FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Prins v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 2002
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Prins v News Corp Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] FCCA 3597 File number: QUD 916 of 2018 Judge: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 29 November 2019 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – application for leave to appeal – primary judge summarily dismissed applicant’s proceeding under s 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) – whether primary judge displayed apprehended bias – whether proceeding unfairly conducted – whether primary judge failed to consider parts of applicant’s case – whether primary judge erred in finding applicant had no reasonable prospects of success – whether acts done “because of” applicant’s race, colour or national or ethnic origin – application dismissed Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PQ(1)
Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1)(d) and 24(1D)
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 18C
Federal Circuit Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.10
Cases cited: Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 352
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2018] FCA 1908
Dobson v Australian Postal Corporation [2013] FCA 320
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Gambaro v Mobycom Mobile Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 144
Girlock (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell (1982) 149 CLR 155
Hagan v Trustees of Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust (2001) 105 FCR 56
Henderson v Queensland (2014) 255 CLR 1
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125
Rowe v Emmanual College [2013] FCA 939
Scott v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 2055
Sharma v Legal Aid (Qld) [2002] FCAFC 196; (2002) 115 IR 91
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118
Toben v Jones (2003) 129 FCR 515
Trustees of the Property of Cummins (A Bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278
Date of hearing: 14 October 2019 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 130 Counsel for the Applicant: Dr H Prins appeared on behalf of the Applicant Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Enbom Solicitor for the Respondents: Macpherson Kelley Pty Ltd ORDERS
QUD 916 of 2018 BETWEEN: SOKHOM PRINS
Applicant
AND: NEWS CORP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
First Respondent
NATIONWIDE NEWS
Second Respondent
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE AUSTRALIAN (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application, excluding costs arising from their default in complying with Order 4 of the orders made on…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 2002
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined each of the grounds of appeal, starting with the allegations of apprehended bias and unfair trial. Ms Prins argued that the primary judge had exhibited bias through various actions, including questioning her identity, sidelining her representative, and making dismissive comments about her application. The court noted that the test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question. The court found that the primary judge's conduct did not demonstrate any apprehended bias and that Ms Prins had not shown that she was denied a proper opportunity to advance her case.
The court also considered whether the primary judge had failed to consider parts of Ms Prins's case, particularly the first half of the article written by one of the respondents. The court found that the primary judge had adequately addressed Ms Prins's arguments and had not ignored any part of her case. The court further found that the primary judge had correctly assessed the evidence and had properly considered the tension between section 18C of the RDA and freedom of speech. The court concluded that Ms Prins had not demonstrated any error in the primary judge's decision.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Ms Prins was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application, excluding certain costs arising from the respondents' default in complying with a previous court order.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application, excluding costs arising from their default in complying with Order 4 of the orders made on 3 September 2019, such exclusion to encompass their costs of preparing and filing written submissions.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I will proceed to consider each of these categories. ConsiderationApprehended bias and unfair trial Ms Prins claims that there was “no justice” in the proceedings. She alleges both that the trial was conducted unfairly and that the primary judge exhibited apprehended bias. There is a distinction between an allegation of an unfair trial and an allegation of apprehended bias: see RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [11]. The former turns largely on whether the litigant has had a proper opportunity to advance his or her case. In contrast, the test for apprehended bias set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6] is whether, “a fair minded lay-observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”. Ms Prins summarises her complaints about the conduct of the primary judge as follows:a.By agreeing to or providing prejudicial directions for my defence;b.By questioning whether I'm the real Applicant at the hearing on 27 March 2018;c.By side-lining the right of my Representative to speak on my behalf, through engaging in questions directed at me;d.By warning my Representative to “be careful”;e.By letting the Respondents get away with an abuse of process;f.By implying that I have no defence because the facts are undisputed;g.By saying that any advice on procedure “is not my job”;h.By not providing procedural fairness in my requests for the consideration of pro-bone assistance;i.By implying that the Respondents' application for dismissal will succeed, and therefore I won't be needing pro-bone legal assistance;j.By referring to me, dismissively, as “coming along” with an affidavit;k.By referring to my application as “some kooky application”;l. By implying that I should file “responsive” Affidavit material: para 30, and then making the dismissive comment, “away you go”;m.By not taking into account that time to be spent on preparation of the unnecessary Affidavit caused me severe prejudice, as I then had insufficient time to properly prepare my Outline of Argument, and prepare for the hearing on 27 March 2018;n.By implying that my pleadings will be improper;o.By his Honour's unqualified agreement that my amended statement of claim is “a complete mess”;p.By not properly explaining the practices and procedures to us relating to considering a dismissal action, the choices we have, in particular, that evidence is not required, and that the dismissal action will be judged on the assumption that the pleaded facts are correct, and by not giving us time, through a short adjournment, to consider the serious implications of this.(References to paragraph numbers omitted; emphasis and errors in the original.) In addition, Ms Prins complains that his Honour yelled, “Rubbish! It’s his freedom of expression, and not offensive”. Further, Ms Prins complains that his Honour said, “The Commission carries out its functions very well.”