FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2009] FCA 415
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Leave to appeal from Federal Magistrates Court – Whether claim is vexatious – whether order made under s 13.11(1)(b) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 is interlocutory in nature
Federal Magistrates Rules 2001 r 13.11(1)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court RulesScott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 1774
Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2000] FCA 1241
Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security M112/00
Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650
Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors [2004] FCAFC 67
Scott v Pedler M83 of 2004
Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FMCA 1642
Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055RALPH SCOTT and SOPHIE SCOTT v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
VID 148 of 2009
TRACEY J
23 APRIL 2009
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 148 of 2009
BETWEEN: RALPH SCOTT
First ApplicantSOPHIE SCOTT
Second Applicant
AND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 APRIL 2009
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be refused.
2.The Applicants pay the Second Respondent’s costs of the proceeding in this Court.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 148 of 2009
BETWEEN: RALPH SCOTT
First ApplicantSOPHIE SCOTT
Second Applicant
AND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First RespondentCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE:
23 APRIL 2009
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 6 February 2009 a Federal Magistrate ordered, pursuant to r 13.11(1)(b) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (“the Rules”), that Mr and Mrs Scott “shall not without leave of a Federal Magistrate institute any proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia.” His Honour also ordered that Mr and Mrs Scott pay the costs of the Commonwealth of Australia which was the Second Respondent to the proceeding in which the application was made.
On 5 March 2009 Mr and Mrs Scott filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court from the Federal Magistrate’s orders. The application was made because Mr and Mrs Scott accepted that the Federal Magistrate’s orders were interlocutory in nature: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Act”). It is to be noted that, by the time the application was made, the 21 day period within which applications for leave to appeal must be filed had expired: see O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules. Mr and Mrs Scott also applied for an order that compliance with this…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 415
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Scotts' application for leave to appeal the Federal Magistrate's orders should be granted. The Federal Magistrate had ruled that the Scotts had habitually instituted vexatious proceedings and ordered that they could not institute further proceedings without the court's leave. The Scotts argued that the Federal Magistrate's decision was flawed and that their case had merit, warranting reconsideration by the appellate court.
The court considered the nature of the Federal Magistrate's order, which was interlocutory, and noted that for an appeal to be granted, the Scotts needed to demonstrate that the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court found that the Scotts had not identified any error in the Federal Magistrate's decision and that their proposed grounds for appeal merely reiterated their previous claims. The court held that the Federal Magistrate was not required to consider whether the previous decisions of higher courts were correctly made. The Scotts' attempt to re-litigate issues that had already been comprehensively considered was deemed futile.
Consequently, the court refused the Scotts' application for leave to appeal and ordered that they pay the costs of the proceeding. This decision reinforces the principle that persistent and vexatious litigation will not be tolerated and that the courts will not entertain repetitive claims that have no reasonable prospect of success.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.
2. The Applicants pay the Second Respondent’s costs of the proceeding in this Court.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: TRACEY J
In their written submissions they identify and reargue the various causes of action which they failed to establish in the earlier proceedings. Some seven pages are then devoted to identifying what are said to be the errors in each of the decisions which are identified above at [4]. They then conclude that:“Under the applied below principle Attorney General (Vic) (sic) v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491 the Applicants are not vexatious litigants, because their case has merits. The decision of the Court below at [21] that the applicants’ case is hopeless and at [20] that at least three court proceedings instituted by Applicants were vexatious is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal.”CONSIDERATION In order to obtain leave to appeal Mr and Mrs Scott need to establish that the Federal Magistrate’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by an appellate Court and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: see Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9. This is because the Federal Magistrate’s decision was interlocutory in nature: see: Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 at 2, where, in the joint judgment of McHugh ACJ and Gummow and Heydon JJ, their Honours said:“[t]he usual test for determining whether an order is final or interlocutory is whether the order, as made, finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them. That question is answered by determining whether the legal effect of the judgment is final or not. If the legal effect of the judgment is final, it is a final order; otherwise, it is an interlocutory order.” The order made by Phipps FM did not purport to determine finally or otherwise the rights of the parties in the proceeding before him. It was therefore an interlocutory decision: see Kay v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (2000) 2 VR 436 at 447-451. Mr and Mrs Scott have, in my view, failed to identify any error in the Federal Magistrate’s decision. The proposed grounds of appeal do no more than advance the bald assertion that the Magistrate should have held that Mr and Mrs Scott were not vexatious litigants and the contention that he failed to take into account their assertion that the decisions in the previous proceedings were flawed and contrary to the documentary evidence. It was not open to the Federal Magistrate to treat the decisions of the High Court and this Court as having been wrongly decided. He made his decision after he had rejected the attempt by Mr and Mrs Scott to re-agitate their grievances under human rights legislation. Mr and Mrs Scott were refused leave to appeal from the Federal Magistrate’s decision by Kenny J. In refusing leave her Honour observed, at [2007] FCA 2055 at [19], that:“The central difficulty for the applicants is that, for the most part, the underlying conduct about which they complain has already been the subject of comprehensive judicial consideration. Although the applicants now formulate their claims before HREOC as violations of their human rights, there is no doubt that they continue to attack (though by another route) the conduct of Centrelink in refusing to grant Mrs Scott a Special Benefit.”