Prins v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prins v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 2002

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal:   Prins v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] FCCA 3597
File number: QUD 916 of 2018
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 29 November 2019
Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – application for leave to appeal – primary judge summarily dismissed applicant’s proceeding under s 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) – whether primary judge displayed apprehended bias – whether proceeding unfairly conducted – whether primary judge failed to consider parts of applicant’s case – whether primary judge erred in finding applicant had no reasonable prospects of success – whether acts done “because of” applicant’s race, colour or national or ethnic origin – application dismissed
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PQ(1)

Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1)(d) and 24(1D)

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 18C

Federal Circuit Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.10

Cases cited:

Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 352

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2018] FCA 1908

Dobson v Australian Postal Corporation [2013] FCA 320

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387

Gambaro v Mobycom Mobile Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 144

Girlock (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell (1982) 149 CLR 155

Hagan v Trustees of Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust (2001) 105 FCR 56

Henderson v Queensland (2014) 255 CLR 1

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125

Prior v Wood [2017] FCA 193

Rowe v Emmanual College [2013] FCA 939

RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620

Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055

Sharma v Legal Aid (Qld) [2002] FCAFC 196; (2002) 115 IR 91

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Toben v Jones (2003) 129 FCR 515

Trustees of the Property of Cummins (A Bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278

Waters v Public Transport Corp (1991) 173 CLR 349

Date of hearing: 14 October 2019
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 130
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr H Prins appeared on behalf of the Applicant
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Enbom
Solicitor for the Respondents: Macpherson Kelley Pty Ltd

ORDERS

QUD 916 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SOKHOM PRINS

Applicant

AND:

NEWS CORP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

First Respondent

NATIONWIDE NEWS

Second Respondent

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE AUSTRALIAN (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 NOVEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application, excluding costs arising from their default in complying with Order 4 of the orders made on…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2002
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Prins v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd, the applicant, Ms Prins, sought leave to appeal against the decision of the primary judge, who had summarily dismissed her proceeding under section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). Ms Prins alleged that she had suffered hurt, humiliation, distress, and economic loss due to certain emails and an article published by the respondents. The primary judge dismissed her proceeding, finding that she had no reasonable prospect of proving that the acts in question were done because of her race, colour, or national or ethnic origin. Ms Prins argued that the primary judge had displayed apprehended bias, that the proceeding was conducted unfairly, and that the primary judge had failed to consider parts of her case. She also contended that the primary judge had erred in finding that she had no reasonable prospects of success.

The court examined each of the grounds of appeal, starting with the allegations of apprehended bias and unfair trial. Ms Prins argued that the primary judge had exhibited bias through various actions, including questioning her identity, sidelining her representative, and making dismissive comments about her application. The court noted that the test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question. The court found that the primary judge's conduct did not demonstrate any apprehended bias and that Ms Prins had not shown that she was denied a proper opportunity to advance her case.

The court also considered whether the primary judge had failed to consider parts of Ms Prins's case, particularly the first half of the article written by one of the respondents. The court found that the primary judge had adequately addressed Ms Prins's arguments and had not ignored any part of her case. The court further found that the primary judge had correctly assessed the evidence and had properly considered the tension between section 18C of the RDA and freedom of speech. The court concluded that Ms Prins had not demonstrated any error in the primary judge's decision.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Ms Prins was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application, excluding certain costs arising from the respondents' default in complying with a previous court order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application, excluding costs arising from their default in complying with Order 4 of the orders made on 3 September 2019, such exclusion to encompass their costs of preparing and filing written submissions.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 29 August 2017, Ms Prins commenced her proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court. She relied upon the emails and the article referred to in her complaint to the Commission. She alleged that she had suffered hurt, humiliation and distress and economic loss, for which she claimed compensation. The judgment of the primary judge The respondents’ case upon the application for summary judgment was that Ms Prins had no reasonable prospect of demonstrating that the relevant acts were, “done because of [her] race, colour or national or ethnic origin” within s 18C(1)(b) of the RDA. They submitted that there was no evidence capable of supporting an inference that the emails and article were sent and published because of Ms Prins’ race or ethnicity. The primary judge accepted, for the purposes of the summary judgment application, that Mr Merritt knew that the applicant was Cambodian in origin. However, his Honour held that there was no basis upon which it could reasonably be concluded that Mr Merritt sent the email and published the article because of Ms Prins’ race or ethnicity. His Honour found that there was evidence to the contrary. In particular, there was a robust public debate in which the parties were participating, the very subject of the debate being s 18C of the RDA and the tension between that provision and freedom of speech, and that Ms Prins’ emails were provocative and in themselves objectively offensive. The primary judge noted Ms Prins’ reliance upon a passage from Toben v Jones (2003) 129 FCR 515 which stated, “the question is whether anything suggests race as a factor in the decision to publish the work in question”. His Honour considered that although, in a very general and broad sense, it might be said that race or ethnicity was a factor in the decision to publish because it was inextricably connected with the subject matter of the debate, that was a different matter to publication “because of” Ms Prins’ race. His Honour held that there was nothing in the emails or the article which indicated a connection with Ms Prins’ race. The primary judge held that Mr Thomas’ and Ms Albrechtsen’s case for summary judgment was even more compelling. The primary judge held that Ms Prins had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her proceedings against Mr Merritt, Mr Thomas or Ms Albrechtsen. Further, as the alleged liability of the remaining respondents depended upon the liability of the journalists, the case against them could not succeed. His Honour, accordingly, summarily dismissed the proceedings.The proposed appeal Ms Prins’ proposed Notice of Appeal describes her grounds of appeal as those contained in her Application for Leave to Appeal. That document is lengthy and discursive, extending over some 36 pages. However, Ms Prins’ grounds appear to be in the following categories:(1)The primary judge displayed apprehended bias.(2)The proceeding was conducted unfairly.(3)The primary judge failed to consider the part of her case relating to the first half of the article written by Mr Merritt.(4)The primary judge largely ignored her amended statement of claim and her outline of argument.(5)The primary judge erred in deciding that she had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting her proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I will proceed to consider each of these categories. ConsiderationApprehended bias and unfair trial Ms Prins claims that there was “no justice” in the proceedings. She alleges both that the trial was conducted unfairly and that the primary judge exhibited apprehended bias. There is a distinction between an allegation of an unfair trial and an allegation of apprehended bias: see RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [11]. The former turns largely on whether the litigant has had a proper opportunity to advance his or her case. In contrast, the test for apprehended bias set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6] is whether, “a fair minded lay-observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”. Ms Prins summarises her complaints about the conduct of the primary judge as follows:a.By agreeing to or providing prejudicial directions for my defence;b.By questioning whether I'm the real Applicant at the hearing on 27 March 2018;c.By side-lining the right of my Representative to speak on my behalf, through engaging in questions directed at me;d.By warning my Representative to “be careful”;e.By letting the Respondents get away with an abuse of process;f.By implying that I have no defence because the facts are undisputed;g.By saying that any advice on procedure “is not my job”;h.By not providing procedural fairness in my requests for the consideration of pro-bone assistance;i.By implying that the Respondents' application for dismissal will succeed, and therefore I won't be needing pro-bone legal assistance;j.By referring to me, dismissively, as “coming along” with an affidavit;k.By referring to my application as “some kooky application”;l. By implying that I should file “responsive” Affidavit material: para 30, and then making the dismissive comment, “away you go”;m.By not taking into account that time to be spent on preparation of the unnecessary Affidavit caused me severe prejudice, as I then had insufficient time to properly prepare my Outline of Argument, and prepare for the hearing on 27 March 2018;n.By implying that my pleadings will be improper;o.By his Honour's unqualified agreement that my amended statement of claim is “a complete mess”;p.By not properly explaining the practices and procedures to us relating to considering a dismissal action, the choices we have, in particular, that evidence is not required, and that the dismissal action will be judged on the assumption that the pleaded facts are correct, and by not giving us time, through a short adjournment, to consider the serious implications of this.(References to paragraph numbers omitted; emphasis and errors in the original.) In addition, Ms Prins complains that his Honour yelled, “Rubbish! It’s his freedom of expression, and not offensive”. Further, Ms Prins complains that his Honour said, “The Commission carries out its functions very well.”