragraphs 1 – 12 inclusive of the declarations pronounced by the Court in Smith v SBP Employment Solutions Pty Ltd & Ors (No. 2) [2019] FCCA 3318 on 5 December 2019, and as a consequence of the order for compensation made in paragraph 1 of this Order, the First Respondent, the Second Respondent, the Third Respondent, the Fourth Respondent, the Fifth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent are jointly and severally liable to pay to the Applicant, within 28 days of the making of these orders, the sum of $13,925.16 as interest on the Applicant’s past economic loss as found by the Court.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 330 of 2018

NICHOLAS SMITH

Applicant

And

SBP EMPLOYMENT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD

First Respondent

SBP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Respondent

MAX BURNS

Third Respondent

TONY AISTHORPE

Fourth Respondent

DAN MAHONY

Fifth Respondent

NEVILLE HOMBSCH

Sixth Respondent

PETER CHADWICK

Seventh…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 3516
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Smith v SBP Employment Solutions Pty Ltd and Ors (No.3), Judge Egan of the Federal Court of Australia considered the compensation payable to the applicant consequent upon the termination of his employment. The dispute centred on how to account for future taxation liabilities when calculating the compensation award, as well as the appropriate treatment of interest on past economic loss and superannuation loss.

The primary legal issue before the Court was to determine what constituted fair compensation in light of the future tax liability arising from the awarded compensation. This involved considering whether the compensation should be "grossed up" to account for the tax the applicant would have to pay on the award, and how to calculate this grossing up. The Court also had to determine the quantum of superannuation loss and the entitlement to interest on past economic loss.

Judge Egan, relying on the reasoning in *Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal* [2016] FCA 1032, adopted the principle that it would be unfair to assess compensation without taking relevant tax implications into account. The Court reviewed authorities, including *Davinski Nominees Pty Ltd v I & A Bowler Holdings Pty Ltd* [2011] VSC 220, which established that where an award of damages is liable to taxation, and this can be calculated with reasonable certainty, it is unfair to ignore these tax implications. The Court rejected the proposition of a further grossing up to account for the tax on the initial grossing up, as seen in *Westpac Banking Corporation v Jamieson* [2015] QCA 50, but affirmed the necessity of an initial grossing up. Applying these principles, the Court found that the applicant's broad brush calculation for grossing up should be utilised in calculating his award of compensation, as the award would be taxed as assessable income and paid in a lump sum in the current financial year, potentially attracting higher marginal tax rates.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant helpfully provided detailed submissions on the issue of compensation, superannuation loss and interest payable on past economic loss. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of Reeves J in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal [2016] FCA 1032. In that judgment, Reeves J at [61] – [64] inclusive said as follows: “[61] There has been some disagreement in the authorities as to how taxation should be accounted for in awards of compensation that are not related to personal injuries. In Davinski Nominees Pty Ltd v I & A Bowler Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 220 (Davinski) (at [33]–[58]), Kaye J conducted a helpful review of all the authorities on this issue dating back to the late 1970s. Davinski was a commercial tenancy dispute where the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal had declared invalid two relocation notices issued under the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) and ordered the party who issued those notices to pay compensation. One of the main issues was the liability to pay tax on the award of compensation (see Davinski at [22]). After reviewing all the authorities, his Honour came to the following conclusion (Davinski at [58]):… Thus, where an award of damages is not liable to taxation, it is just that the damages should be assessed by reference to the post-tax earnings of the claimant. Otherwise, the award of those damages would be well in excess of fair compensation for the loss sustained by the plaintiff. Further, where the award of damages is liable to taxation, and where it is possible, to calculate, with reasonable certainty, both the damages on the basis of the plaintiff’s lost post-tax earnings, and also the tax liability arising from the compensatory verdict, it would be unfair to assess damages, without taking the relevant tax implications into account. In such a case, the assessment of damages, ignoring tax, would not result in an amount of compensation, which is fair both to the claimant and to the defendant.(Emphasis added)[62] More recently the Queensland Court of Appeal in Westpac Banking Corporation v Jamieson [2015] QCA 50 (Jamieson) considered this issue in relation to an award of damages for economic loss caused by negligent investment advice. In that matter, the proposition that there should be a further grossing up to take account of the tax implications of the initial grossing up was rejected as impractical, however, the Court did not question the initial grossing up: see McMurdo P at [6]–[7] and Applegarth J at [195]–[209].[63] It is worth noting that, among the authorities Kaye J reviewed in Davinski, there were five single judge decisions of this Court dealing with the treatment of taxation in wrongful dismissal cases where allowances were made because the awards would be taxed as assessable income in the hands of the taxpayer (see Davinski at [39]–[40]): Wheeler v Philip Morris Ltd (1989) 97 ALR 282 per Gray J; Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (1995) 129 ALR 372 per Moore J; Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1992) 45 IR 178 per Hill J; Reilly v Praxa Ltd [2004] ACTSC 41 per Gray J; and Patterson v Middle Harbour Yacht Club (1996) 64 FCR 405 per Whitlam J.Conclusion on grossing up[64] Mr Haylett has put forward a broad brush calculation for the grossing up that he contends should be undertaken. He has not sought any further grossing up of the kind that was rejected in Jamieson. Assuming the award is to be taxed as assessable income, Hail Creek Coal has not disputed the proposition that, if the award is paid in a lump sum in this financial year, Mr Haylett will be required to pay the tax at higher marginal rates. In these circumstances, I would adopt the conclusion that Kaye J reached in Davinski that it would be unfair to assess Mr Haylett’s compensation without making an allowance for the additional taxation he will have to pay. I therefore consider the broad brush grossing up advanced by Mr Haylett should be utilised in calculating his award of compensation.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established