Gulf Conveyor Systems Pty Limited v Gulf Integrated Solutions Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gulf Conveyor Systems Pty Limited v Gulf Integrated Solutions Pty Limited [2020] FCA 1534  

File number: NSD 997 of 2020
Judgment of: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 22 October 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal against orders adopting referee report – where applicant contended referee and primary judge had not properly considered material before them – application dismissed   
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 54A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 28.67

Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170

Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 784

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Gulf Conveyor Systems Pty Ltd v Gulf Integrated Systems Solutions Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1245

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Minogue v Williams (2000) 60 ALD 366

Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (2001) 207 CLR 72

Sharp v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 908

Sheehan v Lloyds Names Munich Re Syndicate Ltd [2017] FCA 1340

United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 49
Date of hearing: 16 October 2020
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr T Lee of Terence Lockyer Lee & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Rose
Solicitor for the Respondents: MinterEllison

ORDERS

NSD 997 of 2020
BETWEEN:

GULF CONVEYOR SYSTEMS PTY LIMITED

Applicant

AND:

GULF INTEGRATED SOLUTIONS PTY LIMITED

First Respondent

MARK ANTHONY AZZOPARDI

Second Respondent

JASON LENKO ANTUNOVICH (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

THAWLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 OCTOBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

3.The parties file within seven days short minutes of order giving effect to the agreed variation of Order 3 made on 28 August 2020 in proceedings NSD 2216 of 2018.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THAWLEY J:

  1. This is an amended application for leave to appeal a decision of the primary judge adopting a report dated 1 July 2020 (hereafter referred to as “R”) of a Senior National Judicial Registrar who had been appointed a referee to conduct an inquiry into two questions in the proceedings, namely: (a) whether security for costs should be granted; and (b) if so, in what amount: Gulf Conveyor Systems Pty Ltd v Gulf Integrated Systems Solutions Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1245 (hereafter referred to as “J”).  By consent, the adoption hearing before the primary judge was held on the papers.  The primary judge adopted the referee’s report in whole, making orders on 28 August 2020 including that the applicant provide…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1534
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Gulf Conveyor Systems Pty Limited v Gulf Integrated Solutions Pty Limited, the applicant sought leave to appeal against orders adopting a referee's report. The primary judge had adopted the report in whole, and the applicant argued that both the referee and the primary judge had failed to properly consider the material before them. The case involved complex issues relating to intellectual property, and the applicant sought to challenge the referee's findings and the primary judge's decision to adopt the report.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge's decision to adopt the referee's report was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a full court, and whether there was an error of principle, absence or excess of jurisdiction or a patent misapprehension of the evidence that would justify rejecting the referee's report. The court considered the principles established in previous cases, including the need for some error of principle, absence or excess of jurisdiction or patent misapprehension of the evidence to justify rejecting the referee's report, and the general reluctance of the court to allow factual issues determined by a referee to be reargued.

The court found that the primary judge's decision to adopt the referee's report in whole was a discretionary decision, and that the applicant had not demonstrated that the primary judge had made an error in exercising that discretion. The court rejected the applicant's argument that the referee had misunderstood the subject matter of the proceedings and found that the referee's report did not establish the contended misapprehension. The court also found that the primary judge's decision to adopt the referee's report was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a full court.

The court dismissed the amended application for leave to appeal, and ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs. The parties were also ordered to file short minutes of the order giving effect to an agreed variation of an earlier order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

3. The parties file within seven days short minutes of order giving effect to the agreed variation of Order 3 made on 28 August 2020 in proceedings NSD 2216 of 2018.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Sheehan v Lloyds Names Munich Re Syndicate Ltd [2017] FCA 1340 at [10], Allsop CJ emphasised a number of matters, including that:·the Court should be reluctant to allow factual issues determined by a referee to be reargued;·some error of principle, absence or excess of jurisdiction or patent misapprehension of the evidence should generally be demonstrated to justify the rejection of the referee’s report;·the Court will generally not reconsider disputed questions of fact where there exists factual material that is sufficient to entitle the referee to reach the conclusions that he or she did, particularly where the disputed conclusions are made in a technical area in which the referee possesses appropriate expertise;·the discretion to reconsider a referee’s factual findings will generally only be exercised if the findings are such that no reasonable finder of fact could have made that finding.Discretionary decisions The primary judge’s decision to adopt the report in whole was a discretionary decision. In House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ expressed the principles to be applied in an appeal against the exercise of a discretion as follows:The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS The applicant’s submissions were made by reference to each of the grounds identified in its amended application which were not abandoned, namely grounds 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17. I will address the applicant’s specific submissions when addressing whether the grounds which were pressed reveal that the primary judge’s order was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by a Full Court. In its oral submissions, the applicant made clear that its principal complaint was an assertion that neither the referee nor the primary judge had properly considered the material before them as evidenced by the reasons of each. The applicant placed particular emphasis on propositions 11 and 14 identified by McDougall J in Chocolate Factory Apartments, set out at [10] above. CONSIDERATIONWhether order attended by sufficient doubt

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In its oral submissions, the applicant made clear that its principal complaint was an assertion that neither the referee nor the primary judge had properly considered the material before them as evidenced by the reasons of each. The applicant placed particular emphasis on propositions 11 and 14 identified by McDougall J in Chocolate Factory Apartments, set out at [10] above. CONSIDERATIONWhether order attended by sufficient doubt Leaving aside for the moment the question of substantial injustice, the critical question is whether the primary judge’s order was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by a Full Court. Ground 2 The applicant contended that the referee thought the subject matter of the proceeding was the applicant’s patent when it was really the entirety of the applicant’s intellectual property. This was said to be a “manifestly unreasonable conclusion”, upon which the primary judge did not comment adversely, and which ought to have led to the primary judge not adopting the report in whole. The applicant supported its submission by reference to what the referee had stated at R[27]:The question as to whether these proceedings could be characterised as defensive in character was also raised. I accept the Respondents’ submission on this point to the effect that the proceedings do not fit the character of a “defensive” proceeding as that term is generally used in the authorities as they are in essence a claim for damages pursued in various forms. Furthermore, there has been no claim for interim relief to restrain any Respondent from any infringement of the patent that is the subject of the proceedings. I do not accept that the referee thought the subject matter of the proceedings was limited to the applicant’s patent. The passage at R[27], read in the context of the whole of the referee’s report, does not establish the contended misapprehension on the part of the referee. In any event, if there had been a misapprehension on the part of the referee, I am not satisfied that it gave rise to a sufficiently arguable error on the part of the primary judge such as to warrant granting leave to appeal.Ground 5 The applicant asserted that the primary judge erred at J[38] in stating that the applicant complained that the referee did not refer to the amendments to the applicant’s written submissions. The applicant submitted that it did not make this complaint. Rather, its position was that the referee did not address any of its written submissions “with any specificity”. The transcript made it clear that the referee had read the applicant’s written amended submissions. At R[12], the referee noted that she had regard to the parties’ oral submissions, during which the applicant spoke to its written submissions. As the primary judge noted at J[39], the referee was not obliged to refer to the written submissions in detail in her report. In any event, I am not satisfied on the basis of the submissions advanced in respect of Ground 5 that the primary judge’s decision to adopt the referee’s report is attended with sufficient doubt. Ground 6