Smith v SBP Employment Solutions Pty Ltd and Ors (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SMITH v SBP EMPLOYMENT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD & ORS (No.2) [2019] FCCA 3318
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Adverse action – presumption that adverse action taken for a proscribed reason – presumption not rebutted – discrimination and coercion allegations not made out – leave entitlement allegation established – assessment of compensation peculiarly in the realm of the Court where calculation of past and future loss unable to be assessed with exactitude – imposition of pecuniary penalties for serious contraventions of the FWA.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss. 44, 90, 130, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 351, 360, 361, 545, 546(1), 549, 550.

Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld.) s. 119A.  

Cases cited:

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500.
Russel v Institution of Engineers Australia T/A Engineers Australia [2013] FCA 1250.
Tsilibanks v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 740.
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298.
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke [2007] FACFC 87.
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v McCorkell Constructions
Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2013] FCA 446.
Fair Work Ombudsman v Hu [2019] FCAFC 133.
Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1365.
Shea v TRUenergy Services Pty Ltd (No 6) (2014) 242 IR 1.
X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177.
National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth of Australia
(2002) 117 FCR 114.
Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell [2000] HCA 64.
Shepherd v Felt and Textile Industries of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359.
Malec v JC Hutton Proprietary Limited (1990) 169 CLR 638.
Construction, Forestry, Mining, and Energy Union v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1032.
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarket Pty
Ltd [2015] FCA 330.
Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] 166 IR 14.
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry,
Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (No.2) [2018] FCA 1968.
Auimatagi v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2018]
FCAFC 191.
Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 4.

Applicant: NICHOLAS SMITH
First Respondent: SBP EMPLOYMENT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD
Second Respondent: SBP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Third Respondent: MAX BURNS
Fourth Respondent: TONY AISTHORPE
Fifth Respondent: DAN MAHONY
Sixth Respondent: NEVILLE HOMBSCH
Seventh Respondent: PETER CHADWICK
File Number: BRG 330 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Egan
Hearing Dates:

29, 30, 31 July 2019, 1 August 2019,

28 October 2019, 25 November 2019

Reasons Delivered on: 21 November 2019
Delivered at: Brisbane
Date of Last Submission: 25 November 2019
Declarations and Orders Pronounced On:

5 December 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Dr R. Haddrick
Solicitors for the Applicant: FCB Lawyers and Consultants
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M. Alexander
Solicitors for the Respondent: Carter Newell Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. It is declared that the First Respondent has contravened subsection 340(1)(a)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by taking…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 3318
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by the applicant, Mr Smith, against his former employer, SBP Employment Solutions Pty Ltd, and two other respondents. Mr Smith alleged that SBP Employment Solutions had taken adverse action against him for a proscribed reason, specifically in relation to his entitlement to leave. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia before Judge Egan.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the employer had discharged the onus, placed upon it by section 361 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), to prove that the adverse action taken against Mr Smith was not for a proscribed reason. This involved determining the relevant decision-maker and the reasons that actuated their decision, including any recommendations or advice upon which they relied. The Court also considered the assessment of compensation for any proven contraventions and the potential imposition of pecuniary penalties.

Judge Egan's reasoning focused on the nature of the onus placed on employers under section 361 of the Fair Work Act. The Court reiterated that a mere assertion by an employer that the action was not for a proscribed reason is insufficient to discharge this onus, particularly if contrary inferences can be drawn from the facts. Drawing on authorities such as *Barclay*, *Tsilibanks*, *Voigtsberger*, and *Wood*, the Court emphasised that the "mind" of the corporate employer could be located in the collective decision-making process, and the reasons of those making recommendations were as relevant as those of the ultimate decision-maker. The Court found that the employer had failed to rebut the presumption that the adverse action was taken for a proscribed reason, specifically in relation to the applicant's leave entitlement.

The Court found that the employer had contravened the Fair Work Act by taking adverse action against Mr Smith for a proscribed reason. The Court determined that the assessment of compensation was within its realm, given the difficulty in precisely calculating past and future losses. Pecuniary penalties were also imposed on the employer for serious contraventions of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

An employer’s onus may not be satisfied by a mere statement that the action taken by the employer was not for a proscribed reason. As was said by French CJ and Crennan J at [54] of Barclay:“[54] … a question arose as to whether the director’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the onus cast upon the employer. In deciding that the director’s evidence was sufficient, the majority in Pearce recognised that mere declarations of an innocent reason or intent in taking adverse action may not satisfy the onus on an employer if contrary inferences are available on the facts.”(Emphasis added) When deciding, for the purposes of s. 361 of the FWA, who the relevant decision-maker was, or upon whose advice or recommendation the decision-maker relevantly acted upon when taking any adverse action, White J in Tsilibanks v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 740 at [121] – [127] inclusive said:[121] My conclusion that the applicant’s exercise of his workplace rights played no part in the decision of Mr De Angelis and the recommendation of Mr Kerswell is not conclusive of the applicant’s case with respect to the termination of his employment. Regard should also be had to the basis for the underlying recommendation on which they acted. If those making the recommendation to Mr De Angelis did so because of the making of the applicant’s First Complaint, Transfield would not discharge the s 361 onus. This is evidenced by the authorities.[122] In Voigtsberger v Council of the Shire of Pine Rivers (No 2) (1981) 58 FLR 239, the finance committee of the respondent Council had recommended that the applicant’s position be abolished. The report of the finance committee was adopted later that same day by the full Council. Evatt J held at 256 that the decision of the finance committee was the critical decision in the case because the full Council had merely rubber stamped its recommendation. Accordingly, it was essential that the Court have evidence from the members of the finance committee so that it could determine whether a proscribed reason had been a substantial and operative factor influencing the decision of any individual councillor.[123] Smithers J addressed the question of principle involved in Wood (on behalf of the Industrial Relations Bureau) v Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne (1979) 41 FLR 1 at 19 in a context analogous to the present:[19] In the task of ascertaining the mind of the defendant corporation, with respect to the standing down of Mr Kane, that mind may be located in the mind of one authorised officer or of more than one person exercising the executive power of the corporation. It is a pure question of fact where in particular circumstances that corporate mind may be located. In a case where two officers are concerned in the solution of an administrative problem and are working jointly to solve it and decide what the corporation is to do and are working in harmony and in full confidence, the one with the other, the mind of the corporation is to be found in the course of conduct agreed upon between them and the reasons which in the end are the operating reasons for the policy agreed upon. However, as Smithers J went on to acknowledge, that does not preclude the possibility that one of the participants may have as his or her motive an undisclosed proscribed reason for joining in the decision.[124] Gray J also noted the issue in Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (unreported, 21 December 1987) at 84‑5 when he said:[T]here is still a difficult question of the extent to which the improper purpose of one person may be a substantial operative factor in the decision of another. Clearly, if the actual decision maker simply “rubber stamps” a decision in fact made by another, the purpose of that other will be a substantial operative factor. At the other extreme, if the actual decision maker truly believes the false and innocent reasons advised by the other person, the mind of the decision maker will not be tainted by the improper purpose of the other person. The problem assumes greater complexity when the decision is made by more than one person, as might be the case with the board of directors of a company, and as is often the case when the decision is made by a local government authority.[125] Gray J reviewed and applied these authorities in National Tertiary Education Union v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2013] FCA 451 at [25]‑[29].[126] Counsel for the applicant referred to Rowland v Alfred Health [2014] FCA 2. The decision in that case confirms that it is appropriate to have regard to the reasons actuating the members of a selection committee making a recommendation, and not just to the reasons of the ultimate decision maker.[127] Accordingly, it is appropriate in the present case to have close regard to the reasons of those who made the recommendations to Mr De Angelis and Mr Kerswell. This includes their reasons for recommending the restructure which Transfield adopted as well as their reasons for selecting the applicant as a person to be made redundant in consequence of that restructure. The evidence of Mr Rynja and Mr Hall is particularly significant in this respect. Mr Handy did not contribute to the recommendation to Mr De Angelis, and Mr Vigus had only a limited role.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the issue of what evidence was needed to be canvassed in relation to the impugned action taken by an employer, it was said by French CJ and Crennan J in Barclay at [41], [44] and [45] as follows:[41] The question of why an employer took adverse action against an employee is a question of fact arising from the operation of interdependent provisions of the Fair Work Act. These provisions must be construed together in accordance with the principles of statutory construction established by this Court, which must begin with a consideration of the text of the relevant provisions and may require consideration of the context including the general purpose and policy of the provisions.…[44] There is no warrant to be derived from the text of the relevant provisions of the Fair Work Act for treating the statutory expression “because” in s 346, or the statutory presumption in s 361, as requiring only an objective inquiry into a defendant employer’s reason, including any unconscious reason, for taking adverse action. The imposition of the statutory presumption in s 361, and the correlative onus on employers, naturally and ordinarily mean that direct evidence of a decision-maker as to state of mind, intent or purpose will bear upon the question of why adverse action was taken, although the central question remains “why was the adverse action taken?”[45] This question is one of fact, which must be answered in the light of all the facts established in the proceeding. Generally, it will be extremely difficult to displace the statutory presumption in s 361 if no direct testimony is given by the decision-maker acting on behalf of the employer. Direct evidence of the reason why a decision-maker took adverse action, which may include positive evidence that the action was not taken for a prohibited reason, may be unreliable because of other contradictory evidence given by the decision-maker or because other objective facts are proven which contradict the decision-maker’s evidence. However, direct testimony from the decision-maker which is accepted as reliable is capable of discharging the burden upon an employer even though an employee may be an officer or member of an industrial association and engage in industrial activity.”(Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis added) On the question of onus, it was said by French CJ and Crennan J in Barclay at [50] as follows:“[50] The following description of a legislative predecessor to s 361 given by Mason J in General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd v Bowling remains pertinent: “the plain purpose of the provision [is to throw] on to the defendant the onus of proving that which lies peculiarly within his own knowledge.”(Footnotes omitted) An employer’s onus may not be satisfied by a mere statement that the action taken by the employer was not for a proscribed reason. As was said by French CJ and Crennan J at [54] of Barclay:“[54] … a question arose as to whether the director’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the onus cast upon the employer. In deciding that the director’s evidence was sufficient, the majority in Pearce recognised that mere declarations of an innocent reason or intent in taking adverse action may not satisfy the onus on an employer if contrary inferences are available on the facts.”(Emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established