Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1201

Appeal from:

Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd, in the matter of Cristovao v Cristovao [2017] FCA 786

Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 794

File number: WAD 405 of 2017
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 12 October 2017
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – circumstances justifying the removal of party

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – two appeals commenced by single originating process – second appeal from interlocutory decision – leave to appeal not sought –  time to seek leave expired – decision of primary judge plainly correct – second appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act1986 (Cth), s 60

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 25, 31A

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 35.13, 36.52

Cases cited:

Avetmiss Easy Pty Ltd v Australian Skills Qualification Authority [2014] FCA 507

Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 794

Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL [1996] HCA 19; (1996) 185 CLR 124

French v Gray, Special Minister of State [2013] FCA 263; (2013) 217 FCR 404

Re East; Ex parte Nguyen [1998] HCA 73; (1998) 196 CLR 354

Re Luck [2003] HCA 70; (2003) 78 ALJR 177

Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055

Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd, in the matter of Cristovao v Cristovao [2017] FCA 786

Date of hearing: 3 October 2017
Registry: Tasmania
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr S Popperwell
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Denman Popperwell Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Ms K McDonald
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: State Solicitor’s Office

ORDERS

WAD 405 of 2017
BETWEEN:

ROGERIO MARTINS CRISTOVAO

Appellant

AND:

TAN & TAN LAWYERS PTY LTD

First Respondent

JUNE EATON

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 OCTOBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Appellant’s appeal from the decision of Siopis J in Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd, in the matter of Cristovao v Cristovao [2017] FCA 786 be listed for hearing before a Full Court in Perth on a date to be fixed during the Full Court and Appellate Sitting period 12 February – 9 March 2018.

2.Pursuant to s 25(2B)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the Second Respondent is removed as a party to that appeal.

3.The hearing of the appeal be listed for an estimate of 2 hours.

4.In accordance with Practice Note APP2, the Appellant file and serve Parts A and B of the Appeal Book within 14 days of the Registrar approving the indexes.

5.In accordance with Practice Note APP2, no later than 4.00 pm 20…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1201
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd involved an appeal by Mr Cristovao against the decisions of Siopis J, which included an interlocutory decision and a sequestration order. Mr Cristovao filed two appeals from these decisions, which were commenced by a single originating process. However, he did not seek leave to appeal from the interlocutory decision, and the time to seek such leave had expired. The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the appeal was properly instituted and whether the appeal from the interlocutory decision required leave to be granted.

The court found that the appeal was not properly instituted due to the less than satisfactory way in which it was instituted. The court also found that the appeal from the interlocutory decision was a second appeal from a single originating process and did not require leave to be granted as the decision of the primary judge was plainly correct. Therefore, the second appeal was dismissed. The court further found that the claims made by Mr Cristovao did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and that his originating application had no reasonable prospect of success. Consequently, the originating application was summarily dismissed.

The final orders of the court included listing the appeal from the decision of Siopis J for hearing before a Full Court in Perth, removing the Second Respondent as a party to the appeal, and directing that the Registrar provide assistance to Mr Cristovao to settle and prepare the appeal book. The court also dismissed the proceedings insofar as they purported to initiate an appeal against the decision of Siopis J in Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd and ordered Mr Cristovao to pay the Second Respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Appellant’s appeal from the decision of Siopis J in Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd, in the matter of Cristovao v Cristovao [2017] FCA 786 be listed for hearing before a Full Court in Perth on a date to be fixed during the Full Court and Appellate Sitting period 12 February – 9 March 2018.

2. Pursuant to s 25(2B)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the Second Respondent is removed as a party to that appeal.

3. The hearing of the appeal be listed for an estimate of 2 hours.

4. In accordance with Practice Note APP2, the Appellant file and serve Parts A and B of the Appeal Book within 14 days of the Registrar approving the indexes.

5. In accordance with Practice Note APP2, no later than 4.00 pm 20 business days before the hearing, the Appellant must file and serve on the Respondent its outline of submissions and a chronology of the relevant events.

6. In according with Practice Note APP2, no later than 4.00 pm 15 business days before the hearing, the Respondent must file and serve on the Appellant its outline of submissions, a chronology of the relevant events and a list of materials it requires to be included in Part C of the Appeal Book.

7. In accordance with Practice Note APP2, no later than 4.00 pm 10 business days before the hearing, the Appellant must file and serve on the Respondent any submissions in reply.

8. In accordance with Practice Note APP2, no later than 4.00 pm 5 business days before the hearing, the Appellant must:

(a) file four copies; and

(b) serve on the Respondent an appropriate number of copies,

of Part C of the Appeal Book.

9. Outlines of submissions are not to exceed 10 pages in length, including any annexures, and be easily legible using a font size of at least 12 points and one and a half line spacing throughout, including in any footnotes and annexures. Italics or underlining must be used for legislation and case citations and boldface or italics may be used for occasional emphasis.

10. Each party file and serve a list of authorities and legislation in accordance with the List of Authorities and Citations Practice Note (GPN-AUTH).

11. The requirement for the Appellant to apply in writing for assistance to settle the indexes of Part A and Part B of the appeal book pursuant to r 36.52 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) be waived, and the Registrar directed to provide such assistance.

12. The Appellant to seek such assistance within 14 days of this order.

13. The proceedings insofar as they purport to initiate an appeal against the decision of Siopis J in Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 794 be dismissed on the basis that the appeal is incompetent.

14. Mr Cristovao is to pay the Second Respondent’s costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

SIOPIS J
The Full Court is not to be burdened with confusing or incorrectly filed appeal materials. Taking into account the less than satisfactory way in which this appeal was instituted I asked Mr Cristovao if he would require the assistance of the Registrar to settle and prepare the appeal book. He indicated he would benefit from such assistance. I therefore waive the requirement under the rules for the applicant to apply in writing for such assistance pursuant to r 36.52 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and direct that that assistance be provided. To avoid issues later arising, I have ordered that Mr Cristovao seek such assistance within 14 days. THE ‘APPEAL’ FROM THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION IN CRISTOVAO On 13 July his Honour Siopis J ordered that the proceedings commenced by Mr Cristovao by way of originating summons filed on 13 July 2017 (WAD 322 of 2017) “be summarily dismissed pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)”. His Honour’s reasons in respect of the matter then before him were as follows:[4]The background to the originating application is that Mr Cristovao has an appeal (CACV 28 of 2017) pending before the Court of Appeal. An issue in that appeal is whether a costs order made against Mr Cristovao in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia (the Magistrates Court) was validly made. The costs order, and subsequently, the costs assessment, were made in respect of an unsuccessful claim for professional negligence that Mr Cristovao brought against Tan & Tan. [5]It is Mr Cristovao’s liability under this costs order, which is the debt upon which Tan & Tan’s creditor’s petition was founded.[6]It is Mr Cristovao’s contention in the Court of Appeal proceeding that the costs order made in the Magistrates Court was not validly made because there had been non-compliance with O 9A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (the RSC) by Tan & Tan because it had not advised Mr Cristovao that its defence was being funded by its professional indemnity insurers, Law Mutual (WA).[7]I observe that it has been held previously by the Court of Appeal in an earlier appeal proceeding brought by Mr Cristovao (CACV 90 of 2016), that O 9A of the RSC did not apply to proceedings in the Magistrates Court. The appeal currently pending before the Court of Appeal seeks to re-agitated the same point.[8]The claim which Mr Cristovao makes in this originating application is that the Registrar of the Court of Appeal is in dereliction of her duties. On the material before the Court, it appears that the alleged dereliction is that the Registrar has failed to provide Mr Cristovao with a document signed by a court officer showing that the Court of Appeal was aware that Tan & Tan is being supported financially in a “clandestine manner by an interested non-party”. Mr Cristovao sought this “proof” in a letter, dated 4 May 2017. Mr Cristovao concluded that letter by stating that if “such proof” was not forthcoming he wanted the Court of Appeal to provide him with reasons why it was exempting Tan & Tan from the due observance of O 9A of the RSC. [9]There is also before the Court a letter, dated 8 July 2017, wherein Mr Cristovao complained to the Attorney General of Western Australia and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Western Australia that the Registrar of the Court of Appeal was favouring the opposite party by refusing to make public the “Court’s records” referred to in his letter, dated 4 May 2017. Mr Cristovao’s letter of 8 July 2017, went on to say that on the expiry of seven days from the date of the letter, he would:have no choice but to submit the issue of the controversy of the above subject matter to the Federal Court of Australia thereby invoking its jurisdiction under s 39(B)(1A)(c) [sic] of the Judiciary Act, 1903.[10]Mr Cristovao’s originating application, also, claimed that the “dereliction of duties of the Court of Appeal Registrar” favouring “the opposite party” was a contravention of the “federal laws” under s 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (the Racial Discrimination Act) and s 28 of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) (the Age Discrimination Act).[11]Further, by way of interlocutory relief, Mr Cristovao also sought that the judgment on the creditor’s petition (Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd, in the matter of Cristovao v Cristovao[2017] FCA 786) which was listed to be delivered on 13 July 2017 be held in abeyance pending the “quelling of the controversy”.[12]At the hearing at 11:15 am today for the delivery of the judgment, Mr Cristovao was not present in Court. Mr Popperwell, who was present, advised that his client had not been served with Mr Cristovao’s originating application.[13]Before delivery of judgment on the creditor’s petition, I summarily dismissed Mr Cristovao’s originating application filed on 13 July 2017 under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and said that I would publish reasons for judgment later.[14] These are the reasons.[15]The claims which Mr Cristovao makes in his origination application do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court.[16]First, neither Tan & Tan nor the Registrar of the Court of Appeal is a Commonwealth officer and, therefore, s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) has no application to their conduct.[17]Secondly, insofar as Mr Cristovao seeks to allege in his originating application, that the conduct of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal is unlawfully discriminatory under the Racial Discrimination Act or the Age Discrimination Act, there is no evidence that Mr Cristovao has made any such complain to the Australian Human Rights Commission and that the Australian Human Rights Commission has terminated the complaint. Further, Mr Cristovao has not obtained leave to bring any such claim in the Federal Court. Accordingly, the Federal Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mr Cristovao’s complaint insofar as he would seek to allege discriminatory conduct.[18]It follows that Mr Cristovao’s originating application has no reasonable prospect of success and is, accordingly, summarily dismissed.The objection to competency: the Second Respondent’s position

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SIOPIS J

Its content is as follows:Ref: NOTICE OF APPEAL DATED AND FILED ON 17 JULY 2017, APPEALING THE DECISIONS OF IN WAD/332/2017 AND WAD/544/16 DATED 13.07.17(1)I refer to your email letter to me dated, 19 July 2017 at 2:47 PM, and I would like to respond to it as follows:(2)My originating application in WAD/332 of 2017 is an application to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia to quell a controversy arising from the Court of Appeal Registrar J Eaton (Previous-Federal Court, Registrar) refusing to provide me with the court records with regard to the Controversy affecting the integrity of the procedural law in RSC 1971 Order 9A that was refused to be litigated by the Court of Appeal in CACV 28 of 2017 (the Matter Arising).(3)The Matter Arising is concerned with s. 76(ii) of the Commonwealth Constitution of Australia Act, 1901 which states:COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT – SECT 76 – Additional original jurisdiction.The Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter:(ii) arising under any laws made by the Parliament;3.1The Matter Arising is also concerned with s. 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth) which states as follows:(1A) The original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia also includes jurisdiction in any matter:(c) arising under any laws made by the Parliament, other than a matter in respect of which a criminal prosecution is instituted or any other criminal matter.3.2The Matter Arising is concerned with the any laws made by the Commonwealth Parliament and they are:3.2.1 Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Cth Act): s. 9 which states:RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT 1975 – SECT 9 – Racial discrimination to be unlawful(1) It is unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.(1A) Where:(a)a person requires another person to comply with a term, condition or requirement which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case; and(b)the other person does not or cannot comply with the term, condition or requirement; and(c)the requirement to comply has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, by persons of the same race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin as the other person, of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life; the act of requiring such compliance is to be treated, for the purposes of this Part, as an act involving a distinction based on, or an act done by reason of, the other person’s race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. (2)A reference in this section to a human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life includes any right of a kind referred to in Article 5 of the Convention.(3)This section does not apply in respect of the employment, or an application for the employment, of a person on a ship or aircraft (not being an Australia ship or aircraft) if that person was engaged, or applied, for that employment outside of Australia.(4)The succeeding provisions of this Part do not limit the generality of this section.3.3Age Discrimination Act, 2004 (Cth) which provides:28 Goods, services and facilities.It is unlawful for a person who, whether for payment or not, provides goods or services, or makes facilities available, to discriminate against another person on the ground of the other person’s age:(a)by refusing to provide the other person with those goods or services or to make those facilities available to the other person; or(b)in the terms or conditions on which the firstmentioned person provides the other person with those goods or services or makes those facilities available to the other person; orIn the manner in which the firstmentioned person provides the other person with those goods or services or makes those facilities available to the other person.(4)Therefore my WAD/332 of 2017 is an originating Application to quell the Controversy thereby invoking the Federal Court of Australia’s original jurisdiction and is a separate matter altogether from WAD/544 of 2016. The former is therefore not an interlocutory judgment of Siopis J and it does not [require] leave of the Federal Court for its appeal pursuant to s. 24(1D) because:4.1 It is not a judgment by consent.4.2It is not a decision of Siopis J granting or refusing summary judgment under s. 31A. 4.3You may note that paragraph 1 of Siopis J Judgment states that my Originating Application is summarily dismissed pursuant to s. 31A(2) (sic: s.31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 (the Cth Act) is a misnomer.4.3.1The reason it is a misnomer is because that Siopis J judgment is not a summary judgment but a final order which does not require leave of court to appeal pursuant to s.24(1A) and s.24(1D) of the Act as quoted by you.(5)The Sequestration Order of Justice Siopis delivered on 13.7.2017 in WAD/544 of 2016 is also not a judgment by consent nor is it a summary judgment under s. 31A of the Act and is a final order all pursuant to s. 24(1A) and s.24(1D) of the Act as quoted by you.5.1Therefore both the Appeal against Siopis Orders in WAD/322 of 2017 and WAD544/2016 does not require any leave to appeal.If you have reason to consider that it otherwise, please explain.Consideration