CITATION: CASSEGRAIN v COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT BANK OF AUSTRALIA LTD & ANOR [2003] NSWCA 260 HEARING DATE(S): 25 August 2003 JUDGMENT DATE:
23 September 2003JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA at 1; Ipp JA at 58; McColl JA at 59 DECISION: Appeals dismissed with costs. CATCHWORDS: Appeal - Mediation Agreement - Evidence - Whether entered into in good faith - whether obtained by unconscionable conduct. - Appeal - Courts and Judges - Bias - Claim of actual or ostensible bias - No material support - No objection taken during trial - Waiver of subsequent right to complain. LEGISLATION CITED: Commonwealth Bank Sale Act 1995
Commonwealth Banks Act 1959
Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994CASES CITED: Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349
Burger King Corp v Hungry Jacks Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447
David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353
Overlook v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568PARTIES :
Claude George Rene Cassegrain - Appellant
Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd - First Respondent
Commonwealth Bank of Australia - Second RespondentFILE NUMBER(S): CA 41055/02; 41056/02 COUNSEL: C G R Cassegrain in person on behalf of himself and the companies
A G Bell/D A McLure - RespondentsSOLICITORS: In person
L E Taylor - Respondents
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 50062/00; 50072/00 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Einstein J
SHELLER JACA 41055/02; CA 41056/02
ED 50062/00; ED 50072/00
IPP JA
McCOLL JA
CASSEGRAIN v COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT BANK OFAUSTRALIA LTD & ANOR
GERARD CASSEGRAIN & CO PTY LTD & ORS v COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT BANK OF AUSTRALIA LTD & ANOR
These two appeals arose out of proceedings brought to recover monies owed by Mr Cassegrain and associated companies, on loans from the Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd (CDB) and Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) (the banks). The appellants and respondents took part in a farm mediation under the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994, which resulted in Heads of Agreement. The Heads of Agreement acknowledged the appellants indebtedness to the banks; the validity of mortgages and securities held by the respondents; and an agreement to repay the loans before 1 March 1999. If the loans were defaulted, the Heads of Agreement included clauses, which the banks claimed would create a bar to any defence the appellants could raise in subsequent proceedings for recovery. After two extensions of time to repay the loans, the loans were defaulted on 28 May 1999. Pursuant to the Heads of Agreement the banks then bought proceedings in the Commercial List of the Supreme Court.
At first instance the trial Judge held that the mediation and the Heads of Agreement were entered into in good faith and were not obtained by unconscionable conduct on the part of the respondents. The banks should succeed in the proceedings. The appellants’ claims were dismissed.
Held:
(1) That on its face the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Cassegrain v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2003] NSWCA 260
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the mediation agreement was vitiated by unconscionable conduct, and whether there was any actual or ostensible bias on the part of the judge who presided over the original proceedings. The Cassegrains also contended that the judge had failed to give adequate reasons for his decision.
The Court of Appeal found no evidence to support the claims of unconscionable conduct or bias. It was held that the mediation agreement was validly entered into and that the judge's conduct did not demonstrate any bias, actual or ostensible. Furthermore, the court determined that the judge's reasons for his decision were sufficient. The court also noted that no objection was taken regarding bias during the trial, suggesting a waiver of any subsequent right to complain on that ground.
The appeals were dismissed, and the Cassegrains were ordered to pay the costs of the Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeals dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
To facilitate these transactions, a series of agreements were entered into, including a Mediation Agreement. The Mediation Agreement required the parties to act in good faith and not to take any action that could undermine the purpose of the agreement. The appellants subsequently brought proceedings against the Bank, alleging that the Bank had obtained the Mediation Agreement by unconscionable conduct, and that the Bank had breached the terms of the agreement by acting in bad faith. The appellants also sought an order that the trial judge was biased. The primary judge dismissed the appellants' claims and found that there was no evidence of unconscionable conduct or bias. The appellants appealed the decision.
The appellants argued that the Bank had obtained the Mediation Agreement by unconscionable conduct, and that the Bank had breached the terms of the agreement by acting in bad faith. The appellants claimed that the Bank had acted in a way that was oppressive, unconscientious, and unfair. The appellants also argued that the trial judge was biased, and that the judge had pre-determined the outcome of the case. The Bank denied the allegations, and submitted that the appellants had not provided any evidence to support their claims. The Bank also argued that the appellants had waived their right to complain about the judge's conduct by failing to object during the trial. The Court of Appeal considered the evidence and submissions of both parties, and concluded that the appellants' claims were not supported by the evidence. The Court found that there was no evidence of unconscionable conduct or bias, and that the trial judge had not pre-determined the outcome of the case. The Court also found that the appellants had waived their right to complain about the judge's conduct by failing to object during the trial. The appeals were dismissed with costs.
The matter came before the court on appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia, which had earlier dismissed claims brought by the appellants against the respondent bank. The primary judge had ruled that a mediation agreement reached between the parties was not entered into in good faith nor obtained by unconscionable conduct, and dismissed the appellants' claims accordingly. The appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court followed, with the appellants challenging both the finding on the mediation agreement and a claim of judicial bias. The procedural history involved several key steps, including the filing of the initial appeal notice, the lodging of comprehensive written submissions by both parties, and a series of interlocutory orders that managed the proceedings. During the trial, no objection was raised concerning the alleged bias, and thus the court considered the appellants' right to complain about it waived. The appeal was ultimately dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the mediation agreement entered into in good faith or was it obtained by unconscionable conduct?
2. Was there actual or ostensible bias on the part of the judge, and was the failure to object during the trial a waiver of the right to complain of bias later?
3. Were the orders made by the trial judge correct in law and in the circumstances of the case?
Held
1. Was the mediation agreement entered into in good faith or was it obtained by unconscionable conduct?
The court concluded that the mediation agreement was entered into in good faith and was not obtained by unconscionable conduct. As a result, the appeal against the mediation agreement was dismissed.
2. Was there actual or ostensible bias on the part of the judge, and was the failure to object during the trial a waiver of the right to complain of bias later?
The court concluded that there was no actual or ostensible bias on the part of the judge and that the failure to object during the trial amounted to a waiver of the right to complain of bias later. Consequently, the appeal regarding bias was dismissed.
3. Were the orders made by the trial judge correct in law and in the circumstances of the case?
The court concluded that the orders made by the trial judge were correct in law and in the circumstances of the case. Therefore, the appeal against the trial judge's orders was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Cassegrain v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Ltd, the court addressed a multifaceted appeal, tackling issues concerning the validity of a mediation agreement, allegations of judicial bias, and the correctness of the orders made by the trial judge. The court commenced its analysis by scrutinizing the mediation agreement, examining whether it was entered into in good faith or if it was obtained through unconscionable conduct. The court's examination of this issue was grounded in principles of equity, which demand that parties to a contract must deal fairly with each other, and any conduct that would be considered unconscionable is contrary to the law.
The court referenced the equitable doctrine of unconscionability, as encapsulated in the case of Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio. In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the court assessed whether there was any evidence suggesting that one party had taken advantage of the other due to a special disability, or whether there was any conduct that could be deemed as oppressive or unconscientious. The court found no basis to conclude that the mediation agreement was obtained through unconscionable conduct, thereby upholding the agreement as valid. This conclusion was pivotal as it established that the mediation agreement was binding and enforceable, thus impacting the outcome of the appeal.
Turning to the allegations of judicial bias, the court assessed whether there was actual or ostensible bias on the part of the judge, and whether the failure to object during the trial constituted a waiver of the right to complain of bias later. The court meticulously examined the criteria for establishing actual bias, which involves a subjective assessment of whether there was a real likelihood of bias on the part of the judge. Similarly, the court scrutinized the concept of ostensible bias, which is an objective test that looks at whether a fair-minded observer, having all the relevant facts, might reasonably apprehend that the judge might be biased. The court found that there was no evidence to support any claim of actual bias, and that the apprehension of bias was not reasonable given the circumstances.
Moreover, the court considered whether the failure to object to the judge's conduct during the trial constituted a waiver of the right to challenge bias later. The court relied on precedents such as Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, which establishes that a party's failure to object during proceedings can lead to a finding of waiver. However, the court determined that in this instance, the appellant had not waived their right to challenge bias, as there was no explicit or implicit acquiescence to the judge's conduct during the trial. This nuanced interpretation of the waiver principle was critical in allowing the appellant to maintain their challenge to the judge's impartiality.
Finally, the court evaluated whether the orders made by the trial judge were correct in law and appropriate given the circumstances of the case. The court conducted a thorough review of the trial judge's reasoning and the evidence presented, ensuring that the legal principles applied were consistent with established case law. The court found that the trial judge had correctly interpreted and applied the law, and that the orders made were justified based on the evidence and legal principles. This conclusion reinforced the court's decision to dismiss the appeal, as it confirmed that the trial judge's orders were legally sound and procedurally correct.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case encapsulates several key legal principles. Firstly, the court upheld the validity of the mediation agreement, finding it was not obtained through unconscionable conduct. Secondly, the court dismissed the claims of judicial bias, finding no evidence to support such allegations. Finally, the court confirmed the correctness of the trial judge's orders, ensuring they were in line with legal principles and the facts of the case. These findings collectively affirm the binding legal principle that, in the absence of evidence of unconscionability, procedural fairness, and correct application of the law, the outcome of the trial and subsequent appeal should be upheld.