Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2009] FCA 415

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Leave to appeal from Federal Magistrates Court – Whether claim is vexatious – whether order made under s 13.11(1)(b) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 is interlocutory in nature

Federal Magistrates Rules 2001 r 13.11(1)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules  

Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 1774
Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2000] FCA 1241
Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security M112/00
Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650
Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors [2004] FCAFC 67
Scott v Pedler M83 of 2004
Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FMCA 1642
Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055

RALPH SCOTT and SOPHIE SCOTT v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

VID 148 of 2009

TRACEY J
23 APRIL 2009
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 148 of 2009

BETWEEN:

RALPH SCOTT
First Applicant

SOPHIE SCOTT
Second Applicant

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 APRIL 2009

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2.The Applicants pay the Second Respondent’s costs of the proceeding in this Court.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 148 of 2009

BETWEEN:

RALPH SCOTT
First Applicant

SOPHIE SCOTT
Second Applicant

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE:

23 APRIL 2009

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 6 February 2009 a Federal Magistrate ordered, pursuant to r 13.11(1)(b) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (“the Rules”), that Mr and Mrs Scott “shall not without leave of a Federal Magistrate institute any proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia.” His Honour also ordered that Mr and Mrs Scott pay the costs of the Commonwealth of Australia which was the Second Respondent to the proceeding in which the application was made.

  2. On 5 March 2009 Mr and Mrs Scott filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court from the Federal Magistrate’s orders. The application was made because Mr and Mrs Scott accepted that the Federal Magistrate’s orders were interlocutory in nature: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Act”). It is to be noted that, by the time the application was made, the 21 day period within which applications for leave to appeal must be filed had expired: see O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules.  Mr and Mrs Scott also applied for an order that compliance with this…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 415
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission involves Mr. and Mrs. Scott who are appealing a decision made by the Federal Magistrate. The Scotts sought to appeal the Federal Magistrate's interlocutory orders, which were made after they complained to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission about the Commonwealth's failure to make timely welfare payments to Mrs. Scott in 1995. The Scotts have unsuccessfully pursued this matter through various courts for over a decade, alleging that the failure to make payments constituted a violation of their human rights and resulted in significant hardship.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Scotts' application for leave to appeal the Federal Magistrate's orders should be granted. The Federal Magistrate had ruled that the Scotts had habitually instituted vexatious proceedings and ordered that they could not institute further proceedings without the court's leave. The Scotts argued that the Federal Magistrate's decision was flawed and that their case had merit, warranting reconsideration by the appellate court.

The court considered the nature of the Federal Magistrate's order, which was interlocutory, and noted that for an appeal to be granted, the Scotts needed to demonstrate that the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court found that the Scotts had not identified any error in the Federal Magistrate's decision and that their proposed grounds for appeal merely reiterated their previous claims. The court held that the Federal Magistrate was not required to consider whether the previous decisions of higher courts were correctly made. The Scotts' attempt to re-litigate issues that had already been comprehensively considered was deemed futile.

Consequently, the court refused the Scotts' application for leave to appeal and ordered that they pay the costs of the proceeding. This decision reinforces the principle that persistent and vexatious litigation will not be tolerated and that the courts will not entertain repetitive claims that have no reasonable prospect of success.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2. The Applicants pay the Second Respondent’s costs of the proceeding in this Court.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

On 5 March 2009 Mr and Mrs Scott filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court from the Federal Magistrate’s orders. The application was made because Mr and Mrs Scott accepted that the Federal Magistrate’s orders were interlocutory in nature: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Act”). It is to be noted that, by the time the application was made, the 21 day period within which applications for leave to appeal must be filed had expired: see O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules. Mr and Mrs Scott also applied for an order that compliance with this time limit should be dispensed with.BACKGROUND The orders made by the Federal Magistrate were the culmination of a series of proceedings dating back to 1997 in which Mr and Mrs Scott have sought, unsuccessfully, to establish liability on the part of Commonwealth statutory bodies and officers for damage, allegedly suffered by them, as a result of a failure to make timely payment to Mrs Scott of welfare payments said to be due to her in 1995. Payment was ultimately made later that year. Mr and Mrs Scott harbour a deep sense of grievance arising from the failure of the relevant Commonwealth agency to pay special benefit to Mrs Scott in the three month period in 1995. They assert that this failure jeopardised their ability to obtain food and shelter and constituted a fundamental attack on their human rights. They have alleged that the failure was the result of a deliberate decision which was intended to cause them harm. At various stages they have alleged that the relevant officers had acted in contravention of applicable legislation and were liable in deceit and for misfeasance in public office. These allegations have been tested and rejected in a series of decisions:· Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 1774 (Heerey J);· Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2000] FCA 1241 (Beaumont, French and Finkelstein JJ) (Appeal from Heerey J dismissed);· Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security M112/00 (Kirby and Callinan JJ) (Special leave to appeal from Full Court refused);· Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650 (Gray ACJ);· Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors [2004] FCAFC 67 (Gyles, Conti and Allsop JJ) (Appeal from Gray ACJ dismissed);· Scott v Pedler M83 of 2004 (Hayne and Crennan JJ) (Special leave to appeal from Full Court dismissed);· Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FMCA 1642 (Phipps FM); and· Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055 (Kenny J) (Application for leave to appeal refused). The nature of these proceedings is explained in greater detail in the reasons of the Federal Magistrate: see Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2009] FMCA 65 at [6]-[17]. In the course of this litigation, which has now gone on for over a decade, members of this Court have commented on its futility. In Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055 at [23] Kenny J, for example, was moved to observe that “[t]he time has come for Mr and Mrs Scott to turn away from their dispute with Centrelink over the Special Benefit payment.” Earlier, the Full Court in Scott v Pedler [2004] FCAFC 67 characterised the attempt, by Mr and Mrs Scott, in Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650, as, in substance, constituting an abuse of process of the Court. It was effectively doomed to failure by the decision of Heerey J in Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 1774. Undeterred by these observations Mr and Mrs Scott lodged their complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission which led to the proceedings which were dealt with by Phipps FM and Kenny J. Their complaint relied on substantially the same material on which the two previous proceedings in this Court were founded.THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

TRACEY J
In the course of this litigation, which has now gone on for over a decade, members of this Court have commented on its futility. In Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055 at [23] Kenny J, for example, was moved to observe that “[t]he time has come for Mr and Mrs Scott to turn away from their dispute with Centrelink over the Special Benefit payment.” Earlier, the Full Court in Scott v Pedler [2004] FCAFC 67 characterised the attempt, by Mr and Mrs Scott, in Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650, as, in substance, constituting an abuse of process of the Court. It was effectively doomed to failure by the decision of Heerey J in Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 1774. Undeterred by these observations Mr and Mrs Scott lodged their complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission which led to the proceedings which were dealt with by Phipps FM and Kenny J. Their complaint relied on substantially the same material on which the two previous proceedings in this Court were founded.THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE The Federal Magistrate made the order which Mr and Mrs Scott seek to impugn under r 13.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001. Relevantly, that rule provides:“13.11(1) If the Court is satisfied that a person has instituted a vexatious proceeding and the Court is satisfied that the person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted other vexatious proceedings in the Court or any other Australian court (whether against the same person or against different persons) the Court may order:(a)…(b)that the person may not institute a proceeding without leave of the Court.……………………………….” In Scott v HREOC [2009] FMCA 65 the Federal Magistrate found that the proceeding which had led to his previous decision in Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FMCA 1642 “was manifestly groundless, and so utterly hopeless.” He also characterised all proceedings in this Court and the High Court from Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650 to have been so manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless: see Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491 (per Roden J). He continued (at [20]) that:“That means that prior to my decision in October [2007] there were at least three court proceedings instituted by the Scotts which were vexatious. In these proceedings the Scotts sought to re-litigate issues which had already been decided and which they had no hope of reopening. This constitutes habitual and persistent behaviour.” His Honour recognised that the power, conferred on the Federal Magistrates Court by r 13.11, was discretionary. He determined that the discretion should be exercised in favour of making the order because “the Scotts have not been deterred from pursuing hopeless proceedings by costs orders or by statements from judges of the Federal Court of Australia that their cause [was] hopeless”: at [21].THE PROPOSED APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: TRACEY J

In their written submissions they identify and reargue the various causes of action which they failed to establish in the earlier proceedings. Some seven pages are then devoted to identifying what are said to be the errors in each of the decisions which are identified above at [4]. They then conclude that:“Under the applied below principle Attorney General (Vic) (sic) v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491 the Applicants are not vexatious litigants, because their case has merits. The decision of the Court below at [21] that the applicants’ case is hopeless and at [20] that at least three court proceedings instituted by Applicants were vexatious is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal.”CONSIDERATION In order to obtain leave to appeal Mr and Mrs Scott need to establish that the Federal Magistrate’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by an appellate Court and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: see Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9. This is because the Federal Magistrate’s decision was interlocutory in nature: see: Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 at 2, where, in the joint judgment of McHugh ACJ and Gummow and Heydon JJ, their Honours said:“[t]he usual test for determining whether an order is final or interlocutory is whether the order, as made, finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them. That question is answered by determining whether the legal effect of the judgment is final or not. If the legal effect of the judgment is final, it is a final order; otherwise, it is an interlocutory order.” The order made by Phipps FM did not purport to determine finally or otherwise the rights of the parties in the proceeding before him. It was therefore an interlocutory decision: see Kay v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (2000) 2 VR 436 at 447-451. Mr and Mrs Scott have, in my view, failed to identify any error in the Federal Magistrate’s decision. The proposed grounds of appeal do no more than advance the bald assertion that the Magistrate should have held that Mr and Mrs Scott were not vexatious litigants and the contention that he failed to take into account their assertion that the decisions in the previous proceedings were flawed and contrary to the documentary evidence. It was not open to the Federal Magistrate to treat the decisions of the High Court and this Court as having been wrongly decided. He made his decision after he had rejected the attempt by Mr and Mrs Scott to re-agitate their grievances under human rights legislation. Mr and Mrs Scott were refused leave to appeal from the Federal Magistrate’s decision by Kenny J. In refusing leave her Honour observed, at [2007] FCA 2055 at [19], that:“The central difficulty for the applicants is that, for the most part, the underlying conduct about which they complain has already been the subject of comprehensive judicial consideration. Although the applicants now formulate their claims before HREOC as violations of their human rights, there is no doubt that they continue to attack (though by another route) the conduct of Centrelink in refusing to grant Mrs Scott a Special Benefit.”