Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd [2011] FCA 631

Citation: Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd [2011] FCA 631
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Soden v Kowalski [2011] FCA 318
Parties: KAZIMIR KOWALSKI v MITSUBISHI MOTORS AUSTRALIA LTD AND ORS; KAZIMIR KOWALSKI v WARWICK SODEN (IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGISTRAR OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)   
File numbers: SAD 70 of 2011
SAD 71 of 2011
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 7 June 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious litigant – leave to institute appeal – leave refused
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24
Federal Court Rules Order 21 rules 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Cases cited: Ah Toy v Registrar of Companies (1985) 10 FCR 280, cited
Attorney-General (Cth), Re; Ex parte Skyring (1996) 135 ALR 29, considered
Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] FCAFC 111, cited
Cambridge Consolidated NL v Zephyr Minerals NL (1999) 88 FCR 147, cited
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246, cited
Commonwealth Bank v Heinrich (No 2) [2003] SASC 436, considered
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397, cited
Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 28, referred to
Fiorentino v Irons (1997) 79 FCR 327, cited
Granich & Associates v Yap [2004] FCA 1567, cited
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423, cited
Jarrett v Seymour (1993) 46 FCR 557, cited
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572, 104 FCR 564, cited
Jones v Skyring (1992) 109 ALR 303, referred to
Jones Lang Lasalle (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dart [2005] FCA 1614, referred to
Kay v Attorney-General (Vic) [2000] VSCA 176, 2 VR 436, considered
King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2001] FCA 1773, 116 FCR 509, cited
King v Wilson; Ex parte Kisch (1935) 52 CLR 248, considered
Klewer v Attorney-General (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 219, referred to
Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213, referred to
Luck, Re [2003] HCA 70, 203 ALR 1, referred to
Mayne Nickless Limited v Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Limited [2001] FCA 1620, 114 FCR 108, cited
Pedler v Hunters Hill Municipal Council [1976] 2 NSWLR 411, referred to
Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 907, 164 ALR 378, considered
Rawson Finances Pty Limited v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139, cited
Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2009] FCA 415, cited
Shaw v Mcginty [2006] WASCA 231, cited
Sharp v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 908, 88 ATC 4184, referred to
Soden v Kowalski [2011] FCA 318, considered
von Reisner v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 1108, referred to
von Reisner v Commonwealth of Australia [2009] FCAFC 97, 177…
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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 631
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd, the applicant sought leave to appeal the decision of the primary Judge, which had declared the applicant a vexatious litigant and required the applicant to obtain leave from the court to institute or continue a proceeding. The dispute centred on whether the order made by the primary Judge was a final or interlocutory decision and whether leave was required to appeal such an order. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with deciding these legal issues.

The primary legal issues the court had to resolve were whether the order made by the primary Judge was an interlocutory or final decision and whether leave was required to appeal such an order. The court examined the distinction between final and interlocutory judgments, focusing on whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties. The court considered relevant provisions such as Order 21 rule 4 and section 21(5), which indicated that an order declaring a person to be a vexatious litigant and requiring leave to institute or continue a proceeding was interlocutory. The court concluded that such an order did not finally determine the rights of the parties and, therefore, required leave to appeal.

The Full Court held that the order made by the primary Judge was interlocutory and, as such, required leave to appeal. The court emphasised that the order could be varied, set aside, or revoked under section 21(5), indicating it did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant’s Notice of Motion and refused leave to appeal the primary Judge’s decision. The applicant was also ordered to pay the costs of the respondents.

In summary, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed the applicant’s Notice of Motion, refused leave to appeal the primary Judge’s decision, and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs. The court determined that the order declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant was interlocutory and required leave to appeal, thus upholding the primary Judge’s decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Notice of Motion filed on 29 April 2011 is dismissed.

2. Leave to appeal the decision of the primary Judge is refused.

3. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondents.

Note:

1. The Notice of Motion filed on 29 April 2011 is dismissed.

2. Leave to appeal the decision of the primary Judge is refused.

3. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

But even if this tentative conclusion were to be incorrect such that no leave is required to file a Notice of Appeal calling into question the decision of the primary Judge, questions would remain as to whether or not “leave” would nevertheless be required either because:·the appeals are from an interlocutory decision, being a decision requiring leave pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act; and/or ·the prosecution of the appeals would be the continuation of a proceeding within the meaning of Order 21 rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules. AN INTERLOCUTORY OR FINAL DECISION? The question as to whether a judgment is final or interlocutory, it has been said, is a question “productive of much difficulty”: Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 248. The test to be applied is whether the judgment or order, as made, finally disposes of the rights of the parties: Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213 at 225 per Gibbs J. And the resolution of the question, it has also been acknowledged, should not involve the expenditure of significant intellectual energy on the distinction between final and interlocutory judgments: Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572 at [42], 104 FCR 564 at 583 per French J (Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreeing). The policy of the provision, according to his Honour was “plain enough”. The time and resources of the Court and the parties should not lightly be taken up with appeals about decisions in connection with proceedings which do not finally determine the rights of the parties. See also: Mayne Nickless Limited v Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Limited [2001] FCA 1620 at [25], 114 FCR 108 at 118 per Wilcox, French and Drummond JJ. Notwithstanding some decisions to the contrary, it is concluded that in this Court an order declaring a person to be a vexatious litigant and requiring that person to obtain the leave of the court to institute or continue a proceeding is unquestionably an interlocutory order. A provision of “critical” significance in reaching this conclusion is Order 21 rule 4. That is a provision comparable to s 21(5) considered in Kay. Chernov JA there referred to the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Pedler v Hunters Hill Municipal Council [1976] 2 NSWLR 411 where that Court concluded that a judgment declaring a person to be vexatious was final. Emphasis was there placed upon the fact that the order had been made at the conclusion of independent proceedings and had not been made in the course of an existing proceeding or made as a preliminary order in advance of the substantive hearing. After having referred to that decision, Chernov JA continued:[35] In my opinion, however, Pedler can be distinguished from the present case since his Honour seems to have taken no account in his reasoning of s 84(3) being the analogue in New South Wales of s 21(5). In my view, this provision is critical to the determination of whether a s 21(2) order is final or interlocutory. I mention for completeness that, so far as I am able to tell, Pedler has not been relevantly applied in any subsequent case dealing with orders by which a person was declared to be a vexatious litigant.[36] In my view, having regard particularly to the operation of s 21(5) the order in question cannot be said to have a legal effect which finally determines the rights of the parties. Either party can, at any time, seek to have the order varied, set aside or revoked, albeit not on the basis that the decision was erroneous, but by demonstrating a change in relevant circumstances. Any complaint that the decision is wrong in law can, of course, be sought to be pursued by an appeal process, but in the end, even if the order were to remain extant notwithstanding any appeal, it can be varied, set aside or revoked under s 21(5). In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how it can be said that it finally disposes of the rights of the parties inter se.In Klewer at [18] McColl and Campbell JJA and Sackville AJA queried whether the finding in Pedler that the order was a final one was part of the ratio decidendi of the case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established