Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to appeal decision of Federal Magistrate – where Federal Magistrate summarily dismissed application for review of decision of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission – whether decision attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by an appellate court

HUMAN RIGHTS – Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), sections 20(2)(c)(ii) and 20(2)(c)(iii)

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 20(2)(c)(ii), (iii)

Re East: Ex Parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354 cited
The Queen v The Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 cited
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 applied
Finikiotis v Sims Partners [2005] FCA 1774 applied
Rana v University of South Australia (2004) 136 FCR 344 applied
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 applied

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

RALPH SCOTT AND SOPHIE SCOTT v HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
VID 976 OF 2007

KENNY J
21 DECEMBER 2007
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 976 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RALPH SCOTT
First Applicant

SOPHIE SCOTT
Second Applicant

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 DECEMBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2.The applicants’ motion, notice of which is dated 26 November 2007, be dismissed.

3.The applicants’ motion, notice of which is dated 29 November 2007, be dismissed.

4.The applicants pay the second respondent’s costs of the proceeding in this Court.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 976 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RALPH SCOTT
First Applicant

SOPHIE SCOTT
Second Applicant

AND:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSIONS
First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

21 DECEMBER 2007

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicants for leave to appeal are a married couple. A dispute has arisen out of the second applicant’s claim to various social security payments. In particular, for present purposes, between 30 June 1995 and 1 September 1995, the second applicant, Mrs Scott, was not paid a Special Benefits payment. The applicants allege that Centrelink’s conduct in that period amounted to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or imposed upon them “mental suffering and physical pain”. The applicants complained to the Human Rights and Equal…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 2055
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves the applicants, Ralph Scott and another, seeking to appeal a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court that granted the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) summary judgment. The applicants also sought to stay the costs order made by the Federal Magistrate in favour of HREOC and to stay the orders for payment of costs in other related proceedings. The underlying dispute relates to HREOC's decision not to investigate a complaint made by the applicants regarding the conduct of Centrelink and decisions made by the High Court and the Federal Court. The applicants alleged violations of their human rights under various international conventions.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the applicants' application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court should be granted, whether the costs order should be stayed, and whether the orders for payment of costs in related proceedings should be stayed. The court also had to determine whether there was sufficient doubt in the Federal Magistrates' decision to warrant reconsideration by an appellate court.

The court found that the applicants' judicial review application had no reasonable prospect of success. The court noted that the underlying conduct about which the applicants complained had already been the subject of comprehensive judicial consideration in previous proceedings. The court found no error in HREOC's decision, as the commission was entitled to rely on the previous judicial findings and consider the applicants' complaint misconceived due to judicial immunity and the separation of powers doctrine. The court held that the applicants' allegations did not suggest any appealable error in the Federal Magistrates' decision. Accordingly, the court refused the application for leave to appeal, dismissed the motions to stay the costs orders, and ordered the applicants to pay HREOC's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2. The applicants’ motion, notice of which is dated 26 November 2007, be dismissed.

3. The applicants’ motion, notice of which is dated 29 November 2007, be dismissed.

4. The applicants pay the second respondent’s costs of the proceeding in this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

There are presently three matters before the Court. They are:·the applicants’ application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court on 18 October 2007 granting the second respondent summary judgment pursuant to s 17A of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) and r 13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth);·the applicants’ motion, notice of which is dated 26 November 2007, seeking a stay of the costs order made by the Federal Magistrate on 18 October 2007 in favour of the second respondent; and·the applicants’ motion, notice of which is also dated 29 November 2007, seeking a stay of the orders for payment of costs in the proceedings Ralph Scott & Anor v Officer Toni Lee-Anne Pedler, Department of Social Security & Ors V 652 of 2001 (a matter in which judgment was delivered by Gray ACJ on 23 June 2003 in Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650) and Ralph Scott & Anor v Officer Toni Lee-Anne Pedler, Department of Social Security & Ors V 546 of 2003 (a matter in which judgment was delivered by Gyles, Conti and Allsop JJ in Scott v Pedler [2004] FCAFC 67). Following the hearing, by letter dated 10 December 2007, the applicants sought to withdraw this motion.BACKGROUND As noted by the Federal Magistrate, the applicants have a long history of litigation with Centrelink, and its predecessor the Department of Social Security. The factual matters forming the background to this claim are set out in Scott v Pedler [2004] FCAFC 67 per Conti J (Gyles and Allsop JJ agreeing). I do not propose to repeat them in detail here. In summary, the present proceeding arises out of HREOC’s decision on 28 August 2006 to decline to investigate the applicants’ complaint initiated by letter on 29 May 2006. The applicants’ complaint related to the conduct of Centrelink and the Commonwealth of Australia, and decisions of the High Court of Australia and the Federal Court of Australia relating to that conduct. The complaint alleged violations of the applicants’ human rights in contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. It is plain enough from their letter of 29 May 2006 that the applicants were complaining about the conduct that had already been the subject of the previous court proceedings. In section I of the applicants’ letter of 29 May 2006, which was headed ‘The nature of the complaint’, the applicants list their complaints as relating to:·the “[d]ecision of the High Court of Australia in Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors [2005] HCATrans 1002” and the “Federal Court of Australia in Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors [2004] FCAFC 67”; and·the conduct of Centrelink, particularised in section II of the complaint, “Substantiation of the complaint” by reference to decisions of the High Court of Australia in “Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors [2005] HCATrans 1002” and the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in “Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors [2004] FCAFC 67.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J
HREOC declined to investigate the applicants’ claims. Referring to s 20(2)(c)(iii) of the HREOC Act, the delegate of the President of HREOC stated that “the subject matter of your [the applicants’] complaint has been adequately dealt with”. Reference was made to the applicants’ extensive litigation history. Relying on s 20(2)(c)(ii) of the HREOC Act, the delegate also held that the applicants’ complaint was misconceived. The delegate considered that the doctrine of judicial immunity protected the High Court and Federal Court from the investigation that the applicants sought. Citing Re East: Ex Parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 354 (“Nguyen”), the delegate stated that the doctrine extended to “protection from claims brought under Commonwealth anti-discrimination and human rights laws”. Additionally, the delegate was of the view that it was “arguable whether or not the human rights provisions in the HREOC Act apply to an act or practice of the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia in the exercise of its judicial power” due to the separation of powers doctrine. It was the delegate’s opinion that HREOC’s power to investigate an act or practice of the Commonwealth “is generally limited to the Commonwealth within its executive role.”THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE The applicants applied to this Court for judicial review of HREOC’s decision to decline to inquire. By order dated 4 December 2006, Sundberg J transferred the proceedings to the Federal Magistrates Court. On 2 March 2006 the second respondent made an application for summary judgment. The Federal Magistrate gave judgment for the second respondent on 18 October 2007, in which he summarily dismissed the application for judicial review. In so doing, the Federal Magistrate briefly set out the background to the action and referred to the previous actions that have been pursued by the applicants. In considering whether the applicants’ judicial review application had no reasonable prospect of success, the Federal Magistrate considered two matters. First, his Honour considered whether there might be any error in HREOC’s determination that the complaint had been adequately dealt with. In relation to this matter, the Federal Magistrate stated at [29]:No reasonable basis exists for arguing that the commission [sic] was not entitled to come to the conclusion it did. Two judges of the Federal Court heard evidence given by all involved. They found no cause for complaint against the Department or its officers, in fact the contrary. Appeals against the decisions were dismissed. The commission [sic] relied on those cases and the findings made in coming to its conclusion. There is no reasonable argument that the Commission, in doing so, took into account anything other than what was relevant or that there was an improper exercise of power. Secondly, the Federal Magistrate considered HREOC’s grounds in relation to s 20(2)(c)(ii) (judicial immunity and separation of powers). The Federal Magistrate stated:The commission [sic] decided that the claims against the courts are misconceived because it has no authority to inquire into the activities of courts. In Ex parte Nguyen (1998) 196 CLR 254 the High Court dealt with a claim that a Magistrate and a Chief Judge had discriminated against a litigant on the basis of race. The High Court referred to the immunity from suit which protects judicial officers from actions arising out of the judicial function. They said there was nothing in the Race Discrimination Act that suggests that Parliament intended to override the immunity. The same reasoning applies to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act.The Commonwealth’s submissions put other arguments but the High Court’s decision is sufficient grounds for saying that the applicants have no reasonable prospects of success in the complaint that the Commission was in some way wrong in not proceeding with the complaint against the courts.LEAVE TO APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

The Commonwealth of Australia made submissions in opposition to the grant of leave, as well as in opposition to the applicants’ other motions.CONSIDERATION The Federal Magistrate’s decision summarily dismissing the applicants’ judicial review application is interlocutory in nature, since it rests on his Honour’s finding that the applicants have no reasonable prospects of success. As was said in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 at [43] per French J (with whom Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreed) “[i]f a proceeding is dismissed because it is frivolous or vexatious or because no reasonable cause of action is disclosed the decision is treated as interlocutory”: see also Finikiotis v Sims Partners [2005] FCA 1774 at [10] per Lander J and Rana v University of South Australia (2004) 136 FCR 344 at 345-346 per Lander J. Interlocutory decisions require leave to appeal pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). An application for leave to appeal must be determined according to the test in Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ. The applicants need to establish that, in all the circumstances, the impugned decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by an appellate court, and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong. The decision is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered. The applicants’ judicial review application stated the following grounds: failure to take into account relevant considerations; taking into account irrelevant considerations; exercising discretion at the behest of another; improper exercise of power; unreasonable exercise of power; and abuse of power. The gravamen of the applicants’ allegations appears from their affidavits and submissions. Consideration of the applicants’ challenge to HREOC’s decision does not suggest any appealable error in the Federal Magistrate’s decision. As we have seen, HREOC acted in reliance on s 20(2)(c)(ii) and (iii) of the HREOC Act, which provide as follows:(2)The Commission may decide not to inquire into an act or practice, or, if the Commission has commenced to inquire into an act or practice, may decide not to continue to inquire into the act or practice, if:…(c)in a case where a complaint has been made to the Commission in relation to the act or practice:…(ii)the Commission is of the opinion that the complaint is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; [or](iii)where some other remedy has been sought in relation to the subject matter of the complaint – the Commission is of the opinion that the subject matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with … The central difficulty for the applicants is that, for the most part, the underlying conduct about which they complain has already been the subject of comprehensive judicial consideration. Although the applicants now formulate their claims before HREOC as violations of their human rights, there is no doubt that they continue to attack (though by another route) the conduct of Centrelink in refusing to grant Mrs Scott a Special Benefit. In this Court and the High Court, Centrelink’s conduct regarding Mr and Mrs Scott has been the subject of the following decisions:·Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 1774 (Heerey J); ·Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [2000] FCA 1241 (Beaumont, French and Finkelstein JJ);·Scott & Anor v Secretary, Department of Social Security M112/00 (Callinan and Kirby JJ) (special leave refused);·Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650 (Gray ACJ); ·Scott v Pedler [2004] FCAFC 67 (Gyles, Conti and Allsop JJ); and·Scott & Anor v Pedler & Ors M83 of 2004 (Hayne and Crennan JJ) (special leave refused).