BANKRUPTCY – appeal from the making of a sequestration order – matter involving significant litigious history spanning numerous courts – whether the primary judge erred in failing to disqualify himself, failing to go behind the judgment and failing to find that there was other sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order – consideration of whether the failure by the respondent to disclose professional indemnity insurance during proceedings in the state court meant that the costs order relied upon for the bankruptcy notice was invalid – whether the primary judge erred in rejecting an argument that there had been a breach of the indemnity principle in the process of finding that the underlying debt was still owing – no appellable error demonstrated and appeal dismissed
Legislation:
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 52(1), 52(1)(c), 52(2), 52(2)(b)
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the case of Cristovao v Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd, the appellant, Cristovao, sought to appeal a sequestration order made against him. The case has a complicated history, with numerous previous legal proceedings involving Cristovao and his former solicitors, Tan & Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd. The appeal was dismissed by the court, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal from his estate. The appellant raised several contentions in the appeal, including that the primary judge should have disqualified himself, failed to go behind the judgment, and found that there was other sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order. The court found no merit in these contentions and dismissed the appeal. The court also considered whether the failure of the respondent to disclose professional indemnity insurance during proceedings in the state court meant that the costs order relied upon for the bankruptcy notice was invalid. The court found that this argument had no basis and rejected it. Finally, the court considered whether the primary judge erred in rejecting an argument that there had been a breach of the indemnity principle in the process of finding that the underlying debt was still owing. Again, the court found no error and dismissed the appeal.
The court found that the primary judge did not err in any of the ways alleged by the appellant. The application for disqualification was waived by the appellant, and there was no evidence of partiality or actual bias. The court found that the debt was still owing, and there was no basis for going behind the costs judgment to determine whether there was an extant debt. The court also found that the failure of the respondent to disclose professional indemnity insurance did not invalidate the costs order, and there was no breach of the indemnity principle. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, with such costs to be paid from the estate of the appellant.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
It is fair to say that the last two categories of contention were not identified in these precise terms by the appellant but represent our attempt to put, in recognisable legal terms, the substance of the attack on the primary judge’s orders. It will be necessary to examine each of these (partly overlapping) contentions in turn, but before doing so, it is appropriate to deal with the background more generally and the way in which the primary judge dealt with the case below.C RELEVANT BACKGROUND We have already explained in the Introduction how the bankruptcy notice came to be issued and the circumstances that led to the hearing of the creditor’s petition, but this does not reveal the labyrinthine nature of the underlying disputation involving the appellant. As was explained by Pullin and Murphy JJA in Cristovao v Butcher Paull & Calder [No 3] [2011] WASCA 10 at [5]ff, in 2005, the appellant sued his former solicitors for negligence in relation to the handling of Family Court proceedings (it was alleged that an affidavit apparently sworn by the appellant was deficient and that his solicitors were responsible). The District Court of Western Australia action was determined in 2009 when the statement of claim was struck out and judgment was entered against the appellant. This was subsequently the subject of an appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Indeed, earlier, during the currency of the District Court proceedings, an order refusing leave for amicus curiae to appear was also appealed, and the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal with costs. This, in turn, led to disputes about costs which also involved a series of applications including in relation to suspending the taxation process. This was rejected by a judge of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (McKechnie J). Not daunted, a stay was then sought by the appellant, which again eventually ended up in the Court of Appeal. The stay sought was based, in part, upon the appellant not wanting to pay any taxed costs until a number of other proceedings were dealt with (including the appellant’s action against the present respondent which led to the costs order that became the subject of the bankruptcy notice). This application was also dismissed. What then occurred is explained in Cristovao v Tan and Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd [2017] WASCA 54 at [4]ff. In summary, after dismissal of the Magistrates Court proceeding with costs, the bill of costs was assessed by a Registrar and the appellant attended the assessment hearing and submitted that the Registrar should not assess the costs because of the respondent’s failure to comply with the Rule, which was in the following terms:Order 9A Rule 11. Term used: interested non-partyIn this Order –interested non-party, in relation to a party to a case, means a person, other than a practitioner for the party, who – (a) provides funding or other financial assistance to the party for the purposes of conducting the case; and(b) exercises direct or indirect control or influence over the way in which the party conducts the case.Order 9A Rule 22. Parties to advise identity of interested non-parties(1) A party to a case must notify the Principal Registrar and each other party to the case of the identity of any person who is an interested non-party in relation to the party to the case.(2) The notice is to be given in writing as soon as is reasonably practicable after the person becomes an interested non-party in relation to the party to the case.Order 9A Rule 33. Duties of interested non partyThe duties to the Court of an interested non-party in relation to a party to a case are the following – (a) not to engage in conduct which is misleading or deceptive, or to aid, abet or induce such conduct, in connection with the conduct of the case;(b) to cooperate with the parties and the Court in connection with the conduct of the case;(c) to use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the goal in Order 1 rule 4A and the objects in Order 1 rule 4B are attained. (Bolding in original)
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
As the primary judge recorded at [25], an application for disqualification was made at the commencement of a case management hearing (on the basis that the primary judge was a member of a Full Court which had previously found against the appellant). As his Honour recorded, however, “during the case management hearing, Mr Cristovao agreed to me hearing the petition”. No submission was made that the primary judge did not correctly record what occurred and the Recusal Contention, to the extent it is maintained, is without substance. Indeed, even if there was some merit in the disqualification application (which there was not), it is plain that what might be described as a ‘right’ to seek disqualification may be waived: Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; Cassegrain v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd [2003] NSWCA 260; Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen [2016] NSWCA 88; (2016) 332 ALR 128 at 134-136 [23]-[34] per Basten JA. E.2 Pre-Judgment Contention There is no basis, let alone a reasonable basis, for submitting that the primary judge exhibited partiality (a contention indistinguishable from an allegation of actual bias). In rejecting the arguments of the appellant, the primary judge acted judicially, and any suggestion of actual bias is entirely without foundation. E.3 Debt Owing Contention As noted at [19] above, in considering whether the requirements of s 52(1) of the Act had been established, the primary judge was required to determine whether the debt upon which the petitioning creditor relied was “still owing”. His Honour found at [31] that this requirement had been proved by the acceptance of the evidence contained in the affidavit of debt. As noted at [21] above, however, his Honour also recorded that the appellant opposed the making of the sequestration order on the grounds that the costs order and the subsequent costs assessment order were invalidly made. No doubt because the appellant was self-represented, there was no express submission made to the primary judge that his Honour should, at the initial s 52(1) stage, go behind the costs judgment to ascertain whether, in truth, there was an extant debt owing. On the appeal, to the extent the point is raised, it is raised as follows in the amended notice of appeal: 2.3. At [29, 30, 31, 32 and 33] the Decision Maker erred in mixed law and facts, in that where the allegations of fraud are apparent from the past decisions of the state courts, the Federal Court in dealing with Bankruptcy matters as per s. 52 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966 (Cth) (the Act) has an obligation to go behind those state decisions and to refuse that sequestration order based on insufficient cause as per s. 52(2) of the Act.(Uncorrected, bolding in original) As can be seen, this is not apparently a complaint made as to the failure of the primary judge to go behind the “state decisions” for the purposes of identifying whether the requirements of s 52(1)(c) of the Act had been satisfied (that the debt was “still owing”), but a different argument that “for other sufficient cause” a sequestration order ought not be made (a matter which arises at the subsequent and distinct s 52(2) stage, and in respect of which the debtor has the onus).